State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1516

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Matthew Joel Hall,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-23-3831

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Chelsey A. Fischbach, Christa J. Groshek, Groshek Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bond,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from multiple convictions of possession of child pornography and
disseminating pornographic work depicting a minor under the age of 14, and following a
stay of appeal and remand for postconviction proceedings, appellant argues that the district
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court abused its discretion in (1) summarily denying his postconviction petition because he
received ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) denying his request for a downward
dispositional departure. Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Matthew Joel
Hall with seven counts of felony possession of pornographic work depicting a minor under
the age of 14, and three counts of disseminating pornographic work depicting a minor under
the age of 14. Without any agreement with respondent, appellant entered “straight” guilty
pleas to all charged offenses. At sentencing, the district court denied appellant’s request
for a downward dispositional departure and, after Hernandizing appellant’s criminal -
history score,1 sentenced appellant to 153 months in prison.
After filing this appeal, appellant moved to stay the appeal so that he could pursue
postconviction relief. This court granted the motion, and appellant filed a postconviction
petition in district court arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, appellant argued that
his counsel was ineffective because he failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the
alleged unla wful material possessed by appellant to confirm that the material was

1 “Hernandizing” is a method of sentencing whereby district courts, when sentencing a
criminal defendant for multiple felony convictions at the same time, use each of the
defendant’s convictions —assuming the convictions are not part of the same behavioral
incident—to calculate each ensuing criminal -history score for presumptive sentencing
under the guidelines. State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Minn. 1981).
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consistent with child pornography. The district court summarily denied appellant’s petition
for postconviction relief, and this court subsequently dissolved the stay of this appeal.
DECISION
I.
Appellant challenges the district court’s summary denial of his postconviction
petition. This court reviews a district court’s decision to deny a petition for postconviction
relief for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). The
district court will not be reversed unless it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted). A postconviction petition may be summarily denied if “the petition and the files
and records of the proceedings conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024).
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 6, of
the Minnesota Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant ‘the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’” Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quoting
Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ). To establish that counsel was
ineffective under the two -prong Strickland test, appellant must show that (1) his trial
counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) but for
counsel’s unreasonable performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. “A court may
address the two prongs of the test in any order and may dispose of the claim on one prong
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without analyzing the other.” Schleicher v. State , 718 N.W.2d 440, 447 (Minn. 2006) .
“Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and fact,
[appellate courts] review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions on such questions de
novo.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013).
Appellant argues that by admittedly “not review[ing] the alleged pornographic
works that support[ed] the charges in the complaint,” his trial counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, which led to appellant “blindly” pleading
“guilty to possessing/disseminating items that may not even constitute child pornography.”
But assuming, without deciding, that appellant’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient,
appellant is entitled to relief only if he can show “that a reasonable probability exists that
the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” State v. Sardina-Padilla,
7 N.W.3d 585, 603 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). In the context of a guilty plea, a
defendant must show, “a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State , 816
N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Here, appellant did not allege in this postconviction petition and does not argue on
appeal that, but for counsel’s errors, appellant would not have pleaded guilty. Instead,
appellant contends that, if trial counsel had viewed, and then contested, the alleged child
pornography, he “may” have received a shorter sentence because some of the charges
“may” have been dismissed. Specifically, appellant refers to counts III and IV ; count III
alleged that appellant possessed “[a] 28 second video containing a nude prepubescent
female fondling her breasts and genitals,” and count IV alleged that appellant possessed
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“[a] 48 second video of an adult male touching a nude female child’s genitals.” Appellant
argues that count III “should have been contested because touching one’s breasts does not
constitute pornographic work.” And appellant claims that count IV should have been
contested because the “video description . . . is vague and may not constitute pornographic
work, if the nature of the touching was for example conducted for the purpose of
caregiving.”
We are not persuaded. Under Minnesota law, it is unlawful to possess pornographic
work involving “a minor under the age of 14 years.” Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4(b)(3)
(2022). “Pornographic work” includes video that “uses a minor to depict actual or
simulated sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat. § 617.246, subd. 1(f)(2)(i) (2022). And “sexual
conduct” includes “physical contact with the . . . unclothed pubic areas or buttocks of a
human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of
the same or opposite sex . . . in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.” Id.,
subd. 1(e)(5) (2022).
Here, appellant does not dispute that the females in the videos are minors under the
age of 14. And the descriptions of the videos are at least sufficient to establish probable
cause that the videos constitute pornographic work because the descriptions es tablish that
the minors were engaged in “sexual conduct” as defined in section 617.246, subdivision
1(e)(5). Because the descriptions of the videos establish probable cause that the videos
contained depictions of child pornography, appellant is unable to show a reasonable
probability that a motion to dismiss counts III and IV would have been successful.
Although appellant claims that the content of the videos in counts III and IV may show
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something other than sexual conduct, such as “caregiving” or simply “[t]ouching one’s
breasts,” any factual dispute regarding whether the videos constitute child pornography
would have been submitted to the finder of fact. Appellant fails to establish a r easonable
probability that the finder of fact would conclude that the videos do not contain depictions
of child pornography. Thus, appellant fails to establish a reasonable probability that, had
trial counsel viewed the videos described in counts III and IV, he would not have pleaded
guilty to these counts.
As to the remaining eight counts to which appellant pleaded guilty, appellant asserts
that the evidence should have been “reviewed to confirm accuracy in description.” But
appellant does not claim that a review of the evidence would have demonstrated that the
descriptions were inaccurate or that the evidence failed to establish probable cause. And
appellant does not claim that he would not have pleaded guilty to these counts if his trial
counsel had viewed this evidence. In other words, appellant does no t even claim that the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Rather, he simply speculates that the
descriptions alleged in the complaint may be inaccurate. Appellant’s speculation is
insufficient to establish that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for
counsel’s failure to review the evidence alleged in the complaint. See Swaney v. State, 882
N.W.2d 207, 218 (Minn. 2016) (concluding that the defendant failed to satisfy his burden
of proving a reasonable probability that, had certain records been obtained, the result of the
trial would have been different because such a conclusion was based on “nothing more
than speculation”); see also Gates v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 563 (Minn. 1987) (stating that
it is not proper to reverse a conviction on speculation that an investigation might have
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found evidence that would have helped the defendant’s case). Therefore, appellant has
failed to meet his burden to show that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for an evidentiary hearing on his petition for postconviction relief. But again, an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails if either one of the Strickland prongs is not
satisfied. Schleicher, 718 N.W.2d at 447. As addressed above, appellant’s petition and the
files and records of the proceedings conclusively show that appellant has failed to establish
the second prong of the Strickland test. As such , the district court did not abuse its
discretion by summarily denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief.
II.
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a downward
dispositional departure. We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014) . Only in a rare case will we reverse a
district court’s refusal to depart. State v. Abrahamson, 758 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. App.
2008), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009).
The district court “must order the presumptive sentence provided in the sentencing
guidelines unless substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a departure.” State v.
Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). “Substantial and
compelling circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case
different from a typical case.” State v. Olson , 765 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2009)
(quotation omitted). A downward dispositional departure is appropriate when a defendant
is “particularl[y] amen able to individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” Soto,
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855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted). Factors that may indicate a particular amenability
to probation include the defendant ’s “age, . . . prior record, . . . remorse, . . . cooperation,
. . . attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323
N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion “by not finding
substantial and compelling circumstances to depart” because he “positively demonstrated
all of the Trog factors beyond a substantial and compelling standard.” We disagree. A
district court is not required to grant a downward dispositional departure even if a
defendant is particularly amenable to probation. Olson, 765 N.W.2d at 664-65. Moreover,
the district court here specifically found that appellant is not “particularly am enable to
probation.” Instead, the district court found that a “guideline sentence is appropriate . . .
given the nature of the charges, the number of counts that appellant [ple aded] to, and the
lack of insight that he has into his own criminal behavior.” In making this determination,
the district court recognized the recommendation in the psychological and psychosexual
evaluation but declined to adopt it because it was “based on se lf-reporting.” And the
district court declined to find “credible” the rea sons appellant provided for joining the
social media application through which the child pornography was accessed. Finally,
although the pre-sentence investigation stated that appellant is “amenable to community -
based supervision,” it recommended that appellant be sentenced to prison. The district
court’s explanations for denying appellant’s motion for a downward dispositional
departure demonstrate that the court carefully evaluated all the information presented in
making its decision. See State v. Van R uler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 -81 (Minn. App. 1985)
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(stating that this court will affirm “as long as the record shows the [district] court carefully
evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a determination”).
Accordingly, appellant has not shown that this is the rare case in which the district court
abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a downward dispositional departure.
Affirmed.