Peter William Bristol Malmstrom, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1609

Peter William Bristol Malmstrom, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Dana Marie Colestock,
Appellant.

Filed August 18, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-21-1804

Steven T. Hennek, Hennek Klaenhammer Law, PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Sam E. Khoroosi, Jessica M. Sampson, Khoroosi Law Office, P.A., St. Louis Park,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this parenting dispute, appellant-mother Dana Marie Colestock argues that the
district court abused its discretion by awarding her and respondent- father Peter William
Bristol Malmstrom joint legal custody, joint physical custody, and equal parenting time.
Specifically, mother challenges the district court’s finding that father did not commit
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domestic abuse and argues that the district court erred by relying on a custody-evaluation
report instead of properly evaluating the best interests of the child . Because the district
court did not clearly err by finding that domestic abuse had not occurred and because the
district court reached its conclusions based on a detailed analysis of the statutory best-
interest factors and not the custody-evaluation report, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties are the unmarried parents of a minor child who was born in February
2021. In November 2021, father served a petition for custody and parenting time on mother,
seeking joint legal and joint physical custody of the child and reasonable parenting time.
Mother opposed father’s petition and requested that the district court grant her sole legal
and sole physical custody and provide father with supervised parenting time. An initial
case-management conference was held in February 2022, during which mother alleged
domestic abuse by father. Father subsequently amended his petition to seek sole legal and
sole physical custody of the child.
In May 2022, the district court filed a temporary order providing father with
temporary unsupervised parenting time for eight hours every Saturday and for one hour
every Wednesday afternoon starting in July 2022. The district court reserved the issue of
the child’s legal and physical custody.
In December 2022, based on an agreement between the parties, a custody-evaluation
report was completed and filed with the district court. The report recommended that the
parties share joint legal custody, joint physical custody, and equal parenting time.
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A trial was held in late February and early March 2024. During the trial, mother
testified about the alleged abuse by father, including how he had yelled at her multiple
times, had driven while intoxicated with her in the car, and generally engaged in behavior
that scared her. Mother also testified that the child had returned home after father’s
parenting time with unexplained marks and bruises, which led mother to take the child to
a doctor who then reported suspected child abuse by father to child protect ive services
(CPS). Mother stated that CPS investigated that report but determined that there was “not
a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding of physical abuse” and that
“maltreatment did not occur.”
In July 2024, the district court filed its custody order. In its order, the district court
noted that a custody-evaluation report had been completed but stated that it “gave little
weight to the evaluators’ recommendations” because the report was “likely stale” and had
procedural errors and substantive deficiencies. The district court then evaluated the best
interests of the child by analyzing the 12 statutory best-interest factors under what is now
Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1(a) (2024), and , as part of that analysis,
found that father had not “committed any domestic abuse against mother or the child.” The
district court concluded that it was in the child’s best interests to award the parties joint
legal custody, joint physical custody, and equal parenting time.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
The district court has broad discretion in making child-custody and parenting-time
determinations. Matson v. Matson, 638 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Minn. App. 2002); see also In
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re Welfare of C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Minn. App. 2018) (“[T]here is scant if any
room for this court to question a district court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”
(quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019). “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review
the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, “giving deference to the district court’s
opportunity to evaluate witness credibility and reversing only if [the reviewing court is]
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Thornton v.
Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted). A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
The district court’s “guiding principle” and “paramount commitment” when making
child-custody and parenting-time decisions is the best interests of the child. Thornton, 933
N.W.2d at 789 (quotations omitted). “In considering the child’s best interests, a district
court must consider and evaluate all relevant factors, including 12 factors set forth by
statute.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (listing the 12
factors). For each of the statutory best- interest factors, the district court must provide
“detailed findings . . . and explain how each factor led to [the district court’s] conclusions
and to the determination of custody and parenting time.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(1) (2024).
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One of the best-interest factors is “whether domestic abuse, as defined in section
518B.01, has occurred in the parents’ or either parent’s household or relationship; the
nature and context of the domestic abuse; and the implications of the domestic abuse for
parenting and for the child’s safety, well-being, and developmental needs.” Id.,
subd. 1(a)(4). Under Minnesota Statutes § 518B.01, subdivision 2 (2024), “domestic
abuse” includes any of the following conduct when “committed against a family or
household member by a family or household member”: (1) “physical harm, bodily injury,
or assault,” (2) “the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,”
and (3) terroristic threats, criminal sexual conduct, sexual extortion, or interference with
an emergency call. “[I]f domestic abuse, as defined in section 518B.01, has occurred
between the parents,” then the court applies a rebuttable presumption that joint legal or
joint physical custody “is not in the best interests of the child.” Id., subd. 1(b)(9) (2024).
Here, mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the
parties joint legal and joint physical custody and equal parenting time because those
decisions were based on an erroneous finding that father did not commit domestic abuse
and an erroneous reliance on the custody-evaluation report instead of the statutory best -
interest factors. We address each of mother’s assertions in turn.
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Domestic-Abuse Finding
Mother first argues that the district court erred by finding that no domestic abuse
occurred and consequently misapplied the law when it did not apply the statutory rebuttable
presumption against joint legal and joint physical custody.1 See id.
In the custody order, when analyzing the best-interest factor related to domestic
abuse, the district court described the allegations made by mother at trial and determined
that father had not committed any domestic abuse against mother or the child. As part of
its analysis, the district court made the following findings: (1) t here was no evidence that
CPS ever found that the child was abused or neglected by either parent; (2) in a May 2021
intake with a couple’s therapist, mother answered “no” when asked whether father “struck,
physically restrained, used violence against, or injured [her],” and stated that she did not
feel that father was dominant, controlling, or interested in managing her life; (3) mother
offered no evidence that she “supplemented or clarified her answers” to the therapist or
otherwise reported the alleged instances of domestic abuse that occurred after the intake;
(4) “[m]other offered no corroborating evidence that domestic abuse occurred”; (5) “there
[was] no order for protection in place regarding the parties and their child”; and (6) “mother
was not credible in her testimony about the alleged incidents of domestic abuse” because,

1 Father argues that the district court correctly applied the law when it did not apply a
presumption either in favor of joint legal custody or against joint legal and joint physical
custody. See id. Subdivision 1(b)(9) of section 518.17 provides that the court shall use a
rebuttable presumption in favor of joint legal custody if joint legal custody is requested by
a party but shall use a rebuttable presumption against joint legal custody or joint physical
custody if domestic abuse has occurred between the parents. Because mother does not
challenge the district court’s decision not to apply a presumption in favor of joint legal
custody, we do not address that presumption.
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“[i]n reading [her] statements about the incidents and more importantly in observing the
parties as they testified about the domestic abuse allegations, the court was left with the
distinct impression that mother exaggerated the nature and intensity of the incidents.” As
part of the analysis for a different best-interest factor, the district court also noted that
mother “allege[d] that the child often returns from father’s home hungry, thirsty, and
needing to go to the bathroom,” but it found that mother’s statements seemed “exaggerated
given the short duration of father’s visits.”
Mother asserts that the district court’s findings are erroneous for three reasons.
First, mother contends that the district court erred by finding that there was no
domestic abuse because mother provided detailed testimony and her testimony could not
be corroborated because of the nature of the abuse. But the fact that mother provided
detailed testimony does not establish that her testimony was credible. And, because we
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d
279, 284 (Minn. 2008) , and mother admits that there was no corroborating evidence, we
conclude that the district court did not err in its findings about mother’s credibility and the
lack of corroborating evidence.
Second, mother contends that the district court failed to properly consider all the
evidence of domestic abuse—specifically, photos of marks and bruises on the child and
mother’s allegations that, after visiting father, the child would return with marks and
bruises as well as “extreme hunger, thirst, and need to use the bathroom.”
As a preliminary matter, because the district court determined that mother’s
allegations lacked credibility, the district court did not need to address every allegation that
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mother raised. Mother is correct that the district court did not address the marks and bruises
that she alleged followed the child’s visits with father and that were depicted in photos.
But mother acknowledges in her brief that marks and bruises on the child are what led to
the involvement of CPS, and the district court did address CPS’s determination that there
was no child abuse by either parent. Accordingly, although the district court did not
explicitly address the marks and bruises, we conclude that the district court’s other findings
adequately addressed mother’s concern about the child’s safety during father’s parenting
time.
As for mother’s assertions that the child would return from father’s home hungry,
thirsty, and needing the bathroom, the district court did address those assertions and
rejected them, finding that it was an exaggeration to claim that the child experienced
concerning levels of hunger, thirst, or bathroom needs after an eight-hour visit. Mother
argues that the district court’s finding that her statements were exaggerated “defies logic”
because father’s weekly eight-hour visits with the child were enough time for the child to
experience the conditions described by mother. But, to the extent that the evidence supports
a different conclusion than the one reached by the district court, our review of the record
does not leave us “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made .”
Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 790 (quotation omitted). We therefore decline to conclude that
the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous.
Finally, mother contends that the district court “excessive[ly]” relied on the May
2021 intake with a couple’s therapist as an indication that no domestic abuse occurred.
While the district court mentioned the May 2021 therapy intake as part of its findings, it is
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not the only finding made by the district court in support of its finding that domestic abuse
did not occur—the district court also relied on the fact that CPS did not find any abuse, that
there was no other evidence of abuse in the record, and that mother’s testimony to the
contrary was not credible. Accordingly, the district court did not “excessively” rely on the
May 2021 intake and the district court’s finding that father did not commit domestic abuse
is reasonably supported by the evidence in the record. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that father
did not commit domestic abuse and, therefore, it did not misapply the law by not applying
a presumption against joint legal and joint physical custody. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(b)(9).
Custody-Evaluation Report
Second, mother argues that the district court erred because it improperly relied on
the custody evaluation rather than an appropriate analysis of the statutory best-interest
factors. She contends that, although the district court determined that the custody-
evaluation report had deficiencies and should be given little weight, it nevertheless appears
to have relied on the report because it arrived at similar conclusions to those recommended
in the report.
Mother is correct that the district court’s order included the same conclusions about
joint legal and joint physical custody and equal parenting time as the report’s
recommendations. But we are not persuaded that, because the district court reached the
same conclusions as the custody evaluators, the district court must have relied on the
evaluators’ recommendations. The order shows that the district court independently
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evaluated the 12 best-interest factors and determined what it believed to be the appropriate
award of custody and parenting time based on those findings. Some of the relevant findings
include that father ha d completed parenting education in preparation of taking on the
child’s care, see id., subd. 1(a)(1), that both parents are aware of concerns about their own
mental and chemical health and have addressed or have a plan to address such concerns,
see id., subd. 1(a)(5), that “[e]ach parent has shown that they are capable and excited to be
a caretaker for the child,” see id., subd. 1(a)(10), and that mother “testified that she would
collaborate with father on legal custody decisions,” see id., subd. 1(a)(11). Additionally,
while the district court acknowledged that the parties have struggled to effectively
communicate and co-parent, the district court addressed this concern by requiring that the
parties complete a conflict course to help them successfully co-parent. See id. ,
subd. 1(a)(12).
Read as a whole, the district court’s order includes findings on all relevant best-
interest factors, and the findings are sufficiently detailed and explain how the district court
reached its conclusion s and decided to award joint legal and joint physical custody and
equal parenting time. See id., subd. 1(b)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not erroneously rely on the custody-evaluation report or abuse its discretion when
analyzing the statutory best-interest factors.2

2 Mother also asserts that the district court erred by imposing a short step-up parenting
schedule— which required the parties to start equal parenting time by the beginning of
October 2024. But, because mother does not point to any caselaw or statute requiring that
the district court provide an explanation for that decision, we decline to conclude that the
district court abused its discretion or erred in reaching that conclusion.
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In sum, because the district court did not clearly err by finding that father did not
commit domestic abuse and did not erroneously rely on the custody- evaluation report, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the parties joint legal and joint
physical custody and equal parenting time.
Affirmed.