State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1669

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Djamil Vagif Abiyev,
Appellant.

Filed August 11, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-VB-24-7306

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Margaret Neuville, Eden Prairie City Attorney, Steven M. Tallen, Assistant City Attorney,
Gregerson, Rosow, Johnson & Nilan, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Christopher X. Nguyen, Aberrant Law, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Djamil Vagif Abiyev challenges the final disposition of a petty-
misdemeanor speeding violation. Abiyev asserts: (1) insufficient evidence supports the
2
guilty verdict; (2) evidentiary errors occurred at trial; and (3) his constitutional rights were
violated. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 11, 2024, an officer issued Abiyev a citation for driving 54 miles per
hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone, under Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a) (2022). The district
court held a bench trial for the citation in September 2024. Prior to trial, Abiyev filed a
motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Crim. P. 30.02 1 on the basis that respondent State of
Minnesota failed to serve Abiyev’s counsel with discovery.2 The state, after looking at its
records, determined that it accidently sent the discovery materials to Abiyev directly,
instead of Abiyev’s counsel. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and, instead,
offered to grant a continuance to allow Abiyev’s counsel to review the discovery
materials.3 But Abiyev’s counsel declined the continuance and said he was “comfortable
. . . proceeding.” The district court then sought additional confirmation that Abiyev’s
counsel wanted to proceed without viewing the discovery materials, and Abiyev’s counsel
again said that he “would ask to proceed.”4

1 Under this rule, “[t]he court may dismiss the complaint, indictment, or tab charge if the
prosecutor has unnecessarily delayed bringing the defendant to trial.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 30.02.
2 Abiyev’s counsel also asked to waive Abiyev’s appearance pursuant to Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.03, subd. 1(3), which the district court granted.
3 The state supported the continuance and alternatively offered to allow Abiyev’s counsel
to review the discovery materials in the courtroom at that moment. The district court
determined the latter option was not “very fair” because Abiyev was not at the hearing “so
[Abiyev’s counsel could not] look at the stuff and discuss it with [Abiyev].”
4 The state specified that the discovery materials included the officer’s body-camera
footage, the squad-camera footage, the handheld speed- detecting laser device (LiDAR )
testing log, the LiDAR certificates of accuracy, and a copy of the citation.
3
During the bench trial, the state called one witness—the officer who issued Abiyev’s
citation. The officer testified that he had been in law enforcement for nearly 26 years. The
officer had “been trained and tested in visual estimations of speed.” He was first trained
at Mankato State University and practiced visual estimations “on a daily basis,” finding his
“estimates [were] reasonably accurate . . . within-a-five-mile-an -hour window.” The
officer was also “trained and authorized . . . to run speed detecting radar and laser devices.”
The officer then explained that he was on duty on January 11, 2024, and offered
testimony regarding the LiDAR he was using that day. At the beginning of his shift, the
officer “perform[ed] external and internal calibration checks” to ensure the LiDAR was
working properly. The officer explained that the LiDAR did “an internal calibration
check” when he powered it on at the beginning of his shift, which “came up as a pass,”
meaning the circuitry “was working properly.” The officer then completed “external
calibration checks.” This included a “distance test” that “indicate[d] that the range finder
[was] working properly” and a “reticle test” that confirmed the LiDAR’s “crosshair[s]”
were “aimed properly” when “looking through the viewfinder.” The officer testified that
he also performed these tests at the end of his shift and completed an additional “internal
calibration check” during the middle of his shift. All the tests indicated that the LiDAR
functioned properly during the officer’s entire shift.
To support the officer’s testimony regarding the performance of the LiDAR on
January 11, 2024, the state introduced two “certificate[s] of accuracy” (collectively, the
LiDAR certificates), one dated May 16, 2023 (first certificate), and the other dated June 26,
2024 (second certificate). The officer testified that the LiDAR certificates are “kept in the
4
normal course of business” and reflect testing completed by “an outside company ” that
certifies the LiDAR “once a year.” The officer also noted that this particular LiDAR device
had been dropped, causing the display screen to crack. So, the police department “had to
send it out for repair. And the company that does repairs then recertifie[d] it.” Abiyev
objected to the state introducing the LiDAR certificates, and the district court received the
exhibits over his objection.
The officer then testified regarding the events that resulted in Abiyev receiving a
speeding citation. The officer testified that he stopped his vehicle at a crossroad for less
than ten seconds. While stopped, he observed two vehicles approaching his squad car; the
front vehicle “was going faster than the rear one” at a visual estimate of “[a]t least 50 miles
per hour” in the 35 mile-per-hour zone. The officer then used the LiDAR to obtain multiple
consecutive readings of the front vehicle’s speed. The officer testified that he was “certain”
the readings reflected the front vehicle’s speed. The readings showed two 54 mile-per -
hour readings and one 53 mile-per-hour reading as the front vehicle approached the squad
car. Thereafter, the officer initiated a traffic stop and identified the driver of the front
vehicle as Abiyev. Abiyev told the officer he thought he was going “45 or less,” and the
officer issued the speeding citation.
Following the officer’s testimony, Abiyev declined to put anything additional into
the record and moved for a judgment of acquittal, raising questions about the officer’s
training on the LiDAR equipment, the LiDAR certificates , and the officer’s testimony
about the LiDAR’s final speed reading based on the “standards of evidence.” The district
5
court found Abiyev’s arguments unpersuasive. 5 Then, considering all the evidence, the
district court explicitly found the officer’s testimony credible, determined the state proved
Abiyev’s guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and issued Abiyev a “standard fine” of $138
($60 fine plus $78 surcharge).
Abiyev appeals.
DECISION
On direct appeal, Abiyev challenges his conviction on numerous grounds. Broadly,
Abiyev argues: (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction; (2) multiple evidentiary
errors occurred; and (3) his constitutional rights were violated. We address each category
of challenges in turn below.
I.
Abiyev first argues the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty
verdict. To prove Abiyev’s guilt for petty-misdemeanor speeding, the state must prove
that (1) Abiyev drove a vehicle in an area where there was a posted speed limit and (2) the
speed of Abiyev’s vehicle exceeded the posted speed limit. See Minn. Stat. § 169.14,
subd. 2(a). Here, Abiyev only challenges the second element.
We must first determine whether the state used direct or circumstantial evidence to
prove the second element. See State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). Direct
evidence is “based on personal knowledge or observation and . . . if true, proves a fact
without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017)

5 The district court did not specifically rule on Abiyev’s motion.
6
(quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can
infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the state relied on direct evidence—the officer’s personal knowledge and
observation—to prove the second element. Thus, we apply “the traditional standard for
evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn.
2024). To do so, we “carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the
legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [factfinder] to reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt .” State v. Griffin,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). When applying the “traditional
standard,” we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we assume
the factfinder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. State
v. Olson, 982 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn. App. 2022).
We conclude the direct evidence is sufficient to support that Abiyev was driving at
a speed that exceeded the posted 35 mile-per-hour speed limit. The officer visually
estimated that Abiyev’s vehicle was traveling at least 50 miles per hour. The LiDAR
detected Abiyev’s vehicle’s speed twice at 54 miles per hour and once at 53 miles per hour.
And Abiyev admitted to the officer that he was going “45 or less.”
Abiyev’s argument to the contrary focuses on the officer’s LiDAR training and the
LiDAR results. We are unpersuaded for two reasons. First, the district court specifically
found the officer’s testimony regarding the LiDAR credible, and we defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations. State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009); State
v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002). Second, even if we exclude the
7
LiDAR evidence, there is still sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Abiyev’s
vehicle’s speed exceeded the posted 35 mile-per-hour speed limit because the officer
testified that he visually estimated Abiyev’s speed at 50 miles per hour, which the district
court found credible, and Abiyev admitted to the officer that he was going “45 or less.”
We conclude the state presented sufficient direct evidence to support Abiyev’s guilt.
II.
Abiyev next argues the district court made a number of evidentiary errors that entitle
him to a new trial. Specifically, Abiyev argues the district court erroneously admitted the
officer’s LiDAR testimony and the LiDAR certificates and that the cumulative evidentiary
errors warrant reversal and remand for a new trial. We address each argument in turn.
A. Officer Testimony
Abiyev first argues the district court erroneously admitted the officer’s LiDAR
testimony because it lacked foundation. Abiyev did not object to the officer’s testimony
at trial, so we review this issue for plain error. See State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804
(Minn. 2016). To meet the plain-error standard, Abiyev must show that “(1) there was an
error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”
Id. (citing State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). Even when a defendant
satisfies these prongs, we will not exercise our discretion to grant relief unless the “failure
to do so will cause the public to seriously question the fairness and integrity of our judicial
system.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 359 (Minn. 2022).
Under Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 10(a) (2024), evidence of the speed of a motor
vehicle measured by a LiDAR device is admissible when
8
(1) the officer or traffic enforcement agent under
section 169.147 operating the device has sufficient training to
properly operate the equipment;
(2) the officer or traffic enforcement agent testifies as to
the manner in which the device was set up and operated;
(3) the device was operated with minimal distortion or
interference from outside sources; and
(4) the device was tested by an accurate and reliable
external mechanism, method, or system at the time it was set
up.
6

See also State v. Ali, 679 N.W.2d 359, 365 (Minn. App. 2004) (concluding that “existing
caselaw concerning the admissibility of radar evidence is analogous” for determining
“admissibility of evidence from a laser-based speed-measuring device”).
We conclude the district court did not plainly err when it allowed the officer’s
LiDAR testimony. “An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is typically established
if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894
N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Here, the record shows the officer
testified to all four elements required to establish foundation. Therefore, it was not an
error, let alone a plain error, for the district court to allow the officer to testify regarding
the LiDAR’s speed measurement. See Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 10(a); see also State v.
Ojo, No. A19- 2070, 2020 WL 4578984, at *2 (Minn. App. Aug. 10, 2020) (reaching a
similar conclusion).7

6 “[F]or purposes of applying the plain- error doctrine the court examines the law in
existence at the time of appellate review, not the law in existence at the time of the district
court’s error, to determine whether an error is plain.” State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269,
277 (Minn. 2014).
7 We note this opinion is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. To the extent we cite
nonprecedential opinions, we do so only for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
9
B. LiDAR Certificates
Abiyev next raises a number of evidentiary challenges to the admission of the
LiDAR certificates. Specifically, he argues the LiDAR certificates were irrelevant, lacked
foundation, and were inadmissible hearsay. Because Abiyev objected to the admission of
the LiDAR certificates, we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See State v.
Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
Beginning with relevancy, Abiyev argues the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted the LiDAR certificates because “there is no nexus of time between the
certification[s] of the device and the date of Abiyev’s alleged offense.”8 Under Minn. R.
Evid. 401, “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The supreme court has
explained that
[t]he threshold determination of relevance turns on whether the
evidence logically or reasonably tends to prove or disprove a
material fact in issue, or tends to make such a fact more or less
probable, or affords the basis for or supports a reasonable

8 At trial, Abiyev did not raise a relevancy objection to the first certificate, thus, plain-error
review applies to that specific argument on appeal. See State v. Martens, 18 N.W.3d 752,
757 (Minn. 2025) (“If a defendant does object to the admission of evidence, such an
objection preserves review only for the stated basis for the objection . . . .” (quotation
omitted)). But because Abiyev objected to the relevancy of the second certificate, and we
would reach the same outcome under either standard, we analyze the claim under the abuse-
of-discretion standard.
10
inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material
fact.

State v. Horning, 535 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Minn. 1995).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the LiDAR
certificates were relevant. The documents were presented to support the state’s case that
the LiDAR was working properly and accurately on January 11, 2024. And the officer
testified that these tests occur annually, which accounts for the dates on the LiDAR
certificates.
Moving to foundation, Abiyev argues the district court abused its discretion when
it allowed the officer to lay the foundation for the LiDAR certificates. Under Minn. Stat.
§ 169.14, subd. 10(b) (2024), “[r]ecords of tests made of such devices and kept in the
regular course of operations of any law enforcement agency are admissible in evidence
without further foundation as to the results of the tests.”
Again, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed
the officer to lay the foundation for the admission of the LiDAR certificates. As the statute
requires, the officer testified that the LiDAR certificates were “kept in the normal course
of business,” which was sufficient to lay the appropriate foundation. See Minn. Stat.
§ 169.14, subd. 10(b); see also Ojo , 2020 WL 4578984, at *1 -2; State v. Anderson, No.
A07-2245, 2009 WL 173155, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 27, 2009).
Finally, Abiyev argues the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the
LiDAR certificates because they contain inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, Abiyev
asserts that the business-records exception to the hearsay rule does not apply. “‘Hearsay’
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is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Minn. R. Evid. 801(c).
Hearsay is not admissible unless it falls into an exception. Minn. R. Evid. 802. One
exception is for records “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.”
Minn. R. Evid. 803(6).
As discussed above, Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 10(b), specifically contemplates
that when records like the LiDAR certificates are “kept in the regular course of operations
of any law enforcement agency” they “are admissible in evidence without further
foundation as to the results of the tests.’” In Ali, we concluded that a “district court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting [a] Certificate of Testing and Accuracy into evidence
under the business-records exception where the record demonstrate[d] that the certificate
was reliable and was not prepared solely for litigation purposes.” 679 N.W.2d at 361.
Here, the officer testified that the LiDAR certificates were created annually and kept in the
regular course of business to ensure the LiDAR was working properly. Under our existing
caselaw, this testimony was sufficient to allow the ad mission of the LiDAR certificates
under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule. See id.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted the LiDAR certificates.

C. Cumulative Error
Finally, Abiyev argues that cumulative evidentiary errors warrant reversal and
remand for a new trial. Because we conclude the district court did not commit any
12
evidentiary errors, there is no cumulative error. See State v. Williams, 908 N.W.2d 362,
366 (Minn. 2018).
III.
Abiyev finally raises two constitutional challenges. First, he argues the district
court’s decision to admit the LiDAR certificates violated the Confrontation Clause.
Second, he argues the state violated the Due Process Clause when it failed to disclose that
the LiDAR device used to calculate Abiyev’s speed had been broken. We review these
issues de novo. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Minn. 2006) (Confrontation
Clause); Walen v. State, 777 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Minn. 2010) (Due Process Clause).
A. Confrontation Clause
Abiyev asserts that the admission of the LiDAR certificates violated the
Confrontation Clause. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court “determined that testimonial hearsay
statements, absent a prior opportunity to cross-examine, are barred by the Confrontation
Clause.” State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. App. 2018) (citing Crawford, 541
U.S. at 68-69), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018). There are three general forms of
“testimonial hearsay: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent; extrajudicial
statements; and ‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.’” Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52). “[T]he critical determinative factor
13
in assessing whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation.”
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309.
As Abiyev acknowledges, we have binding caselaw that concludes admitting laser-
device certificates of accuracy does not violate the Confrontation Clause. In Ali, the
appellant disputed the admissibility of a testing and accuracy certificate for a laser device
used to determine the appellant’s speed. 679 N.W.2d at 366. We held that admitting the
certificate into evidence did not violate the Confrontation Clause because “it was not
offered to prove an essential element of the crime or to directly connect [the] appellant to
the commission of the crime.” Id. at 367. Rather, we determined that “the certification
document was admitted only as collateral evidence of the reliability of the tests performed
by [the officer],” and was properly admitted under the business-records exception. Id.
Here, the facts are similar to Ali, and Abiyev is contesting the LiDAR certificates
on the same ground. See id. at 366-67. Consistent with Ali, we conclude that the LiDAR
certificates are business records created to reflect the calibration of the LiDAR, not
testimonial evidence offered to prove Abiyev’s guilt. Therefore, the admission of the
LiDAR certificates did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
B. Due Process Clause
Finally, Abiyev asserts the state violated the Due Process Clause when it failed to
disclose that the LiDAR device used to calculate Abiyev’s speed had been broken. In
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that
prosecutorial suppression “of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” The prosecutor’s
14
failure to provide this information, whether intentional or not, is called a Brady violation.
Walen, 777 N.W.2d at 216. To establish a Brady violation
(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it
would have been either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the
evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution,
intentionally or otherwise; and (3) the evidence must be
material—in other words, the absence of the evidence must
have caused prejudice to the defendant.

Id. If all three elements are met and a Brady violation is found, a new trial is warranted.
See Pederson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2005) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
Here, we conclude the evidence that the LiDAR used to calculate Abiyev’s speed
had been broken at some point was not material. The officer’s testimony suggests that the
LiDAR was dropped after Abiyev received the speeding citation, and the LiDAR was then
sent out for repair. The officer indicated this was the reason for the June 2024 date on the
second certificate. There is no indication in the record that the device was broken on
January 11, 2024 —the date of Abiyev’s citation. Instead, all the evidence in the record
indicates the LiDAR was working properly on that date. Therefore, the fact that the LiDAR
had been broken sometime between mid-January and June 2024 was not material, and the
prosecutor’s failure to disclose the information was not a Brady violation. See Walen, 777
N.W.2d at 216. Accordingly, we conclude the state did not violate Abiyev’s right to due
process.
Affirmed.