Jerome E. Johnson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1474

Jerome E. Johnson,
Appellant,

vs.

Stacy A. Bee,
Respondent,

Cheryl Steele,
Defendant.

Filed June 16, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-23-1665

Steve Silton, Cassandra M. Jacobsen, Cozen O’Connor, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Leif T. Simonson, Simonson Law, P.L.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
The parties to this appeal were in a relationship and lived together for approximately
a decade. When they ended the relationship, a dispute arose concerning one party’s
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personal property. The district court found that the plaintiff proved claims of conversion
and replevin but is not entitled to any damages. We affirm.
FACTS
Jerome E. Johnson and Stacy A. Bee began dating in 2013. Soon thereafter, Bee
moved into Johnson’s home in the city of Wayzata. In 2017, Johnson purchased a
condominium in Florida, which became the primary residence for him, Bee, and their two
joint children.
In August or September of 2020, Johnson decided to sell his Wayzata home. He
and Bee agreed that she would assume responsibility for packing, removing, and storing
the contents of the Wayzata home in anticipation of a sale. With the assistance of a friend,
Bee arranged for the rental of five portable storage units. Bee and her friend removed all
furniture and other personal property from Johnson’s Wayzata home and stored it in the
portable storage units.
The parties’ relationship deteriorated in 2022. In the late summer of that year,
Johnson realized that he did not have access to the personal property that had been removed
from the Wayzata home and stored in the portable storage units. According to the rental
agreement, access to the portable storage units required a storage-unit identifier number, a
customer ID number, a PIN number, and keys to any padlocks; likewise, online access to
arrange for access or shipment required a username and password. Johnson repeatedly
asked Bee for this information so that he could access the portable storage units. Bee did
not cooperate.
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In November 2022, Johnson signed an agreement to purchase a house in Florida,
which he wanted to furnish with the items in the portable storage units. Because he did not
have access to the portable storage units, he negotiated a purchase that included many of
the house’s existing furnishings, which increased the purchase price by $60,000 (from
$4,040,000 to $4,100,000). Johnson closed on the purchase in December 2022.
In February 2023, Johnson commenced this action against Bee and the friend who
helped Bee rent and load the portable storage units. Johnson asserted claims against Bee
of conversion and replevin. For relief, he requested an order requiring Bee to transfer
possession of the personal property in the portable storage units to him, damages, and
attorney fees and costs.
Soon after commencing the action, Johnson filed a motion for pre-judgment
recovery of his personal property. See Minn. Stat. § 565.23 (2024). In May 2023, the
district court granted Johnson’s motion and ordered Bee to give Johnson the information
necessary to access the five portable storage units. Bee did so.
Before trial, Johnson voluntarily dismissed his claim against Bee’s friend. The case
proceeded to a court trial on one day in March 2024. After trial, each party submitted
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Johnson’s proposed findings and
conclusions, he requested $60,000 in damages. In June 2024, the district court filed its
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The district court found that Johnson proved
his claims of conversion and replevin but did not prove that he is entitled to any damages.
Johnson appeals.
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DECISION
Johnson argues that the district court erred by not awarding him damages. Bee did
not file a responsive brief. Nonetheless, it is this court’s duty to apply the law to the facts
of the case and determine the appeal on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
A.
Before considering Johnson’s arguments, we will summarize the applicable legal
principles.
1.
Conversion is defined as “an act of willful interference with the personal property
of another, done, without lawful justification, by which any person entitled thereto is
deprived of use and possession, ” and “the exercise of dominion and control over goods
inconsistent with, and in repudiation of, the owner’s rights in those goods.” Christensen v.
Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2003) (quotations omitted). “Wrongfully
refusing to deliver property on demand by the owner constitutes conversion.” Williamson
v. Prasciunas, 661 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted).
Under Minnesota caselaw, the measure of damages on a conversion claim depends
on the nature of the conversion. Three rules can be identified.
First, if the converted property was not returned to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is
entitled to damages equal to “the value of the property at the time of the conversion, with
interest from that time.” McLeod Nash Motors v. Commercial Credit Trust, 246 N.W. 17,
20 (Minn. 1932); see also McKinley v. Flaherty, 390 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn. App. 1986).
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Second, if the converted property was wrongfully detained for a period of time but
eventually was returned to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to “the
reasonable value of its use during the wrongful detention.” Bergquist v. Stenson Co., 260
N.W. 871, 873 (Minn. 1935) (quotation omitted).
Third, if the plaintiff’s rights to property were interfered with in a “merely technical”
way, a plaintiff is entitled to only nominal damages. Sutton v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 109
N.W. 815, 816 (Minn. 1906); see also McKusick v. Seymour, Sabin & Co., 50 N.W. 1116,
1117 (Minn. 1892).
2.
Replevin, sometimes called claim and delivery, “is a common law remedy in which
a plaintiff claiming an entitlement to certain personal property demands the return of that
property from the current possessor.” Zephier v. Agate, 957 N.W.2d 866, 871 n.1 (Minn.
2021) (citing Republic State Co. v. Brown , 197 N.W. 840, 841 ( Minn. 1924)). The
“primary object” of the action “is the recovery of the possession of the specific thing rather
than its value.” Breitman Auto Fin. Co. v. Buffalo, 265 N.W. 36, 37 (Minn. 1936). If the
defendant is in possession of the property and it is possible for the defendant to return it to
the plaintiff, such delivery “must be ordered.” Widgren v. Massie , 352 N.W.2d 420, 426
(Minn. App. 1984); see also New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Bryant, 66 N.W. 974,
975 (Minn. 1896).
If a plaintiff is able to obtain the return of wrongfully detained property, the plaintiff
also may recover “damages for the detention or taking and withholding.” Widgren, 352
N.W.2d at 426 (citing Minn. Stat. § 548.04 (Supp. 1983)). In that event, the measure of
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damages is “the reasonable value of the use of it during the time of its wrongful detention,”
Williams v. Wood, 63 N.W. 492, 492 (Minn. 1895), or “the fair rental value of the
[property], less the damage which would result to it from the extra wear and tear caused by
its use,” Peerless Mfg. Co. v. Gates, 63 N.W. 260, 261 (Minn. 1895). If it is not possible
for the defendant to return the converted property to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may recover
damages. Bogestad v. Bothum, 79 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. 1956); see also Schmalz v.
Maxwell, 354 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Minn. App. 1984) (affirming $50,000 damages award on
replevin claim). In that event, “the proper measure of damages will be the fair, reasonable
market value of the goods at the time of the taking, plus interest.” Schmalz, 354 N.W.2d
at 552.
B.
The district court noted that “Johnson does not request the value of property
converted because that property has already been returned to him and he acknowledges the
property was not damaged while it was outside his possession.” The district court also
noted that “Johnson requests $60,000 in monetary damages which arose from purchasing
replacement furniture because his furniture was being detained.”
Accordingly, the district court sought to determine the amount of Johnson’s
damages on his conversion claim by finding “the value of the use during the period of
detention or prevention or the value of the use of or the amount paid for a substitute.” This
measure of damages is, in essence, the second measure of conversion damages identified
above. See Bergquist, 260 N.W. at 873.
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The district court proceeded to determine Johnson’s damages with the following
analysis:
[T]he court acknowledges Johnson spent $60,000 he otherwise
would not have if he had access to the [portable storage units]
and his property therein to furnish his new home. However,
the court also understands that Johnson remains in possession
of those $60,000 in furnishings. To award Johnson the entire
$60,000 would suggest the furnishings he purchased are now
worth $0, a fact which has not been made to appear in the
record. If the entire $60,000 was awarded to Johnson, he
would receive a windfall equal to the value of the new
furnishings because he can sell those new furnishings if he so
chooses. As there is no record with respect to the value of the
new furnishings on the day Johnson regained possession of his
property, the court cannot determine by what amount he was
damaged by purchasing the new furnishings. The court takes
the purchase price of the new furnishings, $60,000, to be a
reasonable measure of their value on the date his property was
returned to him.

. . . .

Johnson’s monetary and loss-of-use damages are equal to the
cost of purchasing the new furnishings ($60,000) minus the
value of those new furnishings on the day he regained
possession of his property (May 23, 2023). No evidence was
presented regarding the value of the new furnishings on the day
Johnson regained possession of his property; therefore, the
court concludes a reasonable measure of such value is the price
at which they were purchased: $60,000.

The district court rejected Johnson’s request for damages on his replevin claim for the same
reasons.
C.
Johnson argues that the district court erred for five reasons. We address each
argument in turn. To the extent that Johnson’s arguments implicate questions of law
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concerning damages, we apply a de novo standard of review. Lagoon Partners, LLC v.
Silver Cinemas Acquisition Co., 999 N.W.2d 113, 120 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 19, 2024). To the extent that Johnson’s arguments challenge the district
court’s findings of fact concerning damages, we apply a clear-error standard of review. In
re Minnwest Bank Litig. Concerning Real Prop., 873 N.W.2d 135, 143 (Minn. App. 2015).
1.
Johnson first argues that the district court erred by considering the value of only
some of his wrongfully detained personal property. Johnson asserts that the district court
assigned a value of $200,000 to all of his personal property stored in the portable storage
units. He contends that the district court “failed to award monetary damages for any of the
rest of [his] wrongfully detained property,” i.e., the property other than the furnishings he
wanted to use in his new Florida home, and “erred by making no supporting fact findings
to support its decision to exclude the value of non-furniture property in the damage award.”
This argument is without merit because Johnson did not preserve it in the district
court. He did not ask the district court to consider the value of all of his personal property
in the portable storage units and did not ask the district court to award him $200,000.
Instead, in his proposed findings and conclusions, he asked the district court to conclude,
with respect to his conversion claim, that he proved “actual monetary damages in the
amount of $60,000.00 resulting from Defendant Bee’s actions.” Similarly, he asked the
district court to conclude, with respect to his replevin claim, that he proved “actual
monetary damages in the amount of $60,000.00, which was spent because of Defendant
Bee’s wrongful taking and withholding.”
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“It is an elementary principle of appellate procedure that a party may not raise an
issue or argument for the first time on appeal and thereby seek appellate relief on an issue
that was not litigated in the district court.” Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175 v. Columbia Heights
Sch. Dist., ISD No. 13, 842 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)). Because Johnson did not request damages of $200,000
and did not ask the district court to award him damages for the conversion of property other
than the furnishings that he wanted to use in his new Florida home, he cannot now argue
that the district court erred by not awarding him damages for the conversion of “non-
furniture property.”
2.
Johnson also argues that the district court erred by not awarding him interest on the
market value of his converted property for the period of time in which the property was
wrongfully detained. He cites this court’s opinion in McKinley, in which we stated, “The
measure of damages in a conversion case is generally the value of the property at the time
of the conversion plus interest from that time.” 390 N.W.2d at 33 (citing McLeod Nash
Motors, 246 N.W. at 20). But that measure of damages applies only if the defendant did
not return the converted property to the plaintiff. See McLeod Nash Motors, 246 N.W. at
18-20; McKinley, 390 N.W.2d at 31-33. I f, as in this case, converted property has been
returned, the plaintiff is entitled only to loss-of-use damages. See Bergquist, 260 N.W. at
873. As the district court noted, an award of interest would be duplicative of an award of
damages for loss of use.

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3.
Johnson next argues that the district court “erred in determining that [his] monetary
damages and loss-of-use damages . . . are the same.” Johnson again asserts that the value
of his wrongfully detained property is $200,000 and that he incurred $60,000 in expenses
when he purchased temporary furnishings . It appears that Johnson challenges the district
court’s measure of damages. As stated above, if wrongfully detained property is returned
to a plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to “the reasonable value of its use
during the wrongful detention.” Id. In that situation, a plaintiff is not entitled to damages
for both the value of converted property and the value of loss of use of the converted
property. See id. A plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to the value of converted property
only if the converted property is not returned. See McKinley, 390 N.W.2d at 31-33;
McLeod Nash Motors, 246 N.W. at 18- 20. The district court did not err by seeking to
determine Johnson’s damages by finding the value of his loss of use.
4.
Johnson next argues that the district court erred by not awarding him damages on
his replevin claim.
In its conclusions of law, the district court specifically addressed this issue:
The damages for the detention, taking, and withholding of
Johnson’s property in statute and common law are identical to
those damages identified in the conversion section above.
Specifically, the actual monetary damages and loss of use
damages are the $60,000 Johnson paid for new furnishings
minus the value of those new furnishing on the day he regained
possession of his property. Because these damages are
identical to the damages discussed in the conversion section
above, the court restates its analysis from the conversion
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section with the understanding that Johnson will not receive a
double recovery for conversion and replevin.

Johnson contends that, under the law of replevin, he is entitled to damages for the
detention of the property. We agree that, under the law of replevin, if wrongfully detained
property is returned, the plaintiff may recover damages equal to “the reasonable value of
the use of it during the time of its wrongful detention,” Williams, 63 N.W. at 492, or “the
fair rental value of the [property], less the damage which would result to it from the extra
wear and tear caused by its use,” Peerless Mfg. Co., 63 N.W. at 261. The district court did
not misapprehend the applicable law. The district court simply found that Johnson is not
entitled to replevin damages for the same reason that he is not entitled to conversion
damages: the furniture he purchased for $60,000 is still worth $60,000. The district court
did not err in that reasoning.
5.
Johnson last argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that the furnishings
that he purchased for $60,000 in December 2022 had the same value when Bee gave him
access to the portable storage units in May 2023.
The district court reasoned that Johnson is entitled to the value of the loss of use of
the personal property that was wrongfully detained in the portable storage units. The
district court further reasoned that the value of Johnson’s loss of use may be determined
by finding the decrease in the value of the furnishings he purchased to temporarily replace
his furnishings in the portable storage units. In the circumstances of this case, the district
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court’s methodology is logical and consistent with the applicable law. See Bergquist, 260
N.W. at 872.
As the plaintiff, Johnson bore the burden of proving both the existence and amount
of his damages. Canada by Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn. 1997); Wick
v. Widdell, 149 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn. 1967). But Johnson did not introduce any evidence
concerning the value of the temporary furnishings in May 2023. Accordingly, the district
court stated that “there is no record with respect to the value of the . . . furnishings on the
day Johnson regained possession of his property.” Johnson does not challenge that
statement by identifying any evidence in the record of the value of the temporary
furnishings as of May 2023. He merely asserts, without evidentiary support, that the
temporary furnishings depreciated during his ownership and that “any subsequent
purchaser would be unwilling to pay the same mark-up amount . . . as they would pay to a
furniture store.” But that also was true in December 2022, when Johnson purchased the
temporary furnishings from the previous owner of the ho use, and Johnson used the
temporary furnishings for no more than six months.
This court has stated, in the replevin context, that an item’s “cost may be the only
evidence of its value, and may therefore be considered its value.” Schmalz, 354 N.W.2d at
552. In this case, the only evidence in the trial record concerning the value of the temporary
furnishings is the evidence that Johnson purchased them for $60,000 in December 2022.
Given the absence of any other evidence, the district court did not clearly err by finding
that the temporary furnishings that Johnson purchased in December 2022, which were used
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when he purchased them and were used by him for no more than six months, also had a
value of $60,000 in May 2023.
In sum, the district court did not err by not awarding Johnson any damages.
Affirmed.