State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1645

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Thomas Arrandell Weeks,
Appellant.

Filed September 4, 2025
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-12175

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Andrew C. Wilson, Special Assistant Public Defender, Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Thomas Arrandell Weeks challenges his conviction for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
two exhibits at trial and by denying his motion for a mistrial after a witness left the
courtroom during her testimony without permission to do so. We affirm.
FACTS
The jury heard the following testimony during trial. In June 2023, J.A. visited
appellant at his home in Bloomington. J.A. fell asleep while watching a movie in the living
room around 1:00 a.m. She remembered appellant carrying her to his bed. When J.A.
woke up a short time later, she found her phone and dialed 911. Law enforcement quickly
arrived at appellant’s home. J.A. informed them that she woke up to appellant raping her
and that he had ejaculated inside her.
J.A. was taken by ambulance to a hospital where she underwent a physical
examination. During the examination, a forensic nurse examiner took vaginal swabs and
submitted them to law enforcement for testing. The test results revealed the presence of
DNA matching appellant’s.
The state charged appellant with one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2022) (victim physically helpless), and
one count of third- degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344,
subd. 1(a) (2022) (coercion).
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The district court held a jury trial. The jury heard testimony from five witnesses:
J.A., a forensic DNA analyst, a responding officer, the 911 dispatcher, and the forensic
nurse examiner. During her testimony, J.A. became upset and left the courtroom without
permission to do so. At that time, appellant moved for a mistrial, and in the alternative, for
a dismissal of the charges. The district court denied both motions on the ground that J.A.
returned to the courtroom and was able to sit for cross- examination. The jury also
considered several exhibits, including Exhibit 2, a body-worn camera video of J.A.
speaking with responding law enforcement officers when they first arrived at appellant’s
home, and Exhibit 4, a body-worn camera video taken while law enforcement spoke with
J.A. in the back of the ambulance. Appellant objected to the admission of both Exhibits 2
and 4.
The jury found appellant guilty of one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(victim physically helpless) and not guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(coercion). This appeal followed.
DECISION
I. The district did not abuse its discretion by admitting Exhibit 2 as substantive
evidence.
Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state
to introduce Exhibit 2. Appellant asserts that Exhibit 2 is hearsay that does not meet the
hearsay exception for a prior inconsistent statement because J.A. had not yet testified at
trial that penetration occurred. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). This court reviews
evidentiary determinations for an abuse of discretion. State v. King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 414
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(Minn. 2023). The appellant bears the burden of showing that the district court abused its
discretion. Id.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Absent an exception, hearsay is not admissible. Minn. R.
Evid. 802. A prior inconsistent statement is not hearsay and is thus admissible as
substantive evidence when it is “inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony” and the earlier
statement “was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); see also State v. Thames,
599 N.W.2d 122, 125 (Minn. 1999). If the prior inconsistent statement was not given under
oath, it “is not admissible substantively, but may be admitted under Rule 607 for
impeachment purposes.” Id.; Minn. R. Evid. 607.
Exhibit 2 recorded the initial interaction between J.A. and the law enforcement
officers that responded to her 911 call. In her 911 call, J.A. told the dispatcher that she
“thought he was [her] friend” and that she “woke up to him raping [her].” The jury heard
the recording of J.A.’s 911 call before hearing Exhibit 2.
In Exhibit 2, J.A. restates portions of her 911 call to the responding law enforcement
officers, telling the officers that she “woke up to [appellant] raping [her],” that she “thought
he was [her] friend.” She also informed the officers that, when she woke up, “[h]is d[-]ck
[was] in me and my leg up and it hurts,” and that appellant ejaculated inside her. Neither
J.A.’s statement to the 911 dispatcher nor to the responding law enforcement officers were
given under oath.
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To lay foundation for the admission of Exhibit 2, the state questioned J.A. regarding
the incident. J.A. declined to substantively answer the state’s questions, saying that the
details were “on the [police] report.” The state moved for the admission of Exhibit 2. The
district court first asked counsel to approach the bench and addressed an off-record
objection by appellant, then received the exhibit over appellant’s objection but did not
specify why or for what purpose it was being admitted. Appellant’s counsel later stated on
the record that they had objected to the admission of Exhibit 2 on the ground that J.A. had
not “given a statement [at trial] about what sexual acts did or did not occur that night,” and
appellant’s counsel understood the exhibit was admitted “as a prior inconsistent statement.”
The state characterized Exhibit 2 as “evidence [that] came in substantively. . . to the extent
of her excited utterance initially to the law enforcement.”
Appellant’s argument fails because the record does not establish that the district
court admitted Exhibit 2 as a prior inconsistent statement. First, although appellant’s trial
counsel expressed their understanding that the exhibit had been admitted under this
exception, neither the state nor the district court endorsed that conclusion. Indeed, it
appears to have been the state’s understanding that the district court had admitted the
exhibit as an excited utterance. Second, although the district court did not expressly
indicate the basis on which it admitted Exhibit 2 as substantive evidence, it would be
unreasonable to infer from the existing record that it did so as a prior inconsistent statement.
There is no dispute that J.A.’s statements in Exhibit 2 were not given under oath,
which appellant states was the basis for his objection in district court and which would
have categorically exempted those statements from admission as substantive evidence as
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prior inconsistent statements. See Thames, 599 N.W.2d at 125; Minn. R.
Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). Moreover, the district court clearly indicated that the statements had,
in fact, been admitted as substantive evidence and not merely for impeachment purposes.1
And J.A.’s statements in Exhibit 2 were also not inconsistent with her trial testimony but
rather included more detail and provided greater context for J.A.’s testimony and recording
of the 911 call. Given the patent inapplicability of the prior-inconsistent- statement
exception to the statements in Exhibit 2, we perceive no rational basis on which to presume
that the district court admitted the exhibit for tha t reason and decline to reach that
conclusion on this record.
Appellant only challenges the district court’s decision to admit Exhibit 2 as a prior
inconsistent statement, and appellant makes no other argument for reversal or remand.
Because appellant has not demonstrated that the district court admitted Exhibit 2 as a prior
inconsistent statement, he has not met his burden to show that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting it.

1 In addition to the district court’s statements that Exhibit 2 was admitted as substantive
evidence, the court’s treatment of Exhibit 2 also shows that it was admitted as substantive
evidence rather than only for impeachment purposes. For example, the district court did
not give special instructions informing the jury of the limited purpose for the evidence
before playing Exhibit 2. During jury deliberations, the district court provided the jury
with a laptop that could play Exhibit 2 as often as they felt necessary.
In contrast, the district court later admitted Exhibit 4 as impeachment evidence only
and provided repeated limiting instructions, including that it was “admitted only for the
light it may cast on the truth of [J.A.]’s testimony at this trial. You must not consider the
statement as evidence of the facts referred to in the statement.” The district court did not
allow the jury to re-listen to Exhibit 4 in the jury room during deliberations, as it did not
“want [jurors] to place an overemphasis on Exhibit 4 as evidence” because of the “danger
that [jurors] will consider it as substantive evidence if they have to listen over and over
again on their own.”
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Exhibit 4 as a prior
inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes.
Appellant next argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
Exhibit 4 as impeachment evidence on the ground that it violated the Dexter rule, which
prevents evidence that is not substantively admissible from being presented to the jury “in
the guise of impeachment.” See State v. Dexter, 269 N.W.2d 721, 721-22 (Minn. 1978).
Exhibit 4 contained a body-worn camera video recording of law enforcement’s interview
with J.A. in the ambulance. It was recorded about 30 minutes after law enforcement
responded to the scene.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion,
State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 553 (Minn. 2010), and we reverse only if “the
admission of the evidence was erroneous and prejudicial.” See State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d
872, 879 (Minn. 2009). An erroneous evidentiary ruling is prejudicial if it “substantially
influenced the jury’s decision.” Id.
A party may use extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement for
impeachment purposes if “the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny
the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.” Minn. R. Evid. 613(b); see also
State v. Caine, 746 N.W.2d 339, 352 (Minn. 2008).
Despite rule 613, a party may not introduce evidence under “the guise of
impeachment” if the evidence is otherwise inadmissible as substantive evidence. Dexter,
269 N.W.2d at 721-22. The supreme court described this situation in State v. Ortlepp:
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[T]he problem arises when a prosecutor calls a witness who
has given a prior statement implicating the defendant, but that
witness has since retracted the statement and signified an intent
to testify in defendant’s favor if called by the prosecutor. If the
prosecutor is permitted to call this witness and use the prior
statement for impeachment purposes, there is a large risk that
the jury, even if properly instructed, will consider the prior
statement as substantive evidence.
363 N.W.2d 39, 42-43 (Minn. 1985).
At trial, the state asked J.A., “[W]hat does the word ‘rape’ mean to you?” J.A.
answered that she “shouldn’t have used that word because he was on top of me trying to
stop me. So, I just shouldn’t have used that word.” The state then asked the district court
to admit Exhibit 4 as “a prior inconsistent statement with regard to the context in which
[J.A.] was being held.” The state argued that J.A. had testified “that she was simply held
down separate and apart from the sex act for the purposes of preventing her from leaving,”
but that “Exhibit 4 is the context of being held down during penile penetration.” Appellant
objected on the ground that J.A. had not substantively testified to the actual criminal sexual
conduct.
The district court admitted Exhibit 4 as impeachment evidence only. It stated on
the record that E xhibit 4 “qualifies as a prior inconsistent statement” based on J.A.’s
testimony at trial that “she probably shouldn’t have used the word ‘rape ’ because
[appellant] just held her down for her own benefit to keep her from going out.” But Exhibit
4 includes statements by J.A. about appellant holding her down, penetrating her without
her consent, and asking her not to call the police. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
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its discretion by concluding that Exhibit 4 constituted a prior inconsistent statement and
thus was admissible at trial for impeachment purposes but not as substantive evidence.
Appellant also argues that the district court’s instructions regarding Exhibit 4 were
impermissibly confusing to the jury and put the jury at risk of “consider[ing] the prior
statement as substantive evidence.” See Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d at 43. He specifically asserts
that the instructions told the jury “to disregard the substance of J.A.’s statements in Exhibit
4 as they were only admissible for purposes of impeachment,” but to “consider [her]
‘emotional state’ as substantive evidence of guilt.” The record shows that three times the
district court instructed the jury that Exhibit 4 is “admitted only for the light it may cast on
the truth of [J.A.]’s testimony at . . . trial,” and that they “must not consider the statement
as evidence of the facts referred to in the statement.” Contrary to appellant’s argument, the
district court never instructed the jury that it could use Exhibit 4 as substantive evidence of
J.A.’s emotional state. And this court assumes that a jury follows the district court’s
instructions. See State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998).
The record does not support appellant’s assertion that the district court provide d
confusing or inadequate instructions to the jury. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary
lack merit.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion
for a mistrial.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a mistrial after J.A. exited the courtroom during her testimony because her exit was
unfairly prejudicial to his defense.
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“Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Boswell, 20 N.W.3d 640, 654 (Minn. App. 2025), rev. denied
(Minn. June 25, 2025). “[A] mistrial should not be granted unless there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would be different if the event that prompted the
motion had not occurred.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 506 (Minn. 2006) (alteration
in original) (quotation omitted).
In this case, the district court denied appellant’s motion for a mistrial on the record:
The defense’s motions are denied. I do not believe that
certainly we’ve gotten to the level of a mistrial. As the [s]tate
indicated, [J.A.] is here. She has returned. You know, it is
certainly not unusual for a—an alleged victim to become upset.
Frankly, my last trial, I think we took three or four breaks
during the victim’s testimony because she became upset during
questioning. So, it’s not an unusual occurrence. The fact that
she’s back does allow for the trial to continue and for her to be
subject to cross-examination.
As I indicated briefly in chambers, obviously the
[calculus] changes if this happens and she doesn’t make herself
available anymore for cross-examination, we may be dealing
with a different issue.
The transcript makes clear that J.A. was struggling to provide testimony from the start and
that it was difficult for her to talk about the incident. When asked if she could recall the
events of June 10, 2023, she stated, “I really don’t want to.” She twice responded, “No
comment,” to the prosecutor’s questions, testified that none of the testimony was easy for
her, stated that she “just want[ed] this to be over with,” refused to allow the prosecutor to
refresh her recollection, informed the court that she was “getting really irritated,” and
repeatedly stated that she would not be answering any more questions. A short time later,
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she fled the courtroom and vomited, apparently because of the stress of her testimony. 2
J.A.’s discomfort is reflected in the record before her untimely exit from the courtroom ,
and there is no indication in the record that the jury interpreted her actions in a way that
was unfairly prejudicial to appellant. Indeed, although the jury found appellant guilty on
one of the two counts, it acquitted him on the other.
Appellant relies on State v. Cox to argue that the district court should have
considered four factors —“the nature and source of the prejudicial matter, the number of
jurors exposed to the influence, the weight of evidence properly before the jury, and the
likelihood that curative measures were effective in reducing the prejudice”—before it
denied his motion for a mistrial. 322 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. 1982). In Cox, a bailiff
made inappropriate remarks within the hearing of the jury regarding the defendant’s guilt.
Id. at 55 7-58. The supreme court affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the
appellant’s motion for a mistrial and noted that there was a low “likelihood of a tainted
verdict.” Id. at 559.
The Cox analysis does not apply here. First, there is no improper statement by a
court official, which factually distinguishes this case from Cox and does not give rise to a
“presumption of prejudice” here. See id. at 558. Second, appellant cites no relevant
caselaw that requires a district court to analyze the four Cox factors in circumstances like
these—a witness fleeing the courtroom. Third, Cox points to constitutional problems with
“potentially prejudicial material” when “it deprives a defendant of the right to . . . confront

2 Query whether it would have been more prejudicial for J.A. to vomit while on the witness
stand in front of the jury.
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and cross-examine the source of the material.” Id. In this case, J.A. re-entered the
courtroom and sat through her cross -examination that same day. Finally, there is no
indication in the record or argument on appeal that J.A.’s exit was “error” that brought in
“extrinsic material” that should not be considered by the jury, as discussed in Cox. Id.; see
also Boswell, 20 N.W.3d at 655 (analyzing challenge to improper testimony); Manthey,
711 N.W.2d at 506 (same); State v. McCurry, 770 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Minn. App. 2009)
(same), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009).
Appellant does not describe how he believes he was prejudiced by J.A.’s exit. He
does not argue that the jury was more likely to convict him after J.A.’s exit than before her
exit. He asserts that the state’s questioning conduct “reflects [its] priority was winning at
any cost,” but does not connect that argument to J.A.’s abrupt exit or explain how he was
prejudiced by either the questioning or the exit. And there is no indication in the record
that J.A.’s exit was more prejudicial to appellant than it was to the state. There is not a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different had J.A. not exited
in the midst of her testimony, particularly in light of the conclusive DNA evidence, the 911
call, and her statements to law enforcement in Exhibit 2.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s
motion for a mistrial on the ground that J.A. exited the courtroom during her testimony.
Affirmed.