Bruce Ray Fairbanks, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1479

Bruce Ray Fairbanks, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed June 2, 2025
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-KX-00-007845

Bruce R. Fairbanks, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Chutich, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court
of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10, and Minn. Stat. § 2.724,
subd. 3 (2024).
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to correct
sentence. He argues that the district court (1) erred in construing his motion as a petition
for postconviction relief and concluding that his claim was procedurally barred under State
v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976); and (2) abused its discretion in determining
that his sentence was authorized by law. We conclude that the district court erred in
construing appellant’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief. But because the issues
raised in appellant’s motion are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, we affirm.
FACTS
On March 14, 2002, following a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court
found appellant Bruce Ray Fairbanks guilty of first-degree assault against a correctional
employee, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 2(a)-(b) (1998), and kidnapping
while causing great bodily harm to the victim, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25,
subds. 1(1), 2(2) (1998). The district court sentenced Fairbanks to 240 months in prison
for the assault conviction and 480 months in prison for the kidnapping conviction, to be
served concurrently. The 240-month sentence represented an upward durational departure,
authorized by the district court’s determination that Fairbanks qualified as a dangerous
offender pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 2 (2000).
On direct appeal, Fairbanks challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the
assault charge and the district court’s imposition of the maximum statutory sentence for
the kidnapping conviction. State v. Fairbanks, No. C0-02-1576, 2003 WL 21911109,
3
at *1-2 (Minn. App. Aug. 12, 2003) (Fairbanks I), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). We
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the district court to determine the
presumptive sentence for the kidnapping conviction in light of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s intervening decision in Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2003). Fairbanks I,
2003 WL 21911109, at *5 -6. On remand, the district court resentenced Fairbanks to 240
months in prison for the assault conviction and 240 months in prison for the kidnapping
conviction, to be served consecutively.
On April 8, 2004, Fairbanks filed his first petition for postconviction relief, arguing
that his conviction should be reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The
postconviction court denied the petition, concluding that Fairbanks’s ineffective-assistance
claims were procedurally barred.
Fairbanks thereafter filed his second appeal. He argued that the combined upward
durational departure and consecutive sentence were not sufficiently supported by severe
aggravating circumstances, and that his sentence was unconstitutional under Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). State v. Fairbanks, 688 N.W.2d 333, 334- 35 (Minn.
App. 2004) (Fairbanks II), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 13, 2005). We vacated Fairbanks’s
sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the district court violated Fairbanks’s
Sixth Amendment rights by imposing an upward durational departure on the kidnapping
sentence based on judicially found facts. Id. at 337.
The following week, Fairbanks filed his second postconviction petition, again
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court delayed ruling on the
4
petition pending the supreme court’s decision on respondent State of Minnesota’s petition
for review of Fairbanks II.1
On May 5, 2008, the district court resentenced Fairbanks to 240 months in prison
for the assault conviction and 103 months in prison for the kidnapping conviction, to be
served consecutively.
In his third appeal, Fairbanks argued that this sentence should be vacated because
(1) severe aggravating factors were not present to justify the district court’s imposition of
a durational departure and consecutive sentence, and (2) the district court erred in applying
a criminal -history score of one instead of zero in determining the duration of the
consecutive kidnapping sentence. State v. Fairbanks, No. A08-1329, 2009 WL 2366091,
at *1 (Minn. App. Aug. 4, 2009) (Fairbanks III), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2009). We
concluded that the severe aggravating factor of “particular cruelty” was present to justify
imposition of the consecutive kidnapping sentence but reversed and remanded for the
district court to resentence Fairbanks using a criminal-history score of zero. Id. at *3-4.
On remand, the district court resentenced Fairbanks to 91 months in prison for the
kidnapping conviction.
In September 2014, Fairbanks filed his first motion to correct sentence pursuant to
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, arguing that his 240-month sentence for the assault
conviction was not authorized by law because a double durational departure is not

1 Although the supreme court denied the state’s petition on December 13, 2005, the
postconviction court did not rule on Fairbanks’s second postconviction petition until
August 4, 2011. The postconviction court concluded that the second petition was
procedurally barred under Knaffla.
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permissible absent significant extenuating circumstances not already contemplated by the
legislature. The district court denied the motion. It concluded that this court had
considered and rejected a similar argument in Fairbanks III in affirming the consecutive
kidnapping sentence based on the presence of a severe aggravating factor, and that
“[i]dentical logic” justified the imposition of a double durational departure for the assault
conviction. Fairbanks did not appeal the district court’s order.
In August 2015, Fairbanks filed his second motion to correct sentence for the
assault. He argued that this court had erred in Fairbanks III by relying on aspects of the
events that were not part of the charged crime to support a durational departure, and that
the district court had erred in considering the vulnerability of the victim as an aggravating
factor at sentencing. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was
procedurally barred and that the sentence was otherwise authorized by law. Fairbanks did
not appeal the district court’s order.
In July 2020, Fairbanks filed a third motion to correct sentence, arguing that the
consecutive sentence for his kidnapping conviction was not authorized by law. The district
court denied the motion because “the record reflect[ed] a legally permissible reason for the
departure and consecutive sentence,” and because the motion was procedurally barred
under Knaffla. Fairbanks did not appeal the district court’s order.
In June 2024, Fairbanks filed his fourth motion to correct sentence , which is the
subject of this appeal. He argued that his “double durational departure and consecutive
sentence are unauthorized by law” because the holding in Fairbanks II “foreclose[d]” this
court’s determination in Fairbanks III that Fairbanks qualified as a “dangerous offender”
6
and that the severe aggravating factor of “particular cruelty” justified his sentence. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that Fairbanks’s sentence was authorized by
law and that his motion was procedurally barred under Knaffla. The district court observed
that Fairbanks’s “current motion is nearly identical” to his third motion to correct sentence.
The district court also noted that the issue raised in Fairbanks’s motion “ha[d] already been
litigated, appealed, affirmed” in Fairbanks III, and that no compelling reason “would
require this issue to be heard for a second time.”
Fairbanks appeals.
DECISION
Fairbanks challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to correct
sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Under this rule, a district court
“may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” A sentence is unauthorized
by law if it is “contrary to law or applicable statutes.” State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297,
301 (Minn. 2015). Fairbanks argues that the district court erred in concluding that his
motion was procedurally barred under Knaffla and in determining that his sentence was
authorized by law. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court erred in concluding that Fairbanks’s motion to correct
sentence was procedurally barred under Knaffla.

Fairbanks first contends that the district court erred in concluding that his motion to
correct sentence was procedurally barred under Knaffla. Fairbanks’s argument implicitly
challenges the district court’s decision to construe his motion to correct sentence as a
petition for postconviction relief subject to the procedural requirements set forth in Knaffla,
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243 N.W.2d at 741, and codified in the postconviction chapter, Minn. Stat. §§ 590.01-.11
(2022). “The standard for reviewing a district court’s decision to treat a motion to correct
a sentence under Rule 27.03 as a postconviction petition . . . remains an open question.”
Bolstad v. State, 966 N.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Minn. 2021) (declining to adopt a standard of
review because “Bolstad’s argument fails regardless of the standard of review”). We need
not resolve this question because under either a de novo standard of review or a more
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the district court—for the reasons explained
below—erred in construing Fairbanks’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief.
Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2016).
An individual can challenge their sentence in two ways: by filing a motion to correct
sentence under rule 27.03, subdivision 9, or by filing a petition for postconviction relief.
Washington v. State, 845 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. App. 2014). Postconviction petitions
are subject to certain procedural requirements including the Knaffla rule, which “provides
that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all
claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should
have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Buckingham v. State,
799 N.W.2d 229, 231 (Minn. 2011).
A motion to correct sentence is not subject to the procedural requirements that
govern postconviction petitions. Washington, 845 N.W.2d at 210-11. But an individual
cannot avoid these procedural requirements “by simply labeling a challenge as a motion to
correct sentence under rule 27.03, subdivision 9.” Id. at 212; see also Bolstad, 966 N.W.2d
at 243 (“If the motion implicates more than simply the sentence, it is properly treated as a
8
postconviction petition.” (quotation omitted)). For instance, an individual “who brings
what is, in substance, a challenge to a criminal conviction cannot use Rule 27.03,
subdivision 9, to circumvent the procedural requirements” for postconviction petitions.
Wayne v. State, 870 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Minn. 2015). Accordingly, for the current
proceedings, Fairbanks may avoid the procedural requirements for postconviction petitions
“only by asserting a challenge that is within the scope of the rule.” Washington, 845
N.W.2d at 212. By its terms, rule 27.03, subdivision 9, “is limited to sentences, and the
[district] court’s authority under the rule is restricted to modifying a sentence.” State v.
Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 2015). In other words, the challenge must be limited
to whether the sentence was authorized by law. Id. As previously explained, a sentence is
not authorized by law when it is “contrary to law or applicable statutes.” Schnagl, 859
N.W.2d at 301.
In his motion, Fairbanks argued that his “double durational departure and
consecutive sentence are unauthorized by law” because Fairbanks II foreclosed this court’s
determinations in Fairbanks III that Fairbanks qualified as a “dangerous offender” and that
the severe aggravating factor of “particular cruelty” existed. In Fairbanks II, this court
concluded that the district court had violated Fairbanks’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial by relying on judicially found facts to support its finding that Fairbanks qualified as a
“dangerous offender.” 688 N.W.2d at 336-37. In essence, Fairbanks appears to argue that
his sentence is unauthorized by law because it is rooted in factual determinations that were
supposedly precluded by this court’s decision in Fairbanks II. The state argues that
because Fairbanks’s motion “implicate[d] not only his sentence but also decisions from his
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past appeals,” the district court properly construed his motion as a petition for
postconviction relief.
We conclude that the district court erred in construing Fairbanks ’s motion as a
postconviction petition. The motion did not seek to overturn the underlying convictions.
Rather, Fairbanks’s motion can be construed as asserting a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right under Blakely requiring the state to submit and prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the grounds for an upward departure and consecutive sentence to a fact-
finder. In Reynolds, the supreme court concluded that the defendant’s challenge to his
sentence for failure to follow the procedural requirements set forth in Blakely was properly
construed as a motion to correct sentence under rule 23.07, subdivision 9. 888 N.W.2d at
129-30. Because the substance of Fairbanks’s motion likewise asserts a Blakely violation
and does not challenge his underlying convictions, it falls within the scope of rule 23.09,
subdivision 9. See id. ; see also Ironhawk v. State, No. A23-0765, 2024 WL 1039085,
at *2-3 (Minn. App. Mar. 11, 2024) (concluding that the district court erred in construing
motion to correct sentence as postconviction petition because defendant’s arguments —
including Blakely claim—challenged only whether the “sentence was authorized by law,
and not the underlying conviction”).
2 The district court therefore erred by construing
Fairbanks’s motion as a postconviction petition and concluding that his motion was
procedurally barred under Knaffla.

2 We cite nonprecedential authority for its persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fairbanks’s motion
to correct sentence.

We next consider whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
Fairbanks’s fourth motion to correct sentence. We review a district court’s denial of a
motion to correct sentence under rule 27.03, subdivision 9, for an abuse of discretion. 3
Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2016). We review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Townsend v. State, 834 N.W.2d
736, 738 (Minn. 2013). Fairbanks bears the burden to prove that his sentence was unlawful
under rule 27.03, subdivision 9. Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 742-43 (Minn. 2018).
Fairbanks argues that his upward durational departure and consecutive sentence were not
authorized by law pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9. The state argues that the district
court acted within its discretion in concluding that the record reflected legally permissible
reasons for the departure and consecutive sentence, and that Fairbanks’s claims are also
barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. We agree with the state.4
The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that “when a court decides upon a rule of law,
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same

3 Because the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize an appeal
from an order denying a motion to correct sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subd ivision 9,
we “treat[] such appeals as appeals from postconviction orders if the motion was filed
beyond the time for a direct appeal.” Washington, 845 N.W.2d at 211 n.1.

4 Although the district court did not invoke the law-of-the-case doctrine as a basis to deny
Fairbanks’s motion, “[w]e may affirm the district court on any ground, including one not
relied on by the district court.” State v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Minn. App. 2012),
rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2012).

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case.” Townsend v. State, 3 N.W.3d 13, 16 (Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted). The
doctrine “functions to bar issues that were previously considered and denied in the same
case,” and applies to a motion to correct sentence, “when the claim underlying the motion
was previously denied on direct appeal. ” Smith v. State, 974 N.W.2d 576, 581- 82
(Minn. 2022) (concluding that law-of-the-case doctrine barred defendant’s challenges to
his consecutive sentences and upward durational departure). Additionally, the doctrine
bars relitigating a previously decided issue “even if the issue presented is not precisely the
same in all its details.” Townsend, 3 N.W.3d at 17.
We considered and denied the underlying claim set forth in Fairbanks’s fourth
motion to correct sentence in Fairbanks III. 2009 WL 2366091, at *1-3. After we vacated
Fairbanks’s sentence in Fairbanks II, the district court resentenced Fairbanks to 240
months in prison for the assault conviction and 103 months in prison for the kidnapping
conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Fairbanks argued that his sentence was
unlawful because severe aggravating factors were not present to justify the district court’s
imposition of a consecutive sentence and an upward durational departure. Id. at *1. We
rejected Fairbanks’s argument, concluding that both the dangerous-offender aggravating
factor and the severe aggravating factor of particular cruelty were “present to support
imposition of the consecutive kidnapping sentence.” Id. at *3. In his present motion to
correct sentence, Fairbanks again argues, in substance, that the upward durational departure
and consecutive sentence are unlawful for lack of legitimate findings on the aggravating
factors needed to support the sentence. Because this claim was previously considered, fully
12
litigated, and denied on direct appeal, it is barred by the law-of-the -case doctrine. See
Smith, 974 N.W.2d at 581-82.
Affirmed.