In the Matter of the Application of Marco Quinton Hanlon for a Change of Name.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1615

In the Matter of the Application of
Marco Quinton Hanlon for a Change of Name.

Filed May 12, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CV-23-3048

Kyle R. Kroll, Margaret M. Green, Alexandra R. Wilkie, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant Marco Quinton Hanlon)

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Bonnie Norlander, Assistant County
Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman , Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a district court order denying her application to change her
name, arguing that (1) denial of her application violates her right to equal protection, and
(2) the district court abused its discretion when it determined that her proposed name
change would compromise public safety. We affirm.

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
Appellant Marco Quinton Hanlon is a transgender woman who is currently
incarcerated at a Minnesota correctional facility for men. Her incarceration follows a 2019
felony conviction for first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342,
subd. 1(a) (2016).1
On December 21, 2023, Hanlon applied for a name change under Minn. Stat.
§ 259.10 (2024), seeking to change her name to Alexia Lynn Valenteena. The following
day, Hanlon served notice of her application on respondent St. Louis County (the county)
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 1(1) (2024).2
The county objected, asserting that permitting Hanlon to change her name would
compromise public safety. In its objection, the county stated that Hanlon was serving a
144-month prison sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct and that the nature of
her conviction requires registration as a predatory offender upon her release. Given these
circumstances, the county argued that Hanlon’s name change would negatively impact
public safety by “limit[ing] awareness of and hinder[ing] the community’s ability to access
[her] criminal history.”

1 First-degree criminal sexual conduct under subdivision 1(a) involves “sexual penetration”
or “sexual conduct” with a person under the age of 13, and requires that the “actor is more
than 36 months older than the complainant.” Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a).

2 We cite the current versions of these statutes because they have not been amended in
relevant part and “appellate courts apply the law as it exists at the time they rule on a case.”
Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000).
3
Hanlon then filed a motion and supporting memorandum of law contesting the
county’s objection. Hanlon argued that her required predatory- offender registration
mitigated any public-safety risk posed by her name change and that denying her application
would infringe upon her constitutional right to equal protection by preventing her from
being “known by [her] feminine name” and “effectively eras[ing]” her gender identity. In
an accompanying declaration, Hanlon explained that she has been diagnosed with gender
dysphoria and has been receiving hormone-therapy treatment for several years, predating
her incarceration. She indicated that her gender dysphoria has led to mental- health
struggles, and that she has “spent a lot of time working with [her] medical team,” discussing
options for gender-affirming surgery as a way to “cope and heal.” She stated that changing
her name will “allow [her] to live as [her] authentic self.”
Following a hearing, the district court denied the application. Hanlon appeals.
DECISION
Minnesota Statutes section 259.13 (2024) governs the process by which a convicted
felon may seek a name change. The statute affords the prosecuting authority that obtained
the felony conviction the right to object to the name-change request on any one of four
bases: (1) the request “aims to defraud or mislead,” (2) it was “not made in good faith,”
(3) it “will cause injury to a person,” or (4) it “will compromise public safety.” Minn. Stat.
§ 259.13, subd. 2. If the prosecuting authority chooses to object, the burden falls on the
name-change applicant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is no basis for
objection. Id., subd. 3. But a district court must grant the name change if “failure to allow
it would infringe on a constitutional right of the person.” Id., subd. 4.
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We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny a name change for abuse of
discretion. In re Welfare of C.M.G., 516 N.W.2d 555, 561 (Minn. App. 1994). But we
review the question of whether the district court’s decision violates a person’s
constitutional rights de novo. State v. Tate, 682 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. App. 2004), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).
I. Hanlon’s right to equal protection has not been violated.
Hanlon first argues that the denial of her name-change application infringes on her
constitutional right to equal protection in violation of Minn. Stat. § 259.13, subd. 4.
The Minnesota Constitution guarantees equal protection under the law. Minn.
Const. art. 1, § 2. This protection limits “the circumstances under and extent to which the
Legislature can treat similarly situated people differently.” Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of
Minneapolis, 947 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2020). The threshold inquiry for an equal-
protection claim is whether “the claimant is similarly situated in all relevant respects to
others whom the claimant contends are being treated differently.” Schroeder v. Simon, 985
N.W.2d 529, 549 (Minn. 2023) (quoting State v. Lee, 976 N.W.2d 120, 125-26 (Minn.
2022)). To assess this threshold question, we consider “whether the law creates distinct
classes within a broader group of similarly situated persons or whether those treated
differently by the law are sufficiently dissimilar from others such that the law does not
create different classes within a group of similarly situated persons.” Fletcher Props., Inc.,
947 N.W.2d at 22. Minnesota courts “routinely reject[]” equal-protection claims when a
party cannot make the threshold showing that they are “similarly situated to those whom
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they contend are being treated differently.” State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn.
2011).
Hanlon asserts that she is similarly situated to women generally and that other
women are allowed “to be known by their feminine name” while she is not. The district
court agreed that —if it consider ed only the steps Hanlon has taken to socially and
physically transition— she would be similarly situated to women generally. But because
Hanlon is a woman who was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the district
court concluded that her claim did not survive the threshold inquiry. Hanlon argues this
conclusion is erroneous because her “felony conviction is not relevant to the similarly
situated test.” This argument is unavailing.
For purposes of the threshold analysis, the challenged “statute itself tells us what it
is about and what is relevant.” Schroeder, 985 N.W.2d at 550. In Schroeder, the appellants
had been convicted of a felony and were then living in the community on supervised
release. Id. at 534. They contended that the statute governing restoration of the right to
vote—which required that a person’s conviction be discharged before they are eligible to
vote—violated their equal -protection rights. Id. at 546. Applying the threshold analysis,
our supreme court determined the appropriate broader group of similarly situated persons
was not “all Minnesotans of voting age who are generally qualified to vote,” but those who
“have been convicted of a felony and lost their right to vote.” Id. at 550-52.
At issue here is the district court’s application of Minn. Stat. § 259.13, the statute
governing name changes for persons “with a felony conviction.” Accordingly, the
appropriate broader group of similarly situated persons for Hanlon’s equal-protection
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threshold analysis is not all women; it is women who have been convicted of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Because we determine that Hanlon is not similarly situated to
those whom she asserts are being treated differently, we discern no error in the district
court’s conclusion that Hanlon’s challenge does not meet the threshold equal -protection
inquiry.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hanlon’s name-
change application.

Hanlon also argues that the district court abused its discretion because the predatory-
offender registration requirement negates any concern that her proposed name change will
impact the public’s ability to access her criminal history . She asserts—as an undisputed
fact—that predatory offenders must provide names and aliases as part of the registration
process. We are not persuaded by this argument for two reasons.
First, we are not convinced that Hanlon preserved this argument for appeal because
she did not create a record to substantiate her argument. We generally only consider “issues
that the record shows were presented and considered by the [district] court in deciding the
matter before it.” Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted).
And a party may not obtain review “by raising the same general issue litigated below but
under a different theory.” Id. That appears to be what Hanlon seeks to do.
Minnesota’s predatory-offender registration statute requires registrants to provide a
variety of information to law enforcement, including contact information, vehicle details,
and the addresses of any location where the individual lives, works, or studies. Minn. Stat.
§ 243.166, subd. 4a (2024). Significantly, the predatory-offender registration statute does
7
not include a requirement that registrants provide aliases. 3 See Minn. Stat. § 243.166
(2024). Hanlon argues that this statutory omission is irrelevant because, in practice, the
Minnesota predatory- offender registration process does collect alias information, as
demonstrated by the predatory-offender registration form and the Minnesota Department
of Public Safety’s website. But the record does not include the form or any reference to
the website. And the district court made no related factual findings.
Second, Hanlon’s argument is unpersuasive on its merits. Although it is undisputed
that Hanlon will be required to register as a predatory offender following her release from
prison, it is unclear how much of her registration information will be publicly accessible.
The predatory-offender registration statut e expressly provides that registration data is
“private data,” which “may be used only by law enforcement and corrections agencies for
law enforcement and corrections purposes.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 7(a), (b); see
also State v. Davenport, 948 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Minn. App. 2020) (stating that the “purpose
of the predatory-offender registry is to aid law enforcement in subsequent investigations”).
Registration data may only be more broadly disclosed under the narrow parameters
described in Minn. Stat. § 244.052 (2024).
Under section 244.052, predatory offenders are assigned a “risk level” at least 90
days before they are released from confinement. Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subds. 2, 3. This

3 Hanlon argues that the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),
34 U.S.C. §§ 20911-20932 (2018), requires the collection of alias information from
predatory offenders. But the registration requirements under the Minnesota predatory-
offender registration statute clearly differ from the requirements under SORNA. Compare
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4a, with 34 U.S.C. § 20914(a)(1).
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risk-level assignment, which falls on a one-to -three scale, dictates the extent to which the
offender’s registration information is disclosed to the public. Id., subd. 4. For risk-level-I
offenders, law enforcement “may disclose” registration information to “other law
enforcement agencies” or “victims of or witnesses to the offense committed by the
offender.” Id., subd. 4(b)(1) (emphasis added). For risk-level -II offenders, registration
information “may [be] disclose[d] . . . to agencies and groups that the offender is likely to
encounter,” including educational institutions, day-care establishments, and victim -
services providers. Id., subd. 4(b)(2) (emphasis added). Only for predatory offenders
assigned to risk level III is public disclosure mandatory. Id., subd. 4(b)(3). For those
offenders, registration information “shall [be] disclose[d]” to “members of the community
whom the offender is likely to encounter” and must be posted on a publicly accessible
website. Id., subds. 4(b)(3) (emphasis added), 4b.
Because Hanlon is still incarcerated and has not yet been assigned a risk level, it is
unclear how much of her predatory-offender registration information will be publicly
accessible upon her release. In other words, it is unknown at this time how her registration
will impact the public’s ability to access her criminal history following a name change. On
this record we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying Hanlon’s
name-change application.
Affirmed.