State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1467

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Timothy Patrick Cook,
Appellant.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File Nos. 21-CR-23-786, 21-CR-24-82

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation by (1) finding that he violated a condition of his probation and (2) improperly
weighing whether the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Timothy Patrick Cook with
felony drug charges in May 2023 for possessing methamphetamine and narcotics. While
on pretrial conditional release for these charges, he incurred new drug charges in January
2024 for possessing methamphetamine and cocaine.
In April 2024, the parties informed the district court of a plea deal in which appellant
agreed to plead guilty to felony fifth-degree controlled-substance crime–methamphetamine
possession in excess of 0.25 grams (count II) in district court file 21-CR-23-786 and the
same charge (count I) in district court file 21-CR-24-82. In exchange, the state agreed to
dismiss the other charges from both files, in addition to dismissing new charges from a
third file.
At a sentencing hearing in May 2024, the district court imposed stayed sentences of
19 months on counts I and II, to run concurrently, and placed appellant on probation for
five years with certain conditions.
Prior to sentencing, appellant began inpatient treatment. One of the conditions of
appellant’s probation was that he complete treatment and follow aftercare
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recommendations. Treatment staff recommended that he enter a sober-living house after
completing inpatient treatment. His treatment facility made arrangements for appellant to
enter a sober-living house in Little Falls. However, after completing inpatient treatment,
appellant never reported to sober living and instead began heavy drug use and never
contacted his probation officer. The Department of Corrections filed a probation-violation
report on May 24, 2024, and two separate addendums on May 28 and June 3.
Officers eventually took appellant into custody. At a probation-violation hearing,
appellant admitted to two probation violations; namely, that he failed to stay in contact
with his probation agent and that he ingested a significant amount of chemical substances.
At his revocation hearing, appellant argued that he should be reinstated on probation. The
district court revoked appellant’s probation and imposed concurrent 19-month sentences
on counts I and II. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation because it made erroneous or insufficient findings on the first and third Austin
factors. We address each in turn.
Before a district court can revoke probation, it must (1) “designate the specific
condition or conditions that were violated”; (2) “find that the violation was intentional or
inexcusable”; and (3) “find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980) (the Austin factors). A
district court “has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke
probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.” Id. at
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249-50. A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” See State v. Nicks, 831
N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013) (describing standard in relation to postconviction
proceedings). A district court “must make specific findings on all three Austin factors
before revoking probation,” State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. 2008), and
should “not assume that [it has] satisfied Austin by reciting the three factors and offering
general, non-specific reasons for revocation, ” State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608
(Minn. 2005). Appellate courts review whether the district court made the required Austin
findings de novo. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 605.
I. The record supports the district court’s finding that appellant violated specific
conditions of probation.

Appellant argues that the district court made insufficient findings on the first Austin
factor and revoked his probation “on a clearly erroneous and unproven finding of
violation.” While we agree with appellant that the district court erred, we disagree that its
error requires us to reverse the district court’s decision revoking his probation.
The district court imposed several conditions on appellant while on probation,
including, among others, maintaining contact with his probation officer, not ingesting
mood-altering chemicals, and completing treatment and following aftercare
recommendations. At appellant’s probation-revocation hearing, the district court identified
three conditions that appellant violated: (1) failing to remain in contact with his probation
agent; (2) ingesting a significant amount of chemical substances “such that [he] overdosed
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or at least experienced symptoms of overdosing”; and (3) failing “to follow the
recommendations of the treatment program.”
Appellant explicitly admitted to only two of these violations, that he failed to keep
in contact with his probation agent and that he failed to abstain from mood -altering
substances. The district court therefore erred when it found that appellant failed to follow
the recommendations of the treatment program because he never admitted this violation
and the state did not present evidence to support this violation. In fact, when questioned
by the district court about whether it intended to pursue all three violations against
appellant, the state did not indicate that it intended to pursue more than the two violations
to which appellant admitted. However, because the district court validly found appellant
in violation of the conditions to which he admitted, we consider the district court’s
application of the third Austin factor in light of this error before determining whether
appellant is entitled to relief.
1 And because, as explained below , the district court’s
decision to revoke appellant’s probation was based solely upon his conduct underlying the
two admitted violations, we conclude that the district court’s erroneous finding of violation
does not compel reversal of the district court’s revocation decision.

1 See State v. Trott, Nos. A18-1995, A19-0015, 2019 WL 3886915, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug.
19, 2019) (explaining that, although record does not support district court’s determination
with respect to violation of one condition , it was proper to consider third Austin factor
because record supported district court’s determination regarding violation of another
condition). While “[n]onprecedential opinions . . . are not binding authority . . . [they] may
be cited as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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II. The district court properly analyzed the third Austin factor.

Appellant argues that the district court made insufficient findings on the third Austin
factor because it provided “no more than a general, nonspecific recitation of the factors” to
revoke probation rather than “offering [appellant] another opportunity to comply with a
long-term inpatient treatment program.” We disagree.
To satisfy the third Austin factor, district courts must “balance the probationer’s
interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring [their] rehabilitation and the public
safety.” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). In making this determination,
district courts should consider whether “(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public
from further criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional
treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would unduly
depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.” Id. (the
Modtland subfactors). “Only one Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation.”
State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27,
2023).
Contrary to appellant’s argument, the district court, in its own words, made specific
findings under the first and third subfactors to support its revocation determination. On
the first subfactor, which the district court did not expressly reference, it noted that “the
public safety risk just increases dramatically” given that, immediately after appellant
completed treatment, he resumed heavy drug use. It also acknowledged his history of
violating conditions of probation and serving jail time as a result. On the third subfactor,
the district court noted that granting appellant’s request to be placed back on probation,
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given his extensive criminal record and history of violating probation, as well as the fact
that he violated probation here almost immediately after leaving inpatient treatment, would
not allow him to “experience the full breadth of the consequences” of his actions.
Based on these findings, which notably did not directly touch on appellant’s failure
to follow the recommendations of his treatment program, the district court determined that
“the grounds for revoking your probation and executing the sentence . . . are more than
amply demonstrated under the circumstances.” And the district court decided that it would
“not . . . grant the request to place [appellant] back on probation.” The record shows that
the district court based its decision to revoke appellant’s probation solely on his drug use
and his failure to remain in contact with his probation agent.
We conclude that, because the district court made adequate findings under both the
first and third Modtland subfactors and did not rely on the erroneously found violation, it
did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant’s probation.
Affirmed.