In the Matter of

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1423

In the Matter of

Jesse Michael Campbell and On Behalf of Minor Children,
Respondent,

vs.

Raenell Sue Oelkers,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed, motion denied
Bentley, Judge

Wabasha County District Court
File No. 79-FA-24-455

Jesse Michael Campbell, Hammond, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Raenell Sue Oelkers, Elgin, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s grant of an order for protection (OFP) on
behalf of respondent Jesse Michael Campbell and his two minor children, appellant Raenell
Sue Oelkers argues that the district court (1) was biased, (2) clearly erred in its credibility
determinations and weighing of the evidence, (3) lacked jurisdiction to functionally modify
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parenting time and custody, and (4) erred by not making findings under the best-interests-
of-the-child standard. She argues that this court should grant her various forms of relief.
We affirm.
FACTS
The day after a fight relating to a parenting-time exchange, Campbell petitioned for
an OFP against Oelkers (his former spouse) on behalf of himself and their two joint
children. Campbell requested that the order prohibit Oelkers from contacting Campbell and
the minor children, award him “temporary custody” of the children, and limit Oelkers to
supervised parenting time instead of the existing “50/50” split. The district court filed an
emergency ex parte order granting the OFP in part and scheduled a hearing to determine
whether the OFP would remain in effect and whether other relief would be granted.
At the hearing, Oelkers was represented by counsel and Campbell represented
himself. Campbell brought two witnesses to testify on his behalf and attempted to upload
documents to MNDES. But the district court did not permit Campbell to call his witnesses
or introduce his exhibits because he had not timely disclosed them. Campbell’s evidence
thus came only from his own testimony. Oelkers testified on her own behalf and called her
14-year-old daughter, A.M.C., who was present at all relevant times on the day of the
incident. The two joint children did not testify.
Campbell Testimony
Campbell testified as follows. The incident occurred on the weekday on which he
and Oelkers typically exchange their joint children. Campbell was working on a
construction job with an employee, and Oelkers began contacting him around 4:30 p.m. to
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see when he would be dropping the children off at her home. Campbell texted her to say
that he was working late and would be available around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., but Oelkers
called Campbell “nonstop.” When Campbell finished with his work and began driving
home, he received a call from a deputy. The deputy stated that Oelkers was calling and
asking about the exchange time. Campbell told the deputy that he would take the children
to Oelkers around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m.
As Campbell was about to enter Hammond, he saw Oelkers’s white van. Oelkers
pulled in front of Campbell’s van and “slammed on the brakes,” requiring Campbell to
merge into the other lane. Oelkers then accelerated and pulled in front of Campbell once
more, but he avoided her. Campbell proceeded to drive to his girlfriend’s house where the
joint children were, and Oelkers followed.
When Campbell arrived at his girlfriend’s house, he ran to the front door, which was
locked. Oelkers “came running up behind [Campbell] yelling at [him] and began to attack
[him] in a violent manner.” Campbell “was able to fight [her] off,” and his girlfriend
opened the door and let Campbell inside. Oelkers “proceeded to kick the door over and
over again yelling that she’s going to bust it down no matter what.” Oelkers then “walked
around [to] the north side of the house to [the] big bay window” and “punched a hole”
through it. Glass “explod[ed] . . . all over the living room couch and floor.” The joint
children “were hiding behind the couch” during this time, “screaming and crying.” Oelkers
“yell[ed] at the children to come in and crawl through the broken glass,” but Campbell
“redirected” them. Oelkers eventually stopped yelling and proceeded to try other entrances
including a storm door, which she kicked several times, and a window. She ripped an air
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conditioning unit out of the window and attempted to crawl through the window and into
the house.
Oelkers stopped attempting to enter the house when a police officer arrived. The
officer took statements from the parties. Meanwhile, the joint children were screaming and
crying.
Oelkers Testimony
Oelkers testified that, on the day of the incident, she was concerned about the
wellbeing of the joint children because she had not had contact with them or Campbell
since she had dropped off the children the week before. About 15 minutes after she had
called the police to share her concerns, she was driving with A.M.C. and saw Campbell’s
truck approaching her on the road. She assumed her children were in the truck because he
had just texted her, “[W]e are out to eat. Be there when we get there.” Oelkers pulled over
onto the shoulder and slowed nearly to a complete stop, “figuring [they] would have an
exchange of words.” But Campbell “crossed over the center line and was coming towards
[her] head on.” According to Oelkers, Campbell missed hitting her “by just inches, feet
maybe.” Oelkers made a U-turn and followed Campbell to his girlfriend’s house.
Oelkers arrived at the house immediately after Campbell. She saw Campbell get out
of his car and run to the house, and she walked towards him. Campbell told her to “get the
f-ck off the property.” Campbell went into the house, and Oelkers knocked on the door and
began yelling for the kids. She then went to the left side of the house while A.M.C. went
to the right side of the house. Oelkers saw Campbell outside again, near the bay window.
Campbell then pushed her backwards into the window, breaking it. She caught her fall with
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her wrists on the shelf of the bay window. The court received five photographs into
evidence, and Oelkers testified that they depicted bruises and cuts from her being pushed
into the window.
After the window was broken, Campbell went into the house. Oelkers went to the
front of the house and “attempted to see the children through” another window, which was
open. Campbell tried to punch her through the window. He also tried to shut the window,
but only after pulling her in and attempting to shut the window on her neck.
A.M.C. Testimony
A.M.C. testified that she and Oelkers were waiting at Oelkers’s home for the two
children to arrive. The two left to get some groceries, Oelkers called the police, and then
they drove by Campbell’s girlfriend’s house. They then saw Campbell’s car, followed him
to his girlfriend’s house, and parked behind his trailer. A.M.C. saw Campbell running to
the door and trying to get inside. A.M.C. and Oelkers asked where the joint children were,
and Campbell told them to go away. Campbell shut the door on them.
A.M.C. went to the right side of the house and began shouting into a second-story
open window for her siblings. A.M.C. heard her mother screaming, “let go of me
[Campbell].” She then saw Campbell “repeatedly slamming” Oelkers’s arm into the
window, and witnessed Campbell “lunge[] out of the window grabbing and scratching for
[Oelkers’s] neck.” She saw blood on Oelkers’s neck and arms.
Ruling
After a brief recess, the district court announced from the bench that it would grant
the OFP. The district court explained that it did not find that domestic abuse occurred while
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Campbell and Oelkers were driving. But, after weighing the testimony, the district court
found Campbell’s account of the incidents at the house more credible. Accordingly, the
district court determined that Campbell had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Oelkers committed an act of domestic abuse by inflicting fear of imminent physical
harm on Campbell and the joint children. The district court prohibited Oelkers from
contacting Campbell and the joint children for one year and ordered Oelkers to stay a
reasonable distance away from their residence.
Oelkers appeals.
DECISION
Oelkers argues that the district court erred because it (1) was biased, (2) made
erroneous credibility determinations, (3) lacked jurisdiction to modify custody, and
(4) failed to consider the best interests of the children. She asks that this court grant her
various forms of relief, including compensatory parenting time and compensatory
damages.
Appellate courts “review the decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.”
Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its findings are not supported by record evidence or when it misapplies the
law.” Ekman v. Miller, 812 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. App. 2012). We review findings of
fact for clear error. Id. That means we (1) view the evidence in a light favorable to the
findings, (2) do not find our own facts, (3) do not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not
reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-
7
22 (Minn. 2021); see also Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Minn. App. 2022)
(citing Kenney in an appeal from an OFP).
To obtain an OFP, a person may petition the district court and allege “domestic
abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 4 (2024). Relevant here, the petition may seek an
OFP for the petitioner personally and for minor family or household members. Id., subd.
4(a). “Domestic abuse” includes “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” or “the infliction
of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” committed against family or
household members. Id., subd. 2(a) (2024). If the petitioner proves domestic abuse
occurred by a preponderance of evidence, Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64-65 (Minn.
App. 2015), the district court may grant relief enumerated by statute, see Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 6 (2024). Permissible relief includes, among other things, prohibiting the
abusing party from having contact with protected parties, excluding the abusing party from
a reasonable area surrounding the protected parties’ residences, “award[ing] temporary
custody or establish[ing] temporary parenting time with regard to minor children of the
parties on a basis which gives primary consideration to the safety of the victim and the
children[,]” and “other relief” the court “deems necessary for the protection of a family or
household member.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a).
I
Oelkers first argues that the district court judge “displayed multiple signs of bias,
including intervening on behalf of [Campbell], overruling objections, and actively limiting
[Oelkers’s] ability to present key evidence.” She contends that the district court violated
8
“principles of judicial neutrality” and infringed on her constitutional right to an unbiased
decision-maker.
Oelkers did not raise this issue below. “On appeal, we consider only those issues
that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the
matter before it.” Gummow v. Gummow, 375 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1985) (quotation
omitted). Because Campbell did not give the district court the opportunity to rule on the
issue of judicial bias, she has forfeited her judicial-bias argument.
But even if Oelkers had not forfeited the issue, she has failed to prove judicial bias.
Adverse rulings are not a basis for imputing bias to a judge. Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d
338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986). The judge did not show bias when it overruled Oelker’s
objections or limited Oelkers’s presentation of evidence. The judge ruled that Oelkers
could not present a video she offered to impeach Campbell because the video was not
disclosed before the trial—a rule he also applied to preclude Campbell from presenting any
witnesses or exhibits. And the judge properly prevented Oelkers’s attorney from
questioning Campbell about a prior conviction “to show [Campbell’s] character trait for
violence,” because such questioning is prohibited by the rules of evidence. See Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”); see also Minn. R.
Evid. 611(a) (providing that a district court may “exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses” to “protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment,” among other reasons). Because Oelkers’s judicial bias argument was
forfeited and is without merit, she is not entitled to appellate relief.
9
II
Oelkers next argues that the district court’s finding of domestic abuse is not
supported by the record because the court made clearly erroneous credibility
determinations. She claims that the district court did not “adequately address [Campbell’s]
documented falsehoods.” She specifically contends that Campbell: (1) lied when he
asserted “that the children were with him at a restaurant” before he arrived at his
girlfriend’s house; (2) called his girlfriend to hide the children, which suggests he intended
to withhold the children from her; (3) abused Oelkers and distressed the children during
the incident and at other times; and (4) had a “clear motive” to “gain full custody of the
children to eliminate his financial obligation to pay child support.”
In explaining its decision, the district court said that it heard “two different versions”
of the incident at Campbell’s girlfriend’s house, so it had to “judg[e] credibility.”
Accounting for the photographs of Oelkers’s injuries, the district court explained that they
“could be consistent with either version” because the injuries could have occurred “if
[Oelkers] were pushed into the window and [her] posterior side hit the window,” or “if
[Oelkers] broke the window as described by [ Campbell].” Accordingly, the district court
had to determine which account was more credible. The district court found Campbell’s
account more credible than Oelkers’s because it was “more reasonable that [Campbell ]
remained in the house and was in the house when [Oelkers] broke the window,” rather than
Campbell running inside, locking the door, then returning outside to confront Oelkers.
Upon finding Campbell’s testimony more credible, the district court determined that
10
Campbell had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Oelkers inflicted fear
of imminent harm on Campbell and the children.
Oelkers’s request to reweigh the district court’s credibility determinations is
misplaced. Because the district court had the sole opportunity to “assess the credibility of
the witnesses,” this court defers to its assessment. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210
(Minn. 1988).
In any event, none of Oelkers’s arguments support her position that the district court
clearly erred. The “restaurant” argument seems to have derived from Campbell’s testimony
that he was “on [his] way home to grab the children after we ate a quick dinner .” But the
“we” he was referring to seems to be himself and his employee. The discussion about a
phone call to Campbell’s girlfriend and police reports are references to matters that were
not presented to the district court and are therefore outside the record on appeal. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal as “[t]he documents filed in the trial
court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings ”). The remaining arguments—
relating to child support, witness statements, and corroborating evidence—relate to how
the district court weighed the evidence in making its credibility determination. But
appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility determinations. Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 221-22.
III
Oelkers third argues that the district court “overstepped its jurisdictional authority,
as the original custody and parenting time orders were issued in Olmsted County.” An OFP
petition does not need to be filed in “the county in which a pending or completed family
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court proceeding involving the parties or their minor children was brought.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 3 (2024). The statute provides that an OFP also “may be filed in the court
having jurisdiction over dissolution actions, in the county of residence of either party,
. . . or in the county in which the alleged domestic abuse occurred.” Id. In other words, the
statute does not vest exclusive authority to hear an OFP in the district court that has issued
a custody and parenting-time order. Id. Therefore, any challenge to the Wabasha County
District Court’s judicial authority on that basis fails.
IV
Oelkers fourth argues that the district court erred when it “significantly modified
existing parenting time arrangements by issuing a no-contact order that prevented [her]
from having contact with [Campbell] or their shared children for one year” without
“assessing the children’s best interests.” Campbell contends that the district court did not
modify custody.
Again, Oelkers did not raise this argument below and therefore forfeited it. See
Gummow, 375 N.W.2d at 34. But even if the argument had been preserved, we would rule
that it is without merit. As an initial point, the OFP was sought on behalf of the children;
the district court found that Oelkers had committed an act of domestic violence against the
children; and, considering that finding, the district court ordered Oelkers not to have
contact with the minor children. The district court was authorized to do so because the
statute allows it to “order, in its discretion, other relief as it deems necessary for the
protection of a family or household member.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(13). Given
this broad statutory authority to order necessary relief for family or household members,
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coupled with the specific authority to “order the abusing party to have no contact with the
petitioner,” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(10), it follows that a district court may file a
no-contact order between the abusing party and protected parties other than the petitioner,
such as the minor children here.
1 A no-contact order is distinct from an order modifying
custody and parenting time. To be sure, an order granting an OFP can “award temporary
custody or establish temporary parenting time.” Id., subd. 6(a)(4). But Campbell is correct
that the district court’s order here did not do so. On the form order the district court used
in granting the OFP , it did not mark the checkboxes associated with modifications to
custody and parenting time.
And even if we were to understand the district court’s order as implicitly modifying
the custody and parenting time order in the family-court proceeding, Oelkers’s argument
on appeal—that the court erred in failing to apply the best-interests standard— would still
fail because the district court is not required to apply that standard in the context of an OFP
order. See Aljubailah v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn. App. 2017) (“[I]n ordering
temporary custody and parenting-time in connection with an OFP, the district court is not

1 We read Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(10), to include the minor children as the
“petitioners” with whom a district court could order a respondent to have no contact. The
supreme court has stated that a petitioner is “a domestic abuse victim or a person bringing
a petition on behalf of a domestic abuse victim.” Schmidt ex rel. P.M.S. v. Coons, 818
N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn. 2012); but see id. (stating that “an OFP is available only if the
petitioner shows the respondent committed domestic abuse against the petitioner or the
person on whose behalf the petition is brought” (emphasis added)). Because the district
court found that the children experienced domestic abuse, it was authorized to order that
Oelkers have no contact with them. And even if “petitioner” included only the person that
filed the petition, the statute’s catch-all provision to order “other relief as it deems
necessary for the protection of a family or household member” would authorize a district
court to order no contact. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(13).
13
required to make statutory findings on the best-interests factors listed in section
[518.17].”); see also Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(4) (providing that a district court
“may consider” best interest factors, but “[f]indings under section 257.025, 518.17, or
518.175 are not required” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Oelkers has not offered any
basis relating to custody and parenting time that warrants reversal of the district court’s
order.2
V
Finally, Oelkers asks us to (1) direct the district court to consider issuing an OFP on
her behalf against Campbell, (2) award her compensatory parenting time, (3) award her
$5,500 in “restitution” for costs from a missed vacation and “expenses related to moving
due to harassment and character defamation,” and (4) compensate her for emotional
distress “inflicted by [Campbell’s] actions and the resulting court proceedings.”
These requests do not warrant appellate relief for two reasons. First, Oelkers
inadequately briefed the issues. See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers,
Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to reach issue raised on appeal “in the
absence of adequate briefing”). She did not cite legal authority to support her claim that
any court—either this court or a district court —could provide the relief she requests to an
OFP respondent. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(1)-(15) (listing available relief).

2 In reviewing the record, we note that Campbell requested that Oelkers have supervised
parenting time with the minor children for the duration of the OFP. To the extent the parties
wish to modify the terms of the OFP, the proper course is to seek a modification of the
OFP with the district court. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 11(a) (2024) (“ Upon
application, notice to all parties, notice to any custodian, and hearing, the court may modify
the terms of an existing order for protection.”).
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Second, Oelkers did not present these claims for relief to the district court. We generally
do not consider issues that are not presented to and considered by the district court. Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988 ). For these reasons, Oelkers has failed to
establish that she is entitled to the requested relief.3
Affirmed, motion denied.

3 Oelkers also moved to strike portions of Campbell’s brief that reference materials outside
the record. We did not rely on the Campbell’s reference to those materials in our analysis.
Accordingly, we deny Oelkers’s motion as moot. See Justice v. Marvel, LLC, 979 N.W.2d
894, 903 n.9 (Minn. 2022) (denying motion to strike testimony as moot because the court
did not rely on the disputed testimony).