State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1657

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lamechtric Irving Beasley,
Appellant.

Filed December 22, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bond, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-24299

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for two counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial because the district
court abused its discretion in admitting relationship evidence and because the prosecutor
2
committed misconduct during closing argument. Alternatively, appellant argues that the
warrant of commitment incorrectly lists convictions for both counts. Appellant raises
additional issues in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm appellant’s conviction, but we
reverse and remand to the district court to correct the warrant of commitment.
FACTS
In 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Lamechtric Irving
Beasley with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g) (2014). The charges arose from allegations that Beasley sexually
abused his girlfriend’s minor daughter in 2015. The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which
the district court received the following evidence.
The victim in this case, S.J., was born in 2006. In 2012, S.J.’s mother began dating
Beasley. Beasley moved into S.J.’s family home in 2013. S.J. testified that in 2015, when
she was eight years old, Beasley began touching her breasts and bottom while they were
watching television in the living room. After about a month, the sexual abuse escalated to
vaginal and oral penetration, which S.J. testified happened on a nearly daily basis. Beasley
would tell S.J. “your [m]om said this was okay” and “this is love.” The abuse stopped
abruptly around October 2015, after S.J. turned nine years old.
Over Beasley’s objection, S.J. testified that Beasley was physically and verbally
abusive to her, her mother, and her grandmother. Beasley slapped S.J. and dragged her up
the stairs by her arm and punched her mother and grandmother. Beasley also threatened
to kill S.J. and her family if she told anyone about the sexual abuse. S.J. did not
3
immediately report the abuse because, based on Beasley’s threats and his physical abuse
toward her and her family, she was afraid of him.
When S.J. was 16 years old, she disclosed the abuse to her boyfriend, sister, and
mother. S.J.’s subsequent statements to the police and to a CornerHouse forensic
interviewer were admitted at trial. In addition to S.J.’s testimony, the jury heard testimony
from S.J.’s mother, sister, police officers, a child-protection investigator, the Cornerhouse
interviewer, and the doctor who performed S.J.’s sexual-assault examination.
Beasley waived his right to testify. The jury found Beasley guilty on both counts.
The district court convicted Beasley of count one, first-degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), and sentenced him to 168 months in prison.
Beasley appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion in admitting relationship evidence.

Beasley argues that the district court committed reversible error in admitting
relationship evidence. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Minn. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017).
Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is inadmissible. See Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b); State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Minn. 1965). But there is an
exception for what is “commonly referred to as relationship evidence.” State v. Matthews,
779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). Relationship evidence is “[e]vidence of domestic
4
conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or
household members.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2024). “Domestic conduct” includes
“domestic abuse,” as defined in the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01
(2024). Id. Relevant here, the Domestic Abuse Act defines “domestic abuse” as “physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1). A “family or
household member” includes “persons who are presently residing together or who have
resided together in the past.” Id., subd. 2(b)(4).
Relationship evidence is admissible “unless the probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20; see State v. Andersen,
900 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Minn. App. 2017). “[T]he rationale for admitting relationship
evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the relationship between the defendant and
the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime in the context of that relationship.” State v.
Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010).
Relationship evidence may also help the jury assess witness credibility. Matthews, 779
N.W.2d at 549; see also State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004) (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting relationship “evidence that, if
believed by the jury, could have assisted the jury by providing a context with which it could
better judge the credibility of the principals in the relationship”).
Before trial, Beasley filed a motion in limine to exclude prior bad- acts evidence.
The state moved to admit evidence of Beasley’s physical abuse toward S.J. and her family
as relationship evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20, arguing that the evidence was
relevant to put the charged conduct in context and to help explain that S.J. did not
5
immediately report the sexual abuse because she was afraid that Beasley would harm her
or her family. The district court allowed the state to introduce evidence that Beasley was
physically violent toward S.J., her mother, and her grandmother, agreeing with the state
that it would contextualize S.J.’s decision to delay reporting the abuse. The district court
limited the relationship evidence to acts of physical violence that S.J. “witnessed and
knows about,” and cautioned the state that the relationship evidence should “not [be] in
great detail,” because what was relevant for the jury was to “understand what may have
motivated [S.J.]” not to immediately report the abuse. Additionally, the district court
excluded any evidence of Beasley’s convictions or conduct that occurred after the sexual
abuse stopped and it granted Beasley’s request to redact S.J.’s CornerHouse statement to
remove references to domestic violence that went beyond the court’s relationship-evidence
ruling. Finally, the district court provided a cautionary instruction to the jury before the
relationship evidence was admitted during S.J.’s testimony, and again before her mother’s
testimony.
On appeal, Beasley asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence that Beasley was physically abusive to S.J. and her family. Beasley argues both
that the relationship evidence lacked probative value and that any probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Probative Value
Evidence has probative value “when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” State
v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. R. Evid. 401 (defining
“[r]elevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
6
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence”). As the district court found, evidence of Beasley’s
threats to harm S.J. or her family if she told anyone of the abuse, coupled with S.J.’s belief
that Beasley was capable of inflicting such harm because she had seen him hurt people she
loved in the past, had substantial probative value because it helped the jury understand why
S.J. delayed disclosing the abuse. See State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. App.
2008) (“Evidence that helps to establish the relationship between the victim and the
defendant or which places the event in context bolsters its probative value.” (quotation
omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). The relationship evidence was also relevant
to the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, in particular S.J. and her mother.
See McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (affirming the admission of relationship evidence that
helped provide context with which the jury could better judge the parties’ credibility); see
also Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757 (concluding that the relationship evidence in that case
“had significant probative value in assisting the jury to judge witness credibility”).
Additionally, evidence of Beasley’s physical and verbal abuse of S.J.’s mother and
grandmother is probative of how Beasley may have interacted with S.J. Valentine, 787
N.W.2d at 637 (holding that evidence showing “how a defendant treats his family or
household members” is relevant because it “sheds light on how the defendant interacts with
those close to him, which in turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim”).
Beasley maintains that the relationship evidence was only minimally probative
because the state did not “need” the relationship evidence to make its case because the jury
had “ample evidence” from which to assess S.J.’s credibility, including S.J.’s own
7
testimony as to why she delayed reporting the abuse. This argument is not persuasive. A
defendant’s “challenge to the admissibility of the section 634.20 evidence on the ground
that it was not needed to strengthen the state’s case fails” because “the need for section
634.20 evidence is naturally considered as part of the assessment of the probative value
versus prejudicial effect of the evidence.” State v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn.
App. 2008) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn. 2006)
(stating that “a separate analysis of need” is not required to admit evidence under section
634.20). The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the relationship
evidence had probative value.
Risk of Unfair Prejudice
Beasley contends that , even if the evidence was probative, the risk of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value. “All evidence offered against
defendants in criminal trials is prejudicial to some extent.” State v. Spaeth, 552 N.W.2d
187, 195 (Minn. 1996). In the context of relationship evidence, “[w]hen balancing the
probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging
evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that
persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d
at 641 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court reduced the risk of unfair prejudice by excluding some of the
relationship evidence the state sought to introduce. Further, a cautionary instruction can
reduce “the probability of undue weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v.
Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted) ; see also Andersen, 900
8
N.W.2d at 441 (“[T]he district court’s cautionary instructions lessened any probability that
the jury would rely improperly on relationship evidence.”). Before S.J. testified about
Beasley’s physical violence, the district court instructed the jury that the relationship
evidence did not “prove domestic violence.” Further, the district court instructed the jury
that the relationship evidence was being offered
to help you understand sort of the relationship and the
dynamics within the household, as well as what [S.J.], you
know, may have observed and believed as a result of it. . . .
There’s only a special, limited purpose for you to hear this. I
want to make sure you keep your perception of that within that
narrow purpose.

The district court gave similar instructions before S.J.’s mother testified .1 “We
presume that jurors follow a judge’s instructions.” State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 675
(Minn. 1998). While the relationship evidence undoubtedly was prejudicial, Beasley does
not show that the risk of the evidence persuading by illegitimate or unfair means
outweighed its probative value. Thus, t he district court acted within its discretion by
admitting relationship evidence at Beasley’s trial.
II. Beasley is not entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct.

Beasley argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed
misconduct during closing argument. The right to due process includes the right to a fair
trial. State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d 135, 141 (Minn. 2025). “Prosecutors have an affirmative
obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677,

1 As Beasley notes, the district court did not provide a relationship- evidence instruction
during final jury instructions. Beasley does not raise this as an issue on appeal. Therefore,
we do not address this point.
9
686 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “A prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct
when [they] violate[] clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by
a district court, or clear commands in this state’s case law.” State v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d
746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).
Beasley identifies three instances of alleged misconduct by the prosecutor during
closing argument: (1) telling the jury that S.J. could not have made up the sensory details
in her testimony, (2) describing proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a standard that is not
so high, and (3) urging the jury to put themselves in S.J.’s shoes.
The parties agree that Beasley objected to the first two instances of alleged
misconduct. “For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we have utilized a harmless error
test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.” State v.
Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 389 (Minn. 2007). For cases involving “serious prosecutorial
misconduct,” we will reverse unless the misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
meaning that “the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Hunt ,
615 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2000). But “[f]or less serious misconduct, the test is whether
the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” Id.
Beasley contends that the alleged misconduct was serious, and thus we should apply the
more stringent harmless-error test. The state does not appear to take a clear position on
which harmless-error standard applies to the prosecutor’s arguments about S.J.’s sensory
details and the burden of proof.
As to the third alleged form of misconduct, the parties dispute whether Beasley
objected to the prosecutor’s argument asking the jury to put themselves in S.J.’s shoes and
10
which standard of review guides our analysis. Beasley argues that we should apply the
standard of review for objected-to serious prosecutor misconduct. The state contends that,
because the district court sua sponte raised a concern about the prosecutor’s argument and
Beasley did not object, the modified plain-error standard of review is appropriate. See
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006) (outlining the modified plain-error test
that applies to unobjected-to trial errors).
We need not resolve the parties’ disagreements about the proper standard of review
because we conclude that Beasley cannot establish that he is entitled to relief under the
more demanding test that applies to objected-to and unusually serious misconduct.
S.J.’s Description of Sensory Details
Beasley argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that the
sensory details S.J. disclosed “are details that no person can make up unless they have
experienced it.” During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that “[t]hose details
[S.J.] provided to you are details no person can make up unless they have experienced it.
No one makes up a salty sperm taste.” The district court overruled Beasley’s objection to
these statements, determining that it would leave it to the “judgment of the jury [to
determine] what happened to [S.J.] .” Later, discussing the details of the abuse S.J.
provided during the CornerHouse interview, the prosecutor said “[n]obody makes up that
kind of taste because that is a sensory detail.” Beasley once again objected on the ground
that the prosecutor was sharing his “personal opinion” that “nobody would make up” such
sensory details. While the record does not reflect whether the district court granted
Beasley’s second objection, the court cautioned the jury:
11
I think I understand what the objection is. I think the jury
understands as well. It’s not what [the prosecutor] is telling
you you need to believe. It’s what you believe based on your
common sense and the judgment that’s there. So, to the extent
[the prosecutor is] saying, this is what I believe based on the
evidence—that’s not relevant. Is that clear to everyone? Okay.

Beasley contends the prosecutor’s statements that S.J. could not have made up the
sensory details in her testimony were serious misconduct because the prosecutor was
“essentially vouching for S.J.’s credibility.” The state maintains that the prosecutor’s
remarks, while “not ideal,” were not misconduct.
While “[a] prosecutor may not personally endorse the credibility of witnesses,” they
can “argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible.” State v. Fields, 730
N.W.2d 777, 785 (Minn. 2007). “In closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to
the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and
to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584,
589 (Minn. 1996); see also State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn. 1995) (“While
the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence produced at
trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” (quotation omitted)). When
analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we consider the
argument “as a whole,” not “selected phrases and remarks.” State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d
310, 335 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was a permissible reference to
inferences that could be drawn from the evidence presented at trial. Smith, 541 N.W.2d at
589. The CornerHouse interviewer provided expert testimony about the concept of
12
“sensory details,” explaining that a victim’s description of sensory details is a specific part
of the disclosure process. The interviewer testified that, during the CornerHouse interview,
S.J. disclosed sensory details such as the salty taste of sperm in her mouth.
Further, the closing argument as a whole reflects that the prosecutor tied S.J.’s
recollection of sensory details to the credibility factor addressing a witness’s ability to
remember events, telling the jury, “I am asking you find —you believe her, find her
credible, because she lived it. She experienced it. And she talked about it with you. She
went through those details. She went through those sensory details with you.” Thus, the
prosecutor’s statements properly discuss “the credibility of witnesses in the context of the
evidence before the court and the conclusions that can be drawn from that evidence.”
Fields, 730 N.W.2d at 786; see also State v. Martin
, 773 N.W.2d 89, 106- 07 (Minn. 2009 )
(“We conclude that although the first statement was vulgar, none of these statements
constituted vouching for the witness’s credibility. Instead, the statements were inartful
attempts to argue that witnesses were credible.”). W e note as well that the district court
instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s personal opinions and base its credibility
determinations on its “common sense and . . . judgment.” See State v. Whitson, 876
N.W.2d 297, 304 (Minn. 2016) (stating “the prejudicial effect of misconduct can be cured
by proper instructions to the jury”).
Accordingly, the prosecutor’s statements about the sensory details of S.J.’s
testimony do not constitute misconduct.

13
Describing Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Beasley alleges that the prosecutor committed serious misconduct by misstating and
“attempting to reduce” the state’s burden of proof. “A prosecutor’ s misstatement of the
burden of proof is ‘highly improper’ and constitutes misconduct.” Martin, 773 N.W.2d at
105 (quoting Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 302).
During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt is not this standard that is so high.
It is the same exact standard used in any criminal case. It’s the
exact same standard you use in speeding tickets, parking
violations, all the way up to, even, last week, when our former
president was on trial. That is the exact same standard that
every case has to be proven by.

Beasley did not contemporaneously object, but, before beginning the defense
closing, requested a curative instruction on the ground that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not the standard for parking tickets. After the district court expressed uncertainty
on that point, the prosecutor explained that proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies to
parking-ticket disputes . Consequently, the district court denied Beasley’s request for a
curative instruction, concluding that no “correction” was required.
“The highest requirement of proof is in criminal cases where the guilt of the
defendant must be established ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Carpenter v. Nelson, 101
N.W.2d 918, 921 n.3 (Minn. 1960). We thus agree that the prosecutor’s description of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as “not so high” was potentially misleading. Further,
analogizing the burden of proof in a first- degree criminal-sexual-conduct case to the
standard required in parking- or speeding-tickets cases may be confusing because, as was
14
the case with the district court here, jurors might not know the burden of proof in a parking-
ticket dispute.
Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor’s description of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was misconduct, we conclude that Beasley is not entitled to a new trial
because any misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Any confusion caused
by the prosecutor’s description of the standard of proof was mitigated by the district court’s
instructions accurately defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt and instructing the jury
to disregard statements of law that differed from those given by the district court. Whitson,
876 N.W.2d at 304; see also State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. 1996)
(concluding prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during closing argument was harmless
in part because the district court properly instructed the jury on the law). And the
prosecutor referred to the jury instructions in his closing, noting that the jury “ha[d] the
definitions” of beyond a reasonable doubt which it could reference. See State v. Tate, 682
N.W.2d 169, 178-79 (Minn. App. 2004) (concluding prosecuting attorney’s misstatement
of the burden of proof was error, but was harmless because “taken as a whole, [the
statements] do not indicate that the burden of proof was shifted”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.
29, 2004). Finally, defense counsel countered the prosecutor’s argument in his closing
argument, describing proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a “heavy burden” explaining that
“[t]he fact that it’s used for every criminal charge does not lessen the weight of that burden
on the [s]tate.”
Accordingly, even if the prosecutor’s description of the burden of proof constituted
misconduct, the district court’s accurate instructions and the closing arguments of the
15
parties as a whole demonstrate that the verdict was surely unattributable to the prosecutor’s
statement and any misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Asking the Jury to Put Itself in S.J.’s Shoes

Finally, Beasley asserts that the prosecutor committed serious misconduct by urging
the jury to put themselves in S.J.’s shoes. The prosecutor told the jury to “[p]ut yourself
in [S.J.’s] shoes. Imagine what [S.J.] was going through when she went to a doctor who
specializes in child abuse pediatrics. . . . Imagine that kind of invasion into your body —
how that’s going to make you feel.” When the prosecutor began to describe the sexual-
assault examination in graphic terms, the district court interjected and told counsel to
approach. After a bench conference, the district court instructed the jury:
[Y]ou’re not to imagine what it was like to be [S.J.] or anyone.
You are not to put yourself in their shoes and look at the
evidence that way. You can use common sense, certainly, but
. . . you can’t see this case through the eyes of a witness . . . .
So disregard any argument that has suggested that you put
yourselves in [S.J.’s] shoes.

“Generally, arguments that invite the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the
victim are considered improper.” State v. Johnson, 324 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1982).
In every case, a prosecutor “must refrain from making statements that will inflame the
passions or prejudices of the jury.” State v. Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. App.
2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). And, in sexual-abuse cases in particular, we

2 Beasley argues that the prosecutor’s argument impermissibly refers to punishment, which
the jury is not allowed to consider. See State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Minn.
1999) (stating that “sentencing is not a proper consideration for the jury”). We disagree
because, while the prosecutor’s argument discusses the burden of proof, it did not refer to
punishment.
16
hold prosecutors to the highest ethical standards. See State v. Jahnke, 353 N.W.2d 606,
611 (Minn. App. 1984). Sexual-abuse cases “inescapably evoke an emotional reaction,
and any emotive appeal to jurors is likely to be highly prejudicial.” Id.
We are troubled by the prosecutor’s argument urging the jury to put themselves in
S.J.’s shoes as she was undergoing a child sexual-assault examination and agree that, in
making that argument , the prosecutor committed misconduct. But we conclude that
Beasley is not entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor’s statement was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. We reach this conclusion for three reasons.
First, by stopping the prosecutor’s argument and instructing the jury to disregard
any suggestion that it put itself in S.J.’s shoes, the district court mitigated any prejudicial
effect of the misconduct. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d at 304. “Courts presume that juries follow
the instructions they are given.” State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1998).
Second, because of the district court’s prompt intervention, the prosecutor’s improper
comments were not repeated or pervasive. And third, the state’s evidence against Beasley
was strong. S.J. provided detailed testimony about the sexual abuse that was largely
consistent with her prior statements to the police and the CornerHouse interviewer.
Therefore, the misconduct wa s harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury
verdict was “surely unattributable to the error.” Hunt, 615 N.W.2d at 302.

17
III. The district court erred by listing convictions for both counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct on the warrant of commitment.

Beasley argues, alternatively, that the warrant of commitment incorrectly lists
convictions for both counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The state agrees that
we should reverse and remand to correct the warrant of commitment. We also agree.
Minnesota law provides that, “[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be
convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.04, subd. 1 (2024). Minnesota courts have interpreted Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1,
to mean that “a defendant may not be convicted of two counts of criminal sexual conduct
(different sections of the statute or different subsections) on the basis of the same act or
unitary course of conduct.” State v. Folley, 438 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. 1989). Courts
may correct clerical errors in the warrant of commitment at any time. Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 10.
The jury found Beasley guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a), (g). At sentencing, the district court adjudicated Beasley
guilty on count one and sentenced him to an executed sentence of 168 months in prison.
Consistent with the law, the district court did not enter a conviction on count two. Contrary
to the court’s oral pronouncement, however, the warrant of commitment lists convictions
for both counts one and two. Generally, appellate courts “look to the official judgment of
conviction in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been
formally adjudicated.” Spann v. State , 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotation
omitted). But when a district court’s orally pronounced sentence differs from the warrant
18
of commitment, the oral pronouncement controls. State v. Statloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 331
(Minn. App. 2002). Because the warrant of commitment erroneously states that Beasley
was convicted of count two, we reverse and remand to the district court to correct the
warrant of commitment so it reflects a conviction on count one only.
IV. Beasley is not entitled to relief on the arguments raised in his pro se brief.

In a pro se supplemental brief, Beasley asserts various challenges to the testimony
of S.J., the CornerHouse interviewer, and other witnesses. On appeal, we defer to the jury’s
credibility determinations and do not reweigh the evidence. State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d
68, 72-73 (Minn. 2009). And while “some accommodations may be made for pro se
litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the
same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald,
629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). “Claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are
unsupported by either arguments or citation to legal authority are forfeited.” State v.
Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “Such arguments will
not [be] considered unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Id. at 650-51.
Beasley’s claims of error are forfeited because they are unsupported by either legal
arguments or citation to legal authority and because prejudicial error is not obvious on mere
inspection. See id. We therefore do not address them.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.