Dalvin Cook, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1486

Dalvin Cook,
Respondent,

vs.

Gracelyn Trimble,
Defendant,

Daniel Cragg, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed May 5, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-21-14617

Janel M. Dressen, Kathryn E. Campbell, Anthony Ostlund Louwagie Dressen & Boylan
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Gary L. Manka, Katz & Manka, Ltd., Minnetonka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kelly A. Putney, Christopher R. Morris, James C. Kovacs, Bassford Remele, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. This court reviews de novo a district court decision on a special motion for
expedited relief under the Minnesota Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Minn.
Stat. §§ 554.07-.19 (2024).
2
2. Statements made by an attorney to the media regarding a lawsuit do not
generally fall within the protections of the judicial-proceedings privilege.
OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
This interlocutory appeal arises under the Minnesota Uniform Public Expression
Protection Act (UPEPA), an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation)
statute that allows defendants to bring a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss
certain types of claims, and to immediately appeal if the district court denies their motion,
in whole or part. See Minn. Stat. §§ 554.11, .14, .15. Here, appellants challenge a district
court order denying their special motion for expedited relief to dismiss respondent’s
defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims. The claims are based on statements made by
appellants—two attorneys and their law firm—to the media and in a court filing in relation
to a lawsuit brought by their client against respondent. We conclude that the district court
erred in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss respondent’s defamation claims because (1)
the judicial-proceedings privilege protects the statements appellants made in a legal
memorandum they filed in district court and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding that appellants’ statements to the media before they commenced the lawsuit were
made with actual malice. But we conclude that the district court did not err by denying
appellants’ motion to dismiss respondent’s claim for invasion of privacy. We therefore
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

3
FACTS
In November 2021, appellants Daniel Cragg, Anne St. Amant, and their law firm,
Eckland and Blando, LLP (appellants), commenced a lawsuit in Dakota County District
Court (the Dakota County action) on behalf of Gracelyn Trimble, who asserted personal-
injury claims against respondent Dalvin Cook stemming from an altercation between the
two that took place on November 19-20, 2020. Cook is a professional football player who
played for the Minnesota Vikings and was romantically involved with Trimble at the time
of the altercation. Trimble and Cook settled the Dakota County action in May 2024.
Events related to that action form the basis for Cook’s claims in this case.
Cook’s Defamation and Invasion-of-Privacy Allegations
In December 2021, Cook commenced this action in Hennepin County District Court
(the Hennepin County action), alleging appellants defamed him. He subsequently amended
his complaint three times. His currently operative Third Amended Complaint asserts
claims for defamation and publication of private facts (invasion of privacy).
1 The claims
arise out of statements made by appellants at two different times.

1 Cook designated his Third Amended Complaint as confidential in the district court, citing
a protective order issued by the court in relation to discovery. Court records “are presumed
to be open to any member of the public,” unless there is a specific exception in the access
rules. Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 2; see also Minn. R. Pub. Access to
Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 1 (identifying certain types of records not available to public).
But materials filed as confidential in the district court remain nonpublic on appeal. Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 112.02. We are not precluded “from mentioning the contents” of
confidential or sealed documents when the information is “relevant to the particular issues
or legal argument being addressed in the proceeding.” Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of
Jud. Branch 4, subd. 4. Nor are we constrained from disclosing information contained in
the publicly filed briefs. See Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4; see also
Coursolle v. EMC Ins. Grp., Inc., 794 N.W.2d 652, 655-66 n.1 (Minn. App. 2011), rev.
4
First, Cook asserts that appellants made maliciously false statements to the media
in November 2021, shortly before commencing the Dakota County action. Cook contends
the unfiled, unserved complaint appellants provided to the media contained false
statements, including statements that on November 19, 2020, Cook “physically abused”
Trimble, held her “hostage,” caused mace to enter her eyes, and “beat her with a
broomstick,” causing severe injuries. Cook also alleges that appellants made false
statements in a press release issued the day after the complaint was released, including that
Trimble was a “victim” of an assault by Cook. In essence, Cook claims that Trimble’s
complaint and the press release defamed him because Trimble’s allegations in the Dakota
County action were untrue. We refer to the allegedly defamatory statements in Trimble’s
complaint and the press release together as the 2021 media statements.
Second, Cook alleges that appellants made defamatory statements and publicly
disclosed private facts regarding settlement offers he made to Trimble in a legal
memorandum appellants filed in the Dakota County action in July 2023. Appellants filed
the memorandum in opposition to Cook’s motion in limine that sought to exclude evidence
of the two confidential settlement offers. Cook filed his motion—with supporting
documents that included the two offers—as confidential. Appellants’ responsive
memorandum disclosed and discussed the terms of the offers. Appellants did not file the
responsive memorandum as confidential and contend public filing was required under the

denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2011). Here, both appellants and Cook discuss the contents of the
Third Amended Complaint in their publicly accessible briefs filed with this court. We limit
our discussion in this opinion to information disclosed in publicly filed documents, and we
express no opinion on the propriety of the access designations made by the district court.
5
Minnesota Rules of Public Access to Records of the Judicial Branch. The responsive
memorandum includes statements characterizing Cook’s settlement offers in a manner that
Cook asserts are defamatory. We refer to these statements as the 2023 court filing
statements.
Dispositive Motions in the Hennepin County Action
Appellants repeatedly sought dismissal of Cook’s claims, arguing that they are
barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege2 and attorney immunity and that Cook had not
adequately pleaded or offered evidence to prove actual malice as required when a public
figure brings a defamation claim. In October 2022, the district court denied appellants’
motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which included only the defamation claim
based on the 2021 media statements, concluding that the judicial-proceedings privilege did
not apply and that Cook had adequately pleaded actual malice. In May 2023, the district
court denied appellants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims based on the 2021
media statements, reasoning that there were genuine issues of material fact as to actual
malice and attorney immunity. Neither of these decisions was immediately appealable.

2 The parties and the district court have used the term “litigation privilege” to refer to the
absolute privilege that applies to certain statements made in relation to judicial
proceedings. See Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 729 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007).
Some of the caselaw simply refers to this as “absolute privilege.” See id. But absolute
privileges are also recognized in other contexts. See, e.g., Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58,
62 (Minn. 2010) (recognizing constitutional absolute privilege for state legislators in
discharge of their official duties and caselaw extending absolute privilege to other
government officials). We believe that the term “judicial-proceedings privilege” most
accurately describes and reflects the scope of the absolute privilege at issue. See , e.g.,
Matthis v. Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. 1954) (recognizing the “general rule . . .
that, with certain recognized exceptions, defamatory matter published in the due course of
a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged”).
6
See Kokesh v. City of Hopkins, 238 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Minn. 1976) (stating that orders
denying motions to dismiss and for summary judgment generally are not appealable).
Cook subsequently obtained leave to file and serve the Third Amended Complaint, which
added claims based on the 2023 court filing statements.
In May 2024, the legislature adopted UPEPA. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 18, at
2412-17.3 When it applies, UPEPA allows a defendant to bring a “special motion for
expedited relief to dismiss the cause of action or part of the cause of action.” Minn. Stat.
§ 554.09. Appellants then brought a special motion for expedited relief seeking dismissal
of all Cook’s claims. The district court denied the motion, determining that the claims are
not barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege or attorney immunity and that Cook
established a prima facie case as to each essential element of his claims. Appellants filed
this interlocutory appeal from the district court’s order denying their special motion for
expedited relief under UPEPA. See Minn. Stat. § 554.15 (allowing for immediate appeal
from order denying motion to dismiss under UPEPA).4

3 UPEPA is a uniform anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute.
See Unif. Pub. Expression Prot. Act § 1 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 2020). When it adopted
UPEPA, the legislature repealed the state’s previous anti-SLAPP statute, Minn. Stat.
§§ 554.01-.06 (2022), which the supreme court had ruled unconstitutional as applied to tort
claims in Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 6 35-36 (Minn.
2017). 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 18, § 16, at 2416.

4 While this appeal was being briefed, we issued a decision in an appeal from the Dakota
County action. Trimble v. Cook, No. A24-0403, 2024 WL 4927650 (Minn. App. Dec. 2,
2024), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2025). In that case, the district court awarded sanctions
based on appellants’ conduct in publicly filing the memorandum in opposition to Cook’s
motion in limine. Id. at *1-2. We affirmed the monetary sanctions but reversed “any
purported sanction precluding appellants from relying on the litigation privilege as a
7
ISSUES
I. What standard of review applies to appellate review of a district court order denying
a special motion for expedited relief under UPEPA?

II. Does the judicial- proceedings privilege protect appellants’ allegedly defamatory
statements?

III. Has Cook presented evidence sufficient to prove actual malice in relation to any
defamation claim that is not barred by the judicial-proceedings privilege?

IV. Have appellants demonstrated a basis for dismissing Cook’s invasion-of-privacy
claim?

ANALYSIS
Appellants challenge the district court’s order denying their special motion for
expedited relief under UPEPA. Because this is the first UPEPA appeal to come before our
court, we begin by determining the appropriate standard of review before turning to the
merits of appellants’ arguments.
I. We review de novo whether the district court erred by denying a special motion
for expedited relief under UPEPA.

The parties assert that the district court’s order under UPEPA is subject to de novo
review. We agree with the parties.
UPEPA is a procedural statute. See Unif. Pub. Expression Prot. Act § 2, cmt. 2
(stating that the act “operates in a procedural manner” to protect substantive rights); see
also Davenport Extreme Pools & Spas, Inc. v. Mulflur, 698 S.W.3d 140, 153 (Ky. Ct. App.

defense to civil claims that Cook might file against appellants.” Id. at *6. We also reversed
the district court’s disqualification of appellants from representing Trimble. Id.
8
2024) (noting that UPEPA is “solely procedural”).5 When it applies, UPEPA provides an
accelerated method through which a party may seek rulings on the sufficiency of claims
and provides for interlocutory appellate review of orders denying dismissal of claims. See
Minn. Stat. §§ 554.11, .14, .15. 6 A defendant may obtain dismissal under UPEPA by
demonstrating either that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted or that there are no genuine issues of material fact and judgment is appropriate as
a matter of law. Minn. Stat. § 554.13(a)(3)(ii).
7
Because UPEPA provides an accelerated procedure for obtaining rulings under
standards articulated in Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) and 56, we conclude that it is appropriate
to apply the same de novo review that we apply to decisions under those rules. See DeRosa
v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019) (rule 12.02(e)); Maethner v. Someplace
Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 874 (Minn. 2019) (rule 56); see also Davenport, 698 S.W.3d
at 150 (reasoning that de novo review is appropriate because “UPEPA is most akin to an

5 We may rely on caselaw from other jurisdictions that have adopted UPEPA as persuasive
authority because “[l] aws uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and
construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which
enact them.” Minn. Stat. § 645.22 (2024).

6 The causes of action to which UPEPA does and does not apply are delineated in Minn.
Stat. § 554.08(b)-(d). Because no party challenges the applicability of the statute here, we
assume without deciding that UPEPA applies to Cook’s claims.

7 Dismissal may also be appropriate if the plaintiff “fails to establish a prima facie case as
to each essential element of the cause of action.” Minn. Stat. § 554.13(a)(3)(i). Here,
appellants moved for summary-judgment dismissal of the claims based on the 2021 media
statements and dismissal of the claims based on the 2023 court filing statements for failure
to state a claim. Thus, we need not consider what showing is required to demonstrate a
prima facie case under UPEPA.
9
expedited motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
or a motion for summary judgment”). Accordingly, we hold that de novo review applies
to a district court decision on a special motion for expedited relief under UPEPA.
II. The judicial-proceedings privilege does not protect the 2021 media statements
from defamation liability but does protect the 2023 court filing statements.

To prevail on his defamation claim, Cook must prove that appellants made “(a) a
false and defamatory statement about [him]; (b) in an unprivileged publication to a third
party; (c) that harmed [his] reputation in the community.” Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 873.8
Thus, privilege is a defense to a defamation action, and a privilege may be absolute or
qualified, the difference being that absolute privilege “is given even for intentionally false
statements, coupled with malice.” Matthis, 67 N.W.2d at 416. Absolute privilege is based
in public policy and “confined within narrow limits.” Id. at 417.
Under the judicial-proceedings privilege, statements may be protected from claims
that sound in defamation if “(1) made by a judge, judicial officer, attorney, or witness;
(2) made at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at issue is relevant
to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d at 306.9 The

8 As we discuss further below, as a public figure, Cook must also prove that appellants
acted with actual malice. Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 873.

9 The judicial-proceedings privilege is related to but distinct from the attorney immunity
doctrine, which provides “that an attorney within the scope of [their] employment as
attorney is immune from liability to third persons for actions arising out of that professional
relationship.” McDonald v. Stewart, 182 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn. 1970). Appellants
nominally invoke both the judicial-proceedings privilege and attorney immunity. But they
do not meaningfully develop an argument that the 2021 media statements are protected by
attorney immunity, and that argument is therefore forfeited. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327
N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (stating that inadequately briefed issues are not properly
10
judicial-proceedings privilege is absolute, grounded in the public policy of encouraging
witnesses to testify frankly “without fear of civil liability for their statements” and ensuring
that “[t]he final judgment of the tribunal” is based on facts as candidly disclosed by
witnesses who are not “hampered by fear of private suits for defamation.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The privilege fully extends to statements of attorneys “for the interest and benefit
of the party [they] represent[] and to allow [them] full scope and freedom in support or
defense of the rights of that party.” Matthis, 67 N.W.2d at 417.
But application of the privilege is limited; it does not apply unless “the
administration of justice requires complete immunity from being called to account for
language used.” Id. “In the context of [this] absolute privilege, statements may be relevant,
and therefore protected, if the statements have reference and relation to the subject matter
of the action and they are connected therewith.” Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d at 306
(quotation omitted). “The relevance of a statement to litigation is a question of law, and
any doubts as to relevance of a statement must be resolved in favor of finding the statements
pertinent.” Id. at 306-07 (quotation omitted).
We address in turn whether the judicial-proceedings privilege applies to bar Cook’s
defamation claims as they relate to the 2021 media statements and the 2023 court filing
statements.

before appellate court). Moreover, we need not address the application of attorney
immunity to Cook’s defamation claims because we conclude that they are subject to
dismissal on other grounds.
11
A. The judicial-proceedings privilege does not apply to protect appellants’
2021 media statements.

Appellants first assert the privilege in relation to the 2021 media statements, which
include statements in Trimble’s then-unfiled complaint and in a press release, both of
which characterized Cook as the aggressor during the November 2020 altercation.
Appellants assert that the judicial-proceedings privilege applies to these statements because
they were made in the course of representing Trimble. We disagree.
Although our supreme court has not addressed the issue, “[t]he majority of states
have determined that the [judicial-proceedings] privilege does not apply when the
communications are made to the media.” Jacobs v. Adelson , 325 P.3d 1282, 1286 (Nev.
2014); see also Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Tex. 2021)
(noting “weight of authority” that judicial-proceedings privilege does not apply to media
communications); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 Reporter’s Note (Am. L. Inst.
1977) (“The absolute privilege does not extend to a press conference.”); Rodney A. Smolla,
2 Law of Defamation § 8:17 (2d ed. 2024) (explaining that “[s]tatements made at press
conferences or in other circumstances not related to the proceeding are not covered by the
absolute privilege”); Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts
§ 539 (2d ed. 2011) (“An attorney who makes defamatory remarks at a press conference or
other media presentation would not ordinarily enjoy the absolute privilege.”). As the
Nevada Supreme Court explained in Jacobs:
[C]ourts have concluded that the policy considerations
underlying the absolute privilege rule are not applicable to
statements made to the media. Statements made to the media
do little, if anything, to promote the truth finding process in a
12
judicial proceeding. They do not generally encourage open
and honest discussion between the parties and their counsel in
order to resolve disputes; indeed, such statements often do just
the opposite. And allowing defamation claims for statements
made to the media will not generally hinder investigations or
detailing of claims. Thus, the need for absolute privilege
evaporates. Because the privilege’s purpose is not to protect
those making defamatory comments but to lessen the chilling
effect on those who seek to utilize the judicial process to seek
relief, these courts have declined to extend the privilege in this
context.

325 P.3d at 1286 (quotations and citations omitted). The Texas Supreme Court similarly
noted that “[t]he judicial-proceedings privilege . . . does not exist to promote publicity or
public awareness outside the courtroom. Its purpose is to facilitate open and vigorous
litigation of matters inside the courtroom.” Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 49.
A determination that the judicial- proceedings privilege does not extend to media
communications is also consistent with our decision in Chafoulias v. Peterson, No. C2-01-
1617, 2003 WL 23025097 (Minn. App. Dec. 30, 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 25, 2004).
In that case, we declined to extend the judicial-proceedings privilege to statements made
by an attorney to the media even though the statements “simply reiterated the content of
the pleadings” in a pending lawsuit. Chafoulias, 2003 WL 23025097, at *3. We reasoned
that the attorney’s
televised statement, while made during the pendency of a
judicial proceeding, was not made in the course of a judicial
proceeding; and . . . the statement was not an integral part of
the . . . proceeding or necessary to preserve [the attorney’s]
client’s rights in [the] proceeding. . . . [M]ere relation cannot
trigger the privilege if the communication is not made in the
conduct of—and is not integral to—the judicial process.

13
Id. And we concluded that “the policy justifying the judicial [proceedings] privilege as
applied to attorneys does not favor extending the privilege to [the attorney’s] statement[s].”
Id. Although Chafoulias is not precedential, we rely on it as persuasive authority in
concluding that appellants’ 2021 media statements are not protected by the judicial-
proceedings privilege. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).10
Appellants urge us to conclude otherwise, citing Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n for the proposition that “[judicial-proceedings] privilege
commonly attaches to statements made in anticipation of litigation.” 335 F.3d 1161, 1166
(10th Cir. 2003). This proposition is accurate but incomplete. Although prelitigation
statements may fall within the judicial-proceedings privilege, they must be sufficiently
related to the judicial proceedings to do so. See id. (recognizing that privilege is limited to
“statements . . . relevant to the proceeding”); see also Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d
at 306; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 cmt. e. Importantly, Cardtoons did not
involve prelitigation statements to the media—the statements were made in a prelitigation
cease-and-desist letter to another party. 335 F.3d at 1166-67. And there was no dispute in
Cardtoons that the prelitigation statements related to the judicial proceedings. Id. at 1166.
Rather, Cardtoons focused on another requirement for application of the privileg e—
whether the defendant had “an actual subjective good faith belief that litigation [was]

10 Appellants attempt to distinguish Chafoulias, but in doing so they cite to portions of the
opinion addressing whether the statements in that case were protected by qualified
privilege. 2003 WL 23025097, at *6. Appellants do not argue that their statements were
protected by qualified privilege, and we discern no meaningful distinction between
Chafoulias and this case in relation to the absolute judicial-proceedings privilege.
14
seriously contemplated.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 586 cmt. e (stating that privilege applies to prelitigation statements “only when the
communication has some relation to a proceeding that is contemplated in good faith and
under serious consideration”). For these reasons, Cardtoons does not guide our analysis.
Based on the weight of the relevant authority, and consistent with our persuasive
analysis in Chafoulias, we hold that attorney statements to the media generally do not fall
within the scope of the judicial-proceedings privilege. Accordingly, the district court did
not err by rejecting this asserted basis for dismissing Cook’s defamation claims based on
appellants’ 2021 media statements.11
B. The judicial-proceedings privilege applies to protect the 2023 court
filing statements.

Appellants next assert the privilege in relation to the 2023 court filing statements.
Those statements characterized Cook’s settlement offers to Trimble in a manner that he
claims is defamatory. Appellants assert that the 2023 court filing statements are protected
by the judicial-proceedings privilege because they were made in a court filing and relevant
to the Dakota County action. We agree.

11 Some courts have recognized exceptions to this general rule in particular circumstances.
See Jacobs, 325 P.3d at 1286 n.2 (collecting cases recognizing exceptions including when
media is party to litigation and when class lawsuit is contemplated); Chafoulias, 2003 WL
23025097, at *3-4 (recognizing that privilege may apply when media outlet is a party to
the litigation). Appellants do not claim that any exception applies, and the facts in this case
bear no resemblance to those in which exceptions have been recognized. We therefore
need not determine whether those exceptions apply under Minnesota law.

We also note that attorney statements to the media may be protected by other
privileges or protections, including the requirement that public figures prove actual malice
to prevail on defamation claims, which we address in section III below.
15
As explained above, the judicial-proceedings privilege protects, from claims
sounding in defamation, statements that are “(1) made by a judge, judicial officer, attorney,
or witness; (2) made at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at issue
is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d at
306. Appellants’ 2023 statements easily satisfy this test. They were made by attorneys in
a memorandum filed in court in respon se to a motion in limine. And the statements were
relevant to the subject matter of the litigation because they explained why appellants
believed that the settlement offers should be admissible at trial notwithstanding the general
inadmissibility of such evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 408. Indeed, this may be the
quintessential example of statements falling within the protections of the judicial-
proceedings privilege.
In concluding that the judicial-proceedings privilege did not apply, the district court
focused on appellants’ decision to file the responsive memorandum publicly, rather than
filing it as a confidential document. In an appeal from the Dakota County action, we
concluded that the Dakota County District Court did not abuse its discretion by awarding
financial sanctions based on appellants’ failure to file the memorandum under seal.
Trimble, 2024 WL 4927650, at *4 (distinguishing sanctions from civil liability). But
Cook’s defamation claim turns on the alleged falsity of the statements made in the
memorandum—not the fact that appellants filed the memorandum in the public court file.
The district court also seems to have relied on a decision in the Dakota County action that
the judicial-proceedings privilege would not apply to the statements made in the publicly
filed memorandum. But we addressed that decision in Trimble, reversing “any purported
16
sanction precluding appellants from relying on the litigation privilege as a defense to civil
claims that Cook might file against appellants.” 2024 WL 4927650, at *6. The district
court erred by declining to apply the judicial-proceedings privilege to the 2023 court filing
statements.
In sum, we conclude that the judicial-proceedings privilege does not apply to protect
the 2021 media statements but does protect the 2023 court filing statements. We therefore
reverse the denial of appellants’ special motion for expedited relief with respect to Cook’s
defamation claim based on the 2023 court filing statements. And, based on our conclusion
that the 2021 media statements are not privileged, we consider the related defamation claim
on the merits.
III. Dismissal of Cook’s defamation claim based on ap pellants’ 2021 media
statements is warranted because Cook has not presented evidence sufficient to
prove actual malice.

Because he is a public figure, Cook cannot prevail on a defamation claim unless he
proves actual malice, meaning that the allegedly defamatory statements were “made with
the knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false
or not.” Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 873.
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably
prudent man would have published, or would have investigated
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such
doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice.

Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Minn. 1991) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). Actual malice “has nothing to do with motive or ill will in the
17
publishing of otherwise defamatory statements.” Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co.,
610 N.W.2d 321, 329 (Minn. 2000).
Actual malice must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; thus, “the
appropriate summary judgment question [is] whether the evidence in the record could
support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986). “[W]hether the evidence in the record is sufficient to support
a finding of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence is a question of law which [an
appellate] court reviews de novo.” Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 655 (Minn.
2003).
Cook argues that he has presented evidence sufficient to support a finding of actual
malice in this case, pointing to documents and video recordings that his counsel shared
with appellants before they spoke to the media. Because these documents and recordings
were filed as confidential documents in the district court, we do not discuss their contents
here. See supra note 1. But we have carefully reviewed them, and we are not persuaded
that the evidence Cook relies on is sufficient to “permit the conclusion that [appellants] in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of the allegations in Trimble’s complaint in
the Dakota County action. Britton, 470 N.W.2d at 524 (quotation omitted). This is
particularly true when we view the evidence, as we must, through the prism of Cook’s
clear-and-convincing evidentiary burden. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254 (explaining that,
“in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented
through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden”).
18
The Dakota County action stemmed from a tumultuous relationship and presented
a classic he-said-she-said dispute regarding the events of November 19-20, 2020. Cook
points to nothing in the record indicating that appellants doubted the version of the events
advanced by their client. Both Cragg and St. Amant testified and resisted any such
suggestion. For instance, Cragg testified that Cook’s counsel was inferring from a
document that Trimble started things; Cragg did not believe that inference was supported
by the evidence. St. Amant testified that the video recordings shared by Cook’s counsel
did not depict “any actual physical violence” but showed Cook and Trimble “having a
heated conversation.” And both Cragg and St. Amant pointed to messages that Cook sent
to Trimble following the altercation, including one in which he said:
I know what I did can’t be rewind but I just want you to know
I’m sorry I love you so much despite you thinking I don’t or
never did but I do! Whatever you need I’m here for you! And
if you wanna go to the police I’ll respect that I’ll take my
punishment for what I did!

Cook further stated, in response to Trimble saying that her “face [was] so messed up,” that
he was “sorry for that! But the situation just got out of hand from the jump.”
In short, the record demonstrates that there clearly was a factual dispute as to what
transpired between Trimble and Cook on November 19-20, 2020. But even assuming that
Trimble’s version of the events is false, we conclude that no reasonable juror could find,
by clear and convincing evidence, that appellants acted with actual malice in making the
2021 media statements. In other words, the evidence is insufficient to prove that appellants
made those statements either knowing that they were false or with reckless disregard for
their truth. Because Cook cannot prove an essential element of his defamation claim in
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relation to the 2021 media statements, appellants are entitled to summary judgment. See
Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995) (“A defendant is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on
an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim.”). We therefore reverse the denial of
appellants’ special motion for expedited relief to dismiss Cook’s defamation claim based
on appellants’ 2021 media statements.
IV. Cook’s invasion-of-privacy claim is not subject to dismissal.

“Publication of private facts is an invasion of privacy when one ‘gives publicity to
a matter concerning the private life of another * * * if the matter publicized is of a kind
that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of le gitimate
concern to the public.’” Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 1998)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (Am. L. Inst. 1977)). The claim “focus[es]
on a very narrow gap in tort law —to provide a remedy for the truthful but damaging
dissemination of private facts, which is nonactionable under defamation rules.” Bodah v.
Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn. 2003).
As a threshold matter, it is not clear from appellants’ briefing whether they argue
that the judicial-proceedings privilege applies to Cook’s invasion-of-privacy claim. To the
extent that they do so, we reject the argument. The judicial-proceedings privilege applies
to claims that “sound[] in defamation— that is claims where the injury stemmed from and
grew out of the defamation.” Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d at 309. Appellants do
not assert that Cook’s invasion-of -privacy claim sounds in defamation, and we note the
distinction between the two claims; one is premised on falsity and the other on truth. See
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Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 557 (explaining that claim for publicity of private facts provides “a
remedy for the truthful but damaging dissemination of private facts, which is nonactionable
under defamation rules”). Because we conclude that Cook’s invasion-of-privacy claim
does not sound in defamation, the judicial-proceedings privilege does not apply. Cf.
Mahoney & Hagberg, 729 N.W.2d at 310 (determining that “claims that ar[o]se as a
consequence of [the respondent’s] purported defamatory statements” sounded in
defamation “[r]egardless of the label”).
We also reject any argument that Cook’s invasion-of-privacy claim is barred by
attorney immunity as a matter of law. Attorney immunity “may not be invoked if the
attorney, exceeding the bounds of this unique agency relationship, either is dominated by
[their] own personal interest or knowingly participates with [their] client in the perpetration
of a fraudulent or unlawful act.” McDonald, 182 N.W.2d at 440 ; see also Rucker v.
Schmidt, 768 N.W.2d 408, 412 (Minn. App. 2009) (explaining that “summary judgment
based on general principles of attorney immunity is not appropriate” when attorney is
accused of fraud). It would be premature to apply attorney immunity at this juncture
because of factual issues as to whether appellants were “dominated by [their] own personal
interest or knowingly participate[d] with [their] client in the perpetration of a fraudulent or
unlawful act.” McDonald, 182 N.W.2d at 440.
Appellants’ argument on the merits of Cook’s invasion-of-privacy claim is limited.
They focus on the second element of the claim—that the matter publicized is not of
legitimate concern to the public —and argue that true statements regarding Cook’s
settlement offers are “a legitimate concern of the public given the issues being litigated in
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the Trimble case.” And they attempt to draw comparison to the public concern regarding
the “life history” of a person accused of murder, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652D cmt. h. We are not persuaded by this analogy, and appellants cite no other authority
to support their assertion that the settlement offers are a matter of public concern. We
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the special motion to dismiss the invasion-of-
privacy claim and remand for further proceedings on it. In doing so, we express no opinion
on the overall merits of the claim.
DECISION
This court reviews a district court decision on a special motion for expedited relief
under UPEPA de novo. T he judicial-proceedings privilege generally does not apply to
statements made to the media, and the district court did not err in declining to apply it to
appellants’ 2021 media statements. But Cook’s defamation claim based on the 2021 media
statements still fails as a matter of law because the evidence is insufficient to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that appellants made the statements with actual malice. The
judicial-proceedings privilege does protect appellants from Cook’s defamation claim
related to the 2023 court filing statements. Finally, Cook’s invasion-of-privacy claim is
not protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege or otherwise subject to dismissal .
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of the UPEPA motion with respect to
Cook’s defamation claims, affirm the denial of the motion with respect to the invasion-of-
privacy claim, and remand for further proceedings on the invasion-of-privacy claim.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.