Rick Stevens, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1499

Rick Stevens,
Appellant,

vs.

State Bank of Bellingham,
Respondent.

Filed June 23, 2025
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Lac Qui Parle County District Court
File No. 37-CV-22-87

Alf E. Sivertson, Anja M. Sivertson, Law Office of Sivertson and Barrette, P. A., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Melissa Dosick Riethof, Meagher + Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bond ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of respondent, his former employer, on his claim that respondent violated the Minnesota
Whistleblower Act (MWA), Minn. Stat. § 181.932 (2024 ), and abused its discretion by
denying his motion to add a claim for punitive damages. We affirm.
2
FACTS1
In April 2021, an employee who had worked for respondent State Bank of
Bellingham (the bank) for 39 years suddenly passed away. The employee’s family went
to the bank to collect his personal items. Appellant Rick Stevens, the bank’s president and
CEO, told the family that they could not have the employee’s calendars because they
contained confidential customer information. The bank’s vice president of operations
(VPO) was part of the conversation. The VPO disagreed with Stevens’s position on the
calendars and believed that he was rude in discussing the issue with the family just days
after the funeral.
Following the incident, Stevens reported to the bank’s owner that the calendars
contained confidential information and that he merely acted to protect the bank by not
giving the calendars to the family. The VPO reported to the bank’s owner that she observed
Stevens acting insensitively and rudely to the family.
The deceased employee’s son also called the bank’s owner. The son had not gone
with his family to the bank, but his mother told him about the incident. He stated that his
family was upset because Stevens acted disrespectfully. The son stated that Stevens’s
behavior was “consistent” with what customers of the bank had expressed, which was that
Stevens was “condescending and rude toward . . . customers and employees.” The son
stated that he understood that Stevens’s “reputation in the community was poor,” that

1 The facts are derived from the summary judgment record and are recited in the light most
favorable to appellant as the nonmoving party.
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customers “may be looking to move to other area banks,” and that “a small town bank . . .
would be worthless without community support.”
The bank’s owner terminated Stevens’s employment on April 23, 2021, stating that
he was doing so “because of the potential backlash from Stevens’s rude and inappropriate
behavior.”
On April 13, 2022, Stevens sued the bank, alleging that the bank violated the MWA
when it terminated his employment after he reported that the VPO attempted to release
confidential customer information. T he bank filed a counterclaim, alleging that Stevens
was unjustly enriched when he accepted payments from the bank pursuant to a severance
agreement that included a release-of-claims provision that Stevens ultimately failed to sign.
The bank moved for summary judgment. At a hearing, the bank conceded that
Stevens established a prima facia case under the MWA. But the bank claimed that
Stevens’s termination was not in retaliation for his protected conduct; rather, Stevens was
terminated because the bank’s owner believed that Stevens was harming the bank’s
reputation.
On May 5, 2023, the district court filed an order granting the bank’s motion for
summary judgment. 2 The district court determined that Stevens failed to produce
“evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that [the bank]’s reason for
terminating employment, [its] belief that [Stevens]’s rudeness was harmful to [its]

2 The district court denied summary judgment on the bank’s unjust-enrichment
counterclaim, but ultimately entered judgment in its favor. Stevens does not challenge that
decision on appeal.
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reputation and business, was a pretext.” The district court stated that whether the allegation
that Stevens was rude was true was irrelevant to the bank owner’s belief about the situation,
and Stevens offered no evidence that the bank owner’s belief about the situation was false.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
Summary judgment
Stevens first argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of the bank on his MWA claim. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
“shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. This court reviews de novo whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact and “whether the district court erred in its
application of the law.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 77
(Minn. 2002). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence
regarding an essential element . . . to permit reasonable persons to draw different
conclusions.” St. Paul Park Refining Co. v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted). This court views “the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party . . . and resolve[s] all doubts and factual inferences against the moving
part[y].” Rochester City Lines, Co. v. City of Rochester, 868 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn.
2015).
The MWA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who, “in
good faith, reports a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation” of the law. Minn.
Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1). In assessing whether an employer discriminated against an
5
employee, courts use the “McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to allocate the
burden of proof between the plaintiff and defendant.” Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,
972 N.W.2d 362, 372 (Minn. 2022). There are three steps: first, “the employee must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Id. at 372-73. To establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, Stevens, as the employee, must show “(1) statutorily- protected
conduct by [himself]; (2) adverse employment action by the [bank]; and (3) a causal
connection between the two.” Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 590, 592
(Minn. App. 1996) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997). If Stevens
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the bank to show “some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason to explain why it took the adverse employment action.” Hanson,
972 N.W.2d at 373 (quotation omitted). Stevens then carries the final burden to
demonstrate that the “proffered reason is pretextual.” See id.
Here, the parties agree that Stevens established a prima facie case because he offered
evidence that he was terminated shortly after reporting that he had prevented the VPO from
disclosing confidential customer information. The parties also agree that the bank met its
burden to offer a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to explain” its decision to terminate
Stevens—the bank’s owner believed that Stevens’s rude and condescending behavior was
potentially harmful to the bank’s reputation. The issue we must resolve is whether Stevens
offered evidence sufficient to prove that the bank’s “proffered reason is pretextual,” and
that he was actually terminated because he reported the conduct of the VPO.
Stevens argues that the district court erred by accepting the bank owner’s “belief”
that Stevens’s conduct could harm the bank’s reputation, because the evidence shows that
6
Stevens acted appropriately during the interaction with the deceased employee’s family.
We disagree.
Here, the bank’s owner explained the circumstances during his deposition. He
stated that Stevens called him after the interaction with the family and stated that the VPO
yelled at Stevens and insulted him. The bank’s owner called the VPO and asked her what
happened. According to the bank’s owner, the VPO explained:
[The employee]’s widow, came into the bank to pick up some
of [his] personal effects, a 40-year employee of the bank.
. . . .
Mr. Stevens didn ’t acknowledge her coming into the
bank, didn’t get out of his office, and after [the family] had
been there a while he came storming out of his office and said
that you aren’t going to get those calendars, that they are gone
and you can’t have them and was rude in his behavior to [the
family] to the point that they became visibly upset, started
crying, went into the conference room, and it was all as a result
of the rude behavior of Mr. Stevens.
And [the VPO] indicated that the calendars were really
not something that [the family] came in to retrieve, that they
weren’t really even going to go out that day to them. They did
tell them about [the calendars] so [the family] knew . . . [about
the calendars], but they weren’t there to pick up the calendars
and the scene escalated unnecessarily.

The VPO also reported that she and another bank employee were going to quit because
“[t]hey had it with Mr. Stevens’[s] rude behavior to not only [the family], but to the
customers of the bank and to all the fellow employees of the bank.” The bank’s owner
stated:
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Well, this isn’t the first incident that happened.

I mean there were numerous other incidents and
numerous examples of rudeness to customers, customers who
left the bank as a result of it, rudeness to employees.
So this was . . . not the first incident, but it was the last
in my mind.
Like I said, I was not there, but I had to picture this in
my mind, and picture this man is a big man and he is
dominating over this poor grieving widow being rude to her,
making her cry, having to leave the room and go into the
conference room because of his rudeness to her that was
completely uncalled for, completely inappropriate for the
situation.
That optic in my mind, it was so horrible that when it
spread throughout this small town, this small community, and
they were going to get it from [the widow], they weren’t going
to get it from [Stevens], and from [the bank’s employees],
everybody else that was in the bank confirming it, that optic to
me is so bad that there is no way to overcome it. The reputation
was just ruined.
I mean there is no way of overcoming that picture. I
still picture it in my mind, and that is just a horrible, horrible
optic. So I had no other reason, no other choice but to
terminate him.

We agree with the district court that, even taking the evidence in the light most
favorable to Stevens, he failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove that the bank’s proffered
reason for his termination was pretext. The bank owner’s statements show that the bank
terminated Stevens because of his inappropriate behavior that could harm the bank’s
reputation. Stevens does not explain why the bank would have terminated him because he
reported that the VPO wanted to give the family the calendars, especially when the bank’s
owner was told that the family did not go to the bank specifically to collect the calendars.
Nor does Stevens explain why the bank would terminate him because he sought to prevent
the release of confidential customer information. F rom this record, there is not sufficient
8
evidence to allow reasonable persons to draw different conclusions. We conclude that the
district court properly granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment.
Punitive damages
Stevens also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to add a claim for punitive damages, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 549.191 (2024). See Bjerke
v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 196 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that this court reviews denial
of motion to amend a complaint to add claim for punitive damages for an abuse of
discretion), aff’d, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007). Although we have concluded that the
district court properly granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment, and it is therefore
unnecessary for us to address this argument, we briefly address it to affirm the district
court’s decision.
After he filed his complaint, Stevens moved the district court for leave to amend the
complaint to add punitive damages, claiming that the facts would permit a jury to conclude
that it is “highly probable” that the bank “acted with a conscious or deliberate disregard to
the right of Stevens to report planned violations of law without fear of reprisal.” Following
a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Stevens argues that the district court’s denial
of his motion must be reversed because it provided no reason for denying the motion.
After filing the suit a party may make a motion to amend the
pleadings to claim punitive damages. The motion must allege
the applicable legal basis under section 549.20 or other law for
awarding punitive damages in the action and must be
accompanied by one or more affidavits showing the factual
basis for the claim. At the hearing on the motion, if the court
finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion, the court
shall grant the moving party permission to amend the pleadings
to claim punitive damages.
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Minn. Stat. § 549.191. Under Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1 (2024):

(a) Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only
upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the
defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of
others.
(b) A defendant has acted with deliberate disregard for the
rights or safety of others if the defendant has knowledge of
facts or intentionally disregards facts that create a high
probability of injury to the rights or safety of others and:
(1) deliberately proceeds to act in conscious or intentional
disregard of the high degree of probability of injury to the
rights or safety of others; or
(2) deliberately proceeds to act with indifference to the high
probability of injury to the rights or safety of others.

Stevens appears to be correct that the district court did not provide a reason for
denying the motion. But the statute does not require the district court to provide a reason.
Under Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 5 (2024), a district court “shall specifically review the
punitive damages award in light of the factors set forth in subdivision 3 and shall make
specific findings with respect to them.” (Emphasis added.) But there is not a similar
requirement for a district court to make specific findings in denying a motion to amend the
complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. And, although the district court did not
provide a reason for denying the motion, it may be inferred that the district court did not
find that prima facie evidence existed to support the motion. Because Stevens does not
offer authority that the district court must make findings on the motion, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to amend the complaint
to add a claim for punitive damages.
Affirmed.