In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. M. H. and D. J. B., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1622

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S. M. H. and D. J. B., Parents.

Filed May 12, 2025
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Le Sueur County District Court
File No. 40-JV-24-5

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant)

Brent Christian, Le Sueur County Attorney, Travis J. Roline, Assistant County Attorney,
Le Center, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Thomas J. Nolan, Jr., Nolan Law Offices, Bird Island, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem
Linda Gerr)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Smith, John
P., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights.
We affirm.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
In January 2024, Le Sueur County Department of Human Services ( county)
petitioned the district court to terminate the parental rights of appellant SMH (mother) and
DJB (father) to their child DJB Jr. (child), who was born in November 2022. In June 2024,
the district court terminated father’s parental rights by default after he failed to appear at
his pretrial hearing.1 In June, July, and August 2024, the district court held a trial regarding
termination of mother’s parental rights. At the start of trial, the child had been in out -of-
home placement for more than 300 days.
The evidence at trial showed that in February 2023, the county received a report that
mother’s child DEG had bruises from being spanked by father.2 DEG reported that aft er
being spanked, mother told father that “if you hit [DEG] as hard as you hit me, you will
hurt [DEG].” DEG also reported hearing mother and father argue, hearing father punch
mother, throw things , and punch the wall , and hearing mother scream for father to stop
hitting her. Based on these allegations, the county moved the district court for immediate
custody of the child and filed a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) petition.
The district court issued an ex parte order for emergency protective care.
When law enforcement and a child-protection investigator arrived at mother’s home
to take custody of the child, father was very volatile. He screamed and sw ore. He
threatened the child-protection investigator , stating that he hope d the investigator’s

1 Father has not participated in this appeal.
2 As a result of the underlying child-protection proceeding, DEG was placed in the care of
her father, PG. DEG is not a subject of the underlying termination proceeding. We
therefore do not include additional facts regarding DEG.
3
“children get Lou Gehrig’s disease and die.” He also threatened law enforcement, telling
three deputies to “pull out their service weapon and put it in their mouth and swallow.” At
trial, the child-protection investigator testified that, during this incident, the child displayed
“no emotion whatsoever to anything that was going on.” The child’s affect was flat, and
he did not cry, whimper, or flinch.
In April 2023, the district court adjudicated the c hild in need of protection or
services based on mother’s admission that she has a history of dating violent partners and
that father’s “criminal history aligns with her previous choices to become romantically
involved with abusive men.” Mother agreed that services were necessary to ensure that the
child would not witness additional domestic violence. The district court concluded that it
was in the child’s best interests for the county to retain care, custody, and control of the
child. The district court granted the county authority to place the child in out-of-home
placement until mother and father could provide a safe environment and suitable care, “as
demonstrated through substantial compliance with the case plans and by correcting the
conditions that led to the CHIPS Petition.”
Under the case plan, mother was required to:
1. [C]omplete a Parental Capacity Evaluation and follow
recommendations[.]
2. [C]omplete a Diagnostic Assessment, follow
recommendations and demonstrate stable mental health[.]
3. [S]ubmit to random UA’s and if positive, a referral for a
chemical dependency evaluation will be made.
4. [M]aintain independent housing in order to support
reunification.
5. [A]ttend parenting classes and demonstrate appropriate
parenting within six months[.]
4
6. [A]ttend a support group and programming for survivors
of domestic violence and demonstrate skills learned in
maintaining safe and appropriate relationships.
7. [M]aintain employment to support herself and her
children[.]
8. [E]nsure the people around her children are calm and
supportive of positive development.
9. [P]rovide contact information and keep [the county]
updated on her address/phone number.

At the termination trial, the child-protection investigator who drafted the case plan
testified that she discussed the plan with mother and confirmed that mother understood it.
Mother signed the case plan, and the county referred mother for services.
In March 2023, mother complete d the parental-capacity evaluation. The evaluator
recommended that the child not be returned to mother’s care at that time, stating that a
“period of consistent participation in services, as well as sobriety, stable mental health, and
an increased awareness of her trauma experiences is strongly encourage d prior to fully
transitioning the children” to her care. The parental-capacity evaluator also recommended
that mother obtain a trauma-informed mental-health therapist.
In May 2023, mother met with a social worker to discuss an updated case plan. The
first goal listed in the updated case plan was “safety,” and the plan stated that mother’s
“unsafe partner needs to move from the primary residence and not have access” to mother
or the child. The case plan warned that the county would pursue permanent out-of-home
placement if mother did not reduce risk of abuse or neglect. The social worker explained
the updated case plan to mother, and mother signed it. In June 2023, the district court
ordered that mother comply with the updated case plan.
5
On October 6, 2023, mother met with the parental-capacity evaluator for an updated
evaluation. At trial, the evaluator testified that mother seemed to have regressed from the
time of the first evaluation, and that although mother was excited to tell him about the case-
plan components she had completed, she struggled to identify what she had learned. The
evaluator testified that “doing something and getting something out of it are totally
different things” and recommended that the child not be returned to mother’s care at that
time.
In anticipation of a court hearing on October 25, 2023, the county recommended
that mother begin a trial home visit with the child. This recommendation was based on
mother’s perceived compliance with the case plan. When the trial home visit began,
mother told the county and others that she had not had contact with father since March or
April 2023.
In November 2023, the county learned that father had assaulted an individual at a
gas station on October 16, 2023 , and that mother was with father when he committed the
assault. When the county learned that mother was in contact with father, it recommended
that the trial home visit be terminated. When the county informed mother, mother claimed
that she was not at the gas station, that she had not seen father, that she had not spoken with
father, and that the county had no reason to terminate the trial home visit. Mother continued
to deny that she had contact with father until she was confronted with surveillance video.
At trial, mother admitted that she had contact with father in October 2023, in violation of
her case plan, and a social worker testified that, had the county known about mother’s
contact with father, it would not have authorized the trial home visit.
6
When the child returned to his previous foster home after the trial home visit, his
behavior had changed. The foster parent testified that before the trial home visit, the child
was happy, smiled, said “Hi,” waved, and blew kisses. But after the trial home visit, the
child had a flat affect, engaged in head-banging behavior, and woke up in the middle of the
night crying and needing to be consoled.
In December 2023, the county developed a new case plan for mother, which
required mother to do the following: (1) complete an updated diagnostic assessment with
a trauma-informed therapist, follow any recommendations, and demonstrate stable mental
health; (2) attend parenting -education courses as recommended and demonstrate new
skills; (3) ensure the people around her children are calm and supportive of positive
development; and (4) engage in alternative domestic -violence education because she
continued to have contact with father despite attending support groups and programming
for domestic-violence survivors. Finally, the case plan required that mother follow the
recommendations of the updated parental-capacity evaluation. A social worker discussed
the case plan with mother, and mother indicated she understood it.
In January 2024, the county petitioned the district court to terminate mother’s
parental rights. At th at time, mother was referred to a trauma -informed therapist —
approximately ten months after the parental -capacity evaluator had originally
recommended trauma-informed therapy. At trial, the county acknowledged that it did not
initially refer mother for trauma -informed therapy because the social worker who was
handling the case at the time disagreed with the recommendation. The county also
acknowledged that the delay in getting mother into appropriate therapy cost mother “some
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time and progress under statutory timelines.” The guardian ad litem acknowledged that
she disagreed with the previous social worker about the appropriateness of therapy and
acknowledged that this disagreement “caused confusion in this case and somewhat delayed
appropriate services.” However, both the social worker and guardian ad litem testified
that, despite the delay, they believed it was in the best interests of the child to terminate
mother’s parental rights.
In April 2024, approximately three months after mother began trauma -informed
therapy, father punched the window out of a vehicle while he and mother were in another
vehicle at a stoplight. When confronted, mother denied involvement in the incident. But
she testified that despite her attendance in trauma-informed therapy, she continued to have
contact with father. Mother testified that father had been texting her about the child, but
she did not answer. However, when mother was sick and could not find a ride to a
pharmacy, she asked father for transportation. The district court found mother’s testimony
“not believable, not credible, and self-serving.”
Based on the child’s head -banging behavior, he was referred to a clinical
psychologist for a psychological evaluation. At trial, the psychologist testified that the
child’s behavior was “consistent with an unspecified trauma/stressor disorder” and
recommended “that no unsupervised parenting time occur, that the child’s caregiving be
consistent, predictable, and nurturing, and that he be protected from risky and dangerous
adults.” The district court credited this testimony.
In September 2024, based on the evidence presented at trial, the district court
terminated mother’s parental rights to the child. The district court concluded that the
8
county proved three statutory grounds for termination, found that the county made
reasonable reunification efforts, and determined that termination is in the best interests of
the child.
Mother appeals , challenging the district court’s determinations regarding the
statutory grounds for termination, the county’s reunification efforts, and the child’s best
interests.
DECISION
I.
Minnesota courts will terminate parental rights “only for grave and weighty
reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O. , 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). The petitioner
bears “the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence that . . . [a] statutory
termination ground[] exists.” In re Welfare of C.K. , 426 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1988).
A district court’s decision in a termination proceeding must be based on evidence
concerning the conditions that exist at the time of the termination. In re Welfare of Child
of T.D. , 731 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. July 17, 2007).
Termination of a parent’s rights is intended for those situations in which it appears “that
the present conditions of neglect will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In
re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).
In a termination appeal, an appellate court examines the record to determine whether
the district court applied the appropriate statutory criteria. In re Welfare of D.L.R.D., 656
N.W.2d 247, 249 (Minn. App. 2003). We review the underlying findings of fact for clear
error, and we review a determination that a statutory ground for termination exists, as well
9
as the court’s ultimate decision to terminate parental rights, for an abuse of discretion. In
re Welfare of Child of J.H. , 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 6, 2021). We will affirm a termination order if at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and termination is in the best
interests of the child, so long as the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family if
reasonable efforts were required. In re Child. of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn.
2005). Ultimately, the party challenging a termination must show error and prejudice to
obtain relief. See Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc. , 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn.
1975) (stating that to prevail on appeal, an appellant must show both error and prejudice
resulting from the error); In re Welfare of Child. of J.B., 698 N.W.2d 160, 171 (Minn. App.
2005) ( applying Midway in a termination -of-parental-rights case) , petition for rev.
dismissed (Minn. May 3, 2005).
Minnesota law sets forth multiple statutory grounds for termination of parental
rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2024). 3 The district court relied on three
statutory grounds to terminate mother’s parental rights. First, the district court relied on
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), which provides that a district court may terminate
parental rights if “the parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or

3 The legislature renumbered the statutory grounds provided in subdivision 1(b) in 2024 .
2024 Minn. Laws ch. 115, art. 18, § 38, at 1742 -44. Although mother’s parental rights
were terminated after the 2024 version took effect, the district court appears to have relied
on the 2022 version of the statute. The district court concluded that the county proved
three statutory grounds for termination of mother’s parental rights under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), and (8). Under the current version of the statute, these
grounds are set forth in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), and (7). The substance
of the relevant statutory grounds has not changed.
10
neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon that parent by the parent and child
relationship.” Such duties include, but are not limited to, “providing the child with
necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development, if the parent is physically
and financially able.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). “Failure to satisfy
requirements of a court-ordered case plan provides evidence of a parent’s noncompliance
with the duties and responsibilities under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2).” In re
Welfare of Child. of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 666 (Minn. App. 2012).
The district court concluded that mother failed to comply with the duties imposed
by the parent -child relationship because she failed to provide “ a safe, stable and healthy
environment” for the child, as a result of “repeated incidents of domestic violence in the
presence of the child,” and because she refused to acknowledge the harm she h ad caused
the child “through her own actions, behaviors and decisions.” The district court relied on
the following testimony, which it expressly credited.
The parental-capacity evaluator testified that mother had regressed in the six months
after his first meeting with her, that she struggled to identify anything that she had learned
as a result of completing case-plan services, and that he did not know if she had “put in
[the] hard work” required.
The clinical psychologist who assessed the child testified that he engaged in head-
banging behavior, which is “generally seen as a response to distress,” and she
recommended that he “receive caregiving that’s consistent, predicable and nurturing; . . .
11
not be exposed to risky and dangerous adults; and . . . not be subjected to any physical
discipline.”
The child-protection investigator testified that mother “has a pattern of being with
violent men[] and choosing these violent men over the health and safety of her children.”
She also testified that the removal of the child from mother’s home “was one of the most
eerie removals” she had witnessed because the child was “not responding at all” to father’s
screaming and threatening behavior. The child-protection investigator also testified that
she knew “two aspects of [mother’s] case plan are not being foll owed, given the fact that
she still has contact with [father].”
Finally, the social worker testified that the county had “concerns for the child’s
safety in [ mother’s] care,” and even if father was no longer in mother’s life, the social
worker would “continue to have concerns regarding [ mother’s] ability to keep her child
safe, given her past history.” The social worker testified that she could not recommend
reunification unless mother w as “honest with [the county] and open about what was
actually going on between her and [father], [kept] him out of the home, and [made] it very
clear that she was going to not have a relationship with him anymore,” which was necessary
to keep the child safe.
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that the county proved a
statutory ground for termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) . Mother
assigns error to the district court’s finding that the parental-capacity evaluator “did not
know whether she had put in the hard work since his first assessment ,” arguing that the
parental-capacity evaluator’s testimony “was based on stale information and given undue
12
weight by the district court.” Mother does not explain why this information was stale, and
we do not reweigh evidence on appeal. In re C iv. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d
214, 221 (Minn. 2021). Additionally, as the guardian ad litem notes, mother “completely
ignores the 71 separate and detailed findings of fact regarding [ her] dishonesty, failure to
complete a case plan, denial of domestic violence and almost complete lack of insight into
how her own behaviors and decisions have negatively impacted her child.”
Mother also takes issue with the district court’s description of the clinical
psychologist’s evaluation of the child. She argues that the order “does not specify with
whom the interviews were conducted or how much time was spent observing the child.”
Mother’s argument regards the weight assigned to the clinical psychologist’s testimony
and to the psychological evaluation. We do not reweigh evidence on appeal. Id. Mother
further argues that it was an abuse of discretion “to accept [the clinical psycholo gist’s]
testimony as persuasive given the limits of the information available to her for assessment
of the child and the assumptions she necessarily made in her assessment.” But we defer to
the district court’s credibility determinations. See In re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554 N.W.2d
393, 396 (Minn. 1996) (“Considerable deference is due to the district court’s decision
because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”).
Finally, mother argues that the testimony of the foster parent was “inherently biased
based on her position as the prospective adoptive parent and finding her persuasive is an
abuse of discretion.” Again, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Id.
In sum, mother fails to show that the district court erred in concluding that the
county proved—by clear and convincing evidence—a statutory basis to terminate parental
13
rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) . Because we affirm this statutory
ground for termination, we do not address the other statutory grounds on which the district
court relied. T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d at 708 (stating that only one statutory ground for
termination need be proved).
II.
The district court must make “specific findings” in every termination proceeding
that either “reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the
parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding the natu re and
extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite
the family” or that “reasonable efforts for reunification [were] not required.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8 (2024).
We review a district court’s findings identifying the efforts the county made to
reunify a family for clear error . In re Welfare of Child. of J.C.L. , 958 N.W.2d 653, 658
(Minn. App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. May 12, 2021); see In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T.,
814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (stating that we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error). But we review the district court’s determination whether those
efforts were reasonable for an abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. ,
865 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Minn. App. 2015) (concluding that the district court’s “reasonable-
efforts finding was not an abuse of discretion”), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
The district court found that the county “exercised due diligence to prevent foster
care placement and to offer services that were timely, available, relevant and culturally
appropriate for the child and family, to remedy the circumstances requiring the foster care
14
placement and permit reunification.” See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024) (listing factors
that must be considered when assessing reasonable efforts ). The district court explained
that this finding was supported by “extensive filings for this case, including several detailed
case plans tailored to provide [mother] with the resources necessary to provide a safe
environment for her children in the home and to correct the conditions that led to the out -
of-home placement.”
Mother argues that the district court ’s determination that the county’s efforts were
reasonable is inconsistent with “the same court’s acknowledgment of [the county’s] failure
to refer [her] to the appropriate, recommended [trauma-informed] therapy.” She further
argues that the district court failed “to consider its own finding that the [county] was
responsible for the [service] delay.”
The record refutes mother’s argument. The district court noted the social worker’s
testimony that the lack of enrollment in the appropriate therapy cost mother “some time
and progress under statutory timelines” and the guardian ad litem’s testimony that a
“disagreement caused confusion in this case and somewhat delayed appropriate services .”
But the district court explicitly addressed the delayed referral and explained why the
county’s efforts were nonetheless reasonable:
It is true that there was a delay in getting [mother] into
the right type of therapy. However, considering the entirety of
the efforts of [the county] throughout this case as well as the
totality of the circumstances that led to this point in the case,
the court finds that the efforts of the county were reasonable.
It is important to note that we do not expect perfection from the
county in these matter s. The law requires that their efforts to
reunify the family are reasonable. In this case, the Court finds
that they certainly were.
15

We discern no reversible error in this analysis.
Mother also challenges the district court’s finding that it was not in the child’s best
interests to delay permanency “in order to provide additional time for [mother] to identify,
initiate and engage in further services that may or may not be successfully completed and
result in permanent, lasting change in behavior.” She asserts that the district court did not
“consider its own finding that the [county] was responsible for the delay” in services and
that if the county had engaged in reasonable efforts, she would have obtained appropriate,
professionally recommended therapy that could have created a permanent and lasting
change in her behavior.
The record does not support m other’s speculation that she would have made the
necessary changes if she had been provided with trauma-informed therapy sooner. Mother
was referred for trauma-informed therapy approximately six months before the termination
trial. The record indicates that mother did not learn from the services she receive d. For
example, the district court noted that “when pressed, [mother] was unable to provide
concrete examples of how her participation in the case plan components could per mit her
to presently assume the responsibilities of caring for her child should [her child] be returned
to her care.”
Moreover, the district court found that mother was not honest regarding her
compliance with her case plan, noting that mother
could not explain her dishonesty to [ the county], her attorney,
the Court, and the Guardian ad Litem regarding her October
2023 and April 2024 contact with [f]ather. Indeed, when
confronted about alternative persons, instead of [f]ather, who
16
could have assisted her during her illness in April 2024,
[mother] testified that [the social worker ] was out of town.
[The social worker’s ] rebuttal testimony and text messages
received into evidence directly contradicted [m]other’s
testimony. Mother’s testimony was not believable, not
credible, and self-serving.

On this record, mother has not shown that the district court erred in its reasonable -
efforts determination.
III.
If a statutory ground for termination of parental rights is proved, “the best interests
of the child must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024).
Thus, a district court’s order terminating parental rights must include a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 771 N.W.2d
538, 545, 547 (Minn. App. 2009). “The ‘best interests of the child’ means all relevant
factors to be considered and evaluated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2024).
In assessing a child’s best interests, the district court must balance “(1) the child’s
interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving
the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare
of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted); see Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring the district court to address these factors in a
termination proceeding). Although the interests of the parent and child must be balanced,
they are not “ weighed equally.” In re Welfare of Udstuen , 349 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Minn.
App. 1984). Again, the best interests of the child are the paramount concern. Minn. Stat.
17
§ 260C.301, subd. 7; In re Child of P.T. , 657 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Minn. App. 2003), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003).
We review the district court’s determination that termination is in the child’s best
interests for an abuse of discretion. J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600. To be adequate, best-interest
findings must facilitate effective appellate review, provide insight into which facts or
opinions were most persuasive, and demonstrate comprehensive consideration of the
statutory criteria. See In re Welfare of M.M. , 452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990)
(discussing the inadequacy of the district court’s findings in the context of pl acement
following a termination of parental rights).
In addressing the child’s best interests, the district court reasoned:
Regarding the first factor, there can be a presumption
that children, generally, have an interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship. The evidence presented to the court
is essentially neutral on this factor, as the child is too young to
express verbally what, if any, relationship the child has to
mother, or desire to maintain and deepen it.

As to mother’s interest, the district court found:
Regarding the second factor, evidence at trial indicated
that [ mother] has a desire to maintain the parent -child
relationship with the child. The testimony of service providers
tends to indicate that [mother] acknowledged some, though by
no means all, of the documented history and the impact that
has had on all of the children, not just the child. It is unclear
to the court whether [ mother] truly believes that any of her
children have experienced extensive trauma through her own
behavior, decisions and hi story. She only reluctantly
acknowledged being present with [ father] on two separate
occasions after first denying contact. Only after independent
evidence came to light of her untruthfulness did she admit
contact. Each of these occasions resulted in physical violence
being perpetrated by [ father] against other individuals. This
18
dishonesty is only one dynamic in a much larger, more
powerful narrative that places the child and [ mother] on
opposite sides.

Lastly, as to any competing interest of the child, the district court found:
Regarding the third factor, the concerns raised by the
social worker and guardian ad litem and their belief that
termination of [ mother’s] parental rights is in the child’s best
interests, as well as [ mother’s] lack of insight and ability to
take any real and genuine responsibility for her own behavior
and role that led to the child being removed from the home, not
once, but twice, is more than sufficient to outweigh either the
child’s or [mother’s] interest in maintaining the parent -child
relationship.
The child needs permanency. Timeliness is of the
utmost importance in termination of parental rights case [s],
because each delay in the termination of a parent’s rights
equates to a delay in a child’s opportunity to have a permanent
home.
It is not in the best interests of the child to delay
permanency for the child in order to provide additional time
for [mother] to identify, initiate and engage in further services
that may or may not be successfully completed and result in
permanent, lasting change in behavior.
The court must find that at the time of termination, the
parent is not presently able and willing to assume his
responsibilities and the parent’s neglect of these duties will
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period. At this time,
[mother] is unable, and seemingly unwilling, to do so. And
this court has no faith that she will be willing and able to do so
in the foreseeable future.

(Quotations and citations omitted.)
The district court concluded that based on “the evidence as a whole, ” there was
“clear and convincing evidence ” that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests.
19
Mother challenges the district court’s finding regarding the first best-interests factor.
She claims that the district court’s finding that the child is too young to verbally express a
preference regarding the parent -child relationship “highlights the questionable
psychological assessment of the child and any findings or recommendations that the trial
home visit with mother was responsible for the child’s self-injurious behaviors.” Mother
essentially requests that we reweigh the evidence on appeal, which we may not do. Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 221.
Mother also argues that the district court improperly considered concerns regarding
“the child’s need to live in a stable environment, health considerations and the child’s
preferences” as competing interests of the child. But a “ stable environment, health
considerations and the child’s preferences” may be considered when analyzing a child’s
best-interests. In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). Moreover,
although mother claims that the child’s “consistent contact” with her “created stability” for
the child, when the child was returned to foster care after the trial home visit, the child
appeared unsure how to eat, did not seem excited for meals, had a flat affect, engaged in
head-banging, was less interested in bath time, and had forgotten how to waive hello and
blow kisses.
The standard of review applicable to the district court ’s determination of a child’s
best-interests issue is very deferential. See Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477 (stating that, in
the context of child custody matters, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appell ate
court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best -interests considerations”).
Although we recognize that mother is a victim of domestic violence, and we hope that she
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receives the help she needs to be safe, statutes and caselaw unambiguously identify our
primary concern as the best interests of the child and his need for a safe, stable, and
permanent home. On this record, mother has not shown that the district court abused its
discretion in determining that the child’s best interests supported termination of mother’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.