State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1425

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Garlen Wininngham,
Appellant.

Filed August 4, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-7762

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth Scoggin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Stacy Bettison, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that we should reverse his two convictions of possession of child
pornography because the district court erroneously admitted Spreigl evidence of a prior
2
conviction for the same offense and there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
significantly affected the verdict. We affirm.
FACTS
At the end of January 2023, appellant James Garlen Wininngham1 sought assistance
with his laptop computer, which he acquired as previously used and refurbished from a
loan from a program associated with the Department of Veterans Affairs, through a local
nonprofit called Minnesota Tech for Success (MTS). The technician assisting appellant
determined “that there was something wrong with the storage device or a system file
damage” and attempted to recover files from the hard drive. Appellant told the technician
that he was the only user of the laptop. While attempting to recover appellant’s files from
the device, the technician discovered files depicting child pornography. The technician
and his supervisor told appellant that they needed more time with the laptop to resolve the
issue, then called the police. On April 12, 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged
appellant with two counts of possession of child pornography in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 617.247, subd. 4(b)(1) (2022). The case proceeded to a jury trial.
Prior to the start of trial, the state notified appellant and the district court of its
intention to admit Spreigl evidence of appellant’s 2011 conviction of possession of child
pornography to show “intent, knowledge, absence of accident or mistake.” See State v.
Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965); State v. Barthman, 917 N.W.2d 119, 128 (Minn.
App. 2018) (evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, known as Spreigl evidence, is

1 Appellant’s last name is spelled inconsistently throughout the record. We use the spelling
that he stated is correct at trial and that is in the charging documents.
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generally inadmissible, but may be admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) “as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.”) The district court denied the state’s motion, describing its decision on the
prejudice factor as “a very, very close call.” The district court expressed concern that the
jury would use the Spreigl evidence for propensity purposes. However, the district court
cautioned that, “[s]hould the defense open the door to an y of the areas that the State has
suggested such as intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, I am prepared to revisit that
should the issue arise.” The district court stated:
[The Spreigl evidence] could be relevant to other arguments
should the defense raise something like [appellant had] no idea
what child pornography is or something along those lines. So
I want to be clear. It’s a close call in my mind. I am going to
keep it out as a Spreigl in the case in chief. But of course that
door can be opened. And if the door is opened, I will allow it
in.

At trial, the state presented testimony from the technician at MTS who assisted
appellant and discovered the child pornography on appellant’s computer, a supervisor at
MTS who saw the child pornography files on appellant’s computer and called the police,
the police officer who retrieved the laptop from MTS, and the police officer who received
and analyzed appellant’s hard drive. The state also submitted photographic evidence
showing appellant’s laptop and hard drive, two videos depicting child pornography that
were found on appellant’s laptop, and documents related to the police officer’s analysis of
appellant’s hard drive. On cross-examination, appellant’s counsel asked the state’s
witnesses if there were alternative explanations for how the child pornography came to be
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on appellant’s computer, such as another person downloading the content unbeknownst to
appellant or by a computer virus.
Before resting its case, the state renewed its Spreigl motion. The state argued that
appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination questions opened the door to the Spreigl evidence
by asking whether the child pornography could have come to be on appellant’s computer
some other way. Appellant’s counsel argued that its questions on cross-examination were
intended to hold the state to its burden of proof, and that introducing appellant’s prior
conviction “is incredibly strong propensity evidence.” The district c ourt again described
its decision as “a very close call” but this time granted the state’s Spreigl motion, stating:
Throughout the course of the trial, through cross-examination
and actually in opening statement, defense counsel noted -- that
offered various views as to why this material was on
[appellant]’s computer. Maybe it was a virus, malware. Others
may have logged on to the computer, other users potentially.
The laptop was obtained as a used laptop. There may have
been multiple searches at one time possibly caused by a virus
or someone else for that matter. The downloads were quite
frequent in one area. Different passwords may have been used
or similar passwords. Other users may have logged on. All of
those items go to an issue in this case in which the State is
moving to move this in to knowledge, absence of mistake or
accident, possibly intent.

The state then submitted into evidence, over appellant’s objection, a certified copy
of appellant’s 2011 conviction without additional testimony. The district court instructed
the jury that the “evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of assisting you in
determining whether the defendant committed those acts of which the defendant is charged
in the complaint” and is “not to be used to prove the character of the defendant or that the
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defendant acted in [conformance with] such character.” The state rested its case. Appellant
did not present any evidence.
In its final jury instructions, the district court stated:
You have heard evidence of alleged conduct by the defendant
on a separate occasion. As I told you at the time this evidence
was offered, it was admitted for the limited purpose of assisting
you in determining whether the defendant committed those
acts with which the defendant is charged in the complaint. This
evidence is not to be used to prove the character of the
defendant or that the defendant acted in conformity with such
character. The defendant is not being tried for and may not be
convicted of any offense other than the offense charged in this
case. You are not to convict the defendant on the basis of any
occurrence on a separate occasion.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The district court sentenced
appellant to 48 months on count I and 66 months on count II, to run concurrently. This
appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Spreigl
evidence of his 2011 conviction of possession of child pornography, that the evidence
prejudiced him, and that he is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.
It is generally impermissible to introduce evidence of other crimes in a criminal
case. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006). “The danger in admitting such
evidence is that the jury may convict because of those other crimes or misconduct, not
because the defendant’s guilt of the charged crime is proved.” Id. However, under Minn.
R. Evid. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for another
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purpose, “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Barthman, 917 N.W.2d at 128.
District courts follow a five-step process to determine whether they should admit
Spreigl evidence:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686 (the Ness factors). However, Spreigl evidence should be excluded
if its admissibility is a “close call.” Id. at 685.
Appellate courts will not reverse a district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence
unless it clearly abused its discretion by admitting the evidence. State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d
88, 93 (Minn. App. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based
on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v.
Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). Even if the district court abused its
discretion by admitting Spreigl evidence, an appellate court will n ot reverse unless the
appellant can show prejudice, meaning that there is “a reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Clark, 738
N.W.2d 316, 347 (Minn. 2007); see Barthman, 917 N.W.2d at 128; Smith, 749 N.W.2d at
93 (“If there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been favorable to the
defendant had the evidence not been allowed, the evidence is prejudicial and its admission
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is reversible error.”). The appellant has the burden of showing that the district court abused
its discretion and any resulting prejudice. Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 685.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the
Spreigl evidence. First, the district court thoroughly considered each of the Ness factors.
It found that the state gave notice of its intent to admit the evidence , what the evidence
would prove, and that the state presented clear and convincing evidence that appellant
participated in the prior act. The district court found the Spreigl evidence to be highly
relevant because knowledge is an element of the charged offense. Finally, the district court
found that the potential prejudice to appellant from the Spreigl evidence did not outweigh
its probative value.
Second, the district court made its decision to admit the Spreigl evidence after
hearing all of the state’s evidence. See State v. Dewald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Minn.
1991). The district court initially denied the state’s motion to admit the Spreigl evidence
because it was a “close call” whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its
prejudicial effect but stated that it could change its mind if appellant opened the door to the
evidence. After the state presented its case, the district court considered the state’s renewed
motion, reasoned that appellant’s counsel opened the door with questions on cross-
examination and in their opening argument, and admitted the Spreigl evidence.
Third, the district court highlighted that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence
outweighed the prejudice to appellant because appellant’s counsel’s questions on cross-
examination attacked the knowledge element of the charged offense. For example,
appellant’s counsel asked: “[I]s it possible to have an application running on your computer
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that you don’t even know about?”; “Is it possible for [computer viruses] . . . to actually
download things that the user wouldn’t even have any knowledge of?”; “[A]re you aware
at all of programs . . . that are essentially running on a person’s computer, but they didn’t
ask for them? They don’t know they are running in many cases?”; and “[I]f a computer is
open already, if it is unlocked, if it is available, anybody typically could walk up and do a
Google search . . . [a]nd there would be no way to track who had done that?” The Spreigl
evidence allowed the state to counter appellant’s questions on cross-examination by
demonstrating knowledge, intent, or lack of mistake, which is a permissible purpose. See
Barthman, 917 N.W.2d at 128; Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
Fourth, the district court provided a curative instruction after the state introduced
the Spreigl evidence that it was not to be used for propensity purposes as well as a final
jury instruction to the same effect, and we presume that jurors follow a district court’s
instruction. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016).
But here, even if we were to assume that the district court erred in admitting the
Spreigl evidence, there is not a reasonable possibility that its admission significantly
affected the jury’s verdict. In making this determination, we consider (1) how the state
presented the evidence ; (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive; (3) whether the
state discussed the evidence in closing argument; and (4) whether the defense effectively
countered the evidence. Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505; see State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73,
84 (Minn. 2005). “Strong evidence of guilt undermines the persuasive value of wrongly
admitted evidence.” Smith, 940 N.W.2d at 505.
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First, the state did not provide any live testimony relating to the Spreigl evidence.
See Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 347. Second, the state’s case against appellant was strong.
Barthman, 917 N.W.2d at 128. It consisted of testimony from four witnesses, including a
detailed account of the activity taking place on appellant’s computer in the minutes before
one of the child-pornography videos was downloaded; two videos of child pornography
that were found on appellant’s computer; and a document created by the police officer who
analyzed appellant’s laptop showing a breakdown of when and where certain files were
accessed and downloaded. Appellant did not offer any witnesses or exhibits. Third, the
state referred to the Spreigl evidence only once in its closing argument. Fourth, appellant’s
counsel addressed the 2011 conviction during closing argument. Appellant’s counsel told
the jury that the state introduced the prior conviction as a “shortcut” but that it could not
“make assumptions” and could “not [] convict the [appellant] on the basis of any conduct
on a separate occasion.” Moreover, the district court gave two curative instructions to the
jury. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d at 84. We conclude that there is not a reasonable possibility
that the district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence, even if erroneous, significantly
affected the jury’s verdict.
Affirmed.