In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. R. M. P., Mother.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1473

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: M. R. M. P., Mother.

Filed February 18, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Winona County District Court
File No. 85-JV-22-169

James R. Martin, Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant mother)

Karin Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Paul R. Ellison, Assistant County Attorney,
Winona, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Darik Anderson, Eyota, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Thomas Zolondek, Winona, Minnesota (intervenor)

Considered and decided by Worke, P residing Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s transfer of custody of a child to the child’s
paternal grandmother, appellant-mother argues that the record does not support the district
court’s determinations that the transfer of custody is in the child’s best interests, that
respondent-county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and that a basis for the
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transfer of custody existed. Appellant also argues that she was denied due process of law
and the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant M.R.M.P. (mother) is the mother of Z.P., born in September 2014, and
E.O., born in April 2016. In 2022, law enforcement received information alleging that
mother was using methamphetamine at her home in front of her children. After further
investigation, law enforcement executed a search warrant on October 13, 2022, at the
residence where mother was residing with E.O. and Z.P. Several people, including mother,
were present during the search, and law enforcement discovered items consistent with drug
use at the home. In addition, law enforcement discovered two plastic baggies containing
methamphetamine in mother’s bedroom, one of which was located on a nightstand that was
accessible to children. Mother was subsequently arrested on drug-related charges, and E.O.
and Z.P. were removed from mother’s care.
On October 1 7, 2022, respondent Winona County Health and Human Services
(county) petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights to E.O. and Z.P.1 E.O. was placed
with her maternal great-grandparents (the great-grandparents), and mother later voluntarily
agreed to transfer legal and physical custody of E.O. to the great-grandparents.

1 The termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) petition also sought to terminate any and all
parental rights of E.O.’s father, J.O., and Z.P.’s father, J.C. The parental rights of J.O. to
E.O. were later terminated involuntarily in July 2023. And, in November 2023, mother
voluntarily agreed to transfer permanent physical custody of Z.P. to J.C. Any issues related
to the termination of J.O.’s parental right s, and mother’s custody of Z.P., are not relevant
to this appeal.
3
In September 2023, E.O. was removed from the great-grandparents’ care after E.O.
was discovered in mother’s unsupervised care in violation of the transfer -of-custody
agreement. A law enforcement officer at the scene observed that mother had “poor teeth,”
“scabs on her face,” and was “unable to sit still.” Based on his training, the officer believed
that mother was under the influence of controlled substances.
After E.O. was removed from the great-grandparents’ care, the county moved to
vacate the pending order transferring custody of E.O. to the great-grandparents.2 A three-
day trial was then held to determine if the great-grandparents were an appropriate
placement for E.O. Following the trial, the district court vacated the pending transfer -of-
custody order, and placed E.O. with her paternal grandmother (the grandmother).
In April 2024, a trial began on the TPR petition. The trial took place on five days
over the course of four months. Mother’s trial counsel was the fourth attorney appointed
for mother since the TPR petition was filed.
On the last day of trial, the county, with the district court’s permission, petition ed
to transfer permanent legal and physical custody of E.O. to the grandmother. Mother did
not object and indicated that she was “happy” to have the TPR petition withdrawn. The
grandmother then testified that E.O. is doing well and confirmed that E.O. is comfortable
in her home. And the grandmother testified that she is willing to facilitate contact between
E.O. and her family, including mother if contact with mother is safe for the child.

2 The transfer order was not a final order because transfer was deferred pending notice from
the county that all Northstar Kinship Assistance requirements had been satisfied.
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The district court granted the petition to transfer custody of E.O. to the grandmother,
concluding that the county “made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and to reunify
her and [E.O.],” but that , despite those efforts, mother “has not corrected the conditions
that led to out-of-home placement, including housing instability and substance use.” The
district court also determined that “[t]ransfer of permanent legal and physical custody of
[E.O.] to [the grandmother] is in the best interest of the child.” Mother appeals.
DECISION
I.
Mother challenges the transfer of custody of E.O. to the grandmother. When
ordering a transfer of permanent physical and legal custody through juvenile -protection
proceedings, the district court must make detailed findings as to (1) “how the child’s best
interests are served by the order”; (2) “the nature and extent” of the count y’s reasonable
efforts to reunify the family; (3) the “parents’ efforts and ability to use services to correct
the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement”; and (4) “the conditions which led
to the out -of-home placement [that] have not been corre cted so that the child can safely
return home.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a) (2024). Each of these statutory findings must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1.
When reviewing an order transferring permanent physical and legal custody through
a juvenile-protection proceeding, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and the “finding of a statutory basis for the order for abuse of discretion.” In re
Welfare of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 21,
2015). “A district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that lack
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evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a manner
contrary to logic and the facts on record.” In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A. , 11 N.W.3d
346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024). When assessing for clear error, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the findings, do not find facts or reweigh evidence, do not reconcile
contradictory evidence, and “‘need not go into an extended di scussion of the evidence to
prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the district court.’” Id. (quoting In
re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021)).
Mother argues that the record does not support the district court’s determinations
that (A) the transfer of custody is in E.O.’s best interests; (B) the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family; and (C) a basis for the transfer of custody existed. These
arguments are addressed in turn.
A. Best interests
“The paramount consideration in all juvenile protection proceedings is the health,
safety, and best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (202 4). The
best interests of the child is defined as “all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated”
and requires “a review of the relationship between the child and relatives . . . with whom
the child has resided or had significant contact.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511 (202 4); see also
In re Welfare of Child. of J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d 653, 658 (Minn. App. 2021) (discussing the
district court’s review of the relationship between the child and the proposed relative
custodian), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2021). A district court’s best -interests analysis is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d at 357.
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Mother argues first that the “district court must address each of the best interest
criteria” set forth in Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2 (2024), to be “legally sufficient,” and
that “[w]hen proper weight is given to [the criteria set forth in this statute], it should be
determined that there should be no transfer to the . . . grandmother.” We disagree. The
statute cited by mother identifies 11 factors that a social -services agency must consider in
determining the needs of a child when the agency is rec ommending an out -of-home
placement for the child. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b). But section 260C.212,
subdivision 2(b), “is limited to the situation in which a social -services agency is selecting
an out-of-home placement.” J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 657. As this court recently explained,
section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b),
promotes the best interests of a child in foster care by ensuring
that the selected home will serve the needs of the child in the
event that the child later remains in the home pursuant to an
adoption or a transfer of custody. But the statute does not refer
to a district court’s decision to order a permanency disposition,
. . . and the statute is not referenced in the statutes governing
permanency dispositions . . . . The factors in section 260C.212,
subdivision 2(b), are aligned with the best interests of a child
in a permanency proceedings, but those factors are not required
by section 260C.511, which governs and specifies the best -
interests criteria that must be considered before ordering a
permanency disposition other than a termination of parental
rights.

Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
Here, the district court recognized its obligation to make findings concerning “how
the child’s best interests are served by the order” under Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(1), and
its obligation to consider “all relevant factors,” including “the relationship between the
child and relatives and the child and other important persons with whom the child has
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resided or had significant contact” under Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a), (b). To fulfill this
obligation, the district court looked to section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b), for detailed
criteria. After considering the factors set forth in section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b), the
district court determined that “[t]ransfer of permanent legal and physical custody of [E.O.]
to [the grandmother] is in the best interests of [E.O.]” But under J.C.L., the district court
was not required to consider the factors set fort h in section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b),
because section 260C.511 “governs and specifies the best -interests criteria that must be
considered before ordering a permanency disposition other than a [TPR].” 958 N.W.2d at
657.
Nonetheless, the district court’s findings in this case satisfy section 260C.511. The
district court made detailed findings on all the relevant factors set forth in section
260C.212, subdivision 2(b), including th e ninth factor, “the child’s current and long -term
needs regarding relationships with parents, siblings, relatives, and other caretakers.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.212, subd. 2(b)(9). In addressing the ninth factor, the district court determined
that the grandmother has demonstrated “a willingness and capability to facilitate contact
with [E.O.’s] sibling and extended family,” such as encouraging E.O. to see her brother “at
least once per month.” The district court determined that the grandmother encourages
visits with “[m]other (when [m]other is healthy) and [m]other’s family.” Moreover, the
district court found that E.O. and the grandmother “have a good relationship” and that E.O.
“is very comfortable” with the grandmother. And the district court found that the
grandmother “is committed to meeting [E.O.’s] needs on an ongoing basis” and has “given
[E.O.] love, affection, and guidance.” The district court’s findings are supported by the
8
record. Thus, because , here, the ninth factor in section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b),
substantially overlaps with section 260C.511, and the district court made detailed findings
on this factor that are supported by the record, the district court’s best -interests findings
satisfy the requirements of section 260C.511.
Next, mother contends that the district court’s best-interests consideration is flawed
because “[i]t is the situation at the time of trial that is controlling.” Although mother
acknowledges that the “main problem” involved her chemical usage, she claims that the
“only evidence of what her usage was at the time of trial were the tests indicating no use
of amphetamines or other unprescribed chemicals.”
We are not persuaded. In the TPR context, evidence supporting a TPR “must relate
to conditions that exist at the time of termination and it must appear that the conditions
giving rise to the termination will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re
Welfare of P.R.L. , 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 20 01). TPR proceedings are similar to
transfer-of-custody proceedings. But mother cites no authority indicating that, in addition
to present conditions, a district court cannot also consider evidence of conduct related to
the proceedings in their entirety in either a TPR or a transfer-of-custody proceeding.
Here, the district court found that “[m]other has failed to maintain sobriety, as
demonstrated by the significant evidence presented at trial showing positive drug tests and
test refusals.” The district court also found that “[m]other has shown no commitment to
being consistently sober” as demonstrated by her “very limited” engagement in chemical -
dependency treatment. In fact, the district court found that mother “was not engaged in
treatment at the time of trial.”
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The district court’s findings are supported by the record. The record reflects that
mother participated in a drug-testing program between November 2022, and October 2023,
and that during this period, mother refused testing 60 times out of 101 attempts to have
mother submit to a test. In fact, the record reflects that, in October 2023, mother had five
refusals out of eight attempts. The record also reflects that, during the time that mother
was engaged in the drug -testing program, mother had many positive tests for
methamphetamine in addition to her test refusals. And the record reflects that mother’s
refusal to engage in drug testing continued up until the time of trial, as demonstrated by
testimony that mother refused a drug test in April 2024.
In addition to evidence that mother consistently failed , as well as refused to
participate in , drug testing, evidence was presented that mother was discharged from
chemical-dependency treatment in June 2023, after canceling two sessions and missing two
other sessions without notifying the treatment center. And mother acknowledged at trial
that the only type of chemical -dependency programming that she was presently
participating in was conducted through a cell phone application. The evidence presented
at trial demonstrates that mother’s use of controlled substances was rampant throughout
these proc eedings and continued up until the time of trial. As such, the district court
properly considered mother’s failure to maintain sobriety in determining that transferring
custody of E.O. to the grandmother was in E.O.’s best interests.
Mother argue s further that, in evaluating and considering “all relevant factors”
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a), the district court should have considered the best -
interests factors set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a), (b) (202 4). But the supreme
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court has recognized that section 518.17 “applies to the creation and initial approval of
parenting plans .” Hansen v. Todnem , 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018) (emphasis
added).3 This case involves a transfer of custody, not the creation and initial approval of a
parenting plan. And mother cites no caselaw indicating that the best -interests factors set
forth in section 518.17 are applicable in transfer -of-custody matters. As such, the district
court was not required to consider the best-interests factors set forth in section 518.17.
In sum, as required by section 260C.511, the district court considered all relevant
factors related to the best interests of E.O., including her relationship with relatives and
other important persons with whom she has resided or had significant contact. Moreover,
the district court’s findings on these best -interests factors are supported by the record.

3 Hansen is a family law opinion. This is an appeal in a juvenile -protection matter.
Juvenile-protection matters are governed by Minnesota Statutes c hapter 260C , and the
Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure. Neither c hapter 260C nor the Rules of Juvenile
Protection Procedure use the term “parenting plan.” In family -law matters , “parenting
plans” are governed by Minnesota Statutes section 518.1705 (2024). Thus, in a family -
law context, “parenting plan” is not a generic term referring to any plan for the care of a
child. In the family-law context, “parenting plan” is a term of art referring to a mechanism
to address the care of a child when that mechanism fits the profile set out in Minnesota
Statutes section 518.1705. Thus, in the family-law context, all “parenting plans” are plans
to address the care of a child, but a mechanism to address the care of a child that does not
satisfy section 518.1705 is not a “parenting plan.” See, e.g., Rutz v. Rutz, 644 N.W.2d 489,
492 (Minn. App. 2002) (discussing “parenting plans” and Minn. Stat. § 518.1705 (2012));
In re Welfare of B.K.P. , 662 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. App. 2003) (noting that “parenting
time” is a concept distinct from a “parenting plan”). As a result, prudence counsels
avoiding use of the term “parenting plan” to refer to a mechanism to address the care of a
child when that mechanism does not fit the profile in section 518.1705. Because the point
is not before us, nothing in this opinion addressing this appeal in a juvenile -protection
matter is an expression of this court’s opinion about whether this case involves a “parenting
plan” under Minnesota Statutes section 518.1705.

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Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that transfer of
permanent legal and physical custody of E.O. to the grandmother is in E.O.’s best interests.
B. Reasonable efforts
Mother also questions the district court’s determination that the county proved by
clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify her with E.O.
Except under circumstances not applicable here, “reasonable efforts for rehabilitati on and
reunification are always required” under Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (202 4). T.M.A., 11
N.W.3d at 357 (quotation omitted). In an order permanently placing a child out of the
home, a district court must make “detailed findings” about “the nature and extent of the
responsible social services agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify th e child with the
parent or guardian where reasonable efforts are required.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2).
Under the reasonable -efforts standard, the district court must consider various statutory
factors, including whether the services provided by the county were “relevant to the safety,
protection, and well-being of the child”; “adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family”; “available and accessible”; “consistent and timely”; and “realistic under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). Whether the county made reasonable
efforts towards reunification “depends on the problem presented.” In re Welfare of T.R. ,
750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
The district court found that the primary “concern throughout this case was
[m]other’s ongoing substance use.” The district court then found that the county developed
case plans addressing this concern, which included providing “ongoing services to address
[m]other’s chemical use.” The district court also found that the services set forth in the
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case plan included “drug testing, visitation services, gas cards, assistance with
appointments, referrals and ongoing contact.” And the district court determined that these
“services were relevant to the safety and protection of [E.O.], adequate to meet t he needs
of [E.O.] and the family, culturally appropriate, available, . . . accessible, consistent and
timely, and realistic under the circumstances.” Thus, the district court concluded that the
county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and to reunify her with E.O.
Mother argue s that the district court’s findings are unsupported by clear and
convincing evidence because “there has been no showing that the programming
recommended by social services would have an effect on any problem [mother] may have
had, nor has it been shown that any chemical usage experienced by [mother] had any effect
whatsoever on [her] children or [her] ability to parent.” We disagree. The record is replete
with evidence supporting the district court’s finding that the problem presented involv ed
mother’s chemical use and its effect on the health and safety of her children. For example,
the record reflects that a hair follicle test from Z.P. was positive for methamphetamine, that
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were accessible to E.O. and Z.P. while they were
in mother’s care, that mother exhibited signs of being under the influence of chemicals
while caring for E.O., and that mother continue d to use methamphetamine. The record
also reflects that the county developed a case plan to address mother’s chemical usage and
that the case plan was relevant to the safety and protection of E.O. Although mother
disputes much of the evidence presented at trial, it is not the province of this court to
reconcile conflicting evidence or reweigh the evidence. See T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d at 355.
Moreover, mother is unable to identify any different or additional services that the county
13
should have offered during the pendency of this case. The district court made detailed
findings addressing the county’s reasonable efforts, and those findings are supported by
the record. Thus, mother is unable to show that the district court abused its discretion in
determining that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and to reunify
her with E.O.
C. Underlying basis to transfer custody
Mother argues that the district court “erred by finding that an underlying basis for a
transfer of custody to the . . . grandmother existed.” We disagree. In a permanency
proceeding under Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.503-.521 (2024), a district court may order any one
of several dispositions. J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d at 655. One of the possible dispositions is a
transfer of permanent legal and physical custody to “a fit and willing relative ” in the best
interests of a child. Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4.
Here, the district court ordered that permanent legal and physical custody of E.O.
be transferred to the grandmother pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4. In ordering
this disposition, the district court found that transfer of custody is in E.O.’s best interests.
As addressed above, the record supports this finding. Moreover, the district court fou nd
that the grandmother “is a fit, willing , and suitable relative to have permanent legal and
physical custody of [E.O.],” and evidence presented at tr ial, including the grandmother’s
testimony, supports this finding . Although mother disputes much of the evidence
supporting the district court’s findings, and argues at length that the evidence demonstrated
that mother’s most recent drug tests were negative and that “[v]ery little evidence” was
14
presented related to the grandmother’s ability to care for E.O ., we do not reweigh the
evidence. See T.M.A., 11 N.W.3d at 355.
Because the record supports the district court’s determinations that the grandmother
is a fit and willing relative and that the transfer of custody to the grandmother is in E.O.’s
best interests, the district court did not clearly err in finding the underlying statutory basis
for granting the transfer -of-custody petition. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in transferring permanent legal and physical custody of E.O. to the grandmother.
II.
Mother argues that she was denied due process and a fair hearing because, on the
last day of the five-day trial, the district court allowed the county to amend the TPR petition
to a petition to transfer custody. But the record reflects that mother never objected to the
county’s request to amend the TPR petition to a transfer -of-custody petition. Instead, the
record reflects that mother was “willing to agree to amend [the] matter to be a transfer of
legal and physical custody rather than a [TPR] case,” and was “happy actually to have that
issue or [the] petition withdrawn and removed.” The “failure to raise constitutional issues
in the district court precludes the issues from being raised on appeal. ” In re Welfare of
M.H., 595 N.W.2d 223, 229 (Minn. App. 1999). Because mother never objected to the
amendment of the TPR petition, and the district court never considered mother’s due -
process argument, the issue is not properly before us.
III.
Finally, mother claims that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because there was a “lack of communication” between her four attorneys regarding the
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three-day hearing related to the removal of the pending placement of E.O. with the great -
grandparents, which deprived her of the opportunity to examine the great-grandparents “on
the issues relating to the amended petition to transfer custody.” But mother fails to cite
any authority supporting her position. An assignment of error based on mere assertion and
not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is forfeited. Schoepke v.
Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971); see Scheffler v.
City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (noting that a party forfeits a claim
by failing to support it with authority), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017) ; see also State
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. by Special Comp. Fund v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d
480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address inadequately briefed question); In re Welfare
of Child. of V. R. R., 2 N.W.3d 587, 595 (Minn. App. 2024) (applying Wintz in an adoptive
placement dispute under Chapter 260C), rev. dismissed (Minn. Mar. 22, 2024); In re Child
of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying Wintz in an appeal from a
termination of parental rights), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003). Therefore, mother has
forfeited her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.
Affirmed.