In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L. M. G., I. E. F., J. P., Sr., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1554

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
L. M. G., I. E. F., J. P., Sr., Parents.

Filed March 31, 2025
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-JV-22-107

Carrie A. Doom, Sapientia Law Group, Cambridge, Minnesota (for appellant- mother
L.M.G.)

Jeff Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Timothy C. Nelson, Chief Deputy County Attorney,
Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent Isanti County Health and Human Services)

Delmar V. Flynn, Rachel L. Osband, Fiddler Osband Flynn LLC, Minnetonka, Minnesota
(for respondent-foster parents)

Todd Donegan, Donegan Law Office, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent-father J.P.,
Sr.)

Elizabeth Hiljus, North Branch, Minnesota (for respondent child)

Adrienne Wellman, Stillwater, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Mother appeals from the district court’s order involuntarily transferring permanent
legal and physical custody of her children to their foster parents, arguing that the district
court abused its discretion under three of the requisite statutory findings for the transfer.
Foster parents, by notice of related appeal, challenge the part of the district court’s order
requiring that they maintain contact between mother and the children. Because the record
and law support the district court’s custody transfer and its contact requirement, we affirm.
FACTS
L.M.G. (“mother”) has three children. We refer to the children via pseudonyms we
have chosen at random to maintain their privacy: Caleb, born in 2010; Luke, born in 2016;
and Ruth, born in 2017. Isanti County Health and Human Services (“agency”) first started
receiving reports concerning the children’s welfare in 2017 after mother sent Caleb to
school sick and indicated that she does not have a working phone or car to come get him.
Further reports indicated Caleb missing school on several days and sharing details of
domestic violence that he witnessed at home between mother and the father of Luke and
Ruth, whom we refer to as Joshua. Caleb also had a scab on his shoulder that he said came
from mother pinching him.
Child protection reports indicate, and the district court later found, that the children
witnessed “horrendous” domestic abuse between mother and Joshua and were themselves
subject to abuse. Some examples are described based largely on statements of the children
to child protection. Joshua spit on mother and she hit him in the face. Joshua would hit and
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throw mother. Joshua choked mother and was convicted of domestic assault-strangulation.
Joshua tried to suffocate Caleb on a couch, and in another instance locked him out of the
house. Joshua threw Luke into a window, causing bleeding. Joshua would spank the
children, leaving marks. Joshua and mother would hit Luke. Joshua would hit the children
and would choke mother and the children by putting his fingers in their mouths. In an
especially significant incident, Joshua chased mother with two knives during a fight over
drugs and she allegedly used Luke as a shield to protect herself. Mother did not corroborate
the human-shield claim, merely stating that Joshua stopped his attack when she told him,
“[Y]our kids can see this right now and not gonna forget it . . . .”
Mother later admitted to domestic violence in her home that had impacted the
wellbeing of her children. She said the children had seen physical fights, including Joshua
walking on top of her. Mother also tested positive for methamphetamines and THC.
Mother’s parenting skills also came under scrutiny, as family members observed mother
yelling at and using profanity with the children, including saying, “You want the cops
called on mom, thinking I’m beating you and mom be taken away.” In one incident mother
grabbed Caleb by the ear so he would listen to her. The apartment the children were staying
in was described as “disgusting” and having garbage in it, with a dirty mattress and
bedding. A room smelled of drug residue.
In August 2021, police responded to an incident where Joshua allegedly hit mother
after a fight involving a bag of drugs. Mother had bruising on her arms and knees from
another attack where Joshua had pulled her down a staircase. Joshua was consequently
convicted of felony domestic assault for this attack. The children were removed from
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mother and Joshua’s care in August 2021, and the agency filed a child in need of protection
or services (CHIPS) petition. The children have since been in the care of foster parents.
The children underwent psychological assessments. Caleb was diagnosed with
autism, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), language impairment, and developmental
delay. Ruth was diagnosed with PTSD and disinhibited social engagement disorder. Luke
was also diagnosed with PTSD. Witnessing domestic abuse was noted as likely related to
at least one of each child’s symptoms.
After the children were placed outside the home, mother began to better her situation
with assistance of the agency. She successfully completed chemical dependency treatment
in September 2022. She also made significant efforts to address her mental- health
problems, attending thrice-weekly therapy. The agency provided help with these efforts
and others in its attempts to reunify the children with mother. These efforts also included
transportation and practical administrative assistance “at all crucial junctures” of mother’s
journey through completing treatment, helping her attain stable transportation and housing,
and ensuring that she was reaching sobriety goals and attending therapy. Mother agreed
that some of the agency’s support had been helpful.
The agency worked with mother to support visitation between mother and the
children. And foster parents stayed in constant collaboration with mother assisted by the
agency to help support the children’s needs. The agency noted that mother overall had been
cooperative with them. But mother also did not do her part in submitting required
paperwork for family therapy or following through on parenting education. Mother worked
with the children’s therapist to learn how to better parent the children, but the agency was
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concerned after observing mother parenting that she was not always able to adequately
control the children. This contrasted with the children being more regulated with the foster
parents. The children’s therapist was also concerned about mother minimizing the effects
of domestic violence on her and the children, and about the children triggering mother’s
mental health problems, and recommended a decrease in visitation. But the children
showed signs of improvement as visitation had gradually increased. At one point, however,
Luke indicated that mother hit him during one of her unsupervised visits with him. And
during one supervised visit, mother told Caleb that if he chose to stay with foster parents,
he would never see her again.
The agency first filed a petition to transfer permanent legal and physical custody to
the children’s foster parents in 2022, and the consequent custody-transfer trial concluded
in early February 2023. While the district court decided that it would be in the children’s
best interests to have a transfer of permanent custody to the foster parents and that the
agency had made reasonable reunification efforts, it ultimately denied the transfer. The
district court denied the petition because it found that the agency failed to prove that mother
could not use services to correct the conditions that led to the out -of-home placement
because she was “on her way” to correcting those conditions and was beginning to have
insight into her and the children’s significant needs. Likewise, it found that it was unclear
whether the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement had been corrected, because
it remained to be seen if mother could provide safe long-term care for the children. It
ordered that the parties begin to develop a gradual plan for a trial home visit with mother.
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The agency subsequently began facilitating consistent visitation between mother
and the children, up to four times per week. The agency, foster parents, and therapist noted
that there was a correlating increase in the children’s dysregulation as visits ramped up.
Two incidents occurred where mother used physical force while parenting. In one, mother
“bear hugged” Luke and Ruth and threw them on the couch when they were being unruly
and hitting and punching mother. Luke said that mother punched his arm. In another
incident, mother grabbed and pushed one of the children when they were “escalated,” but
the agency suggested this was not a significant concern.
A more significant incident occurred in May 2023. According to the child protection
report, mother told foster parents she was running late, which was uncharacteristic of her,
because she could not get Ruth in the car after she tried to take a toy home with her. When
they got home, Caleb tried to tell foster father something but started to cry so hard that he
vomited. Caleb told him that Ruth had tried to take a toy home and was being defiant while
leaving, causing mother to scream in her face that they needed to leave. Then mother
grabbed Ruth by the shoulder and, in Caleb’s words, “shooked” her. Caleb later relayed he
did not want any more visits with mother and referenced “the violence of the ghost of
[Joshua]”
1 in relation to the incident. Luke relayed the same story to foster mother, and his
heart was racing when he took a bath that night. Ruth reenacted the event for her foster
parents, indicating that mother had grabbed her shoulder. Ruth had a “pretty nasty bruise”
forming where she said she was grabbed, and that night she was also rocking back and

1 Joshua had since passed away.
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forth and crying inconsolably. Mother denied hurting Ruth and described the incident as
Ruth being upset about having to leave mother’s home, and then mother hugging her. The
district court later found mother’s version of events not credible. The state criminally
charged mother with malicious punishment of a child and domestic assault for this incident.
And the agency filed a new petition to transfer permanent custody to foster parents. The
criminal trial took place in February 2024. Caleb testified for the state. The jury found
mother not guilty of the charges.
After the May 2023 incident mother had no visitation with the children for three
months. Ruth resumed visits in August 2023, for about a half an hour once a week
expanding to just over an hour, and these visits were generally positive. But Caleb and
Luke have not participated in visits since the incident. The agency noted the children’s
dysregulation generally decreased when the visitation subsided. Ruth’s visitation was
stopped before the criminal trial and has not resumed. This is even though the district court
directed the agency to make “heavy efforts” toward getting visitation restarted in April
2024, without leaving visitation up to the children, and mother provided the agency detailed
information on how to facilitate visitation. Luke had a phone call with mother indicating
that he wanted a visit. However, the children would have negative reactions when the topic
of visitation would come up, even displaying negative reactions when a letter written to
them by mother was read aloud to them. Given these circumstances, the agency social
worker later testified that they did not want to traumatize the children by forcing visitation.
Mother had been working with a parenting skills worker and a parenting educator
after the first transfer-of-custody trial. But these services ended when visitation ceased.
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These providers were working with mother on her skills regulating the children
appropriately. Family reunification therapy began in early 2024, but did not include mother
as the children were not ready for her to join. The final note from the family therapist in
May 2024 stated that the children “may soon benefit from her joining sessions.”
The trial on the second permanency petition took place in April and May 2024. A
social worker for the agency testified, as did the children’s therapist, the foster parents, the
children’s guardian ad litem, mother, and mother’s therapist. The social worker testified
that, except for three instances concerning physical touch, mother was complying with her
case plan to address the conditions that led to the children’s removal. Mother also testified
and agreed that it would be very difficult if the children were to transition back into her
home. The guardian ad litem testified and recommended that the custody transfer petition
be granted, as it would be in the children’s best interests. The guardian noted that mother
has been “getting involved in any way that she can—attending conferences, talking to the
teachers, convers[]ing with the kids’ therapist.” But, she continued, the children need
permanency and mother continued failing to fully understand the effects of the trauma the
children experienced on their mental health.
Following the trial the district court filed a written order incorporating its prior
findings of fact and orders in this file and related files. The district court concluded that it
was in the children’s best interests for custody to be transferred, noting that mother “put
hands on [Ruth] in a manner that, if not rising to the level of malicious punishment or
domestic assault, resulted in significant distress and fear in [ Ruth] and [Caleb], and, to a
lesser extent, [Luke].” It again found the agency’s efforts at reunification reasonable. It
9
found that mother failed to use services to ameliorate the conditions leading to the
placement, pointing to the May 2023 incident and the children’s dysregulation during
visits. And the district court found that mother does not have a home the children can safely
return to. Mother appeals this decision.
The district court also required the parties to meet and prepare a contact plan for
mother and the children. After the district court’s initial custody transfer order, the parties
began this process. But the parties did not agree on a contact plan; mother rejected the
agency’s proposal because of the infrequency of contact and the discretion given to foster
parents. In a consequent review hearing, Caleb’s attorney expressed opposition to family
therapy because “the children have been able to take a big exhale and just live life now.
There’s been a drastic change. Improvement in their behavior.” This belief is also reflected
in the report of the guardian ad litem, who noticed an improvement in the children
following the custody- transfer decision, with less dysregulation, and further noting that
Ruth and Luke had negative reactions when the topic of contact or visitation with mother
was broached.
The district court said that the contact plan the agency and foster parents proposed
was not a good-faith proposal to meaningfully include mother in the children’s lives, or a
reasonable effort to engage mother to develop a contact agreement. The district court
pressed the parties to craft an agreement with adequate visitation opportunities but noted
that it would issue an order if the parties could not figure it out themselves.
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The parties encountered further hurdles in creating a contact plan. The parties could
not secure a family therapist to work as a bridge for reconnecting mother and the children.
The relationship between foster parents and mother had become strained.
Unable to come up with a solution, the parties returned to the district court for
another review hearing. The parties sought guidance from the district court to create a
contact order. But Caleb’s lawyer expressed that Caleb still did not want any contact with
mother. The district court paused proceedings to “double-check and make sure it’s
something the law permits me to do or doesn’t.” Then the district court returned, stating
that it would maintain jurisdiction over the case, and clarifying, “Meaningful [contact]
means in person at least once every other week for at least an hour. That’s a bare minimum
of meaningful.” On request for further clarification from foster parents, the district court
explained that it was ordering this visitation to be supervised. After foster parents objected,
the district court further explained that the contact did not have to happen immediately but
can be “within the developmental and gradual needs of the children . . . . Nothing that I’ve
said prohibits that.” The district court agreed that the start date for the twice-monthly
contact was not “firmly set” but added that “[t]here has to be a plan.” The district court
closed the hearing noting that the parties would be back in ninety days for a determination
and characterized its contact order as going “[b]ack to the drawing board.” The district
court’s subsequent order finalized the transfer of permanent custody to foster parents and
required the parties to make efforts to enable supervised contact between the children and
mother at least twice per month for at least an hour per visit. Foster parents appeal the
contact portion of the order.
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DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s order transferring permanent legal and
physical custody of her children to foster parents, arguing that the district court abused its
discretion in its decision under three of the four requisite statutory findings. And foster
parents argue by notice of related appeal that the district court’s contact requirement failed
to address the children’s best interests, reflect s an abuse of discretion, and is improperly
vague. We address the appeals in turn.
I
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it transferred custody
of her children to foster parents. A district court may order a transfer of legal and physical
custody to a “fit and willing relative” in a permanency proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.515,
subd. 4 (2024). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its findings
of a statutory basis for transferring permanent custody for an abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D ., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied
(Minn. July 20, 2015). “A district court abuses its discretion if it makes findings of fact
that lack evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary matters in a
manner contrary to logic and the facts on record.” In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A.,
11 N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024). In reviewing a finding for clear error, we view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the finding, do not reweigh evidence, and we need
not provide an extensive discussion to demonstrate the correctness of the finding. Id.
To permanently place a child out of the child’s home, Minnesota Statutes section
260C.517(a) (2024) requires a district court to make certain “detailed findings” addressing:
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(1) how the child’s best interests are served by the order;
(2) the nature and extent of the responsible social
services agency’s reasonable efforts . . . to reunify the child
with the parent or guardian where reasonable efforts are
required;
(3) the parent’s . . . efforts and ability to use services to
correct the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement;
and
(4) that the conditions which led to the out- of-home
placement have not been corrected so that the child can safely
return home.

Each of these findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. T.M.A.,
11 N.W.3d at 355; Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 1. Mother challenges each of the
district court’s findings under section 260C.517(a), except the best-interests finding.
A. The Agency’s Reunification Efforts
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
agency exercised reasonable efforts to reunify the children.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2).
The district court found:
Here, ICHHS’s efforts to reunify [mother] with the
children have fallen within the bounds of reasonableness.
Given the general reluctance of the children (except for [Ruth])
to participate in visitation following the May 9 incident, and
the ongoing related criminal proceedings, which the County
opted to proceed first, the Agency efforts, to remain in
communication with [mother], to collaborate with the
children’s therapist in assessing readiness for visitation, in
working with [mother] to continue efforts toward family
therapy all were reasonable. More could have, and should
have, been done. During her testimony, [mother] highlighted
several areas in which the agency was either less than fully
helpful, including family therapy arrangements, involvement
in the children’s school and doctor appointments, collaboration
with [the therapist], and parenting skills courses. [The social
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worker] frankly concurred on this point at trial. But after the
reports of physical contact in February and May 2023, and in
the context of the children’s mental health needs and history in
sum, there is clear and convincing evidence to show the
agency’s efforts to reunify [mother] with the children have
been reasonable.

What constitutes reasonable reunification efforts depends on the facts of each case.
In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 6, 2021). A district court must consider whether the reunification services were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well- being of
the child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.0 12(h) (2024). The agency’s efforts must go beyond “mere matters of
form so as to include real, genuine assistance,” and the district court must consider the
quality and quantity of the efforts. In re Welfare of Child. of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150
(Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). But in
determining reasonable efforts, “the child’s best interests, health, and safety must be of
paramount concern.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024). The district court’s ruling on
reasonable efforts does not reflect an abuse of discretion.
Mother challenges the district court’s findings underlying this determination.
Mother contends that the district court should not have excused the agency from making
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reasonable efforts because of the reluctance of the children to engage in visitation after the
May 2023 incident. It is true that the district court encouraged the agency to “work toward
establishing renewed contact between the minor children and [mother]” after the incident.
And the district court had specifically ordered in April 2024 that the agency begin
“vigorous efforts” to reinstate visitation. Mother only had visitation with Ruth after the
May 2023 incident, and this ended before the criminal trial began.
But these are children suffering PTSD, with serious mental -health needs who need
a parent skilled and knowledgeable at regulating them. They were further harmed by
mother’s actions in May 2023. The children also had negative reactions when the topic of
visitation would arise after the May 2023 incident. These circumstances reasonably support
the agency’s reluctance to facilitate further mandatory visitation between mother and the
children after May 2023. Considering that the agency’s “paramount concern” in making
reasonable efforts was “the child[ren]’s best interests, health, and safety,” the record
supports the district court’s implicit finding that the agency’s discontinuation of visitation
was reasonable under the circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a).
Mother argues that the agency failed to provide adequate family reunification
services after May 2023. Because mother did not have visitation with all three children
after May 2023, the agency did not provide mother further parenting education and skills
services. The parenting education and skills providers could not provide services unless
mother and all the children were together. However, mother was eventually able to work
with the children’s therapist, learning about their mental health needs. The agency
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supported efforts restarting visitation with Ruth in consultation with mother, and the
agency supported family reunification therapy beginning in January 2024.
Mother argues that the agency’s efforts regarding reunification therapy were
unreasonable because the children were in out-of-home placement for over 700 days before
a family therapist was identified, and then the agency took two more months to begin
family therapy . But as the agency points out, family therapy was offered to mother in
September 2022 but did not start because mother admittedly failed to complete the required
paperwork. The two-month delay is less significant in comparison. We also consider the
agency’s efforts outside the narrow window after the May 2023 incident on which mother
focuses. The district court considered the “history in sum” in making its reasonable-efforts
decision, and its previous order from February 2023 described the agency’s efforts until
that point as reasonable. These efforts helped mother achieve sobriety, address her mental-
health challenges, achieve stable housing, and got her to a position where, at one point, she
could have visitation with the children as often as four days a week. The district court’s
findings outlining the agency’s various efforts are supported by the record.
We agree with the district court that “more could have, and should have, been done”
by the agency to achieve reunification. But the law does not require superlative efforts from
the agency, merely “reasonable” efforts. Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(2). The record evidence
supports the district court’s findings and its determination that the agency’s reunification
efforts were reasonable is not contrary to logic and the facts on record and does not reflect
an abuse of discretion.

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B. Ability to Use Services to Correct Unsafe Conditions
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by deciding that she failed
to utilize services to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement.
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(3). The district court recognized that mother had
successfully used services to correct many of the unsafe conditions, such as achieving
sobriety, and diligently working with mental-health and parenting programming and with
the children’s therapist. Even so, it found:
The credible reports of frightening physical contact between
[mother] and the children in May, and [the agency’s]
observations of increased chaos and dysregulation during visits
with [mother], make clear that these efforts by [mother]
demonstrates her ability to use services but not, considering the
profound needs of her children, to use these services “to correct
the conditions which led to the out-of-home placement.” While
certain essential of those conditions, chemical use and
immediately threatening domestic abuse in the home, have
been ameliorated, the overall record does not demonstrate that
[mother] can use the developed skills to safely parent the
children together.

Reviewing the findings underlying this statutory requirement, we again find adequate
record support.
Mother argues that the district court’s findings underlying this requirement are
clearly erroneous because, between the first transfer-of-custody trial and the May 2023
incident, she had complied with parenting education and skills work along with having
visitation four days per week. She adds that only one visit during this period—the May
2023 incident—was unsuccessful out of more than sixty visits. Yet the May 2023 incident
was plainly significant, and the other incident where mother “bear hugged” the children
17
was significant enough that mother called a foster parent with a concern that the police may
be called on her.
We again look beyond the narrow time-period that mother focuses on. The agency
observed problems before the first trial. M other would be unable to control all three
children at once and would have to sit down with a child for a long time to regulate his or
her behavior. And foster parents noticed dysregulation in the children before and after
visits. The children’s therapist in December 2022 asked that visitation frequency be
reduced because of the level of distress and dysregulation the children experience d. She
observed a month later that mother did not seem to be consistently using the parenting tools
she had been given and raised concerns about her use of authority during visits, involving
yelling and physically turning the children’s heads and running after them. Luke also said
in 2022 that mother hit him during a visit. Mother was given visitation opportunities,
opportunities that expanded after the first trial. Testimony at the second trial indicated that
the children experienced increased dysregulation coinciding with visitation between the
first trial and the May 2023 incident, and that mother had difficulty regulating the children
in her home. Those increases in visitation opportunities resulted in the May 2023 incident,
where mother harmed Ruth. It was within this context that the agency curtailed visitation.
Because we affirm the district court’s finding that the agency’s efforts were reasonable,
including its decision to curtail visitation, we reject mother’s argument that she was
improperly withheld an opportunity to demonstrate firsthand that she could parent all of
the children together after May 2023. The district court’s finding that mother’s use of
services has not allowed her to safely parent all the children together is adequately
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supported by the record and its conclusion on this statutory requirement is not against logic
and the facts on record and does not reflect an abuse of discretion.
C. Failure to Correct Conditions Leading to Out-of-Home Placement
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding that conditions
had not been corrected so that the children could safely return home. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.517(a)(4). The district court noted mother’s successes in remedying
many conditions that led to the placement, such as achieving sobriety and greater stability.
Yet it found:
[D]eterminatively, this record over all makes clear that
[mother] is not yet able to safely parent all three children.
These are children with deep-seated needs for predictable
safety. The reunification efforts that followed the prior trial, in
light of those needs, resulted in an unsafe situation for the
children then and for the foreseeable future.

In assessing this question in the first instance the Court
found in the previous trial: “ . . . It is possible but remains to
be seen if [mother] can in fact, long-term, provide the children
with the stability, predictability and cares consistent with their
needs and safety. ” Upon all the files and proceedings herein
and based on the analysis above, the court unfortunately
concludes that the answer to that question at this time is no.

The district court’s ruling on this statutory requirement does not reflect an abuse of
discretion.
Similar to her other arguments, mother argues that the “isolated incident” in May
2023 led to a wholesale failure by the agency to provide her meaningful opportunities to
parent all three children and the resources to enable her to do so. She argues that the agency
had a continuing obligation to work with her to address unsafe conduct it noticed, citing
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In re Welfare of Children of T.R., which provides that “[t]he requirement that the parties
follow the case plan is a two-way street: the county may not . . . decide for itself that further
efforts are futile.” 750 N.W.2d 656, 665–66 (Minn. 2008). The agency persuasively
responds that it did not unilaterally decide that more efforts we re futile but that mother’s
own conduct impeded visitation after the agency gave her many chances and assistance.
Even though mother created a barrier to successful visitation through her actions, the
agency still made other attempts that could have led to restarted visitation, such as
beginning family reunification therapy, working with the children’s therapist, and helping
mother resume visitation with Ruth.
While mother was meeting many of her case-plan goals the agency set, the two
noted incidents from 2023 of mother using physical force with the children supports the
district court’s finding that mother cannot safely parent all of her children, one of her case-
plan goals. Mother does not challenge the reasonableness of her case plan. As discussed,
the record supports the district court’s findings that these children have heightened needs
for predictable safety, and mother’s physical behavior paired with the dysregulation the
children experienced corresponding to increased visitation with her has shown that she
cannot provide that. Mother has failed to show that the district court’s findings of fact
underlying this statutory requirement are clearly erroneous, or that, in light of those
findings, the district court’s decision is contrary to logic and the facts on the record and
reflect an abuse of discretion.
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Mother has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in
transferring permanent legal and physical custody of the children and we affirm that
decision.
II
Foster parents challenge by notice of related appeal the portion of the district court’s
order requiring contact between mother and the children. They argue that the district
court’s contact requirement failed to address the children’s best interests, that this
requirement was an abuse of the district court’s discretion, and that the wording of the
requirement renders it improperly vague. We address each argument in turn.
A. District Court’s Best Interests Findings
Foster parents challenge the district court’s findings underlying its directive for
mother to have contact with the children. “An order does not permit meaningful appellate
review if it does not identify the facts that the district court has determined to be true and
the facts on which the district court’s decision is based.” See In re Civ. Commitment of
Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App. 2014). The district court’s findings allow us a
sufficient basis to review its assessment of the children’s best interests.
Foster parents correctly note that the district court must “assess whether the
proposed visitation is in the best interests of the child” under the “juvenile protection
statutes.” In re Welfare of Child of A.H., 879 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. App. 2016); see Minn.
Stat. § 260C.511 (2024). In its order for visitation, the district court incorporated its
findings from previous orders. And while foster parents correctly note that none of the
district court’s orders extensively analyzed the best interests of the children in having
21
visitation with mother, its written order after the second trial does state: “Termination of
Parental Rights is not in the best interests of the children in this case given the above facts
and the depth of the, albeit interrupted, bond between [mother] and the children.”
The district court also made several oral findings at the review hearings to support
its visitation decision:
There are several reasons for the court’s comments with
respect to a meaningful relationship . . . There . . . is evidence
throughout the case that in one-on-one situations, or even two-
on-one situations with [mother], the kids do fine. They are still
processing a great deal of trauma, but they’ve been doing that
for years literally now.

And . . . they will come of age with questions with needs
related to understanding their background that the[ir] mother
will be uniquely positioned to assist them with.

. . . [T]he children have thrived where they are which is
the reason for the decision that the court made. But as they
grow and they have questions and they have needs to
understand themselves and their situation it would not behoove
them in the court’s view to see their mother four times a year
. . . .

. . . The children are safe where they are and . . . there
was language in the proposal and discussion at the trial about
not forcing the children into things. . . . However, we do
children a disservice if we tell them that certain things are
optional when they are not. Children have an equally important
need-to-know that certain things are non-negotiable. Behaving,
not swearing at their family members, going to school, not
hitting each other and other people, visiting with certain family
members sometimes when they don’t want to. And the people
around them enforce those necessities by letting them know
that nothing else is going to happen except what’s required to
happen.

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These [are] children with a history of behavioral
outbursts. Conduct that will get them into trouble in future [and
they] need to understand that there are boundaries that they are
going to be required to abide by. One of those will be to have
contact with their mother per court order.

Now, none of what I’m saying undermines the relief they
are feeling and experiencing and the improvement that they’re
seeing in their situation by not being involved in a court trial
and multiple visits about visitation, etc. . . . It’s not going to be
an option for them to never have contact with their mother
that’s just not consistent with their best interests.

(Emphasis added.) The district court added: “I’ve made very clear now my view about the
best interests of the children including [mother] in their lives. It’s not consistent with their
best interests to exclude her.” And at a second review hearing the district court expanded
that:
The Court debated heartily in its own mind prior to
hearing about whether to maintain jurisdiction over the agency
and everybody else for purpose of assuring appropriate
services are delivered to the children and the permanent legal
custodians and for ensuring conditions ordered by the Court
related to the care and custody of the child are met. I am going
to maintain such jurisdiction based on my prior finding and the
overall history of this case. That it is in the children’s best
interests to maintain a meaningful relationship with their
mother.

. . . .

The proposals that have been made are not sufficient.
Once a quarter, maybe, is not meaningful contact. . . .

The Court in making this decision is not discounting the
tremendous distrust and disturbance that the children
experienced earlier in their lives.

23
(Emphasis added.) Foster parents suggest that because the district court was considering
jurisdiction before making this oral finding, this cannot be read to be an analysis of the
children’s best interests in visitation with mother. We disagree. The jurisdiction statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.515, subdivision 4(e)(3), does not expressly require a
best-interests analysis, and we see no reason why the district court could not consider the
best interests of the children in visitation simultaneously with jurisdiction. Indeed, the
district court considered its visitation requirement as a reason for its maintaining
jurisdiction.
Foster parents also argue that error in the district court’s findings is reflected in its
description of the visitation requirement as a “contact agreement,” a term used in the
adoption statute and not at issue here. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.619 (2024). But we read the
district court’s use of the term in a colloquial sense, not in a legal-term-of-art sense.
Nowhere in the record does the district court cite section 260C.619 to support its visitation
order.
Foster parents also suggest that the district court failed to make the specific best-
interests findings related to visitation delineated in Minnesota Statutes sections 260C.212,
subd. 2(b) and 260C.511(a) (2024), citing In re Welfare of Children of J.C.L., 958 N.W.2d
653 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 2021). But J.C.L. does not hold that a
district court ordering visitation in a permanency proceeding must use the criteria from
section 260C.212, subdivision 2(b). Rather, J.C.L. supports that the district court must
consider the criteria specified in section 260C.511 in ordering a permanency disposition
other than a termination of parental rights. J.C.L, 958 N.W.2d at 657. Section 260C.511
24
requires “all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated” and that the district court
“review . . . the relationship between the child and relatives and the child and other
important persons.” We are satisfied that the district court’s findings encompass these
statutory considerations. The district court’s best-interests findings supporting its contact
order provide us a sufficient basis to review it.
B. Abuse of Discretion in Requiring Contact
Foster parents maintain that the district court abused its discretion in requiring
contact between mother and the children, because the decision was “against the logic and
the facts on the record.” A district court abuses its discretion if its fact findings are not
supported by the record, it improperly applies the law, or it resolves an issue contrary to
logic and the facts on record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). We
review a district court’s assessment of best-interests factors for an abuse of discretion. A.H.,
879 N.W.2d at 7. Our review reveals no abuse of discretion.
Foster parents argue that contact with mother is not in the children’s best interests
because she puts their safety in jeopardy. “T he paramount consideration in all juvenile
protection proceedings is the health, safety, and best interests of the child. ”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2024) (emphasis added). Foster parents allege that the
conditions cited by the district court that led to the custody transfer weigh against the
contact order. They point to the domestic violence the children witnessed and were subject
to before being removed from mother’s home. They further argue that “[e]very single time
[mother] has had unsupervised access to her children, she has engaged in harmful
behavior.” They support this contention by pointing to the times mother has used physical
25
force with the children after the initial removal, including the May 2023 incident. But the
district court’s order here addresses safety concerns by requiring the contact mother has
with the children be supervised. The district court elaborated: “It is safe in the Court’s view
to do that. In the presence of other adults. There’s nothing in the case that indicates that the
children will not be safe in the presence of the other trusted adults in their life in [mother]’s
presence.” This is supported by the record. Only one of the harmful instances foster parents
point to appears to have occurred during a supervised visit—the bear -hugging incident.
And this incident was ultimately screened out for a child maltreatment report because there
was insufficient information that mother throwing Ruth was excessive or that Luke was
harmed. The district court adequately considered and provided for the children’s safety in
its order.
Foster parents also point to the trauma and dysregulation the children experience
around having contact with mother and mother’s continued lack of accountability regarding
their trauma. It is true that the district court made findings about the negative responses the
children had around contact with mother. But the district court expressly considered the
children’s processing of “a great deal of trauma.” And the contact order it ultimately made
does not require immediate contact. Rather, it requires efforts to get the children to a place
where they can have meaningful, twice-a-month contact. The district court explained at the
review hearing: “I’m not suggesting that such contact happen immediately. The definition
is for meaningful. I provided one. . . . [I]t can be within the developmental and gradual
needs of the children and the eyes of the people who are caring for them and their other
providers. . . . Nothing that I’ve said prohibits that.” This delay also allows mother time
26
where she may address the district court’s previously noted “significant disconnect
between [her] understanding of the children’s mental health and how reported incidents
have had an impact on that.”
Foster parents liken this case to A.H., when we affirmed a district court’s order
reducing the visitation of biological parents with their child in a post-permanency
proceeding. 879 N.W.2d at 7. The factual similarities underlying the district court’s reasons
for reducing visitation in A.H. may resemble this case, but the fundamental difference
between A.H. and this case is the applicable standard of review. In A.H. we were deferring
to a decision reducing visitation (reviewing the referenced factual findings for clear error),
while here we are deferring to a decision granting visitation. Id. Because of the standard
of review on appeal, the factual similarities between A.H. and this case do not persuade us
to change our decision.
The record here instead supports the district court’s determination that contact is in
the children’s best interests to maintain their relationship with mother. In addition to the
district court’s stated rationale for its contact order relayed previously, the children’s
guardian ad litem and the agency testified about the bond between mother and the children.
Indeed, foster parents themselves testified about the children’s need for their relationship
with mother to continue. After the first trial, the district court found that foster father
testified that if he was granted permanent custody, “he envisions ongoing contact and
collaboration with [mother].” And at the second trial he said that “if permanency is
established in our home . . . that will change [the children’s] perception of [mother] to
know that they’re going to always come back and be safe and remain in a safe
27
environment. . . . [T]hat will, you know, tend to foster a relationship back with [mother].”
He elaborated, “[T]he kids deserve to have [mother] in their life . . . regardless of what that
might look like, and [foster parents are] definitely willing to foster tha[t] and to continue
working on that relationship . . . with the children and [mother].” He recognized that the
children “definitely [have] a bond with [mother].” Foster mother testified, “I’m open to a
contact plan with [mother] still, despite having to go through tri al and everything. I think
that it’s important for [the children] to have that door open.” She elaborated why it was
important to preserve this relationship:
[Mother] loves her children. Is she perfect? No. These
children, despite their conflicted feelings, they’re going to
want a relationship with her eventually in some way, shape, or
form. I think it just needs to be on their terms. [Foster father]
and I would never do anything to harm these children or to
prevent them from having a relationship with their mother,
ever, and I know there’s a conflicted dynamic right now, but I
believe that that relationship is repairable, and I believe that it
is crucial to have that door open no matter what happens with
trial.

At the first review hearing, the district court expressed its dissatisfaction with foster
parents given their apparent change in position on contact: “I took at her word [foster
mother]’s assurance that she intended to foster that connection. But what I have seen
demonstrates not an intent to foster that connection, but an intent to sever it.” The district
court added: “[G]iven the history a meaningful contact agreement that requires their family
to support their contact with their mother is an essential component in this court’s view of
permanency in this case.” Given the testimony about mother’s bond with the children, the
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district court’s best-interests findings for mother having contact with the children is amply
supported by the record and does not reflect an abuse of discretion.
C. Specificity of the Contact Order
Foster parents argue last that the district court’s contact order lacks necessary
specificity. They contend that this court should apply the “fair notice doctrine” to the
district court’s order because of the potential for civil contempt sanctions if the parties do
not follow it. Foster parents seem to be referring to the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which
we have applied to district court orders that can lead to criminal penalties. See
State v. Phipps, 820 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. App. 2012). The Supreme Court describes
that fair notice is achieved by “[t]he prohibition of vagueness . . . [which] is an ‘essential’
of due process.” Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 155-56 (2018). We decide
constitutional issues, such as the void -for-vagueness doctrine, de novo. See
Newstrand v. Arend, 869 N.W.2d 681, 687 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15,
2015). Accepting solely for the sake of argument this transfer of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to a district court order because of the potential for a civil contempt sanction, the
order here survives.
Our precedent further describes this doctrine. There are two reasons why a statute
may be ruled unconstitutionally vague: “First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; and second,
if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). The district court’s
language passes these requirements.
29
Foster parents argue that the district court’s order is vague based on punctuation and
language. In making their argument, they claim that the order directed the parties “to make
good faith, efforts to enable meaningful contact between the minor children and [mother]”
and “to make efforts, to enable contact” between the children and mother.
When the agency asked to clarify the district court’s order, the court stated:
The order reads as previously written with a comma
after meaningful. Meaningful means at least twice a month, in
person, for at least an hour. In the presence—supervised is fine
to begin with. Supervised, two hours a month, on two separate
occasions. To normalize the situation. It is safe in the Court’s
view to do that. In the presence of other adults.

The district court’s final order on contact reads:
The parties are hereby ordered to continue to make good
faith efforts to enable meaningful contact between the minor
children and [mother]. Specifically, the parties are directed to
make efforts to enable contact between the minor children and
[mother] that occurs at l[e]ast twice per month, for at least one
hour per visit, with supervision by the foster parents or other
agreed upon third party.

This order does not have the punctuation irregularities that foster parents use as evidence
to support their void-for-vagueness arguments. Foster parents rely on a version that appears
to have been sent to the parties but is not in the record on appeal and not properly before
us. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (describing the record on appeal). The version
provided by foster parents has seemingly misplaced commas that are corrected in the
version in the official record. Foster parents also assert that the court “back tracked” when
orally describing its order to “please everyone,” but the record instead reflects that the
district court’s order at this stage only ever set out to define the end goal of what
30
“meaningful” contact would look like and required the parties to collaborate to develop a
process toward that goal.
The district court’s contact order clearly requires the parties to engage in good-faith
efforts that will enable this meaningful contact. And its statements at the second review
hearing further assist, rather than hinder, that understanding. It agreed that “the directive is
for the parties to work collaboratively toward achieving meaningful contact.” This stated
definition comports with a common usage of “good faith” in the legal field, defined as a
mental state having “honesty in belief or purp ose.” Black’s Law Dictionary 832 (12th ed.
2024) (defining good faith). The district court’s contact requirement plainly delineates the
prohibited conduct—failing to engage in good- faith efforts that will ultimately allow twice-
monthly supervised contact between mother and the children—and does not encourage
arbitrary, much less discriminatory, enforcement of that order.
Affirmed.