State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1589

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Drace Chaddell Jackson,
Appellant.

Filed July 14, 2025
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-11117

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for second-degree
intentional murder, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his request to impose a sentence at the bottom of the presumptive guidelines range and
imposing a sentence in the middle of the range. Because this is not a rare case where we
reverse a district court’s imposition of a guidelines sentence, we affirm.
DECISION
Appellant Drace Chaddell Jackson argues that the district court abused its discretion
by sentencing him to 348 months in prison for intentional second-degree murder and “asks
this Court to reverse that sentence and remand with instructions to impose a 306-month
sentence.”
Appellate courts may review a sentence “to determine whether the sentence is
inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive,
unjustifiability disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact issued by the district
court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2020). When reviewing a sentence, appellate
courts “afford the [district] court great discretion in the imposition of sentences and reverse
sentencing decisions only for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303,
307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). When the record shows that the district court
“carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before making a
determination,” we do not interfere with the district court’s exercise of discretion.
State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985).
3
As part of a plea agreement, respondent State of Minnesota dismissed the charge of
second-degree unintentional murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2020) and
Jackson pleaded guilty to intentional second- degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subd. 1(1) (2020). The parties also agreed on a sentencing range and a restitution amount.
At his plea hearing, Jackson provided a factual basis, testifying that he used a firearm to
shoot the victim multiple times and intended to cause the victim’s death.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (Supp. 2021). Sentences within the presumptive
range “are presumed to be appropriate for the crimes to which they apply.” Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2021). “This court will not generally review a district court’s
exercise of its discretion to sentence a defendant when the sentence imposed is within the
presumptive guidelines range.” State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010),
rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). Appellate courts will only reverse presumptive
sentences in “rare” cases where “compelling circumstances” exist. Id. (quotations omitted).
The presumptive sentence for second-degree intentional murder with a criminal
history score of zero is 306 months with a permissible range of between 261 and 367
months. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A (Supp. 2021). As part of the plea agreement, Jackson
and the state agreed that Jackson should be sentenced to a term between 306 and 367
months. At his sentencing hearing, Jackson argued that that the district court should
sentence him to 306 months based on his lack of criminal history, “his remorse, his
cooperation, [his] attitude in court,” and “the support of his friends and his family.” The
state argued that Jackson should be sentenced to 367 months because of the seriousness of
4
his conduct and because Jackson evaded law enforcement “for nearly two years” after the
killing. The district court sentenced Jackson to 348 months. The district court
acknowledged that Jackson did not have a criminal history, took responsibility for his
actions by pleading guilty, and had the support of family and friends. But the district court
also noted the impact of the loss of the victim, the seriousness of Jackson’s conduct, and
Jackson’s evasion of law enforcement.
Jackson makes a similar argument on appeal, arguing that the district court abused
its discretion because his age, lack of criminal history, remorse and acceptance of
responsibility, and support of family and friends supported a lower sentence. The state
argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion because (1) the district court
imposed a sentence within the presumptive guidelines range, (2) Jackson “offers no
compelling circumstances to justify reversing the presumptive sentence,” and (3) Jackson’s
“conduct during the offense made his offense more serious than the typical second-degree
intentional murder offense and could have supported an upward durational departure” or a
first-degree murder charge.
Jackson cites to State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982), as authority that
the factors he lists favor a lower guidelines sentence. The supreme court in Trog, however,
discussed “the defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude
while in court, and the support of friends and/or family,” because they were “relevant to a
determination whether a defendant is particularly suitable to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the factors listed in Trog are
relevant for considering a dispositional sentencing departure rather than a request for a
5
reduced sentence duration. Id. Here, Jackson sought a sentence at the lower-end of the
guidelines range, not a departure and there is no authority supporting Jackson’s argument
that these factors show “compelling circumstances” justifying reversal of a guidelines
sentence. Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428 (quotation omitted).
As the state points out, “even if [Jackson] is trying to argue by analogy, the factors
he cites are relevant only to dispositional departures.” “The Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines define two types of sentencing departures: dispositional and durational.”
State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). Dispositional departures “place[] the
offender in a different setting than that called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence,”
such as probation instead of execution of a sentence, while “a durational departure is a
sentence that departs in length from the presumptive guidelines range.” Id. The sentence
Jackson requested is (1) not a departure and (2) relates to the duration of the sentence, not
the disposition. Therefore, the Trog factors do not apply here.1
Even considering these factors, this is not a “rare” case with “compelling
circumstances” requiring the reversal of a guidelines sentence. Delk , 781 N.W.2d at 428
(quotations omitted). Jackson cites to State v. Hennum, where the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed a district court’s guidelines sentence. 441 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. 1989).
The state argues that “the facts here are far different” from those in Hennum.

1 As the state notes, a court can consider remorse when granting a durational departure
when “a defendant can show that his demonstrated remorse is directly related to the
criminal conduct at issue and made that conduct significantly less serious than the t ypical
conduct underlying the offense of conviction.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 626. The record
does not show that Jackson’s remorse impacted the seriousness of his conduct.
6
In Hennum, a woman shot her husband after she experienced years of abuse, which
included incidents where her husband punctured her lung and broke her nose. Id. at 795-96.
At trial, Hennum claimed that she was experiencing “battered woman syndrome.” Id. at
797. The supreme court determined that these circumstances made Hennum “a rare case
which merits reversal of the trial court’s discretionary refusal to depart” from the
sentencing guidelines. Id. at 801 (quotation omitted). Here, the facts are very different.
Nothing about the crime or Jackson himself support a conclusion that this is a “rare” case
with “compelling circumstances” justifying reversal.
2
The district court considered the arguments by both parties, specifically Jackson’s
accountability, his lack of a criminal record, the seriousness of his conduct, and his evasion
of the police for almost two years after the offense. The district court accordingly
determined that 348 months was an appropriate sentence. That decision was within the
district court’s discretion, and this is not a “rare” case where this court should reverse a
district court’s imposition of a sentence in line with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
Delk, 781 N.W.2d at 428 (quotation omitted).
3
Affirmed.

2 We note that Hennum involved a requested departure from the sentencing guidelines.
441 N.W.2d at 801. We are unaware of any binding caselaw where an appellate court has
reversed a guidelines sentence based on compelling circumstances that favored imposition
of a lesser guidelines sentence.
3 Because we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a
sentence of 348 months, we need not address the state’s arguments that Jackson’s sentence
could have been higher because the record evidence justifies an aggravated sentence for
“particular cruelty” under Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(a)(2) (2020), or a first-degree
murder charge under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2020).