Almir Puce, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1639

Almir Puce,
Appellant,

vs.

City of Burnsville, MN,
Respondent.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-19-2127

Stephen W. Cooper, Stacey R. Everson, The Cooper Law Firm, Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Paul Donald Reuvers, Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant Almir Puce challenges the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to respondent City of Burnsville after it deemed his lawsuit moot. Because the
district court did not err in determining that Puce’s lawsuit was moot and that no exception
to the mootness doctrine applies, we affirm.
2
FACTS
Puce applied to the city for approval to redevelop property for commercial use.
Pursuant to a city ordinance that requires land developers to contribute land or money for
use as public parks—Burnsville, Minn., Code § 11-4-8 (A), (E) (2013)1—the city council
approved Puce’s application, which included a $11,700 park dedication fee.
Puce sued the city to challenge the park dedication fee, alleging that the fee violated
several statutory provisions. As litigation progressed, Puce also argued that the fee violated
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
After a trial, the district court rejected Puce’s claims and allowed the city to impose
the park dedication fee. Puce appealed. We reversed the district court, concluding that the
city’s imposition of the park dedication fee “was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious”
in violation of a state statute. Puce v. City of Burnsville, 971 N.W.2d 285, 296 (Minn.
App. 2022), rev’d, 997 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2023).
The supreme court granted a petition for further review. See Puce, 997 N.W.2d at
52. For the first time, the city asserted that Puce’s claim was moot because the city’s
approval of the plat became void when Puce failed to adhere to a city ordinance that
required him to record his plat in Dakota County within one year after the city’s approval.
See Burnsville, Minn., Code § 11-2-4(D) (2013). However, at oral argument, the city urged
the supreme court “to nonetheless reach the merits.” Puce, 997 N.W.2d at 52 n.1. The

1 The city adopted the ordinance pursuant to a statute that enables municipalities to pass
regulations requiring “a reasonable portion of the buildable land . . . be dedicated to the
public or preserved for public . . . parks” or “to accept a cash fee . . . for some or all of the
new lots created in a subdivision.” Minn. Stat. § 462.358, subd. 2b (2024).
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supreme court then addressed the merits of whether the park dedication fee violated the
state statute, reversed our decision, and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 62.
On remand, Puce argued that the district court should declare the park dedication
fee unconstitutional. The city, however, returned the fee to Puce because he had failed to
record his plat within the one-year timeframe as required by the ordinance. The city then
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the dispute was moot.
The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, determining that
that Puce’s lawsuit was moot and that no exceptions to mootness applied. Puce appeals.
DECISION
On appeal, Puce argues that the district court erred by dismissing his lawsuit as moot
because his constitutional claim qualifies for multiple exceptions to the mootness doctrine.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 371-72 (Minn. 2022).
I. The city did not forfeit the mootness argument.

Before we address mootness, we must first address Puce’s preliminary argument
that the city forfeited its mootness arguments by failing to raise the issue before the initial
appeal. We conclude that Puce’s forfeiture argument lacks merit.
Since an actual controversy is “a constitutional prerequisite” to a court’s exercise of
jurisdiction, both district courts and appellate courts will dismiss a case as moot even if a
party failed to raise the issue in district court . See In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824, 826
(Minn. 1989) (“[A court] must consider the mootness question even if ignored by the
parties.”). Although the city did not raise the issue of mootness until late in the
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proceedings, Puce cites no case whereby a party forfeited the issue of mootness by failing
to raise the issue sooner. Instead, courts have a continuing obligation to ensure that they
have jurisdiction over a dispute. Id. The city’s failure to litigate mootness sooner does not
preclude us from reviewing the district court’s mootness ruling in this second appeal.2
II. Puce’s claim is moot and no exception applies.
Puce argues that the district court erred in dismissing his lawsuit because several
exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply . A case becomes moot when “an award of
effective relief is no longer possible.” Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d 1, 5
(Minn. 2015). Because an actual controversy is “a constitutional prerequisite to the
exercise of jurisdiction,” courts generally dismiss matters that are moot. Schmidt,
443 N.W.2d at 826. But mootness “is a flexible discretionary doctrine, not a mechanical
rule that is invoked automatically whenever the underlying dispute between the particular
parties is settled or otherwise resolved.” State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984).
We review mootness rulings de novo. Snell v. Walz, 985 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn. 2023).
Puce argues the following exceptions apply: (1) he suffered collateral consequences
resulting from the judgment, see Winkowski v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn.
2023); (2) the city is likely to repeat its constitutional violations while evading review, see
Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5; (3) his constitutional claim presents issues of statewide
significance that merit immediate review, see Walz, 985 N.W.2d at 284; and (4) the city
voluntarily stopped its unlawful conduct, see id. We address each argument in turn.

2 We also note that the city returned the fee to Puce after the supreme court issued its
decision. The district court’s mootness ruling was premised, in part, on this additional fact.
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A. Collateral-consequences exception does not apply.
First, Puce argues that the collateral-consequences exception to mootness applies.
“Where [a party] produces evidence that collateral consequences actually resulted from a
judgment, [a matter] is not moot.” Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the collateral-consequences exception to
harms arising from “criminal convictions or civil commitments ,” but has declined to
expand the exception beyond those contexts. Quinn v. LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings,
LLC, 985 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Minn. 2023) (collecting cases). As an error-correcting court,
we cannot expand the exception when the supreme court has expressly declined to do so.
See In re Welfare of J.P.-S., 880 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. App. 2016). Thus, the collateral-
consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.
B. Capable-of-repetition-while-evading-review exception does not apply.

Second, Puce argues that we should review his claim under the capable-of-
repetition-while-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine. Dean, 868 N.W.2d
at 5. The exception applies when: (1) “there is a reasonable expectation that a complaining
party would be subjected to the same action again” and (2) “the duration of the challenged
action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires.” Id.
Here, if Puce were to submit another application to the city to develop his property
for commercial use, he would be subjected to the same fee again. The city ordinance has
not been repealed; thus, the city council would require Puce to contribute land or money
for public parks. The first prong to invoke this exception is met. Id.
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However, Puce’s argument fails on the second prong because his claims would not
evade judicial review. If Puce submitted a new application, and the city imposed another
fee, Puce could sue the city and plead his constitutional claims. The district court could
then address the claims in a new lawsuit.
Puce offers no reasoning as to why “the duration of the challenged action” would
be too short to fully litigate. Id. This lawsuit became moot because he failed to comply
with the ordinance that required him to record the plat in Dakota County within one year
after the city’s approval. If a second lawsuit is filed, Puce could simply comply with the
ordinance, record the plat, and the issue would not be moot. Thus, Puce failed to
demonstrate that his claim would evade review. This exception does not apply.
C. Statewide-significance exception does not apply.
Third, Puce argues that his claim falls within the statewide-significance exception
to the mootness doctrine. A court “may exercise discretion to hear an issue that is
functionally justiciable when the issue presents an important question of statewide
significance that should be decided immediately.” Walz, 985 N.W.2d at 284 (quotations
omitted). The statewide-significance exception applies narrowly to urgent circumstances,
such as issues impacting “the efficiency and validity of criminal proceedings across the
state,” “issues of life and natural death,” or when there is “no inherent limitation on the
time available for appeal.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 7.
Puce has not persuaded us that he raised issues of comparable urgency that must be
ruled upon immediately. Therefore, we decline to apply the exception.
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D. Voluntary-cessation exception does not apply.
Fourth, Puce argues that his lawsuit should proceed because the voluntary-cessation
exception applies. Under the voluntary-cessation exception, a defendant cannot moot “a
challenge to [its] conduct by ceasing the challenged behavior to end the litigation, but then
return[] to the allegedly wrongful conduct after the litigation is dismissed as moot.” Walz,
985 N.W.2d at 288. The purpose of the voluntary-cessation exception is to prevent a
defendant from engaging “‘in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared
moot, then pick up where [it] left off, repeating this cycle until [it] achieves all [its]
unlawful ends.’” Id. (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)).
This case became moot because Puce did not comply with the ordinance to record
his plat within one year after the city approved his application. The city did not stop
demanding that land developers contribute land or money for use as public parks, which is
the conduct that Puce challenges. The city, therefore, never voluntarily ended the conduct
that Puce challenges. If Puce applies again to develop his land, and the city approves his
application, the city will again require Puce to provide land or money for public parks.
Afterward, if Puce properly records his plat with Dakota County, and complies with any
additional requirements, he would be able to challenge the park dedication fee in a second
lawsuit without fear that the case could become moot. Thus, the voluntary-cessation
exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.
Although we conclude that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply,
we are not unsympathetic to Puce’s plight. The city council approved Puce’s application—
and imposed the disputed fee—in March 2019 . The city ordinance required Puce to record
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his plat with Dakota County within one year of the approval date or the city would consider
his plat void. See Burnsville, Minn., Code § 11-2-4(D). Thus, by the terms of the
ordinance, the city council’s approval expired in March 2020 after Puce failed to record
his plat. Had the city returned Puce’s money in March of 2020, the issue would have
become moot at that time, and the litigation would have ended.
Instead, the city did not identify the mootness issue until 2023—when the case was
before the Minnesota Supreme Court. Had the city returned Puce’s money after the
one-year recording deadline passed, the parties would have avoided several months of
discovery, a trial (that occurred after the one-year recording deadline had passed), an appeal
to this court, an appeal to the supreme court, and a remand back to the district court.
Nevertheless, we cannot create or adopt a new exception to mootness. See J.P.-S.,
880 N.W.2d at 873. Although mootness is a flexible doctrine, we cannot conclude that an
exception applies to the facts of this case given the arguments that Puce presented.
Affirmed.