In re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1490

In re the Matter of:

Koumealo Amana,
Respondent,

vs.

Braima Diarra,
Appellant.

Filed July 21, 2025
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-DA-FA-24-1755

Holley C.M. Horrell, Benjamin L. Larson, Greene Espel, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Ryan J. Briese, Kristine J. Zajac, Zajac Law Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Bentley , Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant Braima Diarra contests a district court decision to grant his wife,
respondent Koumealo Amana, an Order for Protection (OFP) against him. First, Diarra
argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the OFP because the incidents
of domestic abuse that Amana alleged were too remote in time and those allegations lacked
sufficient specificity. Second, Diarra argues that the district court erred by ordering him
to pay Amana’s mortgage and utilities as part of the OFP. Because the district court
properly exercised its discretion on both issues, we affirm.
FACTS
Amana petitioned for an OFP against Diarra in March 2024. In her petition, she
alleged that Diarra committed multiple acts of domestic abuse against her. The district
court granted a temporary ex parte OFP and held an evidentiary hearing on Amana’s
petition over the course of multiple days. The district court heard testimony from Amana,
Diarra, and their adult daughter.
Amana testified that she is from Togo, Africa. In Togo she met Diarra and married
him in 2004. She moved to the United States in 2009 to live with Diarra, with whom she
has two daughters. Diarra no longer lives in their home, and Amana intends to divorce
him. Amana stated that during their time living together, Diarra abused her multiple times.
First, around May 2009, Diarra burned Amana’s breast with a hot clothing iron in
their home. Amana was with her daughters at the time. She still has a scar from the
incident. The district court admitted a photograph of the scar into evidence.
3
Second, around Christmas one year, Amana told Diarra that there was no food at
home to celebrate the holiday. Diarra became angry and bit her finger. Her children were
present when Diarra bit her. Diarra went away with the police. When Diarra returned after
being released, he threated to kill Amana and the children. Afterward, Amana went to a
shelter with her children to get away from Diarra. In her petition, Amana listed the date of
the incident as January 1, 2019, but testified that the incident to ok place “around 2012.”
Amana later acknowledged the discrepancy and said she was not entirely sure about the
date “because the years have gone by.”
Third, while Amana was preparing to go to an evening class at a nearby church,
Diarra hit her in the eye with a ceramic cup and caused her to bleed. Later that same day,
he hit her in the head. Amana has a scar from the incident, and the district court admitted
a photograph of the scar into evidence. On cross-examination, Amana testified that the
incident took place sometime around 2012.1
Fourth, after a family trip to a retail store, Diarra became “really angry” and
threatened “to get into a car accident” because one of the children had wanted to buy
gummy bears. Amana recalled him saying that “we’re all going to die” and “everything
will be over then.” Amana stated that the incident occurred sometime around 2010.
Amana also testified about her financial situation. She stated that although Diarra
pays for household expenses, she pays for “all the clothes, all the food,” and home repairs.

1 Amana also testified regarding a dispute with Diarra in a passport office. However, the
district court did not mention that testimony in its order granting an OFP and relied
exclusively on information about other incidents.
4
Diarra had paid for the internet for a while but stopped doing so when Amana got the
temporary ex parte OFP. Amana was not working at the time of the hearing because she
lost her job after suffering an injury a few months prior. She had no income aside from
unemployment benefits.
When the daughter testified, she corroborated each of the incidents of domestic
abuse that her mother described. She described Diarra burning Amana on the chest with a
hot clothing iron, Diarra biting Amana’s finger, Diarra hitting Amana in the head, and
Diarra swerving the car and threatening to kill the family after a trip to a retail store when
she was about in sixth grade.
When Diarra testified, he asserted that some of the altercations were “money-
related, and . . . untrue.” He denied ever burning Amana with a hot clothing iron.
Regarding the retail-store trip, he asserted that, on the way back, Amana started fighting
with him and scratched his face. He denied that there was “any time [he] initiated any
assault.” Consistent with earlier testimony about the incident in which he bit Amana’s
finger, the district court admitted a court filing showing that the state charged Diarra with
domestic assault stemming from an incident on Christmas Eve of 2012, although the state
later dismissed the charge. Regarding the family’s financial situation, Diarra stated that he
has a job and pays the mortgage and utilities in the home.
After the hearing, the district court filed an order granting Amana’s petition for an
OFP in July 2024. The district court found that Diarra committed the four acts of domestic
abuse that Amana and her daughter described in their testimony. The district court found
Amana and the adult daughter credible, but Diarra “less credible,” noting that he hesitated
5
to answer questions and “denied facts that were clear” from the record. By comparison,
the district court found “that despite slight [inconsistencies] in [Amana’s] recollection as
to timelines or dates of abuse, her recollection of details related to arguments and the
location, severity, and result of injuries were clear. [Her] demeanor . . . was sincere and
sorrowful.” The district court noted that photographs from the record and the adult
daughter’s testimony corroborated Amana’s allegations.
As part of the order, the district court prohibited Diarra from shipping, transporting,
possessing, or receiving any firearm. Diarra stated under oath that he did not own firearms.
The district court also required Diarra “to pay all mortgage payments and utilities for
[Amana’s] home.”
Diarra appeals.
DECISION
On appeal, Diarra first argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting
the petition for an OFP because the allegations were too remote in time and lacked
specificity. Alternatively, Diarra argues that the district court did not have a legal basis to
require him to pay the mortgage and utilities for Amana’s home.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing an OFP.
Diarra argues that the district court abused its discretion by issuing the OFP. Under
the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, a district court may grant an OFP by ruling on a
petition alleging domestic abuse. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subds. 1, 4-6 (2024).
“Domestic abuse” is conduct “against a family or household member by a family or
household member” that includes, but is not limited to, inflicting “physical harm, bodily
6
injury, or assault” or inflicting fear that such harm is imminent. Id., subd. 2(a) (2024). A
petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate domestic abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence. Oberg v. Bradley, 868 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. App. 2015). To demonstrate
domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, the petitioner must show that it is more
probable than not that domestic abuse occurred. Id. at 65.
We review a district court decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.
Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018). “A district court abuses its
discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). To identify an abuse of discretion,
we review findings of fact for clear error and legal issues de novo. Ekman v. Miller, 812
N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. App. 2012) (clear error); Braend ex rel. Minor Child. v. Braend,
721 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. App. 2006) (de novo).
A. The remoteness -in-time of Amana’s allegations did not preclude an
OFP.

Diarra argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting an OFP
because, under the OFP statute, domestic abuse cannot be too remote in time. Diarra relies
primarily on Bjergum v. Bjergum , 392 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. App. 1986). In a variation of
this same argument, Diarra also contends that the district court abused its discretion
because there was no present intent to inflict harm or to create fear of imminent harm,
relying primarily on Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. App. 1984), overruled by
Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 495.
7
Contrary to Diarra’s arguments, the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that
“[t]he plain language” of the OFP statute “does not require that the ‘physical harm, bodily
injury, or assault’ has occurred within a specified time before the petition is filed or be
imminent.” Thompson , 906 N.W.2d at 499. Given the holding in Thompson, Diarra’s
reliance on court of appeals cases that require domestic abuse to not be too remote in time,
such as Bjergum and Kass, is misplaced. In fact, the supreme court expressly “overrule[d]
Kass to the extent that its interpretation of [section 518B.01,] subdivision 2(a)(1) deviates
from [its] analysis.” Id. at 500.
Nevertheless, Diarra argues that Thompson does not control because “it does not
apply to situations where the respondent is barred from firearm possession.” He points to
language in Thompson where the supreme court stated: “The fact that specific temporal
language does not appear in [section 518B.01,] subdivision 2(a)(1) suggests that to obtain
an ordinary OFP—one that is not granted ex parte and does not call for the seizure of the
abuser’s firearms—the petitioner need not demonstrate that the danger of physical harm is
immediate or imminent.” Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
In that portion of the opinion, the supreme court was referring specifically to
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(i). Id. Under subdivision 6(i), when the district court
restricts a party from possessing firearms, “the court shall determine by a preponderance
of evidence if an abusing party poses an imminent risk of causing another person
substantial bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(i).

8
Under the statutory scheme, the purpose of an imminency finding is for a district
court to determine the procedure by which it confiscates firearms from the abusing party.
If the district court finds that an abusing party poses an “imminent risk, the court shall order
that the local law enforcement agency take immediate possession of all firearms in the
abusing party’s possession.” Id. If the district court does not find a party poses an
imminent risk, “the court shall order the abusing party to transfer any firearms that the
person possesses, within three business days, to a federally licensed firearms dealer, a law
enforcement agency, or a third party who may lawfully receive them.” Id., subd. 6(g). The
diverging procedures for firearm confiscation demonstrate that a district court may restrict
firearm access without finding that an abusing party poses an imminent risk of causing
another bodily harm.
Here, we first reject any contention on the part of Diarra that an erroneous firearm
restriction would render an entire OFP void. Under Thompson, a district court may issue
an OFP it if determines that domestic abuse occurred by a preponderance of the evidence
and by concluding that the relevant circumstances necessitate protection for the petitioner.
906 N.W.2d at 499- 500. Second, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing a firearm restriction without finding that Diarra posed an imminent
risk of causing another bodily harm. As we stated, the purpose of an imminency-finding
is for the district court to determine the procedure by which it confiscates firearms from
the abusing party. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(i), (g). Here, Diarra represented to
the district court that he did not own firearms, thereby negating the need for an imminency-
finding.
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We conclude that neither the remoteness-in-time of the allegations nor the absence
of an imminency-finding precluded the district court from issuing an OFP.
B. Amana’s allegations were sufficiently specific to support an OFP.
Diarra also argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting an OFP
because the domestic-abuse allegations lacked specificity. Diarra points specifically to the
vagueness and lack of consistency in the record as to when exactly the incidents occurred.
He also argues that the allegations did not include sufficient information about location.
To resolve Diarra’s argument, Thompson is again instructive. There, the supreme
court determined that the district court properly granted an OFP. 906 N.W.2d at 501. First,
the supreme court emphasized that the district court heard testimony about “multiple
specific incidents of kicking, choking, and slapping.” Id. The supreme court noted that
the district court found the testimony credible, and based on that testimony, determined
that appellant had “mentally, physically, and sexually abused” the petitioner. Id. Second,
the supreme court noted that the district court considered “the relevant circumstances” of
the abuse, “including [its] timing, frequency, and severity[,] . . . as well as the likelihood
of further abuse,” before issuing the OFP. Id.
Here, like in Thompson, Amana detailed “multiple specific incidents” of domestic
abuse, including Diarra burning her with a clothing iron, biting her finger, hitting her in the
head, and threatening to crash a vehicle that she was in. See id. Her adult daughter
corroborated each of these incidents in her own testimony. And like in Thompson, the
district court found both Amana and her daughter credible. See id.; Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427
10
N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“Deference must be given to the opportunity of the
[district] court to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”).
Furthermore, like in Thompson, the district court considered the relevant
circumstances of the abuse. 906 N.W.2d at 501. In its order, the district court found “that
despite slight [inconsistencies] in [Amana’s] recollection as to timelines or dates of abuse,
her recollection of details related to arguments and the location, severity, and result of
injuries were clear.” This finding has support from the record. Amana and her daughter
provided detailed testimony about the abuse. And Amana, contrary to Diarra’s arguments,
was specific about the location of the incidents, describing them taking place at home, and
in the case of the vehicle-incident, after a trip to a retail store. Finally, although Amana
and her daughter were not particularly precise or consistent in identifying when exactly the
incidents took place, they still provided some indicia of time throughout their testimony:
the hot-iron incident took place around May 2009; the finger-biting incident took place
during Christmas-time; the incident where Diarra hit her in the head took place around
2012; and the car-incident occurred approximately when the daughter was in the sixth
grade. Diarra does not cite caselaw that requires domestic-abuse allegations to be more
specific than what Amana and her daughter provided.
We conclude the evidence was sufficiently specific for the district court to act within
its discretion by determining that domestic abuse occurred and that the abuse necessitated
an OFP.

11
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Diarra to pay the
mortgage and utilities under the OFP.

Alternatively, Diarra argues that the district court erroneously provided Amana with
relief that the OFP statute does not permit. Diarra points specifically to the district court
ordering him to pay the mortgage and utilities on the home and notes that the district court
did not provide this relief in the form of spousal maintenance. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552
(2024).
Under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a), a district court may provide various forms
of relief to an OFP-petitioner including:
(5) on the same basis as is provided in chapter 518 or
518A, establish temporary support for minor children or a
spouse, and order the withholding of support from the income
of the person obligated to pay the support according to chapter
518A; . . .
(8) award temporary use and possession of property and
restrain one or both parties from transferring, encumbering,
concealing, or disposing of property[;] . . .
(11) order the abusing party to pay restitution to the
petitioner; . . .
(13) order, in its discretion, other relief as it deems
necessary for the protection of a family or household member,
including orders or directives to the sheriff or other law
enforcement or corrections officer as provided by this
section[.]

Relief under subdivision 6 “is within the district court’s discretion,” and district
courts “should consider the uniqueness of the remedies available under the statute, as well
as the potentially devastating consequences if such relief is not granted.”
Mechtel v. Mechtel, 528 N.W.2d 916, 920 (Minn. App. 1995). In addition, the supreme
court has stressed that OFP proceedings are time-sensitive and do not require detailed
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findings of fact that may inappropriately delay relief. See Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d
282, 290 (Minn. 1992) (concluding that district courts, when deciding upon custody for
children as part of issuing an OFP, need not make particularized findings regarding a
child’s best-interests under separate state statute).
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion by requiring Diarra to
pay the mortgage and utilities under subdivision 6(a). To be sure, other provisions in
subdivision 6(a) expressly authorize similar kinds of relief. For example, subdivisions
6(a)(5) and (11) permit financial relief in the form of spousal maintenance and restitution.
And subdivision 6(a)(8) allows district courts to grant possession of property and to restrict
“parties from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or dis posing of property.” But
regardless of whether the district court could have ordered similar relief under those
provisions, subdivision 6(a)(13) vests the district court with broad authority to “order, in
its discretion, other relief as it deems necessary for the protection of a family or household
member.”
Here, based on the evidence in the record, the district court properly fashioned relief
that was necessary to protect Amana. The district court heard testimony that Amana was
unemployed, but that she was paying for many of the household expenses. Diarra testified
that he has a job and pays the mortgage and utilities. Given the breadth of the district
court’s discretion, and t he time-sensitive nature of providing relief to Amana and her
household, we refrain from concluding that the relief in this case was improper because it
was outside the statutory framework for spousal maintenance . Because ensuring that
Amana can maintain a home is vital to her protection, the district court did not abuse its
13
discretion by requiring Diarra to continue paying the mortgage and utilities under
subdivision 6(a) of the OFP statute.2
Affirmed.

2 We emphasize that if financial hardship prevents Diarra from fulfilling his obligations,
he may seek to modify the OFP. See Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 11 (2024).