Robert Salvaggio, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1540

Robert Salvaggio,
Relator,

vs.

Prominent Technology, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed July 7, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 50611585-3

Jasper D. Berg, IAJ Law, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for relator)

Prominent Technology, Inc., Bismarck, North Dakota (respondent employer)

Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Schmidt ,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) finding him
ineligible for unemployment benefits because he did not quit his employment for a good
reason. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Robert Salvaggio is an information technology professional who worked for
respondent Prominent Technology, Inc., from May 21, 2019, to May 1, 2024. Salvaggio
initiated discussions with Prominent in January 2023 about transitioning from full-time
employment to a part-time position after receiving a poor performance review. In response
to his request, Prominent offered Salvaggio the option to continue working full-time, part-
time temporary, or as temporary regular employee. Salvaggio agreed to work for
Prominent as a part-time employee, assuming that he would work at least 20 hours per
week at a pay rate of $71.00 per hour. When Prominent could not guarantee Salvaggio that
he would work 20 hours a week, he submitted his resignation.
After ending his employment with Prominent, Salvaggio sought unemployment
benefits from the Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED).
DEED issued an initial determination of ineligibility, finding that Salvaggio ended his
employment due to a change in a condition in his employment, specifically, a change in
his hours, that Prominent did not initiate. After receiving a determination of ineligibility
from DEED, Salvaggio requested a hearing before an ULJ.
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In June 2024, the parties appeared telephonically for a recorded evidentiary hearing.
Salvaggio claimed that discriminatory comments made by company leadership about his
age and his wife being his “sugar mama” traumatized him and adversely impacted his
mental health. However, he never requested an accommodation from Prominent
leadership. During the hearing, Salvaggio recalled a single instance in which Prominent
referenced his age. Salvaggio admitted that he signed an employment-status-change letter
with Prominent “as a last resort” to have money coming in, even though the letter did not
state the number of hours he would work. Salvaggio stated that he chose not to have other
witnesses testify about statements Prominent made about his work performance at the
hearing.
Prominent’s witness did not recall any references to Salvaggio’s age and his ability
to do his job and stated that the comment about his wife was made in jest.
Following the hearing, the first ULJ found Salvaggio’s testimony to be credible.
The first ULJ further determined that Salvaggio quit for a good reason because Prominent’s
leadership engaged in “discrimination using gender stereotypes” by referring to his wife as
his “sugar mama,” implied age discrimination, and criticized his leadership in front of his
team. Prominent requested reconsideration of the first ULJ’s decision, and the chief ULJ
reassigned Salvaggio’s case to a second ULJ.
On reconsideration, the second ULJ reversed the prior decision, finding that
Salvaggio voluntarily transitioned to a part- time role without guaranteed minimum hours
and that he did not quit because of Prominent’s leadership’s remarks. The second ULJ did
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not find Salvaggio’s testimony credible based on their review of the evidence presented,
which included the testimony Salvaggio had given at the prior hearing.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The first ULJ judge provided adequate assistance to Salvaggio to help him
develop the record.

Salvaggio contends that the first ULJ breached his duty to assist him with the
presentation of evidence and proper development of the record because the circumstances
surrounding the termination of his employment with Prominent impacted his ability to
communicate effectively during the hearing. We are not persuaded.
An ULJ must conduct the hearing “as an evidence-gathering inquiry.” Minn. R.
3310.2921 (2023). In doing so, the ULJ “must assist all parties in the presentation of
evidence” and control the hearing “in a manner that protects the parties’ rights to a fair
hearing.” Id. We may affirm an ULJ’s decision, remand for further proceedings or, we
may reverse or modify, if among other reasons, the ULJ employed an unlawful procedure,
the decision is affected by other error of law, it made a determination unsupported by
substantial evidence, or it conducted the hearing in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subds. 7(d)(3)-(6) (2022); see also Wichmann v. Travalia & U.S.
Directives, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Minn. App. 2007). To prove that an ULJ acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, the claimant must demonstrate that the ULJ relied on improper
factors, ignored important issues, the decision ran counter to the evidence, or was highly
implausible. In re Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Minn. 1999).
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We will reverse when the evidence shows that the ULJ did not “take a hard look” at
the issues and the decision lacks well-articulated standards and findings. Cable Commc’ns
Bd. v. Nor- West Cable Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 669 (quotations omitted)
(Minn. 1984). When the relevant facts are not in dispute, we review an ULJ’s denial of
unemployment benefits de novo. Menyweather v. Fedtech, Inc., 872 N.W.2d 543, 545
(Minn. App. 2015).
At the outset of the hearing, the first ULJ told the parties that they had the right to
request that the hearing be rescheduled so that they could present documents and witnesses.
Throughout the hearing, the first ULJ asked Salvaggio a series of questions about each of
his claims of age and disability discrimination. These questions assisted Salvaggio in his
presentation of evidence. The ULJ also provided Salvaggio with multiple opportunities to
ask further questions or add any comments to the record after the ULJ questioned each
party. Although Salvaggio stated that he had been traumatized by the situation with
Prominent, he did not express that he could not proceed with the hearing or that he did not
understand the purpose of the proceeding. To the contrary, prior to closing statements, the
ULJ asked Salvaggio if he wanted to add anything. Salvaggio responded, “I appreciate
how this was done. I conveyed the thoughts I had intended, so I thank you for that.”
Salvaggio’s statement not only suggests that he understood the proceeding and could
proceed with the hearing, but that he believed he adequately supported his claims.

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II. The chief ULJ’s reassignment of Salvaggio’s case to a different ULJ is
permitted by statute.

Salvaggio argues that the chief ULJ acted arbitrarily by reassigning his case to a
different ULJ after Prominent requested reconsideration and that the second ULJ erred by
making credibility determinations without an additional hearing. We disagree.
“The chief [ULJ] must assign a n [ULJ] to conduct a hearing and may transfer to
another [ULJ] any proceedings pending before [an ULJ].” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd.
1b(b) (2024). A request for reconsideration must be decided by the ULJ who issued the
decision unless that judge (1) is no longer employed by the department; (2) is on an
extended leave; or (3) has been removed by the chief ULJ. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd.
2(e) (2024).
While Salvaggio asserts that the chief ULJ acted arbitrarily by failing to provide a
reason to change the ULJ, the statute does not require the chief ULJ to provide one.
Because the statute allows the chief ULJ to assign a new ULJ to decide a request for
reconsideration in certain circumstances, Salvaggio’s argument fails.
Salvaggio also asserts that the second ULJ committed an unlawful error by making
credibility determinations that were contrary to the first ULJ’s credibility determinations
without ordering an additional hearing following his request for reconsideration. Upon a
request for reconsideration, a newly assigned ULJ may “modify [] the findings of fact” and
issue a decision, Minn. Stat. § 268.105 , subd. 2(f)(2), but must explain the reasons for
discrediting the testimony of a witness when their credibility has a significant effect on the
outcome of a decision, Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a). Moreover, we review an ULJ’s
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decision to hold an additional evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion, and we will
only reverse on that basis. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. App.
2006).
Salvaggio relies on Skarhus to support his argument that the second ULJ could not
substitute its own credibility determination. But in Skarhus, we stated that an ULJ’s
credibility determinations cannot be disturbed by an appellate court and that “[c]redibility
determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ.” Id.
As to the second ULJ’s decision not to hold another hearing, we first note that the
second ULJ had access to the recording of the first hearing as well as all of the documents
the parties submitted. In addition, the second ULJ issued a thorough decision setting forth
its basis to modify the prior decision, including the reasons why it did not find Salvaggio’s
testimony to be credible, which are supported by the record. See Stagg v. Vintage Place,
Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (appellate courts review ULJ’s factual findings in
light most favorable to decision and do not disturb those findings if supported by record);
see also Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5).
And, as noted above, we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. See Skarhus,
721 N.W.2d at 345. We discern no abuse of discretion by the second ULJ’s decision not
to hold an additional hearing.
III. The record supports the second ULJ’s determination that Salvaggio is not
entitled to unemployment benefits because he did not quit for a good reason.

Salvaggio contends that the second ULJ committed an error of law by failing to find
that he is entitled to unemployment benefits because Prominent (1) unilaterally reduced his
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hours; (2) referred to his wife as his “sugar mama”; and (3) subjected him to age and
disability discrimination. We are not convinced.
An employee who voluntarily quits is entitled to unemployment benefits if the
decision to quit is the result of a good reason caused by the employer. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2024); see Rootes v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., 669 N.W.2d 416,
418 (Minn. App. 2003). A good reason to quit caused by the employer is one that (1) is
directly related to the employment for which the employer is responsible; (2) is adverse to
the worker; and (3) would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become
unemployed rather than continue their employment. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a)(1)-
(3) (2024). Further, it must be real, “substantial not trifling, [] reasonable, [and] not
whimsical.” Ferguson v. Dept. of Emp. Servs., 247 N.W.2d 895, 900 n.5 (Minn. 1976)
(quotations omitted).
An employer’s unilateral and substantial decrease of an employee’s hours of work
is a good reason to quit. Thao v. Command Ctr., Inc., 824 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. App. 2012).
The employee bears the burden of proving that they had a good reason to quit. Hein v.
Precision Assocs., Inc., 609 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. App. 2000). Appellate courts review
this issue de novo. Thao, 824 N.W.2d at 4. But appellate courts review an ULJ’s factual
findings in the light most favorable to the decision and will not disturb tho se findings if
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 315.
Salvaggio contends that he experienced “more than an 83% reduction in hours, after
his employment status change” and asserts that he did not know that Prominent would not
guarantee him a minimum number of hours until after he changed his employment status.
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To support his argument, Salvaggio relies on Thao, 824 N.W.2d at 3. In that case,
Command Center hired Thao as a permanent employee and told her that she would work
at least 32 hours per week and that her hours could increase up to 40 hours a week. Id.
However, management for Command Center testified that they hired Thao for primarily
part-time work and that they never promised her increased hours or permanent full- time
work. Id. This court reversed and remanded because the ULJ did not determine whether
Command Center’s reduction of Thao’s hours was adverse to her and whether it would
cause “an average, reasonable, employee to quit or remain in employment.” Id. at 11.
Thao is substantially different from this case. Unlike Thao, Salvaggio admitted
several times during the hearing that Prominent never guaranteed that he would work a
minimum number of hours before he agreed to change his employment status and that he
submitted his resignation because Prominent could not guarantee him 20 hours a week.
Moreover, the second ULJ found that Salvaggio quit because he did not receive as many
hours as he hoped he would, not because Prominent unilaterally reduced his hours.
Because the second ULJ’s finding that Prominent did not unilaterally reduce his hours is
supported by substantial evidence, we conclude that it did not err by determining that
Salvaggio did not quit for a good reason.
Similarly, Salvaggio failed to establish that the comment about his wife being his
“sugar mama” gave him a good reason to quit. Notably, Prominent and Salvaggio agreed
that the comment had been made once, and both parties perceived it to have been made in
jest. Thus, the record supports the ULJ’s determination that Salvaggio did not have a good
reason to quit.
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Additionally, Salvaggio’s claims of age and disability discrimination are not
supported by the record and also show that he did not quit for good reason. Salvaggio’s
claim of age discrimination was contradicted by his own testimony during the hearing. For
example, Salvaggio testified that he believed Prominent stated that they would hire
someone younger and cheaper, but that he “couldn’t tie” Prominent’s statements about his
work performance to his age, and that he remembered Prominent referring to hiring
someone younger during only one conversation. Salvaggio admitted that he did not seek
any accommodations from Prominent with respect to his mental-health issues nor did he
discuss how they impacted his ability to work or caused him to quit. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports Salvaggio’s claims of age and disability discrimination and that he did not quit
his employment for good reason.
Affirmed.