In Re the Custody of LMK & LJK:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1596

In Re the Custody of LMK & LJK:

Matthew Steven Krebs, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Nicole Lynn Carlson,
Respondent.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-FA-19-210

Carrie A. Doom, Sapientia Law Group, Cambridge, Minnesota (for appellant)

Nicole Lynn Carlson, Dalbo, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order denying appellant father’s motion to
modify custody, father argues that the district court abused its discretion in its balancing of
the best-interests factors and by determining that the benefits of modification did not
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outweigh the harm to the children. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion,
we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Matthew Steven Krebs (father) and respondent Nicole Lynn Carlson
(mother) are the parents of two minor children, L.M.K., born in 2013, and L.J.K., born in
2014. The following summarizes the district court’s factual findings in its order denying
modification of custody after an evidentiary hearing, along with the evidence received at
the hearing as relevant to the arguments on appeal.
In May 2020, the district court awarded sole physical and sole legal custody of both
minor children to mother and established a parenting-time schedule for father. The district
court’s order also directed the parties to participate in reunification therapy.
The parties began reunification therapy in November 2020. The therapist did not
believe, based on her observations, that father and the children needed reunification
therapy. The therapist also noted that mother had many concerns, including father’s history
of drug use, her own history of domestic abuse with father, and the possibility that their
sons were sexually abused. Mother seemed “afraid” that the children would have “a similar
experience” to hers. Mother seemed to “struggle to . . . separate her own experiences from
what the [children] experienced.” Mother ultimately asked to stop reunification therapy
because she thought the therapist was “on [father’s] side.” As a result, reunification therapy
stopped, and the therapist began providing individual therapy for father.
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Sexual-Abuse Reports
Mother made four sexual-abuse reports to Isanti County Health and Human Services
(ICHHS) involving allegations of sexual abuse of the children by father. In August 2022,
mother filed the first report and it “was screened out.” Mother filed the second report in
September 2022 and alleged that L.J.K. was “hiding under his bed and having major
meltdowns,” that father “spanked L.J.K. 10 times” in September 2021 while L.J.K. “yelled
that [father] was touching his privates,” and that L.J.K. had “rectal bleeding the prior
spring.” According to the district court, this report was “screened out” because the alleged
incident “was over a year old” and there was “no information” that father caused the alleged
injuries or committed sexual behaviors.
Mother made the third and fourth reports in October 2022. One of the October
reports was screened out; the other went to investigation. An investigator conducted a
forensic interview with L.J.K. during which L.J.K. said that his father “was touching him
sexually” on “his privates,” which were “his butt and wiener.” L.J.K. reported that father
“told him not to talk about ‘the bad stuff.’” L.J.K. also stated that, on one occasion, father’s
“hand touched his penis and [father] told L.J.K. to ‘do it a lot.’” The investigator found that
L.J.K.’s descriptive language was “uncommon for a child of his age.” According to the
district court, the investigator “determined there was not a preponderance of the evidence
to support a finding of sexual abuse or threatened sexual abuse.”
In March 2023, both parents participated in psychological evaluations. The
evaluator did not use any collateral sources in his evaluation. According to the district
court, the evaluator concluded that father did not “present increased risk of sexual trauma”
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to the children; the evaluator also determined that mother “demonstrated significantly
above average fear” of father.
Father’s Parenting Time
Over time, father’s parenting time with the children expanded based on the
parenting plan. Father started supervised parenting time in May 2020. Father reached the
final phase of the parenting plan by December 2021 and began unsupervised parenting
time.
The record includes evidence that father experienced disruptions in his parenting
time. During the investigations of the sexual-abuse-report allegations, father’s parenting
time stopped until the report was screened out or closed. Father’s parenting time was also
altered for other reasons. For example, in May 2022, mother sent a cell phone with the
children when they went to father’s house for parenting time. Father did not want the
children to have a cell phone and tried to take the phone away. L.J.K. told father he could
not take away the cell phone or L.J.K. would “get in trouble with mom.” That same month,
L.J.K. “would not go to school due to anxiety” and “did not attend some of [father’s]
parenting time.”
In November 2022 —after the fourth report of sexual abuse discussed above —the
district court granted an ex parte order for protection (OFP) against father on behalf of the
children. In January 2023, following a contested hearing, the district court filed an order
for dismissal, determining that the allegations against father had not been proved. After the
dismissal, father’s parenting time resumed with L.M.K. but did not immediately resume
with L.J.K. Instead, the parties began working with a parenting consultant, who
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recommended reunification therapy before father resumed parenting time with L.J.K.
Father and L.J.K. participated in reunification therapy, which ended in October 2023.
Father’s parenting time with both children resumed.
Father’s parenting time with L.J.K. stopped again in January 2024. During father’s
parenting time, father asked the children to turn their video games off and L.J.K. asked if
he could leave and stay at mother’s house. When father told L.J.K. he could not leave ,
L.J.K. “stormed out of the house without shoes or a coat.” L.J.K. returned to father’s home
“within a few seconds, laid down on the couch and pouted, but then fell asleep for a few
hours.” The next day, L.J.K. told father that he “did not want to talk about what had
happened.”
L.J.K. stopped attending father’s parenting time. L.M.K. said that, if his brother was
not going, “he did not want to either.” When mother would drive to drop off the children
for father’s parenting time, both children would “refuse to leave [mother’s] car.”
Eventually, L.M.K. started going to parenting time again, and he and father would play
video games online with L.J.K., who stayed with mother.
Motion to Modify Custody
In December 2023, father moved the district court to modify custody and parenting
time. Father sought sole physical and sole legal custody of both children. Father also
requested that mother have supervised parenting time once per week and participate in
therapy “to address her trauma triggers.” Father’s motion did not provide for increases in
mother’s parenting time. Father submitted an affidavit with the motion and requested an
evidentiary hearing. Mother opposed the motion.
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The district court found that father had “made a prima facie case of endangerment”
and granted father’s request for an evidentiary hearing. The district court conducted a
three-day evidentiary hearing in May 2024 and received testimony from father, mother, an
ICHHS employee, the psychologist who performed the parties’ psychological evaluations,
the children’s individual therapist, the reunification therapist, mother’s cousin, the
children’s maternal grandfather, and the children’s maternal grandmother.
The district court denied father’s motion on September 3, 2024. Of the four
requirements to modify custody and parenting time, the district court found that only two
were satisfied based on the evidence. The district court determined that (1) father
demonstrated “a change in circumstances justifying modification of the custody order”;
(2) father demonstrated that mother “endangered the [children] through harm to their
emotional health and development by harming their relationship with [father]”;
(3) modification of custody was “not in the children’s best interest”; and (4) the benefits of
the proposed modification “would not outweigh the harm to the children from the change
in environment.”
District Court’s Analysis of Best-Interests Factors
In reaching its decision, the district court considered the 12 best-interests factors
outlined in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024). This opinion first summarizes the four
factors favoring modification.
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A. The physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other needs of the children
under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1).
The district court determined that the first factor slightly favored modification. The
district court found that mother’s actions “caused damage to the [children’s] emotional
health and development” by harming their relationship with father. But the district court
also found that this damage has been “mitigated by other efforts” mother has made to “tr[y]
to allow the [children] to maintain a relationship with their father,” such as allowing phone
conversations and communications through video games and bringing the children to
parenting time.
B. The physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a parent that affects the
children’s safety or developmental needs under Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a)(5).
The district court determined that the fifth factor was an “important factor” that
slightly favored modification. The district court found that mother’s “heightened concerns
over [father’s] actions have negatively impacted the [children’s] development of a
relationship with their father” and that she is “unable or unwilling” to engage in sessions
with father to improve their coparenting.
C. The parents’ willingness and ability to provide ongoing care for the children
under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(7).
The district court determined that the seventh factor slightly favored modification.
The district court found that “[ b]oth parties are willing and able ” to care for the children.
The district court also found that mother’s “inconsistency with parenting time . . . was due
to [her] fear rather than an intentional effort to damage the relationship between [father]
and the [children].”
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D. The parents’ willingness and ability to cooperate under Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a)(12).
The district court determined that the twelfth factor slightly favored modification.
The district court found that the parties do not have an ability to coparent “given their
relationship history.” Mother has “failed to minimize” the children’s exposure to her
conflict with father, although both parties “have been open” to reunification therapy. The
district court concluded that “joint physical and joint legal custody are not in the best
interests of the children.”
We turn to the district court’s determinations about the five factors that weighed
against modification, two of which the district court considered together.
A. Whether domestic abuse has occurred under Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a)(4).
The district court determined that the fourth factor weighed against modification,
but the court gave it “minimal weight.” The district court found that, although father
“verbally abused” mother during their relationship, “that relationship ended many years
ago.” The district court also did not find mother’s allegations that father sexually abused
the children credible.
B. Each parent’s participation in caring for the children under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a)(6).
The district court determined that the sixth factor weighed against modification. The
district court found that mother “cared for the [children] for their entire lives,” while father
“handled overnights for the [children]” but was “largely uninvolved in managing their
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health . . . and their schooling.” The district court added that there was no evidence father
would be unable to meet the children’s needs.
C. The effect of changes to home, school, and community on the children’s
well-being and the children’s relationships under Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a)(8)-(9).
The district court considered the eighth and ninth factors together and determined
that they weighed against modification. The district court found that the effect of changes
to home, school, and community on the children’s well-being was “moderately important”
and that the effect of those changes on the children’s relationships with parents, siblings,
and other significant persons was “very important.” The district court stated that father was
requesting “a change in where the [children] reside.” The district court found that this
change would not impact the children’s school or extracurricular activities, but it “would
negatively impact their relationships with neighbors and cousins” as well as their maternal
grandmother, whom they see “almost daily.” The district court found that, although the
modification would “improve the relationship between the [children] and their father,” it
would “do substantial harm to their relationship to their mother.”
D. The benefit to the children in maximizing parenting time with both parents
and the detriment to the children in limiting parenting time with either parent
under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(10).
The district court determined that the tenth factor weighed moderately against
modification. The district court found that, although the children would “see their father
much more,” the proposed modification would “result in mother receiving less parenting
time than father receives now” and her parenting time would be supervised.
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Along with its determinations that four factors favored modification and five factors
weighed against modification, the district court discussed the three remaining factors. It
determined that the second factor was neutral and had little weight— whether the children
had any special needs. Minn. Stat. § 518.47, subd. 1(a)(2). The district court noted that the
“only special need for the [children] is the need for therapy” and there is no evidence that
either parent cannot meet this need.
The district court found that two factors did not apply. The district court determined
that the third factor, which considers the children’s preference, id., subd. 1(a)(3), does not
apply because the children “are not of sufficient age and maturity to express an
independent, reliable preference.” The district court also determined that the eleventh
factor, which considers each parent’s support of the children’s relationship with the other
parent, does not apply to cases of domestic abuse. Id., subd. 1(a)(11). The district court
found that, although the domestic abuse “was not recent, it still affects [mother’s]
relationship with [father] and her willingness to support her children’s relationship with
her abuser.” The district court also noted that, even if it considered this factor, “it would
not change its ultimate determination.”
In its final weighing of the best-interests factors, the district court determined that
the “most important factors” are the first, ninth, and tenth factors. While the first factor
weighed slightly in favor of modification, the ninth and tenth factors weighed against
modification. The district court thus concluded that modification of custody is “not in the
children’s best interest.”
Father appeals.
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DECISION
Father argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in its balancing
of the best-interests factors and by determining that the benefits of modification did not
outweigh the harm to the children. Mother did not file a brief, and we therefore decide the
appeal on the merits of the case. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
The district court has broad discretion in making child-custody and parenting-time
determinations. Matson v. Matson, 638 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Minn. App. 2002). “Appellate
review of custody determinations is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion
by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law. ”
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985). We review a district court’s findings
of fact for clear error. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Clear error
exists when a factual finding is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 633
(Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007). On appellate
review of a district court’s best-interests analysis, “we give considerable deference to the
district court’s findings.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App.
2012); see also Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468 , 477 (Minn. App. 2000)
(“[C]urrent law leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the trial court’s
balancing of best-interests considerations.”).
The district court may modify custody if the moving party establishes “(1) the
circumstances of the children or custodian have changed; (2) modification would serve the
children’s best interests; (3) the children’s present environment endangers their physical
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health, emotional health, or emotional development; and (4) the benefits of the change
outweigh its detriments with respect to the children.” Crowley v. Meyer, 897 N.W.2d 288,
293 (Minn. 2017); accord Minn. Stat. § 518.18(c)-(d) (2024). The party seeking to modify
custody bears the burden of proving all four requirements to obtain relief. Crowley,
897 N.W.2d at 293.
The district court ruled in father’s favor on the first and third requirements to modify
custody. Because all four requirements are interrelated, we briefly discuss these rulings.
On the f irst requirement, the district court found that “there have been major changes in
circumstances.” To support modification, a “change in circumstances must be significant
and must have occurred since the original custody order; it cannot be a continuation of
conditions existing prior to the order.” Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App.
1997). The district court found that mother petitioned for an OFP against father, mother
made several abuse reports to ICHSS, and father experienced disruptions in his parenting
time because of L.J.K.’s refusal to participate. The district court determined that “these
changes are significant.”
On the third requirement, the district court found that father “demonstrated
endangerment.” “[A] sustained course of conduct by one parent designed to diminish a
child’s relationship with the other parent is unacceptable and may be grounds for denying
or modifying custody.” Lemcke v. Lemcke, 623 N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn. App. 2001), rev.
denied (Minn. June 19, 2001). The district court found that mother’s inability to “separate
her past experiences with [father] from his current actions . . . harms the [children’s]
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emotional health and development by negatively impacting their relationship with
[father].”
On appeal, father objects to the district court’s conclusions on the second and fourth
requirements from Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d). Because all four requirements must be met for
a district court to modify custody, see Leyh v. Stelzer, 398 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. App.
1986), father must prevail on both issues to be entitled to relief.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its balancing of the
best-interests factors.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in its balancing of the
best-interests factors. In doing so, father attacks specific points within the district court’s
analysis without discussing all of the best-interests factors or placing his arguments in the
context of the factors. Father makes four main arguments, which we discuss in turn.
First, father argues that the district court “used the children’s relationship with their
mother to the exclusion of all other factors.” It is true that the district court “may not use
one factor to the exclusion of all others” in balancing the best-interests factors. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(b)(1) (2024). But that is not what happened here. The district court
considered all relevant factors and weighed them before coming to a conclusion.
The district court was even-handed in its analysis of the best-interests factors. The
district court found that mother’s conduct endangered the children “by harming their
relationship with [father]” and that mother disrupted father’s parenting time due to her
allegations of sexual abuse, which the district court did not credit. The district court also
found that mother is “ unable or unwilling to engage in joint sessions with [father] to
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improve their coparenting because of her mental health.” And the district court found that
four best-interests factors favored granting father’s motion to modify custody. In doing so,
the district court considered the children’s relationship with father, finding that there was
no evidence that father would be unable to meet the children’s needs, that father’s
“chemical issues appear to be well addressed,” and that father’s “recent evaluation does
not provide cause for concern.” But the district court also found that father is “fairly quick
to anger, which raise[d] some concerns for the Court.” The district court also noted that
father “has not been involved in managing” the children’s needs “day-to-day” and that
father did not know the names of the children’s “best friends, teachers, or medical
providers.”
Because the district court did not “use one factor to the exclusion of all others,” see
id., father’s argument appears to be based on the weight the district court gave to each
factor and the underlying evidence. This court does not reweigh the evidence on appeal,
see Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477, and therefore, father is not entitled to relief based on
this argument.
Second, father argues that the district court’s balancing of the best-interests factors
conflicts with its finding of endangerment. Father contends that the district court “found
that the children were already alienated from their father and so their relationship with their
mother needs to be preserved.” Father contends that the district court’s finding of
endangerment by mother and its finding that modification is not in the children’s best
interests “rewards Mother’s behavior by preserving her relationship at the expense of [the
children’s] relationship with father.”
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The district court’s finding of endangerment is not inconsistent with the district
court’s best-interests analysis. A finding of endangerment and the best interests of the
children are two separate requirements for modifying custody. Crowley, 897 N.W.2d at
293; see also Minn. Stat. § 518.18(c)-(d). If finding parental endangerment was
automatically inconsistent with finding that the best interests of the children supported the
existing custody arrangement, then they would not be two separate requirements. Father
must succeed on both the finding of parental endangerment and the best-interests analysis
to prevail on his motion to modify custody. The district court considered the harm mother
caused to the children’s “emotional development and relationship with their father” in its
best-interests analysis, determining that, for this reason, the eighth and ninth best-interests
factors weighed in favor of modification. But the district court’s analysis of all best-
interests factors weighed against modification. “[W]e give considerable deference to the
district court’s findings” in this balancing of the best-interests factors. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d
at 92.
Third, father argues that denying his motion to modify custody and leaving the
children in mother’s care means the children “will not have a relationship with their father.”
But the district court found that the “damage [mother] has done has been mitigated by other
efforts she has made to facilitate [father’s] relationship” with the children, such as
“allowing phone conversations” and bringing the children “to exchanges whenever she has
been required” to do so. The district court did not “ignore[]” mother’s impact on the
children’s relationship with father, as father contends. The district court considered
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mother’s role in disrupting and facilitating the children’s relationship with father when it
balanced the best-interests factors.
Finally, father argues that the district court “fail[ed] to consider the impact on the
children [of] Mother’s unfounded fears of sexual abuse.” We disagree. Father’s arguments
ignore the district court’s full analysis of the best-interests factors. The district court
addressed mother’s sexual-abuse allegations and specifically “[did] not find them
credible.” And the district court considered those unproven allegations in its finding of
endangerment. Mother’s inability to “fully move past the trauma of her relationship” with
father was part of the district court’s determination that mother endangered the children by
harming their relationship with their father.
Because the district court analyzed all 12 best-interests factors and its findings were
supported by record evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its balancing
of the best-interests factors.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the benefits
of modification did not outweigh the harm to the children.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
benefits of modification did not outweigh the harm to the children. Because we determine
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its balancing of the best-interests factors,
we need not reach this issue, but do so in the interest of being thorough.
The district court considered whether “the harm to the child[ren] likely to be caused
by the change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of change” and concluded
that it was not. See Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 778. The district court reasoned that the
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modification would “significantly disrupt the [children’s] lives” and cause “a serious and
permanent change to their relationships with their mother, grandmother, mother’s family,
and neighbors.” The district court noted that father’s proposed modification requests
supervised parenting time for mother and does not provide for a graduated schedule
increasing her parenting time. The district court concluded that this proposed modification
“would cut [the children] off from their mother to an even greater exte nt than they are
currently alienated from their father.” (Emphasis added.)
Father’s central argument is that the district court “minimized” the harm to the
father-child relationship. Father points to the district court’s statement that mother’s “only
harm to the children is their relationship with [father].” Father misunderstands the district
court’s order. The district court made this statement to explain that father’s rationale for
advocating that mother have only supervised parenting time “is tenuous” because mother’s
“only harm to the children is their relationship with [ father].” The district court did not
value the children’s relationship with their mother over their relationship with their father;
the district court declined to damage the children’s relationship with mother to benefit their
relationship with father.
Father also argues that the district court’s finding that father’s “proposal does not
provide any sort of graduated schedule for [mother] to claim more parenting time or have
any unsupervised parenting time” is clearly erroneous. But the record supports this
conclusion. Father’s motion requested that he receive sole legal and sole physical custody
and that mother receive supervised parenting time, and his motion did not include any
schedule for increasing mother’s parenting time. At the hearing, father testified that ending
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mother’s supervised parenting time should be up to “a parenting consultant or the courts
or some mental health professional that can verify that she’s in a well enough place to be
able to co-parent” and that he should not “be the judge of that.” The district court’s finding
is therefore supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. See Kampf, 732 N.W.2d at
633.
The district court properly considered, if it granted father’s motion, both the benefits
to the children’s relationship with father as well as the harm to the children caused by a
disruption to their environment and other relationships. Father essentially argues that the
district court incorrectly weighed the evidence. But on appeal we reweigh neither the
evidence on which the district court based its best-interests findings nor the best-interests
findings. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477. We conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that the benefits of custody modification do not
outweigh the harm to the children.
Affirmed.