State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1569

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Thomas Jay Shern,
Appellant.

Filed August 11, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Polk County District Court
File Nos. 60-CR-19-2061, 60-CR-20-744

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, First Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Wheelock , Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this direct appeal from his judgments of conviction for third-degree possession
of a controlled substance within a prohibited zone, fourth-degree driving while impaired,
and failure to appear for a court proceeding, appellant seeks to withdraw his guilty pleas,
arguing that his plea to the controlled-substance offense lacked an accurate factual basis
and that all three of his pleas were not voluntary or intelligent. We affirm.
FACTS
On a dark evening in October 2019, appellant Thomas Jay Shern drove into East
Grand Forks on a route that passed within 300 feet of a public park. 1 A law-enforcement
officer noticed Shern’s vehicle because it did not have functioning taillights. Upon further
investigation, the officer discovered that Shern’s vehicle registration had expired, and he
stopped Shern for these violations.
While speaking with Shern, the officer observed indicia of intoxication. Because
he knew that Shern previously had been arrested for a controlled-substance offense, the
officer asked Shern whether he was on probation. After the officer confirmed that Shern
was on probation, dispatch contacted Shern’s probation agent, who authorized a test and
search of Shern’s person for controlled substances. During this search, the officer found
Shern to be in possession of marijuana and methamphetamine. Shern’s urine also tested
positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and methamphetamine.

1 We take the facts from the appellate record, including hearing transcripts and filings with
the district court.
3
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Shern with third-degree possession of a
controlled substance within a prohibited zone in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023,
subd. 2(a)(6) (2018), and fourth-degree driving while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2018), with reference to Minn. Stat. § 169A.27, subd. 2 (2018).
Because Shern later failed to attend an omnibus hearing for these charges, the state charged
Shern with felony failure to appear for court in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.49, subd. 1(a)
(2018).
In April 2022, Shern pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of a controlled
substance within a prohibited zone, fourth-degree driving while impaired, and failure to
appear for court. Before Shern submitted his guilty pleas, the district court explained to
Shern that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving certain rights. The district court then
questioned Shern about his mental state and faculties under oath. In response, Shern
affirmed that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that he was not under the
care of a medical doctor or mental-health professional, that there was not “anything that
would impair [his] ability to understand what’s going on here today,” that he had not been
diagnosed with any medical illness or infirmity that would cause the district court concern
about his ability to go forward with his plea, and that he had never “been diagnosed with
any mental illness or emotional instability that would cause the Court to be concerned about
[his] capacity.” Shern then pleaded guilty to all three charges.
During his plea hearing, Shern affirmed that he had reviewed the plea agreements
with his attorney and that he understood the meaning of the proceeding. Shern also verified
that he had reviewed the complaint charging him with third-degree controlled-substance
4
possession and fourth-degree driving while impaired and agreed that “the probable cause
portion of that complaint [was] true and accurate to [his] knowledge.” After this, the
prosecutor engaged Shern in the following colloquy with respect to charge for possession
of a controlled substance:
PROSECUTOR: [O]n October 7th, 2019, were you traveling
across Highway 2 from Grand Forks into East Grand Forks?
DEFENDANT: Yes.

. . . .

PROSECUTOR: And were you on probation at that time?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR: And do you have any reason to dispute that
Officer [A.] contacted your probation agent and received
permission to request a search of your vehicle?
DEFENDANT: No, I told him he could.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And during that search of the vehicle,
Officer [A.] discovered a cigarette pack with a small amount
of what at the time was suspected to be marijuana, is that
correct?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR: And was that marijuana in the cigarette
packet?
DEFENDANT: Yes, it was.

PROSECUTOR: And did Officer [A.] also discover . . .
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: . . . a plastic bag with crystal chunks in it?
DEFENDANT: Yeah, there’s a cellophane off a cigarette
pack.

PROSECUTOR: That makes sense.
DEFENDANT: Yeah.

PROSECUTOR: And do you have any reason to dispute that
Officer [A.] conducted a field test on the crystal-like chunks in
5
that bag and that field test came back positive for the presence
of methamphetamine?
DEFENDANT: Ah, yeah. It really wasn’t chunks though. It
was like just dust in the bag. It was—you know.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. But you would agree that there was
some amount of substance in there?
DEFENDANT: Yeah, there was residue in there, yes.

The plea colloquy later continued:
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Was the methamphetamine . . .
yours?
DEFENDANT: Ah, yes.

PROSECUTOR: And do you have any reason to dispute that
the crossing over the Kennedy Bridge would place your vehicle
within 300 feet of Sherlock Park in East Grand Forks?
DEFENDANT: Yeah, right. Yeah, it does.

During the colloquy, Shern also provided a factual basis with respect to the
driving-while-impaired charge. The district court received the complaint’s probable-cause
statement as a supplement to the factual basis for Shern’s pleas and accepted Shern’s pleas.
Shern then pleaded guilty to failing to attend a hearing for the charges arising out of the
traffic stop, and the district court accepted Shern’s plea for that offense.
Having received Shern’s guilty pleas, the district court then considered and granted
Shern’s request for a furlough to attend a family member’s funeral. Shern failed to return
from the furlough, and the district court issued a warrant for his arrest.
Shern appeared in district court much later, and the district court ordered that Shern
remain in custody until his next hearing. In a later hearing, Shern asked the district court
to order a competency evaluation pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01
because he was “having little mental issues” and wanted “to take care of it” while he was
6
in court. The district court asked Shern’s attorney about this, who explained that there was
“no doubt that [Shern is] competent.” Shern later discharged his attorney and represented
himself at sentencing.
During his sentencing hearing, Shern made numerous statements alleging that his
former public defender did not effectively represent him, that he has dementia, and that he
did not understand the sentencing hearing. The district court found that Shern was “more
than able to go forward with [sentencing],” revoked the previous stay of execution of
Shern’s sentences, and committed Shern to the commissioner of corrections.
Shern appeals.
DECISION
Shern argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas for third-degree
possession of a controlled substance, fourth-degree driving while impaired, and failure to
appear for a court proceeding because they were not valid. Specifically, Shern contends
that his plea to the controlled-substance charge was not accurate and that all three of his
pleas were not voluntary or intelligent. We address his arguments in that order.
To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v.
Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003). The validity of a guilty plea is a question of
law that appellate courts review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). The defendant bears the burden of showing that their plea was not valid. Id.
“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity and subsequent
presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary
dismissal.” Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 647 (Minn. 2025) (quotations omitted).
7
We first consider the accuracy requirement as it relates to Shern’s plea for
third-degree possession of a controlled substance. The accuracy requirement “protect[s] a
defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of
were he to insist on his right to trial.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).
“To be accurate, a plea must be established on a proper factual basis.” Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 94. A proper factual basis requires “sufficient facts on the record to support
a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to plead
guilty.” Kelsey v. State, 214 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. 1974). In other words, the district
court “must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime
charged can be reasonably inferred.” Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). “[I]n determining the accuracy of a guilty plea, the reviewing court
does not consider allegations in the complaint unless the truthfulness and accuracy of the
allegations have been expressly admitted to by the defendant.” Rosendahl v. State,
955 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. App. 2021); accord Ibrahim v. State, 14 N.W.3d 294, 302-03
(Minn. App. 2024).
Shern argues that his guilty plea for third -degree possession of a controlled
substance in a prohibited zone was not accurate because it did not establish that he
unlawfully possessed one or more mixtures containing methamphetamine or amphetamine
in a school zone, park zone, public-housing zone, or a drug-treatment facility. In his brief,
Shern challenges the accuracy of his guilty plea with respect to only the “possession of a
mixture containing methamphetamine” element of the offense.
8
We do not find Shern’s argument persuasive because, during his plea colloquy,
Shern agreed that there was “dust in the bag” or “residue” that tested positive for
methamphetamine. Moreover, Shern affirmed that he had “an opportunity to review the
complaint in this case” and that it was “true and accurate to [his] knowledge.” Because
Shern verified the “truthfulness and accuracy” of the complaint, we conclude that the
district court properly relied on the complaint’s probable-cause statement as a supplement
to Shern’s plea. See Rosendahl, 955 N.W.2d at 296. When considering both Shern’s
testimony at his plea hearing and the complaint’s probable-cause statement, we conclude
that Shern’s plea to third-degree possession of a controlled substance was accurate.
We next consider whether Shern’s pleas were voluntary. “The purpose of the
voluntariness requirement is to [ensure] that the defendant is not pleading guilty because
of improper pressures.” Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. Here, Shern argues that his guilty pleas
were not voluntary because of statements he made at his sentencing hearing.
At his sentencing hearing, Shern stated that he “didn’t know probation reinstatement
was even an option,”2 that his public defender had not adequately represented him, and that
his public defender “denied [him] a Rule 20 when [he had] more than enough records . . .
that says [he has] a mental illness.” Notwithstanding these later statements, at his plea
hearing, Shern entered his pleas under oath, verifying that he wanted to proceed with them.

2 The record is unclear as to whether Shern’s plea agreement included an option for him to
be reinstated on probation. Even if this was contemplated in his plea agreement, however,
the district court determined that , “due to his conduct after [the] plea hearing,” which
included failing to return from his furlough for several months, Shern violated the terms of
the plea agreement.
9
Because “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity and
subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to
summary dismissal,” Davis, 15 N.W.3d at 647 (quotation omitted), we do not find Shern’s
post-plea hearing statements persuasive as they relate to the voluntariness of his guilty
pleas. Moreover, reliance on statements made at a sentencing hearing several months after
a plea hearing contravenes our caselaw. See Erickson v. State, 702 N.W.2d 892, 898
(Minn. App. 2005) (determining that a guilty plea was valid despite defendant’s later
statement that he was under the influence of substances at the time of his plea because he
testified at the plea hearing that he understood the ramifications and that he was not under
the influence of substances). Therefore, we conclude that Shern’s pleas were voluntary.
Finally, we consider whether Shern’s pleas were intelligent. “To be intelligent, a
guilty plea must represent a knowing and intelligent choice among the alternative courses
of action available.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). Shern argues that his plea s were not intelligently entered because “the record
does not indicate that any plea petition was filed with the court or gone over by Shern and
his counsel” and because the statements Shern made at his sentencing hearing in 2024 show
that Shern did not know what he was pleading to in 2022. However, Shern stated in his
plea colloquy that he had adequate time to discuss his plea agreements with his attorney.
Thus, contrary to his assertion at the sentencing hearing, we are persuaded that Shern made
“a knowing and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available” when
he pleaded guilty to these offenses. Id. Shern also does not identify any authority to
support his argument that a plea petition is essential to determining whether a guilty plea
10
was intelligent or valid, and we are not aware of any.3 Therefore, we conclude that Shern’s
pleas were intelligent.
Because the record defeats Shern’s contentions that his plea to possession of a
controlled substance was not accurate and that he did not voluntarily or intelligently enter
any of his pleas, we conclude that he has failed to establish that withdrawal of his pleas is
necessary. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments of conviction.
Affirmed.

3 In contrast, t his court has affirmed guilty pleas on many occasions when a formal plea
petition was not filed. See, e.g., State v. Kasper, No. A22-1832, 2023 WL 8178148, at *1
& n.3 (Minn. App. Nov. 27, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2024); State v.
Wurtzberger, No. A23-0387, 2023 WL 7119125, at *1 & n.1 (Minn. App. Oct. 30, 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2024); State v. Hyde, No. A17-0147, 2017 WL 5243531, at *1
(Minn. App. Nov. 13, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2018) ; Poland v. State ,
No. A14-1947, 2015 WL 5664879, at *1 (Minn. App. Sept. 28, 2015), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 15, 2015). Because these opinions are nonprecedential, they do not present a rule of
law; we cite them for their persuasive value only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding authority . . . but may be cited
as persuasive authority.”).