In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. J. W. and L. S. G., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1591

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
C. J. W. and L. S. G., Parents.

Filed March 31, 2025
Remanded
Worke, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-JV-23-788

Mary I. Johnson, Johnson Law Firm P.A., Virginia, Minnesota (for appellant-mother
C.J.W.)

Joshua P. Nuckols, Joshua Nuckols Law, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent-father
L.S.G.)

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, Molly Jo French, Assistant County
Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Koochiching County Public
Health and Human Services)

Angela J. S. Sonsalla, Perham, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s denial of her petition to terminate
respondent-father’s parental rights, arguing that the district court abused its discretion
when it ruled that, although mother proved two statutory bases for termination, it was
nevertheless not in the child’s best interests to terminate father’s parental rights. Because
the district court’s findings on the child’s best interests are insufficient for appellate review,
we remand that issue.
FACTS
Appellant C.J.W. (mother) and respondent L.S.G. (father) have one joint child (the
child) who was born in 2017. The parties were never married but lived together with the
child and mother’s two other children.
In January 2023, father was convicted of sexually abusing mother’s daughter. In
November 2023, mother filed a private petition to terminate father’s parental rights to the
child. Mother later filed an amended petition asserting multiple statutory bases for
termination of parental rights (TPR) and argued that TPR was in the best interests of the
child.
In August 2024, following a trial, the district court denied mother’s petition. The
district court found that there was clear and convincing evidence of two statutory bases
supporting TPR. It found that father inflicted egregious harm on mother’s daughter while
in his care and that father was convicted of an offense requiring him to register as a
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predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), (8) (2024). 1 The district
court determined that, although mother proved two statutory bases for TPR , it was
nevertheless not in the child’s best interests to terminate father’s parental rights.
This appeal followed.
DECISION
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). We review a district court’s TPR decision
for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn.
App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey ,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
“A district court may terminate parental rights if (1) at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, (2) the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and (3) termination is in the child’s best interests.”
J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600.
2

1 After the district court’s trial in this matter, but before the district court filed its order, the
legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1, by removing subdivision 1(b)(3) and
renumbering subdivision 1(b)(3)-(9). See 2024 Minn. Laws. ch. 80, art. 8, § 27, at 203-05;
2024 Minn. Laws ch. 115, art. 18, § 38 at 190-91 . Because the amendments do not
materially change the relevant section, we cite the current version.

2 The district court determined that reasonable reunification efforts were not required
because the child has not “been alleged to be in need of protection or services” and mother’s
petition established a prima facie case that father committed an offense requiring
registration as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(6) (2024).
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When a statutory condition for TPR is found, “the best interests of the child must
be the paramount consideration” in determining whether parental rights will be terminated.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024). “[A] child’s best interests may preclude
terminating parental rights even when a statutory basis for termination exists.” In re
Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Minn. App. 2003) (quotation omitted). “In analyzing
the best interests of the child, the court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest
in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B.,
492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04, subd. 2(c)(ii)
(identifying the same factors). “Competing interests include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” Id.
In a TPR proceeding, the district court “must consider a child’s best interests and
explain its rationale in its findings and conclusions.” Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d at 626. This is
necessary because when “findings do not adequately address best interests, they are
inadequate to facilitate effective appellate review, to provide insight into which facts or
opinions were most persuasive of the ultimate decision, or to demonstrate the court’s
comprehensive consideration of the statutory criteria.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that
TPR was not in the child’s best interests.
In its best-interests analysis, the district court found that “[t]here are competing
interests in this case.” It found that the evidence “clearly shows [father]’s desire to
maintain the parent-child relationship.” But it also found merit in mother’s argument that
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TPR served the child’s best interests because of the “egregious harm [father] inflicted on
[mother]’s daughter,” and the “issues of having a ‘dad’ as a registered sex offender.” The
district court ultimately decided that it was not in the child’s best interests to terminate
father’s parental rights.
In reaching that decision, the district court found, among other things, that witnesses
testified credibly to the positive bond between father and the child, the benefits to the child
of a potential resumption in the parent-child relationship, and the risks to the child’s well-
being if the possibility of a relationship is foreclosed. Though we conclude that the record
supports those findings, they primarily address the child’s interest in maintaining the
parent-child relationship but do not adequately address the competing interests that the
district court found existed. Particularly absent from the findings regarding competing
interests are findings that address the statutory bases supporting TPR.
We also note that , while the district court found that it was in the child’s best
interests to preserve the parent-child relationship “at this time,” its findings do not address
the child’s competing permanency interests. See In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886,
893 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a district court’s TPR decision relies “not primarily on past
history, but to a great extent upon the projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care
for his or her child” (quotation omitted)).
Because the district court’s findings do not adequately address the child’s competing
interests, they are insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review of the district court’s
ultimate decision. See In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App.
2014) (“An order does not permit meaningful appellate review if it does not identify the
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facts . . . on which the district court’s decision is based.”). We therefore remand the issue
for additional findings. 3 The district court has discretion to reopen the record, and if
necessary, require the parties to submit expert material or data on the issue.
Remanded.

3 Because the district court found two statutory bases for TPR and we are remanding for
additional findings on the best-interests issue, we need not reach mother’s other arguments.