James Wayne Gamble, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1476

James Wayne Gamble, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 9, 2025
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Lac Qui Parle County District Court
File No. 37-CR-21-291

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Keaon Dousti, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Richard Stulz, Lac Qui Parle County Attorney, Madison, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief from his conviction of first-degree sale of controlled substances, arguing that law
enforcement did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop that
2
led to the discovery of the controlled substance and that there is insufficient evidence in
the record to sustain his conviction. Because law enforcement had reasonable articulable
suspicion to initiate a traffic stop and the circumstantial evidence supports appellant’s
conviction, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2021, a deputy of the Lac qui Parle County Sherriff’s Office conducted
a traffic stop and search of a car driven by appellant James Wayne Gamble. The search
revealed, among other contraband, 27 grams of methamphetamine. Respondent State of
Minnesota charged Gamble with one count of second-degree possession of controlled
substances in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.022, subdivision 2(a)(1) (2020),
one count of driving while impaired in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.2 0,
subdivision 1(7) (Supp. 2021), and one count of first-degree sale of controlled substances
in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 1(1) (2020). Gamble
subsequently moved to suppress all evidence found as a result of an unlawful traffic stop.
Contested Omnibus Hearing
The district court held a contested omnibus hearing to address Gamble’s motion.
The deputy who conducted the traffic stop was the only witness to testify at the hearing.
The following describes the facts as established by his testimony at the omnibus hearing.
In October 2021, while the deputy was on patrol, he stopped at an intersection facing
westbound when he noticed a car traveling northbound on Highway 75. As the car crossed
the deputy’s line of sight, the driver, who would later be identified as Gamble, “looked in
[his] direction and then immediately looked back straight ahead.” The driver was wearing
3
sunglasses, a hat, and a hood covering the majority of his face. The deputy ran the license
plate of the car and noticed it was not reported stolen but was registered to an “elderly
female.” The deputy recognized that the driver of the car was not an “elderly female,” but
was instead a “middle-aged, Caucasian male.”
Based on this information, the deputy decided to follow the car. When the deputy
got behind the car, Gamble “immediately” turned onto a gravel road. The deputy followed.
After traveling about “150, 200 yards,” Gamble drove the car to the right side of the road
and came to a stop but left the car running . The deputy then pulled up behind Gamble’s
car with the intention of doing a welfare check. Before the deputy could get fully out of
the patrol car, Gamble abruptly drove away. The deputy turned on his emergency lights
and initiated a traffic stop.
After making contact, the deputy recognized the driver as Gamble from a previous
interaction about a month prior. When the deputy returned to his squad car, he checked
Gamble’s driving status and learned that his license had been revoked. The deputy further
knew that another deputy had recently tried to contact Gamble. After speaking to the other
deputy on the phone, the deputy learned that Gamble’s probation agent wanted Gamble
arrested on an arrest and detain (A&D) warrant.
The deputy informed Gamble of the A&D warrant. The deputy arrested Gamble
and informed him that the car would be towed because it was a traffic hazard. The deputy
also informed Gamble that he would conduct an inventory search of the car prior to towing.
The deputy asked Gamble if there was any contraband in the car, to which Gamble initially
stated there was not. But he then quickly added that all his possessions were on the hood
4
of the car and anything else in the car was not his. At some point prior to the inventory
search, Gamble informed the deputy that he was purchasing the car from someone other
than the registered owner, and that there was methamphetamine in the backseat of the car.
During the inventory search, the deputy located a sunglasses case in the back seat. Inside
the case was a plastic bag with a “large amount” of a substance, which Gamble identified
as methamphetamine. Also in the vehicle were “various paraphernalia items.” After being
arrested, Gamble provided a UA as requested by probation, which came back positive for
“meth, amphetamines, THC, and MDMA.”
Following the omnibus hearing, the state submitted a written memo randum of law
arguing that Gamble’s motion to suppress should be denied because the initial stop was a
lawful welfare check and there was reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the scope
of the stop.
In a written order, the district court denied the motion to suppress. The court agreed
with the state that the deputy had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to
initiate the traffic stop based on the totality of the circumstances, especially Gamble’s
evasive driving. The district court noted that when the deputy first saw Gamble’s vehicle,
the deputy noticed that Gamble was dressed in a manner that seemed to hide Gamble’s face
and that Gamble looked away from the deputy. After the deput y learned that the car did
not belong to Gamble and started following the vehicle, Gamble turned off the main
highway onto a dirt road and pulled over as though he wanted the deputy to drive past him.
And when the deputy stopped his car behind Gamble’s car to conduct a welfare check,
Gamble immediately drove off. The district court determined that this action demonstrated
5
to the deputy “that Gamble wanted to get away.” Based on these circumstances, the district
court concluded that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.1
Trial
The case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, the state called the deputy who arrested
Gamble, a Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) forensic scientist, and an agent from
a drug and gang task force. The deputy’s testimony largely reflected his testimony at the
omnibus hearing, but he provided some additional details at trial. The deputy testified that
when he first approached Gamble after initiating the traffic stop, Gamble was on the phone
with someone whom the deputy believed to be Gamble’s wife. The deputy further testified
that, when he asked Gamble to provide proof of insurance, Gamble told the deputy that he
was going to text his wife for a copy of the current insurance. Gamble initially told the
deputy that he had purchased the car from D.S., who was not the registered owner, and that
he was doing some work for D.S. But the deputy testified that once he informed Gamble
that he was going to conduct an inventory search of the car, Gamble stated that he did not
own the car and claimed that the car belonged to D.S. The deputy further testified that
Gamble claimed that he received methamphetamine as payment for work done for D.S.
But the deputy could not recall whether Gamble stated that he received the
methamphetamine found in the back seat of the car as payment. According to the deputy,

1 The district court also concluded that the expansion of the traffic stop was lawful based
on the officer’s testimony that Gamble was unable to provide a driver’s license or proof of
insurance when asked and the officer subsequently learning that Gamble’s driver’s license
was revoked.
6
Gamble also admitted that he “was or had been high” and that he had used
methamphetamine the previous night.
The deputy also testified about items that he found during the inventory search of
the car. In the back seat of the car, the deputy found a sunglasses case containing a “large
amount of methamphetamine.” The deputy also found a pipe that he believed was used to
smoke methamphetamine, a bundle of unused plastic baggies, two small baggies with a
“crystal-like substance residue,” and a few dollar bills with a “crystal-like substance.” On
the floorboard of the back seat, the deputy found a bag containing suspected marijuana
pipes. And on the floorboard of the front passenger seat, the deputy found a small spoon
with white residue, torch lighters, and a scale.
The BCA forensic scientist testified that the sunglasses case contained a bag with
“slightly more than 27 grams” of methamphetamine. The state offered, and the district
court received, a report generated by the forensic scientist, which confirmed the substance
was methamphetamine.
The state called the task-force agent to testify to the typical conduct of an individual
who possesses drugs for personal use as compared to those who possess drugs for sale.
The agent testified that a dealer will typically possess a larger amount of drugs than a
person who only intends to use drugs for personal use. The agent testified that 27 grams
of methamphetamine is “significantly higher” than what he typically sees possessed by a
standard user for personal use, which is typically “under ten grams.” The agent also
testified that a common method of ingesting methamphetamine is to snort it through a
7
dollar bill. The agent further testified that individuals who deal methamphetamine
typically divide larger amounts into small baggies using spoons.
The state also offered, and the district court received, several exhibits into the
record. These exhibits included the items found by the deputy during the inventory search
of the car: specifically, the methamphetamine that led to the arrest; six unused, small plastic
baggies; two used, small plastic baggies; the sunglasses case; and several items that field-
tested positive for methamphetamine, including dollar bills, a pipe, a spoon, and a scale.
Photographs of these items taken at the time of the inventory search were also received into
evidence.
2
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Gamble moved for a directed
verdict on all three charges. Following arguments from the parties, the district court
granted Gamble’s motion for a directed verdict for the charge of driving while impaired.
The district court, however, denied Gamble’ s motion for the other charges. The district
court determined that, based on the evidence at trial , the jury could find that Gamble
“possessed the methamphetamine and that he possessed the methamphetamine with intent
to sell.” The district court reasoned that Gamble’s evasive conduct, his admission that he
received methamphetamine as payment, and his conflicting statements regarding his
ownership of the car provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find him guilty of possession
of the methamphetamine. The district court further noted the other items found with the
drugs that are consistent with the sale of drugs, including the unused plastic baggies, a

2 The parties also stipulated that the registered owner of the car driven by Gamble sold the
car to D.S. and that the registered owner left no possessions in the car.
8
spoon, and a scale. The district court also reasoned that Gamble’s statements that he owned
and obtained insurance for the car, as well as the fact that Gamble was alone in the car
when the deputy stopped him, eliminated the hypothesis that the drugs belonged to
someone else.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charges of first-degree sale of a
controlled substance and second-degree possession of a controlled substance. The district
court entered judgment of conviction on the first-degree -sale charge and dismissed the
second-degree-possession charge as a lesser included offense. The district court
subsequently sentenced Gamble to 90 months’ imprisonment.
Postconviction Proceedings
In April 2024, Gamble filed a petition for postconviction relief. Gamble argued that
his conviction and sentence should be reversed because law enforcement did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and the evidence was insufficient
to sustain his conviction of first-degree sale of a controlled substance. In a memorandum
in support of his petition, Gamble argued that the fact that he nervously looked away from
the deputy, drove a car registered to someone else, and drove the car evasively did not
amount to reasonable articulable suspicion. Gamble also argued that the welfare check
could not justify the seizure. Second, Gam ble argued the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction because, based on the circumstances proved, there was a rational
hypothesis that Gamble intended the drugs for personal use, rather than for sale. Gamble
did not seek an evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction relief. Instead,
Gamble specifically stated in his petition that “[n]o evidentiary hearing [was] requested”
9
because “[t]he record provide[d] sufficient evidence for [the district court] to make its
decision.”
The state asked the district court to deny the petition, arguing that the totality of the
circumstances provided the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to initiate a traffic
stop. The state also asserted, for the first time, that Gamble committed a traffic violation
when he initially stopped his car prior to the traffic stop because he was obstructing traffic.
With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence, the state responded that Gamble’s asserted
hypothesis was not reasonable in light of the circumstances proved.
The district court denied Gamble’s motion for postconviction relief. In doing so,
the district court incorporated its analysis in its order denying Gamble’s motion to suppress
and its analysis from the bench denying Gamble’s motion for a directed verdict.
Gamble appeals.
DECISION
A person convicted of a crime may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition
alleging that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of
the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2022). We review the
denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Peltier v. State,
946 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when it has
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Martin v. State,
969 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
10
Gamble argues that the district court misapplied the law when it determined that
reasonable articulable suspicion supported the traffic stop. He also argues the district court
abused its discretion when it concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict Gamble
of first-degree sale of controlled substances. We consider each argument in turn and
conclude that neither is availing.
I. The district court did not err when it determined that law enforcement had
reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Gamble.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures of “their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The Minnesota supreme court has held that
law enforcement may, without a warrant, “temporarily seize a person to investigate that
person for criminal wrongdoing” if law enforcement has reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the person is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 -43
(Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “[T]he bar for reasonable suspicion is low.”
State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 758 (Minn. 2021). But “[r]easonable suspicion must be
‘particularized’ and based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” Id. at 752 (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Put another way, law enforcement “must be able to
articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal
activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (quotations omitted); see also
Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752 (stating that reasonable articulable suspicion “requires more
than a mere hunch” (quotation omitted)).
11
Law enforcement may seize an individual by means of a traffic stop if they have
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity at its inception. State v. Askerooth,
681 N.W.2d 353, 363- 64 (Minn. 2004). And law enforcement may expand a traffic stop
beyond its original purpose but “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop must be
tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop,
(2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” Taylor, 965
N.W.2d at 752 (quotation omitted). “Headlong flight . . . is the consummate act of
evasion” and “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; see also State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827
(Minn. 1989) (stating “if the driver’s conduct is such that the officer reasonably infers that
the driver is deliberately trying to evade the officer and if, as a result, a reasonable police
officer would suspect the driver of criminal activity, then the officer may stop the driver”).
Evasive conduct is particularly pertinent when it can be connected to some other factor that
contributes to law enforcement’s reasonable articulable suspicion. See Wardlow, 528 U.S.
at 124 (connecting evasive conduct to being present in a high-crime area).
Gamble argues that the district court abused its discretion in its order denying
postconviction relief when it concluded that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to
initiate a traffic stop. Gamble contends that the circumstances that led the deputy to stop
him after he pulled over briefly on the gravel road and then drove away do “not add up to
reasonable [articulable] suspicion.” The state responds that the totality of the
circumstances—starting from when the deputy first saw Gamble to when Gamble drove
away abruptly—establish the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to stop Gamble.
12
We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion, Peltier,
946 N.W.2d at 372, but whether the undisputed facts provide law enforcement with
reasonable articulable suspicion is a legal determination that we review de novo. See
State v. Garding, 12 N.W.3d 697, 703 (Minn. 2024) (stating that on a motion to suppress,
appellate courts “review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the district
court’s legal determination that an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion de novo”
(quotation omitted)). When considering whether there is reasonable articulable suspicion
to conduct a stop, we consider “the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that
trained law enforcement officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that
would be beyond the competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson,
622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the deputy testified to
“specific, articulable facts” that provide d the deputy with “a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting [Gamble] of criminal activity.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842-43
(quotations omitted). These facts include that: Gamble quickly looked away from the
deputy when they first made eye contact ; shortly thereafter the deputy began following
Gamble who then “immediately” pulled off the highway and onto a gravel road; and after
turning onto the gravel road, Gamble pulled over and then abruptly drove away from the
deputy. These facts are relevant to a reasonable-suspicion determination. See Wardlow,
528 U.S. at 124 (“[N ]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion.”); see also Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 827 (concluding that there was
reasonable articulable suspicion based on the defendant’s driving conduct). Considering
13
Gamble’s evasive conduct together with the fact that Gamble was driving a car not
registered to him, there are specific facts articulated by the deputy to support his suspicion
that Gamble was engaged in criminal activity. See Diede, 735 N.W.2d at 842-43.
Gamble argues that these facts do not amount to reasonable articulable suspicion.
But in making this argument, Gamble addresses the facts in insolation rather than
considering them together under the totality of the circumstances . See Richardson,
622 N.W.2d at 825 (requiring a consideration of the totality of the circumstances when
determining the presence of reasonable articulable suspicion). Gamble begins by arguing
that “[n]ervousness at seeing police is not enough to justify reasonable suspicion.” T he
record reflects, however, that the deputy did not base the traffic stop solely on Gamble’s
nervousness. He also considered Gamble’s evasive driving and the fact that Gamble was
driving a car that was not registered to him. Gamble contends it is “not suspicious” that he
was driving a car registered to someone else because it is “commonplace” for people to
permit others to drive their car. This argument is not persuasive because conduct that is
commonplace and lawful can still be considered suspicious, particularly when viewed in
conjunction with evasive conduct. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124- 25 (holding that being
present in a high-crime area and evasive conduct justified an investigative stop). Finally,
Gamble argues that his driving conduct was not evasive because the deputy did not testify
that Gamble was trying to elude him or escape detection. The deputy, however, did testify
that he initiated the traffic stop in part “to investigate the suspicious behavior.” And when
asked what conduct he found to be suspicious, the deputy referenced Gamble’s driving
along with the other facts described above. Given the totality of the facts testified to by
14
the deputy, we conclude the deputy had the requisite suspicion to support the traffic stop
and that the stop was not based on a mere hunch.3
Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Gamble’s
petition for postconviction relief because the deputy had reasonable articulable suspicion
to conduct the traffic stop.4
II. There was sufficient evidence to convict Gamble of first-degree sale of
controlled substances.

Gamble next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it determined
that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for first-degree sale of a
controlled substance. Specifically, Gamble argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to sell the methamphetamine found in the car.
Gamble contends that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that he possessed the
drugs for personal use, not for sale. We disagree.
To evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence, “appellate courts carefully examine the
record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would
permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263

3 Gamble also argues that the traffic stop cannot be justified based on a welfare check.
However, the record reflects that while the deputy intended to conduct a welfare check,
Gamble drove away before he could do so. As a result, no welfare check occurred.

4 Because we conclude that Gamble’s nervous, evasive conduct while driving a car not
registered to him provided the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary for the deputy to
conduct a traffic stop, we need not address the state’s alternative argument that a traffic
violation supported the stop.
15
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and assume that the fact-finder disbelieved any evidence that
conflicts with the verdict. State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
When, as here, a defendant’s intent was proved by circumstantial evidence, we
apply a “heightened two-step test.” State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 2021)
(quotation omitted). First, we identify the circumstances proved by the state.
State v. Loveless, 987 N.W.2d 224, 247 (Minn. 2023). In doing so, we assume that the jury
resolved any factual dispute consistent with the verdict. Id. Second, “we examine
independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved.” Id. (quotation omitted). This includes inferences inconsistent with
guilt. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010). To affirm the conviction,
“the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. at 330. But “mere conjecture” is not enough to
overturn a conviction. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d at 890-91 (quotation omitted). In analyzing
the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider the evidence as a whole and not as discrete
and isolated facts.” Loveless, 987 N.W.2d at 247 (quotation omitted).
First-Degree Sale of Controlled Substances
We begin our analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the elements
of the offense charged. The state charged Gamble with first-degree sale of a controlled
substance pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 1(1). A person is
guilty of first-degree sale under this provision if, on one or more occasions within a 90-day
period, they “sell[] ” at least 17 grams of methamphetamine or cocaine. Id. “Sell” is
16
defined, in relevant part, as “to sell, give away, barter, deliver, exchange, distribute, or
dispose of to another, or to manufacture” as well as “to possess with intent to perform” any
of the enumerated acts. Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1), (3) (2020). The state has the
burden at trial to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Burg, 648 N.W.2d 673, 677-78 (Minn. 2002).
Circumstances Proved
We next identify the circumstances proved at trial. Assuming the jury resolved any
fact disputes in a manner consistent with the verdict, the circumstances proved at trial are
as follows. The deputy found a sunglasses case containing a plastic bag with 27 grams of
methamphetamine in the backseat of the car that Gamble was driving. Found with the
sunglasses case was a bundle of six unused, small plastic baggies. In addition, there were
two small plastic baggies containing a crystal-like substance. The deputy also found a
scale and a spoon in the car. The weighing surface of the scale field-tested positive for
methamphetamine, as did the spoon. Dollar bills and a pipe, which field-tested positive
for methamphetamine, were also found in the car , along with a number of suspected
marijuana pipes.
The circumstances proved also include that drug dealers typically carry a larger
quantity of drugs than individuals who possess drugs only for personal use, and that they
typically divide larger amounts into small baggies using spoons. A typical user will usually
carry less than ten grams of methamphetamine at a time, and 27 grams is “significantly
higher” than the amount a standard user would carry for personal use. Instead, a typical
user will buy drugs as needed. Snorting methamphetamine through rolled up dollar bills
17
is a method of ingesting it. Finally, the circumstances proved include that Gamble admitted
to using methamphetamine recently and to receiving methamphetamine as payment.
Inferences Drawn from the Circumstances Proved
Finally, we consider the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
circumstances proved “to determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving v. State,
891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “Intent is an inference drawn by
the jury from the totality of circumstances.” State v. Raymond, 440 N.W.2d 425, 426
(Minn. 1989).
Gamble concedes, and we agree, that the circumstances proved are consistent with
guilt. Gamble’s intent to sell methamphetamine can be drawn from the following
circumstances proved. The deputy found 27 grams of methamphetamine in the car that
Gamble was driving. This amount of methamphetamine is “significantly higher” than the
amount a typical user would possess for personal use at one time. A typical user possesses
less than ten grams of methamphetamine at a time. The large quantity of drugs that Gamble
had in the car supports an inference that he possessed the drugs with intent to sell them.
See id. (stating that intent is generally proved circumstantially based on the totality of the
circumstances). In addition, the deputy also found paraphernalia in the car that could
reasonably support an inference of intent to sell, including a scale, a spoon, and unused
plastic baggies. And, while there is also evidence that Gamble used methamphetamine,
evidence of use is not inconsistent with an intent to sell. Therefore, the circumstances
proved are consistent with that of guilt.
18
Gamble argues that, while the circumstances proved are consistent with that of guilt,
they also support the hypothesis that he did not intend to sell the drugs, but rather he
intended to use the drugs for personal consumption. To support this argument, Gamble
points to his admitted use, his claim that he received methamphetamine as payment for
work he completed, and the dollar bills with methamphetamine residue. Gamble also
argues that the spoon and plastic baggie s support the hypothesis that he intended to use,
not sell, the drugs. The spoon, Gamble argues, could be used to facilitate smoking the
drugs. Regarding the baggies, he points to evidence that some of the baggies had residue,
suggesting that the baggies were not intended to facilitate the sale of drugs but instead that
they once contained drugs and were emptied into a larger bag. Gamble further argues that
because he received methamphetamine as payment for work, a jury could conclude that the
scale was used to weigh the drugs that he received rather tha n to weigh out amounts for
sale. And Gamble contends that the absence of “notebooks, ledgers, or
cutting/manufacturing agents”—that one would expect with a sale operation—support the
hypothesis that he intended to use, rather than sell, the drugs.
Gamble’s alternative hypothesis, however, does not consider the totality of the
circumstances proved. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 733. While there is evidence that Gamble
was a user of methamphetamine, Gamble does not reconcile the 27 grams of
methamphetamine found in his possession with the circumstance proved that 27 grams is
significantly more methamphetamine than a typical user would carry at one time for
personal use. Gamble contends that the circumstances proved support that he received the
drugs as payment for work he completed. B ut the circumstances proved do not establish
19
that he received the drugs at issue as payment. And because the circumstances proved do
not establish the drugs at issue were received as payment, they also do not support his
related contention that the scale was used to weigh the drugs when he received them.
Insofar as Gamble argues that it could be inferred that the scale was used to weigh
methamphetamine that he received as payment, this is not inconsistent with guilt, because
the scale could be used both to weigh drugs when he received them and to facilitate their
sale. Further, while two of the small plastic baggies contained methamphetamine residue,
six of the baggies did not and were unused. Finally, the absence of “notebooks, ledgers,
or cutting/manufacturing agents” does not support Gamble’s proposed inference, because
“the absence of evidence in the record regarding a certain circumstance does not constitute
a circumstance proved.” State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 473-74 (Minn. App. 2019).
In sum, Gamble’s argument that the methamphetamine in the car was solely for his
personal use is not a rational alternative hypothesis. Considering the totality of the
circumstances proved, we conclude there is no reasonable inference other than guilt. The
district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded there was sufficient evidence
at trial to convict Gamble of the offense of first-degree sale of a controlled substance.
Affirmed.