A25-0125

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1671
A25-0125

Shawnae Feltus,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Niemala, et al.,
Appellants,

and

RE/MAX Thousand Lakes,
Third-Party Defendant.

Filed August 25, 2025
Affirmed; motions granted in part and denied in part
Johnson, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-CV-19-3246

Erik J. Honkanen, Honkanen Law Firm, S.C., Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Miles John Ringsred, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Johnson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
This case concerns a sale of residential property that occurred more than a decade
ago. The buyer sued the seller to enforce a provision in the purchase agreement that
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required the seller to provide marketable title. During trial, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement, which was stated orally on the record and later embodied in a court
order. The seller agreed “to do whatever is needed to transfer marketable title of the real
property” within 90 days. Eleven months later, the district court found that the seller had
not yet delivered marketable title, found the seller in constructive civil contempt, ordered
the seller to initiate a quiet-title action within 45 days to resolve specified title defects, and
awarded the buyer approximately $6,000 for the attorney fees and expenses incurred in
bringing the contempt motion. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2011, Jeffrey Niemala purchased a lot with a mobile home in Itasca County. In
June 2013, he sold the property to Shawnae Feltus on a contract for deed for $49,000, with
the final payment due in 2023. In the purchase agreement, Niemala agreed to use his “best
efforts to provide marketable title” by the closing date in January 2014 or within 30 days
thereafter. In an addendum to a recorded deed dated February 2014, Niemala and his wife,
Linda Niemala, agreed to “take the necessary action required to remove the title objection
on the property for any interest claimed by” certain former owners by December 2019.
In October 2019, Jeffrey Niemala gave Feltus notice of cancellation of the contract
for deed. In November 2019, Feltus commenced this action against the Niemalas. She
asserted numerous claims and requested, among other things, an order declaring that she is
the owner of a fee- simple estate in the property and an order requiring the Niemalas to
provide her with marketable title. In June 2021, the district court granted Feltus’s motion
for partial summary judgment and denied the Niemalas’ motion for summary judgment.
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This court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. Feltus
v. Niemala, No. A22-0673, 2023 WL 125337, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 9, 2023).
The case went to trial in September 2023. During the second day of trial, the parties
reached a settlement agreement, which was stated orally on the record. In November 2023,
the district court filed an order that restated two provisions of the settlement agreement as
follows:
Defendants, Jeffrey Niemala and Linda Niemala, agree
to do whatever is needed to transfer marketable title of the real
property, which is the subject of this lawsuit, and also to deliver
title of the mobile home located on the property within 90 days
from September 13, 2023. Such work needed to accomplish
this includes, but is not limited to, contacting the Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in an attempt to obtain title for the
mobile home and/or initiating a declaratory judgment action, if
needed, for purposes of obtaining the title to the mobile home.

The parties agree for the Court to retain jurisdiction for
postjudgment issues, which are contemplated to be an Order to
Show Cause in the event there is a failure to comply with the
terms of the agreement and the order of the Court approving
the agreement. Relief in the Order to Show Cause may include
fees, costs, and attorney’s fees.

In December 2023, the Niemalas’ attorney provided Feltus’s attorney with a title-
insurance company’s commitment to insure the title for only $10,000. The title
commitment states that title purportedly was conveyed to Jeffrey Niemala by the widow of
one of the former owners of the property but that the deceased former owner’s interest
“will have to be terminated by an appropriate probate proceeding or by a quiet-title action
resulting in title being transferred to Jeffrey R. Niemala. ” In January 2024, Feltus’s
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attorney consulted with a title company, which identified additional title defects. Feltus’s
attorney communicated these concerns to the Niemalas’ attorney in February 2024.
In March 2024, Feltus filed a motion for an order to show cause why the Niemalas
should not be held in contempt. While the motion was pending, the Niemalas consulted
with a title company, which reviewed Feltus ’s evidence and agreed that additional steps
were necessary to deliver marketable title.
In May 2024, the district court held a hearing on Feltus’s contempt motion. The
Niemalas argued that they had been acting diligently and in good faith to deliver
marketable title and that Feltus had not identified the steps necessary to make title
marketable. In August 2024, t he district court issued an order finding the Niemalas in
contempt because they had “failed to do whatever is needed to transfer marketable title to
[Feltus] within 90 days of September 13, 2023.” The district court awarded Feltus attorney
fees and expenses totaling $6,295.50. The Niemalas appeal.
DECISION
I. Finding of Contempt
The Niemalas’ primary argument is that the district court erred by finding them in
contempt. We construe this argument to have five parts, which we address in turn. We
apply an abuse-of- discretion standard of review to the district court’s contempt order.
Sehlstrom v. Sehlstrom, 925 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Minn. 2019).
A.
The Niemalas argue that the district court’s November 2023 order did not “clearly
define the acts to be performed.” A district court may find a person in contempt only if a
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“decree of the court clearly defined the acts to be performed.” Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d
212, 216 (Minn. 1968). If a contempt motion is based on a settlement agreement, the
specific terms of the agreement must have been stated in a court order; it is insufficient if
a court issued an order that “merely acknowledged that the parties have settled their
pending lawsuit by an order of approval without imposing any express commands or
prohibitions upon” the parties. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. Sandquist Steaks, Inc., 245 N.W.2d 837,
838-39 (Minn. 1976).
The district court’s November 2023 order required the Niemalas “to do whatever is
needed to transfer marketable title.” The Niemalas contend that “this language is
impermissibly vague, as it fails to identify the specific actions required.” In its August
2024 order, the district court stated that the requirement of delivering marketable title “has
been the same since” the parties’ purchase agreement in 2013. Indeed, the court’s
November 2023 order simply restates the Niemalas’ contractual promise in the purchase
agreement (to deliver marketable title by not later than 30 days after closing) and their
subsequent contractual promise in an addendum to the recorded deed (to “take the
necessary action required to remove the title objection on the property for any interest
claimed by” the former owners by December 2019). The district court also reasoned that
the term “marketable title” is a fixed, objective concept. The district court cited Mattson
Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Title, LLP, 824 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 2012), in which the supreme
court explained that the term “has a well-defined and well-understood meaning,” which is
title “that is free from reasonable doubt; one that a prudent person, with full knowledge of
all the facts, would be willing to accept.” Id. at 628 (quotation omitted). Given the caselaw
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defining marketable title, the contractual promises made by the Niemalas, and the terms of
the district court’s November 2023 order, we conclude that the acts necessary to avoid a
contempt finding were clearly defined.
B.
The Niemalas argue that the district court erred by allowing Feltus to change the
terms of the settlement agreement by adding requirements. This argument
mischaracterizes the district court’s contempt order. Throughout this case, Feltus has
sought to enforce the Niemalas’ promises to deliver marketable title. After the November
2023 order, the parties’ attorneys discussed specific issues related to marketable title. That
process led to the identification of specific title defects. The district court agreed with
Feltus that the Niemalas must cure those defects to deliver marketable title. The district
court did not change the terms of the settlement agreement; t he district court merely
enforced the promises made by the Niemalas in the purchase agreement, the addendum to
the deed, and the settlement agreement.
C.
The Niemalas argue that the district court’s November 2023 order did not give them
a reasonable time in which to comply with the order. See Hopp, 156 N.W.2d at 216. The
district court’s November 2023 order specified that the Niemalas had 90 days to deliver
marketable title because that was the agreement of the parties. Furthermore, the Niemalas
still had not delivered marketable title at the time of the contempt hearing, which was held
eight months after the settlement agreement was reached. Thus, the district court’s
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November 2023 order gave the Niemalas a reasonable amount of time in which to deliver
marketable title.
D.
The Niemalas argue that the district court erred by finding them in contempt without
finding that they engaged in “bad faith, disrespect, or intentional disobedience.” They rely
on Minnesota State Bar Association v. Divorce Assistance Ass ociation, Inc., 248 N.W.2d
733 (Minn. 1976) (MSBA), in which the supreme court stated that a district court may
impose a contempt sanction “only where the alleged contemnor has acted contumaciously,
in bad faith, and out of disrespect for the judicial process.” Id. at 740. But the supreme
court has stated that the contempt power gives a district court “inherently broad discretion
to hold an individual in contempt.” Erickson v. Erickson , 385 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Minn.
1986). Furthermore, t he supreme court has stated that, in a contempt proceeding, “the
function of the court is to make the rights of one individual as against another meaningful”
and that, “[i]f the duty is one specifically defined by a proper decree of the court, it must
be free to compel performance by methods which are speedy, efficient, and sufficiently
flexible to meet the problem at hand.” Hopp, 156 N.W.2d at 216.
The Niemalas contend that they immediately took steps to comply with the
November 2023 order and acted in good faith to resolve title issues but encountered various
obstacles and delays. In contrast, Feltus contends that the Niemalas did not take timely
and appropriate action, such as consulting with a qualified title expert. The evidentiary
record on this issue is mixed. The Niemalas took some steps toward delivering marketable
title but did not accomplish that goal by the agreed -upon deadline. The district court
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focused on the Niemalas’ failure to consult a title expert before the 90-day deadline. The
record shows that, a few weeks after the 90-day deadline, a title company sent the Niemalas
a title commitment and stated that “title is clear.” The Niemalas’ attorney promptly shared
that communication with Feltus’s attorney. The attorneys proceeded to exchange messages
concerning title insurance and a notice of lis pendens. On February 22, 2024, Feltus’s
attorney informed the Niemalas’ attorney that the title commitment was inadequate and
identified specific title defects and the specific actions necessary to resolve the defects.
The record is devoid of evidence that the Niemalas took any of the specified actions before
Feltus filed the contempt motion on March 22, 2024, or before the May 2024 hearing on
the contempt motion.
In these circumstances, the district court’s authority “to make [Feltus’s] rights . . .
meaningful” by enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement and the November 2023 order
is broad enough “to compel performance by methods which are speedy, efficient, and
sufficiently flexible to meet the problem at hand.” See id. Given the circumstances, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the Niemalas in contempt.
E.
The Niemalas argue that the district court erred on the ground that alternative
remedies were available. The Niemalas cite Sehlstrom, in which the supreme court held
that a writ of execution could have been used to enforce a money judgment arising from a
settlement agreement. 925 N.W.2d at 239-40. But the Niemalas’ obligation is not a money
judgment, so a writ of execution was not and is not available. The Niemalas do not contend
that contempt is an unlawful remedy. They contend that Feltus could have commenced a
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new action alleging a breach of contract and seeking specific performance. But a motion
for an order to show cause was expressly contemplated by the parties’ settlement
agreement. The Niemalas’ trial attorney agreed to that procedure on the record during trial,
and the district court reiterated the availability of the procedure in its November 2023 order.
Thus, the district court did not err on the ground that an alternative remedy would have
been more appropriate.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding the Niemalas in
contempt. In reaching that conclusion, we are mindful of the consequences of the district
court’s contempt order. The district court did not penalize the Niemalas for their failure to
timely deliver marketable title. The district court merely reiterated that the Niemalas must
do what they repeatedly have promised to do so that Feltus may receive marketable title.
Thus, the district court did not err by finding the Niemalas in contempt.
II. Fees and Expenses
The Niemalas also argue that the district court erred by awarding Feltus the attorney
fees and expenses she incurred in bringing the contempt motion.
If a party suffers “actual loss or injury” due to another party’s contempt, a district
court may order the contemnor “to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to
indemnify the party and satisfy the party’s costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee incurred in the prosecution of such contempt.” Minn. Stat. § 588.11 (2024).
This statute authorizes an award of attorney fees and related expenses that were “incurred
in the prosecution of the contempt.” Hanson v. Thom, 636 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Minn. App.
2001) (quotation omitted); see also D.D. Wozniak & Cynthia L. Lehr, Dealing with a
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Double-Edged Sword: A Practical Guide to Contempt Law in Minnesota, 18 Wm. Mitchell
L. Rev. 7, 17 (1992) (stating that “contemnor may be liable to the party for costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorney fees”).
The Niemalas first challenge the award on the ground that the contempt order is
invalid. See S ehlstrom, 925 N.W.2d at 239-40 (reversing award under section 588.11
because contempt finding was reversed). That argument is without merit because we have
concluded that the district court did not err by finding the Niemalas in contempt. See supra
part I.
In the alternative, the Niemalas challenge the award by arguing that Feltus should
be responsible for the fees and expenses incurred in investigating and analyzing title issues.
The Niemalas contend that, in real-estate transactions generally, “the seller bears the initial
burden of demonstrating marketable title, but the buyer is responsible for any further
investigation beyond that initial proffer.” But Feltus’s attorney fees and expenses were
incurred in litigation, not for purposes of a real -estate transaction. After the Niemalas
failed to meet the 90- day deadline, Feltus’s attorney consulted with a title expert, who
identified title defects and specified the actions necessary to resolve the defects. In
connection with the contempt motion, Feltus obtained and submitted an affidavit of a title
expert to prove that the Niemalas had not delivered marketable title. The record reflects
that the expert did not execute the affidavit until it was needed for “the prosecution of the
contempt.” See Hanson, 636 N.W.2d at 594. The title expert’s fee was $750, which is not
excessive.
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Thus, the district court did not err by granting Feltus’s request for reimbursement of
the attorney fees and expenses she incurred in bringing the contempt motion.
III. Motions on Appeal
Before concluding, we must address three motions that are pending in this court.
First, Feltus asks this court to take judicial notice of a probate proceeding
concerning the former owner of the property. See Minn. R. Evid. 201. “The documents
filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall
constitute the record on appeal in all cases.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. We sometimes
will take judicial notice on appeal. See, e.g. , In re Calm Waters Cannabis Co., ____
N.W.3d ____, ____, 2025 WL 1550827, *5 n.8 (Minn. App. June 2, 2025); Smisek v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 400 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. App. 1987). But in this case,
Feltus asks us to take judicial notice of proceedings that occurred after the district court
filed its August 2024 contempt order. The probate-court proceedings are irrelevant to the
question whether the district court erred in its contempt order. Thus, we deny Feltus’s
motion for judicial notice.
Second, the Niemalas ask this court to strike Feltus’s responsive brief on the ground
that she relied, in part, on information that is not in the record. We agree that portions of
Feltus’s responsive brief refer to information that is not in the record. This court may
selectively disregard and strike improper references to facts that are not in the record without
striking an entire brief. AFSCME, Council No. 14 v. County of Scott, 530 N.W.2d 218, 222-
23 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 16 & June 14, 1995). Thus, we grant in part
and deny in part the Niemalas’ motion to strike. Specifically, we strike the following portions
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of Feltus’s responsive brief: (1) the second sentence of the first full paragraph on page 16,
(2) the paragraph that wraps from page 16 to page 17, (3) the last clause of the last sentence
of the paragraph that wraps from page 17 to page 18, and (4) the first sentence of the second
paragraph on page 18.
Third, the Niemalas ask this court for leave to supplement the record in response to
Feltus’s improper references to facts that are not in the record . Supplementation is
unnecessary because we have struck from Feltus’s brief all information that is not in the
record. Thus, we deny the Niemalas’ motion to supplement the record.
Affirmed; motions granted in part and denied in part.