Kryzta Ellyzabeth-Marie Martinez, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1475

Kryzta Ellyzabeth-Marie Martinez,
Respondent,

vs.

Zhana Jeanette Gunderson,
Appellant.

Filed June 16, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-HA-CV-24-185

Kryzta Ellyzabeth-Marie Martinez, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Zhana Gunderson, Alexandria, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO), arguing that
(1) respondent failed to prove harassment, (2) the district court engaged in improper

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
ex parte communication with respondent, (3) the district court improperly removed
appellant’s witness from the courtroom during the evidentiary hearing, (4) the district court
prevented appellant from presenting a defense, and (5) the judge was biased against
appellant. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 17, 2024, respondent Kryzta Ellyzabeth-Marie Martinez filed a petition for
an HRO against appellant Zhana Jeanette Gunderson, alleging that Gunderson had been
sending her harassing messages, mostly by email, for months. She said that she had been
working with Gunderson “to get a notary signed for money [Gunderson] loaned [her],” and
when the process was interrupted by Martinez being hospitalized, Gunderson started
sending “derogatory and false accusatory messages to emotionally antagonize [her].”
The district court granted an ex parte HRO and, upon Gunderson’s request,
scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Martinez presented six exhibits
containing emails between the parties (mostly emails that Gunderson sent her) between
January 2024 and the day she filed the HRO petition. In the emails, Gunderson repeatedly
accuses Martinez of stealing money from her and hundreds of other people; disparages
Martinez by calling her liar, thief, con artist, scum, psychopath, worthless, narcissist, and
many other names; and says that she hopes Martinez will be “punish[ed],” “haunt[ed]” by
her actions, and put in an “insane asylum.” The emails continued even after Martinez
objected, telling Gunderson she would not let her “continue to abuse [her] verbally.”
Martinez testified about the negative effect the emails have had on her health, including
disrupting her hospitalization and severely compromising her mental health.
3
Gunderson also testified. She acknowledged that she authored the emails, stating
that she was trying to collect on a loan and initially was “very amicable with [Martinez].”
When Gunderson began describing how Martinez had borrowed money from other people
and not repaid it, the district court stopped her, explaining that the sole issue was whether
Gunderson engaged in harassing behavior toward Martinez. The district court also stated
that, because Gunderson acknowledged sending the emails with “horrible language in
them,” it was finding that she did engage in harassment and did not need to receive any
additional evidence.
The district court thereafter issued a written HRO, noting that Gunderson “admitted
she sent the emails,” finding that Gunderson “commit[ed] various harassing acts in an
attempt to collect a debt,” and prohibiting Gunderson from contacting Martinez for two
years.
Gunderson appeals.
1
DECISION
A district court may issue an HRO if it finds that “there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 5(b)(3) (2024). The term “harassment” includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or
unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to
have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless
of the relationship between the actor and the intended target.” Id., subd. 1(a) (1) (2024).

1 Martinez did not file a brief, but we consider the appeal on its merits under Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 142.03.
4
This definition requires “both objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of
the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to
harassing conduct.” Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App. 2006), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).
On appeal, we review a district court’s decision whether to grant an HRO for abuse
of discretion. Borth v. Borth, 970 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn. App. 2022). “A district court
abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the record,
misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts
on record.” Id. (quotation omitted). We give “due regard” for the district court’s credibility
determinations and will not disturb its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008).
As in the district court, Gunderson does not deny sending the many emails that
prompted Martinez to seek an HRO. Rather, she contends Martinez presented “Insufficient
Evidence to support [her] Claims” and that the emails she sent to Martinez do not constitute
harassment because they contain “no abusive and/or foul verbiage.” This argument is
unavailing. The district court found the “tenor” of Gunderson’s emails was harassing,
highlighting instances of Gunderson calling Martinez things like a con artist, scumbag, and
“thief without morals.” The court also noted that Martinez objected to the emails as
“abusive,” expressly credited her testimony that she was “very bothered” by the emails,
and found this reaction “reasonable.” And the court found that Gunderson’s awareness of
Martinez’s significant mental-health issues shows that she knew the effect her emails had
5
on Martinez and Martinez’s “vulnerability.” This record amply supports the district court’s
finding that Gunderson harassed Martinez.
Gunderson also advances four challenges related to the manner in which the district
court conducted the evidentiary hearing.2 First, she asserts that the judge and her law clerk
spoke with Martinez in the courtroom just before the hearing began and contends this was
improper ex parte communication in violation of Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9. But
nothing in the record reflects that such an exchange occurred or that Gunderson presented
her concerns about it to the district court, either during the hearing or in a subsequent
motion. As such, she has not preserved the issue for our review. Fiduciary Found., LLC
ex rel. Rothfusz v. Brown, 834 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2013). Moreover, Gunderson does not identify any prejudice to her from the
claimed exchange, and none is apparent from the record. See Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d
531, 537 (Minn. 2007) (considering whether ex parte communication was harmless error).
Second, Gunderson contends the district court improperly removed her witness from
the courtroom, apparently challenging the district court’s decision to sequester the witness.
A district court may sequester witnesses, even if a party does not request it. Minn. R.
Evid. 615. “[E]xclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is a time-honored practice
designed to prevent the shaping of testimony by hearing what other witnesses say.” State
v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 618 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The decision whether

2 In support of these challenges, Gunderson’s brief references materials outside the record,
which she moved this court to add to the record. We denied the motion and, therefore, do
not consider those materials in deciding this appeal.
6
to sequester witnesses is left to the district court’s “ sound discretion.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Because Gunderson did not object to the sequestration, she has forfeited the
issue. Fiduciary Found., 834 N.W.2d at 762. But her challenge also fails on the merits
because Gunderson identifies neither error nor prejudice in the decision to exclude her
witness from the courtroom until after she and Martinez had testified.
Third, Gunderson argues that the district court impaired her defense because it did
not allow her to present evidence beyond her own testimony. The district court determined
that, because Gunderson admitted that she sent the harassing emails, the other evidence
that she proposed to present (testimony and exhibits) was not relevant. Evidence must be
relevant to be admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 402. And we will not disturb a district court’s
determination regarding relevance absent an abuse of discretion. Aljubailah v. James, 903
N.W.2d 638, 644 (Minn. App. 2017). Gunderson suggests that her other evidence would
have shown that she was justified in sending the emails because Martinez owed her money.
This amounts to an argument that she was justified in harassing Martinez. But the HRO
statute is not concerned with motive; the sole inquiry is whether the respondent’s actions
“had, or were intended to have, a substantial adverse effect on the [petitioner’s] safety,
security, or privacy.” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn. App. 2004). Indeed,
people are “free to express outrage” about another’s actions, “[b]ut there are limits to such
expressions in order to keep peace in the community.” Id. at 846. Because the excluded
evidence tends to show only that Gunderson had a reason to be upset with Martinez, not
the reasonableness of her conduct in expressing her anger, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by excluding it as irrelevant.
7
Finally, Gunderson contends the judge was biased against her. She asserts that this
bias is evident from the judge interrupting her, allocating time unequally between the
parties, and calling her a “nasty mean creditor.” We presume that district court judges
properly discharge all judicial duties. Hannon v. State, 752 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008).
And we do not impute bias from adverse rulings or critical remarks but examine the whole
record for indications of favoritism or antagonism. Byers v. Comm’r of Revenue, 735
N.W.2d 671, 673 (Minn. 2007). We discern no such indications in this case.
The record reflects that the judge interjected at various points during the hearing to
help the two self-represented parties manage their presentations of evidence. The judge
also curtailed Gunderson’s presentation when she sought to present evidence that was
irrelevant to the limited issue before the court. And while the transcript reflects that the
district court told Gunderson that the “things that are stated in [her] e-mails [to Martinez]
are really, really bad and super mean,” it does not reflect the personal insult that Gunderson
claims the court levied at her. In short, our careful examination of the record reveals that
the judge’s challenged statements and conduct constitute appropriate time-management
efforts, discretionary evidentiary rulings, and accurate (if critical) descriptions of the
evidence. They do not indicate judicial bias.
Because the record supports the district court’s finding that Gunderson’s emails to
Martinez constitute harassment, and Gunderson has not demonstrated error or prejudice in
the court’s conduct of the hearing, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by granting the HRO.
Affirmed.