This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1519

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lafayette Temple,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-5864

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Bentley, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BENTLEY, Judge

In this direct appeal from appellant Lafayette Temple's conviction for filing improper financing statements against law enforcement officers and attorneys, Temple argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the offense occurred in Ramsey County and (2) he intended to harass and retaliate against the subjects of the financing statements. Because the evidence was sufficient to support Temple's convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.

FACTS

The series of events leading to Temple's conviction began with a seemingly routine traffic stop. The following facts summarize the evidence received at trial, which included an officer's body-worn camera footage and testimony.

Officer W. of the Bloomington Police Department pulled Temple over on December 4, 2019, on suspicion that he was speeding.[1] The officer asked Temple for his driver's license and proof of insurance, but Temple repeatedly refused. Instead, Temple insisted that Officer W. take a document from him, review it, and provide the information requested on the document. Although Officer W. initially declined to take the document, he eventually relented. After several other officers arrived, including Officer R. and Sergeant H., Officer W. looked at the document.

The document was entitled, "Legal Notice and Demand." It made various assertions, including that the recipient must complete the attached "public servant questionnaire" and that there is "state-certified documentation that identifies the party that tendered this document to you as having complete and lawful constitutional immunity from persecution." The document also declared, "Your action from this point will be in violation

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[1] Throughout the opinion, we refer to nonparties by their initials, instead of their real names, in accordance with our rules of public access. *See* Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 8, subd. 2(b)(5) (recommending that appellate opinions limit disclosure of witness identities "to what is necessary and relevant").

of this living person's protected rights, and you will be assessed with levies and fines and or tort upon those violations, starting at $2,000,000.00 and upwards of $5,000,000.00 to be immediately attached to all your asset[s] for payment." The second page contained a "Public Servant Questionnaire" that requested the public servant's identity and the purpose of their investigation.

After Officer W. reviewed the document, Temple tendered a passport card but would not produce a driver's license. Temple also told the officers that he had been "a cop for 17 years." When Officer W. asked whether Temple had been drinking, Temple denied that he had. Temple also declined Officer W.'s request for Temple to step out of the car. To avoid escalating the situation, Officer W. provided handwritten responses to Temple's questionnaire and signed it. Temple then got out of his car, and Officer W. conducted field sobriety tests. A preliminary breath test registered the alcohol concentration in Temple's blood as under the legal limit. Officer W. cited Temple for speeding and driving without being in possession of his driver's license. As he handed the citation to Temple, Temple asked, "Do you really want to do this?" and stated that Officer W. was "forfeiting" his home and job.

First Financing Statement

Days after Temple received the citation, he began sending correspondence to the police officers involved in the stop and several public officials associated with the City of Bloomington. Temple sent three letters demanding over $36 million for trespassing, abuse of authority, assault, unlawful detainer, and copyright infringement. One letter implored the Bloomington police chief to void the citation. Another letter asserted that Officer W., Officer R., and Sergeant H. tacitly agreed to his claims because they did not respond.

Although the City of Bloomington did not respond directly to Temple, it notified its insurance provider of a potential claim. The provider assigned counsel, including attorney S.A., who reviewed Temple's correspondences and began monitoring the Minnesota Secretary of State's website for financing statements that Temple may have filed.[2]

On April 20, 2020, Temple filed an online financing statement with the secretary of state. The statement named Temple as the secured party and listed five debtors: Officer W., Officer R., and Sergeant H., who were present at the traffic stop; the Bloomington police chief; and the Bloomington Police Department. The statement listed the Bloomington Police Department address for all debtors. As collateral, the statement contained an exhaustive list claiming, among other things, "[a]ll collateral including assets . . . from every source" and "[a]ll accounts . . . not listed as assets."

On May 14, 2020, S.A. filed a motion in Hennepin County District Court for judicial review of the April 20, 2020 financing statement because the statement was fraudulent or otherwise improper. Another attorney from S.A.'s firm, J.H., was included on the signature block of the motion but did not otherwise participate in the litigation. The motion was served on Temple by mail on the same day it was filed, but he did not file a response. Instead, Temple mailed S.A. a letter responding to some of the claims in the motion and

[2] "[A] financing statement serves the purpose of putting nonparties such as other subsequent creditors on notice that the debtor's property is encumbered." *Allete, Inc. v. GEC Eng'g, Inc.*, 726 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted).

reasserting his demand for payment. The district court decided that the financing statement "is not a legally valid financing statement." The secretary of state expunged the financing statement on June 16, 2020.

Second and Third Financing Statements

Temple submitted two more financing statements after the first was expunged. On June 27, 2020, Temple submitted a second financing statement, which was like the first except in two respects. For one, the statement now stated that it was "for the amount of $66,500,000.00." For another, the statement used home addresses for the police chief and the sergeant. On November 19, 2020, Temple filed a third financing statement that added attorneys S.A. and J.H. to the June 27, 2020 financing statement. That filing included the attorneys' home addresses.

S.A. did not learn about the new financing statements until February 2021, as she did not expect Temple to file additional financing statements after the first one was removed. After S.A. found out, she started another district court action to remove the subsequent statements. This time, the district court held a hearing.

At the hearing, Temple stated that he entered into contracts with the police officers, police chief, and city attorneys because he provided them with documents that they did not rebut, and that the failure to rebut something means that it becomes legally true; that he is entitled to $154 million based on their violation of those contracts; that he is allowed to file a financing statement to secure assets if a payment has not been made; that he did not intend to retaliate by filing the financing statements; and that he was willing to remove the attorneys from the financing statement based on the district court judge's "argument" that they could not legally contract with Temple as a matter of "quasi-judicial immunity."

Following the hearing, the district court concluded that the financing statements were invalid because Temple "failed to demonstrate that the debtors authorized the filing." The financing statements were removed soon afterwards.

Criminal Proceedings

The state charged Temple with two felony counts and two gross-misdemeanor counts of improper filing of a financing statement, Minn. Stat. § 609.7475 (2024), for each of the April, June, and November 2020 filings, for a total of 12 counts. Temple waived his right to a jury trial, and the matter proceeded by court trial on February 26, 2024.

At trial, the affected officers and attorneys testified about the consequences that the financing statements had on them. Sergeant H. testified that the financing statement was mailed to his home, which "surprised [him] and shocked [him]" and made him "uncomfortable." It caused him to have a discussion with his young children to call him or 911 if they noticed anyone sitting in front of their house or delivering anything in the mail. Similarly, S.A. testified that the inclusion of the officer's addresses on a public document caused them to be upset because their addresses are "sensitive" and "private information under Minnesota law." S.A. was also concerned about Temple's use of her home address. It "influenced what [her family was] doing with security for the home," causing her to talk with her family and neighbors about keeping a "lookout." For Officer R., he noticed the financing statement when he was attempting to secure a mortgage for his home. This prompted him to request S.A. to draft a letter to his mortgage lender explaining the situation.

The court also received evidence about Temple's career in law enforcement. Temple was a police officer with the Metro Transit Police Department between 2013 and 2015 and was a licensed peace officer for over a decade.

Finally, an employee of the secretary of state testified that financing statements submitted online are received at the secretary of state's office in Ramsey County.

On April 8, 2024, the district court issued an order finding Temple guilty of all twelve counts of improper filing of a financing statement. It found that the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that Temple filed the financing statements with the intent to harass and retaliate. And because the statements were filed in Ramsey County, the court found that venue was proper.

The district court convicted Temple of three felony counts of improper filing with intent to harass, with one count relating to each filing date. Temple was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for the count relating to the April 20, 2020 filing and to 21 months' imprisonment for each of the counts relating to the second and third filings, with all three sentences to be served concurrently.

Temple appeals.

DECISION

Temple argues that his conviction should be reversed because the state's evidence fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Ramsey County was a proper venue for his trial and (2) he filed the financing statements with an intent to harass and retaliate.

Due process requires the state to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *In re Winship*, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); *State v. Merrill*, 428 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn. 1988); *see* U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. When an appellate court reviews whether there is sufficient evidence to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, we conduct a "painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction," supports the fact-finder's decision. *State v. Horst*, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We "assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that verdict." *State v. Palmer*, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). "We use the same standard of review in bench trials and in jury trials in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence." *Id.*

I

We turn first to Temple's argument that his conviction must be reversed because the state failed to prove that venue was proper in Ramsey County. A general venue statute provides that all criminal cases "shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed," Minn. Stat. § 627.01, subd. 1 (2024), and the improper-financing-statement statute at issue provides that "[a] violation of this section may be prosecuted in either the county of residence of the individual listed as debtor or the county in which the filing is made." Minn. Stat. § 609.7475, subd. 4. Temple argues that these statutes make venue an element of the crime that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the state did not meet its burden because it presented no evidence about where the debtors lived or where Temple was physically located when he submitted the online financing statements.

The state maintains that venue was proper in Ramsey County because the financing statements were received by the secretary of state's office there. We begin by reviewing the law on venue as an element of a criminal offense. Then, we address Temple's arguments about whether venue was proper in Ramsey County.

A

Temple's venue challenge relies on the principle that venue is an element of the offense that the state needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This principle is rooted in our court's prior decisions. *See State v. Seivers*, 2 N.W.3d 568, 573 (Minn. App. 2024) (stating that Minn. Stat. § 627.01, subd. 1, makes "venue an essential element of every criminal offense" (quotation omitted)), *rev. granted and stayed* (Minn. Apr. 24, 2024). But after the parties submitted briefing in this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified that "the statutory venue requirement set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 627.01 is not an element of an offense." *State v. Paulson*, 22 N.W.3d 144, 151 (Minn. 2025). We are bound by the supreme court's precedent on this issue. *See State v. Curtis*, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (noting that this court "is bound by supreme court precedent").

Although the supreme court has not yet addressed the venue requirement set forth in the improper-financing-statement statute, *Paulson* appears to compel the conclusion that the venue requirement is not an element of the offense. In *Paulson*, the supreme court decided that Minnesota Statutes section 627.01 does not make venue an element of an offense because an improper venue "does not negate a defendant's criminal culpability." 22 N.W.3d at 151. Likewise, the statutory venue requirement set forth in the improper-financing-statement statute is distinct from a defendant's criminal culpability for the offense. The statute lists substantive elements of the crime that would make a person "guilty of [the] crime," Minn. Stat. § 609.7475, subd. 2, and sets forth the location where "[a] violation of this section may be prosecuted" in a different part of the statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.7475, subd. 4. Applying *Paulson* here, we are inclined to conclude that venue is not an element of the improper-financing-statement offense that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, we need not decide that question here, without the benefit of briefing by the parties, because we conclude that venue was proper in Ramsey County.

B

Even if venue were an element that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, we are persuaded the state satisfied that requirement. The dispute turns on where a person "presents for filing or causes to be presented for filing" an online financing statement. *Id.*, subd. 2(2). Temple argues that the venue is proper only in the county where the presenter is physically located when they submit an online record. The state argues that the proper venue includes the physical location where an online record is received. This presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. *State v. Miller*, 977 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. 2022).

The supreme court has recently interpreted the scope of a comparable statutory venue requirement. *State v. Johnson*, 995 N.W.2d 155, 159-61 (Minn. 2023). Reviewing a conviction for the crime of false reporting, which is committed when a person 'informs a law enforcement officer that a crime has been committed . . . knowing that [the report] is false and intending that the officer shall act in reliance upon [the report], the supreme court considered whether an element of the crime is committed where the law enforcement officer is "informed" by the false report. *Id.* at 160 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 1 (2022)). The supreme court first looked to dictionary definitions of "inform," but some definitions mentioned a recipient and others merely involved making information available. *Id.* at 160-61. To resolve the competing interpretations, the court looked to the whole statute and noted that "the language of the statute expressly provides that, to commit this crime, the defendant must inform a specific type of person—a law enforcement officer[.]" *Id.* at 161. Accordingly, the court noted that "the plain language of the statute reflects a legislative intent to include, as part of the crime, a police officer's receipt of the false information." *Id.* Thus, the supreme court held that venue is proper both in the county where the report is made and where the report is received. *Id.*

We reach a similar conclusion here. Some dictionary definitions of "present" include a recipient, and others describe only the offering of information. *Compare The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* 1393 (5th ed. 2018) ("To offer for observation, examination, or consideration; show or display."), *with The Compact Oxford English Dictionary* 1420 (2d ed. 1991) ("To bring or lay before a court, magistrate, or person in authority, for consideration or trial; to make presentment of."). But reading the statute as whole, we are persuaded that venue is appropriate in the county where a filing is received. The statute applies to a person who "presents *for filing* or causes to be presented *for filing*" an intentionally harassing or fraudulent record. Minn. Stat. § 609.7475, subd. 2(2). "Filing" is "[t]he act or an instance of submitting or lodging a document with a court clerk or record custodian." *Black's Law Dictionary* 769 (12th ed. 2024). Reading these words together, presenting something for filing necessarily includes a specific recipient: a court clerk or records custodian. Put another way, the statute reflects a legislative intent that the crime is not complete unless and until it has been presented to a records custodian for filing. Here, the evidence established that the records custodian—the secretary of state—was located in Ramsey County. Therefore, the "offense was committed," Minn. Stat. § 627.01, subd. 1, at least in part in Ramsey County, and the state met its burden to establish venue there.

Temple argues that this reading would contravene legislative intent because it would mean that every improper financing statement offense could be tried in Ramsey County, even if the only connection to Ramsey County were that the financing statement was received by the secretary of state there. But the best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute, *State v. Latino*, 15 N.W.3d 654, 659 (Minn. 2025), which supports our conclusion that venue is proper in the county where a record is received. For the reasons described above, venue was therefore proper in Ramsey County.[3]

II

We turn now to Temple's argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he filed the financing statements with an intent to harass and retaliate. Temple argues that the circumstances proved support a reasonable hypothesis that he filed the financing statements "in a good faith, but mistaken, belief that the

[3] The state also argues that Temple forfeited a challenge to the venue element by waiving his right to a jury trial. Because we conclude that Temple's challenge to the venue element fails for other reasons, we need not reach that issue.

[financing statements] were a legally permissible method to enforce his rights." He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had an intent to retaliate against the police chief's and J.H.'s performance of official duties.

As we stated previously, the state must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. *Winship*, 397 U.S. at 364; *Merrill*, 428 N.W.2d at 366. Temple was convicted of a felony violation of the statute criminalizing the filing of improper financing statements. *See* Minn. Stat. § 609.7475, subds. 2(2), 3. A person is guilty of this offense if he "presents for filing or causes to be presented for filing a record with the intent that it be used to harass or defraud any other person." *Id.*, subd. 2(2). The offense is enhanced to a felony if the person files the record "with intent to retaliate against" certain individuals, including an "officer of the court, because of that person's performance of official duties in connection with a judicial proceeding"[4] or "a police officer or chief of police because of that person's performance of official duties." Minn. Stat. § 609.7475, subd. 3(b)(1)(ii), (iv). Temple's challenge rests on the state's proof of his intent to harass or retaliate. "Intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence." *State v. Lampkin*, 994 N.W.2d 280, 291 (Minn. 2023).

Our review for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is "a two-step process." *State v. Cruz*, 997 N.W.2d 537, 551 (Minn. 2023). First, we "identify[] the circumstances proved." *Id.* (quotation omitted). In doing so, we consider "only those circumstances that

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[4] The parties do not dispute that lawyers are officers of the court. *See Walsh v. State*, 975 N.W.2d 118, 126 n.7 (Minn. 2022) (stating that "all lawyers in the state are officers of the court" (quotation omitted)).

are consistent with the verdict." *Id.* (quotation omitted). This requires "winnow[ing] down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts" that is consistent with the fact-finder's decision and disregarding evidence inconsistent with the fact-finder's decision. *Id.* (quotation omitted). Second, we must determine "whether the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt." *Id.*

A

We first identify the circumstances proved. Officer W. conducted a traffic stop and issued Temple a citation for speeding and driving without a driver's license; Sergeant H. and Officer R. assisted with the stop. Temple refused to identify himself until Officer W. took a document entitled "Legal Notice and Demand" from Temple. Officer W. wrote some responses on the document and signed it, but he did not believe that he was entering into a contract with Temple. In the weeks following the traffic stop, Temple sent three letters to the police officers and Bloomington city officials asserting that the police department owed him millions of dollars for legal claims arising out of the stop and Officer W.'s acceptance of the "Legal Notice and Demand." He also asked the police chief to "void" the citation. The letters explained that Temple's claims are founded in a "Commercial Affidavit Process" that functions outside and independent of the current "Failed Legal System."

After receiving no response to his letters, Temple filed a financing statement with the secretary of state naming the police officers and police chief and providing the Bloomington Police Department's address. The financing statement identified nearly all their accounts and assets as collateral. The city attorney filed an action to expunge the financing statement, a district court found that the financing statement was not valid, and the secretary of state expunged it. Temple was aware of the district court proceeding.

Shortly after the secretary of state expunged the first financing statements, Temple filed a second financing statement, which listed Sergeant H. and Officer W.'s home addresses and added that the statement was for $66.5 million. Months later, Temple filed another financing statement that added the attorneys who removed the first statement as debtors and listed their home addresses. The inclusion of their home addresses caused S.A. and Sergeant H. to be fearful, and it complicated Officer R.'s pursuit of a home mortgage. S.A. initiated a second action to expunge the second and third financing statements, and the district court held a hearing where Temple made a number of statements asserting that his filings were permissible and that the named parties owed him money. Finally, before the alleged offense took place, Temple was a licensed peace officer in Minnesota, having held his license from 2006 until 2017 or 2018.

Temple argues that the circumstances proved include his beliefs about the propriety of his actions—essentially, he has asserted a mistake-of-law defense both before the district court and on appeal.[5] Specifically, Temple argues that he believed that Officer W.'s signature on the "Legal Notice and Demand" created an enforceable contract that authorized the filing of a financing statement; that he was allowed to file financing statements against the other officers because they were complicit in the violation of

[5] The parties take the position, and the district court agreed, that a mistake of law would negate the intent element of the offense. We analyze the issues on appeal in accordance with the parties' arguments without deciding whether a mistake of law defense is appropriate in this context.

Temple's rights; and that he was allowed to file financing statements against the city attorneys because they became parties by litigating the financing statements while not remedying the rights violation.

We may not consider Temple's statements regarding his beliefs as circumstances proved because our consideration is limited to circumstances consistent with the finding of guilt. *Cruz*, 997 N.W.2d at 551. The district court noted that, "if [Temple] believed in good faith that it was legal to file the [financing statements] against the police and the attorneys, he may not have had the requisite intent for the harassment or retaliation elements." But because the district court found Temple guilty, Temple's statements that he filed the financing statements in good faith and not with an intent to harass or retaliate are inconsistent with the verdict and, therefore, not part of the circumstances proved.

B

We next consider whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any alternative rational hypothesis. *Id.* Temple is guilty if he filed the financing statements with the intent to harass and did so with the intent to retaliate against an attorney, police officer, or police chief because of their performance of official duties. *See* Minn. Stat. § 609.7475, subds. 2(2), 3(b)(1). To act with intent means "that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result." Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2024). A fact-finder may infer intent "from the totality of the circumstances." *State v. Young*, 710 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 2006) (quoting *State v. Raymond*, 440 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Minn. 1989)).

The following circumstances proved, when considered as a whole, are consistent with Temple's intent to harass and retaliate. Temple filed financing statements against the police officers involved in the traffic stop that resulted in him receiving a citation, attaching to nearly all their assets and asserting a theory that they owe him millions of dollars because of their conduct. He filed the statements after asking the police chief to "void" the citation, which the police chief did not do. Temple later filed the second and third financing statements under a similar theory, and he did so after knowing that the first statement was judicially expunged. He listed home addresses of the officers and city attorneys on some of the subsequent financing statements, causing Sergeant H. and S.A. to fear for their safety. Taken together, these circumstances proved are consistent with Temple's guilt.

We must also consider whether the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. *Cruz*, 997 N.W.2d at 551. Temple argues that there is a rational alternative hypothesis that he did not intend to harass or retaliate because (1) he filed the financing statements with a good-faith belief that he was using a "legally permissible method to enforce his rights" and (2) he could not have retaliated against the police chief and the city attorney who appeared only on a signature line because they did not exercise official duties. We address these arguments in turn.

Considering Temple's first argument, we do not agree that the circumstances proved, winnowed to exclude evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict, support a rational hypothesis that he lacked the intent to harass or retaliate because he believed in good faith that he was legally authorized to file the financing statements. We are unpersuaded for three reasons.

First, considering the record as a whole, it does not support that Temple believed he had a legal right to file the financing statements. We acknowledge that Temple has adopted a belief system under which he is entitled to the relief that he sought. But the record before us shows that Temple knows that his ideas about the law are distinct from what the law in fact is. For example, in his letters to the city, Temple identified a distinction between the "Commercial Affidavit Process" that he subscribes to and the "Failed Legal System" in which "equity court[s]" and "statute[s]" operate. And at the expungement hearing, he acknowledged the existence of traffic statutes but purported that he could not be liable under them because he "had no knowledge that the driver's license made [him] accountable for any infraction of a statutory nature." Also, after Temple's first financing statement was reviewed by a district court and declared invalid, he filed two additional statements under the same legal theory. In short, Temple's belief in a separate version of the law does not support an alternative hypothesis that he believed his actions were truly "legal."

Second, the purported monetary value of Temple's claims precludes any rational hypothesis that he believed he is legally entitled to the relief he sought. Temple initially valued his claims arising out of the traffic stop at $36.5 million. By the time he filed the second financing statement, he asserted that he was owed $66.5 million. And at the expungement hearing, Temple stated that he was owed $154 million. The record does not support a rational hypothesis that Temple sincerely believed he was legally entitled to such amounts. Moreover, he caused several of the victims to feel afraid or suffer hardship, which is a natural consequence of his actions and thus is further evidence of his intent. *See Nelson v. State*, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) (stating that intent may be inferred "from the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions" (quotation omitted)). The significant and escalating value of his claims strongly suggests an intent to harass and retaliate and is inconsistent with a rational hypothesis that he believed the claims are valid.

Third, it is not rational to conclude that someone who was a Minnesota-licensed peace officer for over a decade would believe that he was entitled to file a financing statement asserting that he is owed millions of dollars because he was issued traffic citations during a routine traffic stop. If Temple had wanted to vindicate a violation of his rights, he could have contested the traffic ticket. The only rational conclusion based on the circumstances proved is that Temple filed the financing statements in retaliation for the traffic stop and with an intent that they be used to harass the individuals named in the statements.

Considering Temple's second argument that he could not have retaliated against the police chief and J.H. because they performed no official duties against which he could retaliate, we likewise conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. As an initial point, Temple does not contest that the other officers and S.A. were performing official duties and could therefore be the subjects of retaliation. Because some combination of those individuals was included in each of the three financing statements for which Temple was convicted, Temple could be guilty of filing a financing statement with an intent to retaliate against those individuals, even if he technically could not have retaliated against the police chief and J.H. Therefore, the circumstances would be consistent with guilt even if Temple were correct. In any event, we disagree that Temple could not retaliate against the police chief and attorney for the city because they did in fact perform official duties. The city's attorney was performing official duties by appearing as a counsel of record for the city, and Temple's letters suggest that he named the police chief because the chief did not "[speak] with his officers as [Temple] asked."

Because the circumstances proved, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding of guilt, are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt, the evidence was sufficient to support Temple's convictions.

Affirmed.