State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1597

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terrance Deon Anderson,
Appellant.

Filed July 14, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-13695

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Workman Jesness,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant Terrance Deon Anderson appeals from his conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm , arguing: (1) the district court abused its discretion in responding
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to the jury’s note that they were at an impasse and in denying appellant’s motion for a
mistrial; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2006, Anderson was adjudicated delinquent for a crime of violence—terroristic
threats. In 2022, law enforcement ran the license plate of a vehicle and learned the owner
of the car had a felony warrant. The police officer stopped the car and detained the driver,
Anderson. The officer found a gun in Anderson’s pocket. The officer reviewed
Anderson’s criminal history and discovered he was ineligible to possess a firearm.
The state charged Anderson with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. At
a two-day trial, respondent State of Minnesota presented four witnesses. On the first day
of jury deliberations, the jury sent three questions to the district court:
[1] The instructions say that the jury MAY find that the
element of possession is present if the jury finds [beyond a
reasonable doubt] that Defendant had [a]ctual possession.
Does this mean that the jury can find that the element of
possession is not met even if there is actual possession? Why
use of “may” rather than “must”?

. . . .

[2] Does the defendant[’s] adjudication as delinquent as
a juvenile have any temporal limitations?

. . . .

[3] Are we allowed to add comment to a verdict[?]

The district court responded in the negative for questions two and three. For the first
question, the district court explained that “[t]he ‘may’ refers to actual or constructive
possession, that is, you may find possession based on either one.”
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On the second day of deliberations the jury sent two more questions: “[4] Is it legal
for an individual to carry a gun without any priors or record, if that individual does not
have a permit?” and “ [5] Is it lawful to search an unidentified individual when they are
physically separated from a vehicle for which a felony warrant exists ?” The district court
responded to both questions four and five with: “The attorneys and I have agreed that you
have all the law that you need to decide the issues in this case. You have my instructions,
you have the evidence, you have everything you need.”
The jury then informed the district court that they had reached an impasse. The
court informed the parties that it planned to reread the “duties of jurors” instructions along
with a directive. Anderson objected to the jury continuing deliberations and moved for a
mistrial. Anderson argued that the jury had deliberated for over five hours, which was
disproportionate to the length of the trial that only took half of a day. The district court
denied the motion for mistrial, stating the time the jury has taken is not extreme.
The district court then instructed the jury:
To return a verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, each juror
must agree with that verdict. Your verdict must be unanimous.
You should discuss the case with one another and deliberate
with a view toward reaching agreement, if you can do so
without violating your individual judgment. You should
decide the case for yourself, but only after you’ve discussed
the case with your fellow jurors and have carefully considered
their views. You should not hesitate to reexamine your views
and change your opinion, if you become convinced they are
erroneous; but you should not surrender your honest opinion
simply because another juror disagrees or merely to reach a
verdict. Your duty is to both the State and the Defendant. The
State and the Defendant both have the right to expect that you
will see that justice is done according to your true conclusions.
The responsibility that rests upon you should be borne
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courageously and without fear or favor. Be fair. Act honestly.
Deliberate without prejudice, bias, or sympathy, without
regard to your personal likes or dislikes.

The jury returned to deliberations and, about an hour later, returned a verdict of guilty. The
district court polled the jury and each confirmed the verdict was their own.
Anderson renewed his motion for a mistrial, noting that several jurors looked like
they were on the verge of tears and took a while to answer when polled. The district court
denied the motion because the jury took under 24 hours to deliberate, the jury was not shy
about asking questions, and the court did not see any tears or hear any long pauses.
The district court sentenced Anderson to 60 months, stayed for three years, a
downward dispositional departure. Anderson appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s note
that they were at an impasse or in denying Anderson’s motion for a mistrial.

Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion (1) by further instructing
the jury after the jurors had indicated that they were at an impasse and (2) by denying
Anderson’s motion for a mistrial. We address each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it reread the jury
instruction after the jury indicated that it was at an impasse.

Anderson argues the district court abused its discretion by failing “to instruct the
deadlocked jury that a hung jury was a permissible outcome.” We review “a district court’s
charge to a jury to continue deliberating after the jury has indicated it was deadlocked” for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 550 (Minn. 2012).
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A “jury may be discharged without a verdict if the court finds there is no reasonable
probability of agreement.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(4). A district court cannot
instruct a jury that a case must be decided or let a jury “believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an
available option.” State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 912 (Minn. 1996) (citation omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the American Bar Association’s (ABA)
procedure for district courts to use when faced with a jury indicating they are at an impasse.
State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 772 (Minn. 1973). The procedure articulates language
that admonishes the jury “only to consult and deliberate with a view to reaching an
agreement consistent with their individual judgments.” Id. at 773. The instruction is meant
to be given before the jury deliberates and can be given again if the jury indicates it is
deadlocked. Id. at 372-73. The supreme court stated that “[t]he potential for coercion is
minimized if the charge is simply reread at a time when the jury appears to be deadlocked.”
Id. at 373. The ABA standards “are now reflected in CRIMJIG [3.02],” Cox, 820 N.W.2d
at 551, under “Duties of Jurors.” 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.02 (2024).
Anderson asserts that the instruction given failed to inform the jurors that a hung
jury is an acceptable outcome and thus coerced them into reaching a verdict. We disagree.
Anderson cites two cases in support of his argument. He first cites State v. Young,
in which the jury asked the district court if unanimity on two counts and a hung jury on the
third count was a valid verdict. 610 N.W.2d 361, 362 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied
(Minn. July 25, 2000). The district court replied: “No, please continue deliberating.” Id.
We reversed because the district court’s instruction requiring deliberations to continue told
the jury that deadlock was not a permissible outcome. Id. at 363.
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Anderson argues the instruction the district court gave here was similarly erroneous.
But the instruction given to Anderson’s jury was the same language now in CRIMJIG 3.02.
And, in Young, we referenced a case in which the same CRIMJIG 3.02 instruction was
provided to a jury and noted that “[t]his instruction adequately described the jury’s role
and duty and, as such, was not coercive.” Id. The jury in Young also specifically asked if
a hung jury was a valid verdict whereas there was no such inquiry by the jury here. Thus,
the instruction given in this case is distinguishable from the instruction provided in Young.
Anderson also cites State v. Petrich, in which the jury had asked the district court
what would happen if it could not reach a unanimous verdict on an element.
494 N.W.2d 298, 299 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 1993). After
rereading the standard instruction, the district court responded: “the jury must reach a
unanimous verdict whatever it is. That is the law and that is our system of justice.” Id.
We reversed because the statements after the standard instruction were erroneous. Id. at
300. We reiterated that “judges may not tell juries they must reach a verdict.” Id. at 300.
Anderson argues his case is similar to Petrich because the district court failed to tell
the jury a deadlock was an acceptable outcome. But in Petrich, we held that “Judges are
not required to tell jurors that a deadlock is a permissible result of their deliberations[.]”
Id. Thus, Petrich does not require reversal.
Anderson acknowledges that the district court was not required to instruct the jury
that a deadlock is a permissible outcome but contends that the court “should have exercised
its discretion to inform the jury that a deadlock is a permissible outcome.” Anderson cites
State v. Kelley to argue that the multiple jury questions required the district court to “have
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exercised more caution” because the number of jury notes indicated that the jury was
“having difficulty in determining whether the state had proven all of the elements .”
517 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1994). But the jury notes in Kelley were about the jury being
in a deadlock with no sign of breaking. Id. at 907-08. And in response to each note, the
district court told the jury to continue their deliberations with no input from counsel. Id.
In contrast to Kelley, the jury here only had one note about an impasse. The jury’s
other questions sought to clarify the law or were procedural questions about deliberations.
The district court appropriately responded to all the questions without requiring the jury to
continue deliberations. The court only required the jury to continue deliberations one time.
The district court’s rereading of the jury instruction did not tell the jury that they must reach
a verdict, nor did it state that deadlock was not an option. The district court acted well
within its discretion in responding to the jury’s note and requiring the jury to deliberate
further. Cox, 820 N.W.2d at 550.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Anderson’s
motion for a mistrial.

Anderson argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motions for a mistrial because the deliberation time was excessive given the length of the
trial, the jurors sent multiple notes that suggested they were struggling, and the jurors had
emotional reactions to the verdict. We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2016).
In arguing that a short case followed by lengthy jury deliberations warrants a
mistrial, Anderson cites State v. Soyke, 585 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. App. 1998). In Soyke, we
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affirmed a district court’s declaration of mistrial because of jury deadlock. Id. at 421. As
to the amount of time the jury had deliberated, we held that “[d]eliberations of four-and-a-
half to five hours are not plainly inadequate to bring a jury that has heard less than a day’s
worth of testimony to a point of deadlock.” Id. at 421. But that was not all we considered.
Instead, our primary reason for affirming in Soyke was due to the jury’s note—and
a foreperson’s statement—which indicated the jury was deadlocked. Id. The jury informed
the court that “they did not believe they could ‘keep talking it over,’ and that they had
‘exhausted all of those possibilities.’” Id. at 419. The jury’s message here did not similarly
indicate that they were completely stalled in a deadlock.
As we have previously held, “[t]here is no standard as to how long a jury must
deliberate before the court may determine a deadlock and declare a mistrial. This is entirely
within the court’s discretion.” State v. Yeboah, 691 N.W.2d 87, 92 (Minn. App. 2005),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2005).
Finally, Anderson points to the emotional response of the jurors to argue that they
were coerced into a decision. But in denying the motion for a mistrial, the district court
observed that it did not see any jurors tearing up or hear any long pauses in the jurors’
responses when they were polled. The supreme court has held that the district court “judge
is in the best position to determine whether an error is sufficiently prejudicial to require a
mistrial or whether another remedy is appropriate.” Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 262. The
district court did not abuse its discretion.
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II. A conviction of felon in possession of a firearm does not require knowledge of
ineligibility.

Anderson argues that the state did not prove that he knew he was ineligible to
possess a firearm under the statute. This court has rejected the argument that knowledge
of being ineligible to possess a firearm is an element of the offense. Underwood v. State,
8 N.W.3d 655, 661 (Minn. App. 2024) (noting that Minnesota caselaw infers a requirement
for “the state to show that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm,” it does not require
“that [a defendant] knowingly violated the statute”), rev. granted (Minn. Oct. 15, 2024).
As precedential authority, Underwood controls our decision even though the supreme court
has granted the petition for review. See State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 695 (Minn.
App. 2021) (holding that a “precedential opinion of this court is binding authority” unless
and until the supreme court reverses), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021).
Affirmed.