State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1435

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Delmarcus Deante Joseph,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-CR-21-746

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of fifth-degree drug possession and possession
of a pistol without a permit, arguing that (1) his guilty pleas are invalid because they were
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inaccurate and unintelligent, and (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his
presentence motion for plea withdrawal based on the violation of his right to a speedy trial.
We affirm.
FACTS
On December 21, 2021, police responded to a reported assault at a motel in
International Falls. Upon arrival, police located appellant Delmarcus Deante Joseph and
the alleged assault victim (victim) in a vehicle in the motel parking lot. Victim told police
that Joseph had pushed her up against a wall and choked her, and that he had “drugs and a
handgun” in the vehicle. Joseph was subsequently arrested, and a search of the vehicle
revealed a firearm and cocaine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Joseph with five crimes: attempted second-
degree assault, domestic assault by strangulation, fifth-degree drug possession, possession
of a firearm by an ineligible person, and possession of a pistol without a permit. On January
10, 2022, Joseph had his first appearance and the district court appointed a public defender
(defense counsel). Joseph pleaded not guilty and demanded a speedy trial. The district
court set the matter for trial on February 28—49 days later. B ut Joseph failed to appear for
his February 10 pretrial hearing, during which the district court discussed Joseph’s speedy-
trial request with defense counsel:
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Do—does the defendant
forfeit his right to a speedy trial when he fails to appear?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I don’t know the answer to that though
I can tell the Court that if his—if a warrant issues, our file
closes and I will not be preparing for that trial.

THE COURT: A warrant is going to issue.
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yep.

THE COURT: So, the body only—
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And so then we’re off the case, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: —body only bench warrant. There’s no, I
mean, there’s no way we’re going to try this case on February
28th when he’s on warrant status here and two other counties.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yep.

THE COURT: It’s not happening.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If there’s constitutional issues, I guess, we’ll be
having to deal with it. But I— I don’t—I honestly don’t know
the answer to that question, but I can’t imagine that there’s
some—some timing issue there. And given— given the request
was premature as is, I don’t think we’re, you know, trampling
on [Joseph’s] rights in any way.

Approximately six months later, on August 22, Joseph asked to appear before the
district court on the warrant. Joseph explained that, at the time of his pretrial hearing, he
“had absconded from [his] . . . house.” The district court advised Joseph that his speedy
trial “couldn’t happen when [he] didn’t appear for th[e] pretrial hearing back in February”
and asked Joseph if he understood why that was. Joseph responded affirmatively and the
district court quashed the warrant.
On September 19, defense counsel appeared on Joseph’s behalf for a pretrial
hearing. Joseph did not appear, prompting the district court to reschedule the pretrial and
issue a second bench warrant. Joseph once again failed to appear at the October 17
rescheduled pretrial. It was not until October 16, 2023—almost an entire year later—t hat
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Joseph returned to court. Following that hearing, the district court granted Joseph’s request
to represent himself.
Two days later, the district court held a pretrial hearing where the state advised the
court that a plea agreement had been reached. Under the agreement, Joseph entered an
Alford1 plea to the fifth-degree drug charge and pleaded guilty to possessing a pistol
without a permit. In exchange, the state dismissed the remaining charges. During Joseph’s
plea colloquy, the district court found a “sufficient factual basis” for each guilty plea and
that Joseph had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights. The court
scheduled a sentencing hearing for November 29.
Joseph failed to appear for sentencing, and a third bench warrant issued. Four
months later, Joseph appeared in court remotely from a Minnesota correctional facility,
where he was incarcerated for an unrelated offense. Joseph explained that he did not appear
for sentencing because he “overslept.” He requested a public defender.
On May 29, 2024, Joseph appeared with defense counsel and moved to withdraw
his guilty pleas and dismiss all charges against him based on a speedy-trial violation. The
state opposed the motion, asserting that withdrawal was not “fair and just” because any
delay in the case was attributable to Joseph’s “absolute failure to cooperate with his
defense.”
On June 5, the district court issued an order denying Joseph’s motions. The court
concluded that no speedy-trial violation had occurred, reasoning that “it is clear from the

1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (explaining a defendant may plead guilty
based on the factual record while maintaining innocence).
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file that the delays [in Joseph’s case] were caused by [his] failure to appear and resulting
warrants.” And because Joseph sought to withdraw his pleas “solely upon his alleged
speedy trial violation,” the court found no reason to allow him to do so.
Two days later, Joseph moved the district court to reconsider. The court orally
denied Joseph’s motion and sentenced him to 19 months in prison for the fifth-degree drug
charge and 364 days in local confinement for the pistol-possession charge.
Joseph appeals.2
DECISION
I. Joseph is not entitled to plea withdrawal based on manifest injustice.

A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw their guilty plea.
State v. Townsend, 872 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2015). But withdrawal must be
allowed when necessary to avoid a manifest injustice. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,
94 (Minn. 2010); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice exists if
a plea is invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). For a guilty plea to
be constitutionally valid, it must be “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 94. A defendant may challenge the validity of their plea for the first time on
direct appeal. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989); see also State v. Jones,
7 N.W.3d 391, 399 (Minn. 2024). We review the validity of a plea de novo. State v. Bell,
971 N.W.2d 92, 100 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2022).

2 Respondent State of Minnesota did not file a brief. We nevertheless decide the case on
the merits pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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Joseph argues that his guilty pleas are invalid because they were both inaccurate and
unintelligent. We address each argument in turn.
A. Joseph’s pleas were accurate.
To be accurate, a guilty plea must be supported by a “proper factual basis.” Jones,
7 N.W.3d at 395 (quotation omitted). The accuracy requirement is satisfied “if the record
contains sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the defendant is guilty of at least
as great a crime as that to which [they] pled guilty.” Id. at 396. This is typically done by
having the defendant explain what happened in their own words. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at
94.
Fifth-Degree Drug Possession
Joseph entered an Alford plea to fifth- degree drug possession. An Alford plea is
accurate when (1) the state demonstrates a “strong factual basis” for the offense, and (2) the
defendant “acknowledge[s] that the evidence would be sufficient for a jury to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 12-13
(Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). Because a defendant maintains
their innocence when entering an Alford plea, the defendant’s acknowledgment of the
sufficiency of the evidence against them is “critical to the court’ s ability to serve the
protective purpose of the accuracy requirement.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649. An
acknowledgment that there is a “mere risk” that the defendant may be found guilty does
not satisfy the accuracy requirement for an Alford plea. Id. at 650 (quotation omitted).
Joseph argues that his Alford plea was inaccurate because he “never acknowledged
that the State had sufficient evidence to convict him.” At the plea hearing, the prosecutor
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questioned Joseph about the factual circumstances surrounding the discovery of cocaine in
his vehicle. The prosecutor then asked:
And so do you believe that if we had a trial and I called
the law enforcement officers that responded to the scene, who
made that contact with you, found the suspected cocaine in the
vehicle and I called [victim] and she testified that it was your
cocaine, that she’d seen you with it the night before. That
there’s a substantial likelihood that you’d be found guilty of
possessing that cocaine in the fifth degree?

(Emphasis added.) Joseph responded, “I agree with that.”
Joseph likens use of the phrase “substantial likelihood” to a “mere risk,” which does
not meet the accuracy requirement for Alford pleas.3 We are not convinced. When
assessing the accuracy requirement for a Norgaard plea,4 we concluded that a defendant’s
agreement that there was “a substantial likelihood that [they] would be found guilty”
adequately acknowledged the sufficiency of the state’s evidence. Williams, 760 N.W.2d
at 14 (emphasis added). Like an Alford plea, the factual basis for a Norgaard plea must be
established by means other than the defendant’s admission of the facts. Id. at 12. Thus,
like a defendant entering an Alford plea, a defendant entering a Norgaard plea—because

3 As support for his argument, Joseph cites State v. Bailey, No. A21-0335, 2022 WL 433243
(Minn. App. 2022). Bailey is neither binding nor persuasive authority. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). In Bailey, we concluded that plea withdrawal was required
because the defendant’s use of hedging language—including the terms “possibility” and
“chance”—did not constitute “an unqualified affirmative response to the question of
whether a jury would have sufficient evidence to find him guilty.” 2022 WL 433243, at *3.
In contrast, Joseph expressed unqualified agreement that the evidence here is sufficient to
find him guilty.

4 A Norgaard plea occurs when a defendant pleads guilty despite claiming a loss of
memory regarding the circumstances of the offense. Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 12; see also
State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1961).
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they cannot remember the events at issue— must acknowledge the state has evidence
sufficient to find them guilty. Id. Because Joseph acknowledged the “substantial
likelihood” that the state’s evidence was sufficient to find him guilty —the same standard
we endorsed in Williams—we conclude that Joseph’s Alford plea to fifth- degree drug
possession was accurate.
Possession of a Pistol Without a Permit
Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2020), makes it a crime for a person to “carr [y],
hold[], or possess[] a pistol in a motor vehicle . . . or on or about the person’s clothes or the
person . . . in a public place . . . without first having obtained a permit.” The term “public
place” is statutorily defined as:
[P]roperty owned, leased, or controlled by a governmental unit
and private property that is regularly and frequently open to or
made available for use by the public in sufficient numbers to
give clear notice of the property’s current dedication to public
use but does not include: a person’s dwelling house or
premises, the place of business owned or managed by the
person, or land possessed by the person; a gun show, gun shop,
or hunting or target shooting facility; or the woods, fields, or
waters of this state where the person is present lawfully for the
purpose of hunting or target shooting or other lawful activity
involving firearms.

Minn. Stat. § 624.7181, subd. 1(c) (2020). In State v. Bee, our supreme court held that this
definition includes the interior of a vehicle geographically located in a “public place.” 17
N.W.3d 150, 153-55 (Minn. 2025).
Joseph contends that his guilty plea was inaccurate because neither the state nor the
court elicited the fact that he was in a public place at the time officers found him with a
pistol. We disagree. At the plea hearing, Joseph agreed under oath that (1) he had traveled
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to a “local motel” in International Falls; (2) police responded to that motel based on a report
related to his conduct; (3) police made contact with him in the “vehicle [in which he had]
traveled” to International Falls; and (4) at the time police made contact, he was sitting in
the passenger side of the vehicle with a pistol in his possession. This record supports that
Joseph’s vehicle was in a motel parking lot when police encountered him and discovered
the pistol. And because Joseph offers no argument to the contrary, we conclude that the
district court reasonably inferred that the motel parking lot is a “public place.” See Nelson
v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (stating that before accepting a guilty plea, the
district court must “make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the
crime charged can be reasonably inferred ” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)).
Joseph’s guilty plea to possession of a pistol without a permit was accurate.
B. Joseph’s pleas were intelligent.
An intelligent guilty plea demonstrates a “knowing and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action available” to the defendant. Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873,
877 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). The intelligence requirement ensure s that a
defendant “understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the
consequences of his plea.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
Joseph argues that his guilty pleas were unintelligent because he was acting on “bad
legal advice” from the district court that he had “waived his ability to assert a violation of
his speedy trial rights.” The record defeats this assertion.
At no point did the district court inform Joseph that he had waived or forfeited his
speedy-trial right. Although there was some on-record discussion between the court and
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defense counsel about the impact Joseph’s failure to appear at his first pretrial hearing
might have on his speedy-trial demand, Joseph was not present for that conversation. And
when the district court next communicated with Joseph, approximately six months later, it
did not tell him—as Joseph alleges—that he had “forfeited []his demand” for a speedy trial.
Rather, the court explained that his nonappearance made it such that his speedy trial could
not occur as scheduled, to which Joseph responded that he understood. Finally, at the
guilty-plea hearing the district court asked Joseph:
And you also understand that as part of the proceedings in this
case that if you thought that there were any violations of your
rights . . . you could ask for a pretrial hearing to challenge those
items in front of the court. But by going forward here today,
we would be wa iving that and you wouldn’t be having any
hearing like that either.

(Emphasis added.) Joseph responded, “Yes, I understand.”
Because the record does not support Joseph’s contention that the district court gave
him “erroneous [legal] advice” and because the district court affirmatively ensured that
Joseph was cognizant of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, we conclude that
Joseph’s pleas are intelligent.
In sum, Joseph has failed to demonstrate that his pleas were inaccurate or
unintelligent and he is not entitled to withdraw them based on manifest injustice . Lussier
v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012) (stating the burden is on the defendant to
demonstrate that their plea was invalid).

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plea withdrawal
under the fair-and-just standard.

At any time before sentencing, a district court may permit a defendant to withdraw
a guilty plea if it is “fair and just to do so.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. Under this
standard, a district court considers: (1) a defendant’s reasons for withdrawal, and (2) the
prejudice withdrawal would cause the state given its reliance on the plea. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d at 97. The defendant bears the burden of proving that a fair-and-just reason for
withdrawal exists. State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. App. 2011). We review a
district court’s application of the fair-and-just standard for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Joseph argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence
motion for withdrawal on the basis that there was no violation of his right to a speedy trial.
We are not convinced for two reasons.
First, Joseph provides no legal authority for the proposition that a speedy- trial
violation renders it fair and just for a defendant to withdraw their guilty plea. Rather,
Minnesota caselaw instructs that, generally, a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional
defects, including any alleged speedy-trial violations. State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878
(Minn. 1986); see State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 97-98 (Minn. App. 2008). Applying this
principle, we conclude that Joseph waived his speedy- trial argument upon entering his
guilty pleas.
Second, even on its merits, Joseph’s argument fails. Whether a criminal defendant
was deprived of their constitutional right to a speedy trial is assessed based on: (1) the
length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of their right, and
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(4) any prejudice to the defendant. State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 245 (Minn. 2021).
These factors are balanced against the case -specific circumstances to determine whether
the delay “endanger[ed] the values that the right to a speedy trial protects.” State v. Paige,
977 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
We recognize there was a lengthy delay between Joseph’s January 2022 speedy-
trial demand and his October 2023 guilty pleas. But the record reflects that the primary
cause of this delay was Joseph intentionally absconding custody and avoiding his court
appearances. Indeed, Joseph concedes that most of the delay in his case (443 out of 646
days) is attributable to him “without good cause.” And while Joseph asserted his right to
a speedy trial at his initial appearance, he did not once reiterate his request thereafter.
Finally, no prejudice, such as oppressive pretrial incarceration related to these charges or
heightened anxiety, is apparent from the delay. See State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 192
(Minn. 2022) (listing key interests in assessing prejudice). And we are not persuaded by
Joseph’s contention that the delay prejudiced his defense because witnesses may be subject
to time-related memory loss. A witness’s memory loss would have an equal —if not
greater—impact on the state, which bears “the burden of proving the charged crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Enyeart, 676 N.W.2d 311, 325 (Minn. App. 2004), rev.
denied (Minn. May 18, 2004). On this record, we discern no speedy-trial violation.
In sum, Joseph failed to demonstrate the existence of a fair and just reason for plea
withdrawal. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of his presentence
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Affirmed.