Samantha Wakasugi, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1647

Samantha Wakasugi, Appellant,

vs.

3M Company,
Respondent.

Filed June 2, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Chutich, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-23-4381

Paul C. Dworak, Naomi E.H. Martin, Storms Dworak LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Courtney M. Blanchard, Joseph G. Schmitt, Austin J. Spillane, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Chutich, Judge.

* Retired justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court
of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10, and Minn. Stat. § 2.724,
subd. 3 (2024).
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CHUTICH, Judge
Appellant Samantha Wakasugi challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of the
pregnancy-discrimination claims she brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and
the Minnesota Parental Leave Act against respondent 3M Company after her position was
eliminated during a reduction in force. Wakasugi contends that reversal is required because
she produced sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case of discrimination and that
3M’s explanation for her discharge was pretextual. Because genuine issues of material fact
exist as to whether Wakasugi’s pregnancy was a motivating factor in the decision to
eliminate her position, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
On appeal from summary judgment, we set forth the following facts in the light
most favorable to Wakasugi, the nonmoving party. In 2016, 3M hired Wakasugi as a
customer account representative. In July 2021, she was promoted to the position of price
change specialist, a position requiring a balance of analytical and customer service skills.
The director of pricing operations for the United States and Canada, Jody Gaffney, testified
that he hired Wakasugi because, among other things, he valued her customer-service
background at 3M and her work ethic. Four other price change specialists were hired in
mid-2021, and three of them had the same job grade as Wakasugi. During her time in this
position, Wakasugi received positive performance reviews in 2021 and 2022.
On October 5, 2022, Wakasugi emailed Joyce Hatch, who directly supervised the
price change team, that she was pregnant and that she planned to take parenting leave in
3
March 2023. Wakasugi applied for parental leave through the company’s third-party leave
administrator and was approved.
Hatch obtained Wakasugi’s permission to tell her supervisor, Gaffney, 1 about the
pregnancy and upcoming leave. Gaffney could not recall exactly when he learned of
Wakasugi’s pregnancy, but stated he would “bet money” that Hatch informed him, and that
“knowing [Hatch] and our relationship,” it would have been “shortly thereafter” Hatch
received Wakasugi’s October 5, 2022 email.
Later that October, Gaffney received a call from the newly appointed marketing
operations director, Heather Blasingame, who was attending a week -long conference to
plan a corporate restructuring set to occur by the end of March 2023. Blasingame’s
supervisor, Nancy Mallory, had been asked in June 2022 to restructure the company’s
global marketing organization by eliminating positions deemed unnecessary or transferable
to lower-cost global service centers.
Mallory intended, initially, to eliminate the entire five-person price change team,
but at the conference, Blasingame convinced her that the team’s work was essential and
would be difficult to reassign. At the end of the conference, Blasingame was told that one
of the team’s positions must be eliminated by March 23, 2023.
Blasingame called Gaffney and informed him that the price change team needed to
be reduced by one employee for the upcoming year. In a brief call, with “no deep dive,”

1 After Gaffney hired Wakasugi, he was her direct supervisor for only four months before
Hatch assumed this supervisory role. After that, Gaffney remained the team’s second-level
supervisor and communicated regularly with Hatch until he retired in November 2022.
4
Blasingame asked him, “[W]ho would you select at this point in time?” When Gaffney
answered, “Wakasugi,” Blasingame entered her name in a spreadsheet identifying her for
termination.
On January 10, 2023, as part of the corporate reorganization, Blasingame met with
Hatch and David Shute 2 to plan a management transition of the pric e change team from
Hatch to Shute. During the meeting, Hatch stated that Wakasugi was pregnant, with a due
date around March, and that she would go on maternity leave.
Later that same day, Blasingame emailed Shute informing him that the price change
team would be reduced by one employee at the end of March 2023. The email read:
The headcount impact of the 1 FTE will come out of the
USAC area —Sam Wakasugi —which will be a Q1/Q2
headcount reduction. I have not yet heard back from
HR/[Mallory] on how separations tied to [the reduction-in -
force] will take place. I anticipate learning more about
communications and timing shortly. . . .

On January 25, 2023, Blasingame forwarded an email to Mallory that Blasingame
sent to 3M’s people relations manager Brian Jackson. The email sent to Jackson simply
advised that one position would be eliminated and that the process for a review by human
resources and the legal department needed to occur. Even though Mallory was copied on
the original email to Jackson, Blasingame forwarded the email again to Mallory with one
change: in the body of the forwarded email, Blasingame wrote “Samantha Wakasugi” in
bold letters.

2 Shute had no previous experience working with Wakasugi or any other member of the
price change team.
5
When a reduction in force does not eliminate an entire team, 3M’s policy requires
that a termination of a specific person’s position be based solely on their score in a skills
assessment. Senior manager of human resources Ross Kent stated that preselection of
employees for a reduction-in-force is strictly prohibited. Before a skills assessment is
completed, directors conducting a reduction-in-force are to discuss positions only, and not
the persons occupying them.
Half of the scoring on the skills assessment is based on an employee’s performance
ratings, and the other half is determined by job-specific criteria. Managers select three
job-related skills for evaluation, and a human-resources employee adds two standardized
skills used in all reduction-in-force cases involving customer operations. The employee
with the lowest overall score has their position eliminated.
On January 31, 2023, the morning of the day that the skills assessment later took
place, Hatch submitted her formal 2022 year-end review of Wakasugi, rating her
performance as “Effective.” The evaluation contained no criticisms of Wakasugi’s work,
complimented her on her contributions in using a “blocked line tool” and in strengthening
relationships within the company, and ended with “Looking forward to your
accomplishments in 2023!”
Later that day, Blasingame, Hatch, and Kent met over a conference call to conduct
a skills assessment of Wakasugi and the other price change specialists. Blasingame and
Hatch met before the assessment “to come up with detailed skills” and selected: analytical
skills, process and project management, and communication abilities. When they
determined the components of the skills assessment, each knew that Wakasugi was
6
pregnant. Before the meeting, Kent reviewed the past performance evaluations for all five
of the pricing team employees and assigned them identical scores of 2, which meant
“effective performance” that meets expectations.
Blasingame and Hatch scored Wakasugi the lowest on their part of the assessment.
After the scoring was concluded, Kent first learned that Wakasugi was pregnant.
Wakasugi points to various evidence in the record, much of it disputed by 3M, to
support her claim that the skills assessment was pretextual and that her position had already
been selected for termination. She cites Blasingame’s deposition testimony to assert that
Blasingame disclosed to Hatch —before the skills assessment took place—that the price
change team was “going to be impacted by one head count and . . . that Jody Gaffney had
previously identified Sam Wakasugi as that individual.” Wakasugi also notes the
testimony of Kent and Hatch to assert that Blasingame, who had never reviewed
Wakasugi’s work, took an active role in sco ring Wakasugi. Wakasugi further identifies
stark disparities in the scoring and comments section and asserts that the negative
comments that she received conflicted with Hatch’s year- end performance review
submitted earlier that day. Moreover, she argues that she was hired for her
customer-service skill set, which was different from her co-workers but of no less value,
and that the subjective skills assessment did not capture or credit her for these skills.
In February 2023, shortly after the skills assessment, 3M informed Wakasugi that
her position was being eliminated in 45 days as part of the company’s restructuring efforts.
Two days later, Wakasugi met with Hatch to discuss the company’s decision. Hatch told
her that there were no performance issues and that she did not know why 3M chose her for
7
dismissal. According to Wakasugi but disputed by Hatch, Hatch told her that the decision
was “poor timing with the baby due soon,” and to look on the bright side because she could
now spend all her time and energy preparing to give birth and raising her child.
Wakasugi obtained counsel. 3M ultimately paid Wakasugi her full parental-leave
benefits pursuant to its existing leave policy, which allows employees on an approved leave
of absence when their job is eliminated to complete any paid leave before separation.
Wakasugi began her parental leave on March 14, 2023, and it ended on July 3, 2023.
In August 2023, Wakasugi sued 3M, alleging violations of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (the Human Rights Act), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.50 (2024), and the Minnesota
Parenting Leave Act (the Parenting Leave Act), Minn. Stat. §§ 181.940-.44 (2024).
Wakasugi alleges that 3M discriminated against her based on her pregnancy and her request
for parental leave.
After discovery, 3M moved for summary judgment on each count, which the district
court granted. T he court determined that Wakasugi was laid off during a bona fide
reduction-in-force, and that she failed to make an “‘additional showing’ that her pregnancy
was a factor in the decision to select her position for elimination.” Concluding that
Wakasugi’s “only evidence of pregna ncy discrimination is that she happened to be
pregnant at the time of the [reduction-in-force],” the district court dismissed her claims
under the Human Rights Act. The court also determined that Wakasugi’s claim under the
Parenting Leave Act failed because she could not make an “additional showing” that her
leave request “actually factored into the decision to eliminate her position.”
8
Wakasugi appeals, challenging the summary dismissal of her
pregnancy-discrimination claims under these two acts.
DECISION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Henry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #625, 988 N.W.2d 868, 880 (Minn. 2023). “In doing so, we
examine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court
properly applied the law.” Id. Our analysis views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party—here, Wakasugi—and we resolve all doubts and factual
inferences against the moving party, 3M. Id. “[W]e do not weigh facts or make credibility
determinations.” Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020).
When evaluating a claim on summary judgment, courts are not to usurp the role of a jury;
when reasonable persons might draw different legal conclusions from the evidence
presented, summary judgment is inappropriate. Id. at 232.
I. Wakasugi’s Human Rights Act Claim

On appeal, Wakasugi does not challenge the district court’s determination that there
was a bona fide reduction in force. Rather, she argues that, under Minnesota law, the record
and conflicting testimony create genuine issues of material fact as to whether 3M selected
her position for elimination because of her pregnancy status and request for parenting
leave. We agree. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wakasugi we
conclude that material, disputed facts exist as to whether Wakasugi’s pregnancy and
upcoming parenting leave were substantial causative factors in 3M’s decision to eliminate
9
her role as a price change specialist and as to whether the January 31 skills assessment was
a pretext for discrimination.
“Employment relationships are generally at-will in Minnesota, so an employer may
discharge an employee for any reason or no reason and an employee is under no obligation
to remain on the job.” Hanson v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 372 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted). But under the Human Rights Act, “[e]xcept when based on a bona
fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair employment practice” for an employer to
discharge an employee because of sex. Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(2). “‘Sex’ includes,
but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth, and disabilities related to pregnancy or
childbirth.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 42. “When a substantial causative factor entering
into the decision to discharge an employee is based upon gender or a status of pregnancy,
the [Act] affords the employee remedies against the employer including an action for the
recovery of damages, injunctive relief, and costs and attorney fees.”
Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 1988).
On appeal, Wakasugi agrees that her discrimination claim is based upon
circumstantial evidence. She also agrees that, because her claim rests on circumstantial
evidence, the three-part burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) applies. “Under this framework,
a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination.”
Hansen v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 813 N.W.2d 906, 918 (Minn. 2012). Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, “the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. If the
10
employer satisfies this burden, then the plaintiff must “put forward sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the employer’s proffered explanation was pretextual.” Id. “[E]ven if an
employer has a legitimate reason for the discharge, a plaintiff may nevertheless prevail if
an illegitimate reason more likely than not motivated the discharge decision.”
McGrath v. TCF Bank Sav., fsb, 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993) (quotation omitted).
Ultimately, whether discrimination occurred is a question of fact.
LaPoint v. Fam. Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 514 (Minn. 2017).
A. Wakasugi established a prima facie case of discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Human Rights Act, a
party must typically show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was
qualified for the job from which she was discharged; (3) she was discharged; and (4) her
employer hired “a nonmember of the protected class to do the same work.”
Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 442 (Minn. 1983). Recognizing that
“[i]t may . . . be impossible for the aggrieved employee to meet the fourth requirement” in
a reduction-in-force situation, our s upreme court, in a Human-Rights-Act case, adopted a
“modified version” of the prima facie test first used by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in a claim arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act .
Dietrich v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 536 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Minn. 1995) (citing
Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (8th Cir.1985)).
This modified version requires a plaintiff to satisfy the first three prongs of a prima
face case and then come forward with some additional evidence “that her sex was a factor
in the termination decision.” Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918-19; see also Yates v. Rexton, Inc.,
11
267 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff in a reduction-in-force action
involving age discrimination must show as a fourth prima facie prong that “age was a factor
in the employer’s decision to terminate him”). The Eighth Circuit has explained that this
“additional showing inquiry is not a significant hurdle for an employment discrimination
plaintiff.” Yates, 267 F.3d at 799 (quotation omitted). Rather, it merely requires some
additional evidence—besides the mere fact of discharge —from which, in the absence of
an explanation from the defendant, a fact-finder may reasonably infer that a plaintiff’s
protected status contributed to the elimination of her position. See Dietrich, 536 N.W.2d
at 324-25; Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 778-79 (8th Cir. 1995). This
additional showing may “take many forms,” and the “factually-oriented, case-by- case
nature of [discrimination] claims requires that we not be overly rigid in our consideration
of the evidence of discrimination a plaintiff may offer.” Dietrich, 536 N.W.2d at 324
(quoting Holley, 771 F.2d at 1165-66).
Upon summary judgment, 3M does not dispute that Wakasugi satisfied the first
three prongs of the prima facie case. But it asserts that Wakasugi failed to make the
required “additional showing” to satisfy her prima facie case, arguing that she presented a
“series of speculative conclusions unsupported by the record.” In particular, the company
contends that no evidence supports Wakasugi’s assertion that Gaffney even knew that she
was pregnant in October when he identified her to Blasingame as the price change
specialist whose position should be eliminated. The company also claims that only
speculation supports Wakasugi’s assertion that her pregnancy and upcoming leave
12
influenced Gaffney’s and Blasingame’s decision to select her well before any skills
assessment was conducted. We disagree.
The record includes evidence that after Wakasugi informed Hatch of her pregnancy
and application for leave, Hatch relayed the information to Gaffney, reportedly stating,
“Guess what? Samantha is pregnant.” Gaffney, the director of pricing operations, was set
to retire in November 2022, and testified that he and Hatch spoke often. Although he could
not remember exactly when he learned of Wakasugi’s pregnancy, he stated he would “bet
money” that Hatch informed him, and that “knowing [Hatch] and our relatio nship,” it
would have been “shortly thereafter” Hatch received Wakasugi’s October 5, 2022 email.
3M’s suggestion that Gaffney may not have learned about the pregnancy until after his
retirement in November ignores this testimony and that of Hatch, who said unequivocally
that she told Gaffney about the pregnancy while he was still employed at 3M.
Based on Gaffney’s testimony that Hatch “would have let [him] know” about
Wakasugi’s pregnancy “before” his retirement, and viewing this evidence in the light most
favorable to Wakasugi, as we must do upon summary judgment, the record supports a
reasonable inference that Gaffney knew of Wakasugi’s pregnancy before his call with
Blasingame in later October.
The context for that call further supports Wakasugi’s prima facie case. From
October 17 to October 22, Blasingame attended a conference to plan a corporate
restructuring set to occur by the end of March 2023. As the conference was ending,
Blasingame learned that the position of one price change specialist had to be eliminated by
March 2023. She then called Gaffney, informed him that the team needed to be reduced
13
by one person for 2023, and asked him who should be cut. Id. In a brief call—before any
skills assessment was planned or even any criteria developed for it— Blasingame asked for
his recommendation; Gaffney selected Wakasugi. Gaffney said he did so because “it was
a feeling that she—forgive this—didn’t get it.” He admitted that during the time he
managed her, he had never documented any concerns about Wakasugi’s performance or
this feeling.
After this October call, Blasingame specifically identified Wakasugi as the team
member to be cut in a spreadsheet and later sent two January emails to colleagues Mallory
and Shute that would allow a fact-finder to reasonably infer that Wakasugi had already
been chosen to be cut from the team. Blasingame’s January 10 email sent to Shute named
Wakasugi as the employee selected to lose her job. Shute testified that this email implies
that Blasingame had finalized Wakasugi’s selection. Notably, Blasingame sent this email
after a call that same day with Shute and Hatch, during which Hatch had informed
Blasingame that Wakasugi was pregnant and would be taking leave in March, the same
time the reduction-in-force would occur.
Wakasugi contends that all Blasingame then knew about her was that “she was
pregnant and going on leave at the same time the team—which Blasingame herself had
fought to keep intact —needed to be reduced from five to four.” She contends that a
“reasonable jury could conclude that [she] was selected not out of animus or hostility, but
because her pregnancy and leave made her the most ‘convenient’ choice.” We agree that
Wakasugi had presented evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to reach that
conclusion.
14
In addition, the forwarded email that Blasingame sent to Mallory on January 25
made one notable change in the original email sent to Jackson. The original email to
Jackson, on which Mallory was already copied, stated only that one position would be
eliminated, while Blasingame wrote “Samantha Wakasugi” in bold letters in the body of
the forwarded email.
Accordingly, viewing this record evidence in the light most favorable to Wakasugi
as the nonmoving party, we conclude that Wakasugi has met her burden to make a prima
facie case of discrimination.
B. 3M has articulated a legitimate, non -discriminatory reason for
eliminating Wakasugi’s position.
Because Wakasugi has articulated a prima facie case, the burden shifts to 3M to
“articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.” Henry, 988 N.W.2d at
883. The company has met this burden by producing evidence that it was conducting a
legitimate reduction-in-force, which Wakasugi does not now dispute, and that as part of
that process, Wakasugi’s score on the weighted skill assessment was the “sole basis for
selecting [her] position for elimination.” Because 3M has satisfied the test’s second prong,
the burden returns to Wakasugi to “put forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
employer’s proffered explanation was pretextual.” Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918.
C. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the proffered reason
for eliminating Wakasugi’s position was pretextual.
Wakasugi can satisfy her burden to show pretext “either directly by persuading the
court that a discriminatory
reason likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
15
Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986) (quotation omitted). Our
supreme court has explained that for Wakasugi to do so, “proof that the defendant’s
explanation is unworthy of credence may be quite persuasive. ”
Hoover v. Norwest Priv. Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 545 (Minn. 2001) (quotation
omitted). And “[i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from
the falsity of the explanation that the employer is covering up a discriminatory purpose” as
long as they could infer the reason is not only pretext but pretext for discrimination. Id. at
545-46 (quotation omitted).
Wakasugi asserts that she presented sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to her, to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
3M’s explanation for why she was selected for discharge is false. We agree that she has
produced sufficient competent evidence to make summary judgment inappropriate on the
issue of pretext.
First, to demonstrate that 3M’s reliance on the skills assessment score was pretext
for a predetermined decision to eliminate her position, Wakasugi cites record evidence that,
well before the skills assessment occurred, she had already been identified as the person to
lose her position. She challenges 3M’s explanation that she was identified as a temporary
“placeholder” by highlighting the October 2022 spreadsheet identifying her for
termination, as well as Blasingame’s January 10 and January 25 emails, discussed above,
that specifically name Wakasugi as the pricing team member whose position would be
eliminated. She disputes 3M’s contention that Wakasugi was a temporary “placeholder”
by contending that 3M has no formal policy referencing or supporting the use of a
16
“placeholder” process in reduction-in-force cases; nothing in the emails suggested that the
identification of Wakasugi was temporary; two of 3M’s own employees, Shute and
Mallory, testified that the January 10th email could be read as communicating that
Wakasugi was the person selected for the one -person reduction; and neither Mallory nor
Blasingame explained the January 25, 2023 forwarded email to Mallory where Blasingame
had added “Samantha Wakasugi” in bold letters when Blasingame knew Wakasugi was
pregnant.
In addition, Wakasugi presented evidence that 3M deviated from its historical
practice in conducting a reduction in force. Kent testified about the practice that 3M
directors were to follow in identifying positions—and not persons —in reduction-in-force
decisions. Specifically, Kent testified that “whenever we are going through any of these
reduction conversations with directors and vice presidents —and there are many, many,
many meetings to talk about this—there are org charts listed with no names. . . . We are
just talking about boxes, positions.” Moreover, evidence shows that four of the five price
change specialists had the same job grade as Wakasugi; accordingly, inserting a specific
name, instead of a position as a “placeholder” was unnecessary to calculate the financial
benefits of a headcount reduction.
Wakasugi next cites record evidence that Blasingame’s decision to inform Hatch
before the skills assessment test that Gaffney had previously identified Wakasugi as the
employee to be impacted by the one-person reduction—and withholding that information
17
from human-resources manager Kent3—further supports the reasonable conclusion that her
discharge was predetermined before the test occurred. She asserts that the timing of that
conversation is material because marketing operations director Blasingame was informing
a subordinate, Hatch, that Hatch’s previous boss had already decided who should be cut
from the pricing team. Wakasugi further contends that a reasonable inference is that
Blasingame was attempting to influence Hatch’s scoring on the upcoming skills assessment
in “a predetermined direction.”
3M cites Hatch’s version of the conversation to deny that it occurred before the
skills assessment and states that any difference in memory is not material. But Blasingame
clearly testified that she told Hatch about the head count reduction before the skills
assessment and that “Gaffney had previously identified Sam Wakasugi as that individual.”
We must view this conflicting testimony in the light most favorable to Wakasugi, the
nonmoving party, and draw any reasonable inferences in her favor. Accordingly, we agree
that a reasonable person could infer that by communicating Gaffney’s previous decision to
Hatch, Blasingame was attempting to influence Hatch’s scoring on the upcoming test.
The record also shows contradictory evidence about who contributed to the actual
scoring of Wakasugi and the other price change specialists during the skills assessment.
Kent testified that half of the scoring on the skills assessment was based on job- specific
criteria. This part of the test was created by Blasingame and Hatch after each knew that
Wakasugi was pregnant and had sought parental leave coinciding with the one- person

3 Kent testified that any preselection of an employee before the skills assessment was
prohibited and would be a “red flag” requiring assignment of a new assessor.
18
reduction to the price change team. The assessment’s other half was based on an
employee’s performance ratings from previous years. After Kent assigned all five of the
pricing team employees identical scores based upon past performance evaluations, he
documented the scores and comments provided by Hatch and Blasingame on analytical
skills, process and project management, and communication abilities.
Blasingame testified that, because she had no interactions with Wakasugi before the
assessment, and had not reviewed any of her projects, all the scores came directly from
Hatch. Despite Blasingame’s lack of knowledge of Wakasugi’s performance, Kent and
Hatch each testified that Blasingame contributed to the ratings and the comments recorded
in the notes. In fact, Kent testified that it was Blasingame “talking more” during the
assessment and not Hatch, who had the most knowledge about Wakasugi’s performance.
On a scale of 1 to 3 (with 3 being the highest), Wakasugi was the only employee to
receive a score of 1 and the only one who failed to earn any 3s. The comment section
revealed that Wakasugi was the only price specialist who received any negative feedback,
while others received glowing reviews, sometimes with identical language. Her comments
read as follows:
Will do what she’s asked but not always proactive. Does not
always follow through on commitments. Request was made to
follow up on Blocked Line tool and was not done in a timely
manner. Has difficulty synthesizing data and information to
make decisions. Difficulty understanding, digesting, and
applying information from price waterfalls, etc. e.g., logic
areas with PFDC data. Requires more support to understand,
build, and create data connectivity. Lacks deep understanding
of pricing structures.

19
Wakasugi disputed these criticisms in her deposition, testifying that she was “never
once told I had missed a deadline or I wasn’t up-to-date on certain projects on time.” 3M
argues that her sworn testimony refuting every critique in the comments should be
disregarded as “self-serving.” But the lack of any previous documentation from her
managers criticizing her skills and contemporaneous documentation support Wakasugi’s
testimony. On the same day that she was scored the lowest on the skills assessment, Hatch
thanked her for “all the great work [she had] accomplished in 2022.” In addition, the
review praised Wak asugi for the very tasks that Hatch and Blasingame criticized in the
skills assessment, including the Blocked Line Tool and PFDC efforts. 4 Hatch concluded
the review by stating that she was looking forward to Wakasugi’s accomplishments in
2023.
Similarly, Wakasugi presented evidence that she met with Hatch to discuss 3M’s
decision to eliminate her position. Although 3M contends that Hatch was the key person
providing information during the skills assessment, she told Wakasugi that she did not
know why Wakasugi had been chosen or the reasons behind the decision. Hatch assured
Wakasugi that there were no performance issues. According to Wakasugi, Hatch
acknowledged that the decision was “poor timing with the baby due soon” and told her to
look on the bright side as she could now spend all her time and energy preparing to give
birth and raising her child. Hatch denies making these comments, but when reviewing a

4 The review provided in pertinent part: “The PFDC update management and training
helped our business partners to capture notification requirements in a timely manner which
provided consistency for our customers. Your work with the blocked line tool helped
standardize usage across ECO and also strengthened relationships with OTC.”
20
grant of summary judgment, we do not determine issues of credibility. Henry, 988 N.W.2d
at 880.
3M asserts in any case that Hatch’s sympathetic comments are stray comments by
a non-decisionmaker that do not reflect a discriminatory motive by either Gaffney or
Blasingame. But Hatch’s key role in the skills assessment, which the company asserts was
the sole reason for the elimination of Wakasugi’s position, gives those statements more
import. See Arraleh v. County of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that
federal courts have “carefully distinguished between comments which demonstrate a
discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely
involved in employment decisions, from stray remarks in the workplace, statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process”
(emphasis added) (quotation omitted)); Rolon v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack,
601 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467, 469 (D. Conn. 2009) (concluding that an employer’s comments
including “Why are you working? You don’t want to be here when you have a new baby
at home,” sufficiently supported an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex and
pregnancy). Moreover, animus and hostility are not prerequisites for a discrimination
claim; a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence that their protected characteristic
“actually motivated” the adverse employment action. See LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 514.
In addition, 3M dismisses Hatch’s comments as conflating adequate performance,
as reflected in Wakasugi’s two positive performance reviews, with a determination of the
relative skills of the pricing team, upon which its reduction-in-force decision was solely
made. But Wakasugi contends that “[p]erformance is skills in action” so the company’s
21
attempted distinction is invalid. She asserts that a closer look at the reviews of the other
price specialists shows that each had identified areas for improvement, and she details those
performance issues for three of the specialists. Wakasugi further cites Hatch’s admission
that she routinely asked senior analysts to help other price specialists, and not just
Wakasugi. Given the content of these evaluations and Hatch’s testimony, 3M’s claim that
Wakasugi had the lowest comparable skills cannot be established at this stage of the
litigation.
We emphasize again that neither the district court nor we may make credibility
determinations or weigh evidence upon summary judgment. Henry, 988 N.W.2d at 880 .
We express no opinion regarding the merits of Wakasugi’s claim, but note that at this
procedural posture, we are required to construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to her as the nonmoving party. In so doing, we conclude that a
reasonable juror could determine that the timing of her pregnancy and maternity leave
when the company needed to reduce her five- person unit by one person was a motivating
factor in the decision to eliminate her position. Based on this evidence, we conclude that
Wakasugi has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the stated reason
for her dismissal was pretextual. Accordingly, we reverse the entry of summary judgment
on Wakasugi’s claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and remand to the district
court for trial.
II. Wakasugi’s Parenting Leave Act Claim
Wakasugi next challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment
dismissing her Parenting Leave Act claim. Relying on a 2023 amendment to the Parenting
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Leave Act, she contends that the legal analysis to evaluate this claim is the same framework
that applied to her Human Rights Act claim and that the district court similarly erred in
dismissing this claim. We agree that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
because material facts exist as to whether 3M eliminated Wakasugi’s position in retaliation
for her request for parenting leave; specifically, whether the January 31 skills assessment
was a pretext for discrimination.5
3M contends that Wakasugi waived her argument that she established a prima facie
case of retaliatory discrimination by failing to argue the issue at summary judgment. We
disagree. The record reflects that Wakasugi asserted a theory of liability under the
Parenting Leave Act throughout the summary-judgment proceedings. Although Wakasugi
and the district court may have oversimplified the elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination under the Parenting Leave Act by assuming that the related but distinct
prima facie elements of the Human Rights Act claim applied, Wakasugi nevertheless

5 Wakasugi asserts that the 2023 amendment to the Parenting Leave Act applies to her
claims. During the 2023 legislative session, the Legislature amended a subdivision of the
Parenting Leave Act that relates to employer retribution for an employee requesting or
obtaining a parental leave of absence. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 53, art 11 § 30, at 1293
(codified at Minn. Stat. § 181.941, subd. 3 (2024)). This change became effective on July
1, 2023.
Generally, we “apply the law as it exists at the time” we rule on a case, but “[a]n
exception to this rule exists when rights affected by the amended law were vested before
the change in the law.” Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d
566, 575 (Minn. 2000). Because 3M does not argue on appeal that the 2023 amendment
to the Parenting Leave Act affected its vested rights, we apply the 2023 version of the
Parenting Leave Act. And we note that our conclusion that Wakasugi met her burden on
the prima facie and pretext prongs of the McDonnell-Douglas analysis would be the same
under either version of the Parenting Leave Act.
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asserted that she met this test and challenged 3M’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for
her termination as pretextual.
The Parenting Leave Act provides that “[a]n employer must grant an unpaid leave
of absence to . . . a female employee for prenatal care, or incapacity due to pregnancy,
childbirth, or related health conditions.” Minn. Stat. § 181.941, subd. 1(a)(2). And no
employer may “discharge, discipline, penalize, interfere with, threaten, restrain, coerce, or
otherwise retaliate or discriminate against an employee for requesting or obtaining [such]
leave of absence.” Id., subd. 3. A claim under this subsection is, in essence, a
retaliatory-discharge claim.
Like claims of discriminatory practices under the Human Rights Act, a modified
burden-shifting McDonnell-Douglas analysis applies to these claims of retaliatory
discharge arising under the Parenting Leave Act. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 444-45. To
“establish a prima facie case where an alleged retaliatory discharge is involved, an
employee must establish: (1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse
employment action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.” Id. at
444 (analyzing a claim of retaliatory discharge under the Human Rights Act alleging that
an employee was discharged for filing a charge of discrimination against their employer);
see also Hanson , 972 N.W.2d at 372 n.16 (recognizing “McDonnell Douglas as the
appropriate framework” to apply in retaliatory-discharge claims under the Minnesota
Whistleblower Act); Gangnon v. Park Nicollet Methodist Hosp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1054 (D. Minn. 2011) (applying the prima facie test detailed in Hubbard to
retaliatory-discharge claim under the Parenting Leave Act).
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Wakasugi has demonstrated the necessary elements of the retaliatory-discharge
prima facie case under Hubbard. Wakasugi engaged in statutorily protected conduct when
she requested parental leave for her pregnancy and experienced an adverse employment
action when she was discharged. And 3M’s “knowledge of [Wakasugi’s] protected activity
along with close temporal proximity to the adverse action suffices to establish a causal
connection.” Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 374, 372 n.18 (noting that despite federal cases
determining otherwise, Minnesota courts “have never mandated anything beyond close
temporal proximity to establish a causal connection for an employee’s prima facie case” of
retaliatory discharge); see also Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 445 (“A causal connection may
be demonstrated indirectly by evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of
retaliatory motive, such as a showing that the employer has actual or imputed knowledge
of the protected activity and the adverse employment action follows closely in time.”).
Because Wakasugi established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, “the
burden of production shifts to the employer to provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for the adverse employment action. Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 373 (quotation
omitted). As discussed above, 3M met this burden by producing evidence that it was
conducting a legitimate reduction-in-force, and, as part of that process, Wakasugi’s score
on the weighted skill s assessment was the sole reason 3M selected her position for
elimination. Accordingly, the burden shift ed back to Wakasugi to demonstrate that this
explanation was pretextual. Hansen, 813 N.W.2d at 918. And, as in our foregoing analysis
of pretext under the Human Rights Act, we conclude that a reasonable person could find
that the timing of Wakasugi’s request for parental leave when the company sought to
25
reduce its pricing team by one person motivated 3M to eliminate her position. Because
Wakasugi has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 3M’s stated reason for
her dismissal was pretextual, we reverse the entry of summary judgment on Wakasugi’s
claim under the Parental Leave Act and remand to the district court for trial.
Reversed and remanded.