State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1675

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tyrel Traverse Ambuehl,
Appellant.

Filed September 2, 2025
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Becker County District Court
File No. 03-CR-24-367

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree assault with a dangerous
weapon, arguing that (1) the district court committed plain error by admitting inadmissible
character and other-act evidence, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by using
inflammatory language and misstating the law, and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors
denied him a fair trial. Appellant raises several additional claims in a pro se supplemental
brief. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tyrel Traverse Ambuehl with
second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222,
subd. 1 (2022), and felony domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd.
4 (2022). Ambuehl and the victim, C.L., were romantic partners.
Before trial, the state moved to admit body- camera video of Ambuehl’s arrest, as
well as testimony “show[ing] the strained relationship between [Ambuehl] and [C.L.], to
give proper context to the charges stemming from th[e] incident, and to demonstrate
[Ambuehl]’s intent and/or lack of mistake.” Ambuehl did not object.
The state’s witnesses included C.L., the 911 operator who took C.L.’s call, and the
responding officer. C.L. testified that on March 4, 2024, Ambuehl confronted her about a
video he found on her cell phone. During the argument that followed, Ambuehl struck
C.L. with an aluminum baseball bat, knocked her to the floor, and continued assaulting her.
C.L. reported the assault the following morning. The 911 operator testified that on March
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5, 2024, C.L. called and reported that she had a “rough night” the night prior. She stated
that she was at her mother’s house, that Ambuehl was sitting in her car, and that she needed
to have him removed. The responding officer testified that he took C.L.’s statement and
observed an “elongated bruise,” that extended “from [C.L.’s] bicep to [the] back of her
shoulder.” The bruise was “dark purple, reddish in color,” and “in the shape of a baseball
bat.” The state played the officer’s body-camera video for the jury. Ambuehl did not
object to the video or the testimony.
At the close of evidence, the district court provided the jury the following
instruction:
You have heard evidence of alleged conduct by the defendant
on a prior occasion or occasions other than March 4, 2024. As
I told you at the time this evidence was offered, it was admitted
for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent
of the relationship between the defendant and [C.L.] in
order . . . to assist you in determining whether the defendant
committed those acts with which [the defendant] is charged in
the complaint. This evidence is not to be used to prove the
character of the defendant or that the defendant acted in
conformity with such character.

The jury found Ambuehl guilty on both counts. The district court imposed a 71-
month sentence for the second-degree assault conviction and imposed no sentence for the
domestic-assault conviction. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Judicial Plain Error
Ambuehl argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting approximately 30
statements from witness testimony and the body-camera video that, he contends, were
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inadmissible character and other-act s evidence. The state argues that most of the
challenged statements are admissible as relationship evidence, and that any inadmissible
statements were harmless. Because Ambuehl did not object to the challenged statements
at trial, we review his claims for plain error.
To establish reversible error under the plain -error test, an appellant must show
“(1) an error (2) that is plain (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”
State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 655 (Minn. 2023). “An error is plain if it is clear or
obvious, which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a
standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). If an appellant satisfies all three prongs of the plain-error test, we may correct
the error “only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001) (quotation
omitted).
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 provides that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct
by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household
members, is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” “Domestic conduct” under the statute “includes, but is not
limited to, evidence of domestic abuse” as defined by Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)
(2022). Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2022). Under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a), “[d]omestic
abuse” includes “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” or “the infliction of fear of
imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” committed against a family or
household member.
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“Relationship evidence is relevant because it illuminate[s] the history of the
relationship between the victim and defendant and may also help prove motive or assist the
jury in assessing witness credibility.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted). The supreme court has said that evidence of prior “acts of
violence committed by the same defendant against the same victim” has “inherent
[probative] value.” State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. 1999). We also
recognize the probative value of relationship evidence that illustrates a victim’s fear of the
defendant or the defendant’s past attempts to “manipulate, control, and restrain” a victim.
State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). And evidence showing “how
a defendant treats his family or household members, such as his former spouses or other
girlfriends,” is relevant because it “suggests how the defendant may interact with the
victim.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010) , rev. denied (Minn.
Nov. 16, 2010).
We conclude that most of the statements that Ambuehl challenges on appeal are
admissible relationship evidence under section 634.20. Before turning to the statements
that we conclude are not admissible as relationship evidence, we briefly address several
arguments raised by Ambuehl.
Ambuehl argues first that, even if the challenged statements meet the definition of
relationship evidence, the statements are not admissible as such because they were not
identified before trial and the district court did not provide a limiting instruction to the jury
regarding their proper use. Ambuehl’s argument is unavailing because section 634.20
evidence is presumptively admissible, Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at 442, and is not subject to
6
the procedural safeguards applicable to 404(b) evidence; State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635,
638-39 (Minn. 2006). Furthermore, the district court gave a limiting instruction at the close
of evidence, and, because Ambuehl did not object at trial, the district court was not required
to give an instruction sua sponte and contemporaneous with each statement. See
State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 279 (Minn. 2019) (requiring a defendant “to object to the
admission of relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 before a district court is
required to provide a cautionary instruction”).
Ambuehl also argues that the district court failed to weigh the probative value of the
statements against the danger of unfair prejudice. But with respect to the statements that
we conclude meet the definition of relationship evidence, Ambuehl does not explain how
the district court’s allegedly insufficient analysis resulted in prejudice affecting his
substantial rights. See State v. O’Meara, 755 N.W.2d 29, 33 n.1 (Minn. App. 2008).
We next address the statements that are not admissible under section 634.20. We
conclude that even if admitting these statements constituted plain error, Ambuehl fails to
establish that the error affected his substantial rights. To satisfy the substantial-rights prong
of the plain- error test, Ambuehl bears the burden to establish that there is “a reasonable
likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s
verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Our
analysis under this prong of the plain-error test “is the equivalent of a harmless error
analysis.” State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2011). To determine whether
an appellant meets his burden, we consider several nonexclusive factors, including: “(1) the
manner in which the party presented the evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly
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persuasive, (3) whether the party who offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and
(4) whether the defense effectively countered the evidence.” State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d
48, 54 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). Additionally, “[s]trong evidence of guilt
undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id.
The remaining inadmissible statements include: C.L.’s statements that Ambuehl
“works hard at sabotaging a lot of sh-t”; “needs help” to understand “right and wrong”;
probably ran when she called the police; that she “sold her [friend] a coin” to provide
Ambuehl money to “beat ” his addiction; and that she supported Ambuehl through his
“other cases,” including an assault case in which he “fought for her.” The inadmissible
statements also include the 911 operator’s testimony that he told responding officers that
Ambuehl was likely to run; Ambuehl’s statements to the responding officer that he needed
to attend court or he would lose his bond money; and that C.L. supported him through his
“other cases.”
Manner Presented
Ambuehl contends that the challenged statements featured prominently at trial
because the state used the evidence throughout its case and the statements appear on 18 of
122 trial transcript pages. But Ambuehl’s accounting assumes that all of the statements he
challenges are inadmissible. Excluding the statements that we conclude are admissible,
the record shows that the inadmissible statements appear on just two transcript pages and
that the state did not rely on the statements during its opening statement, closing argument,
or redirect examinations. See id. at 56 (concluding that challenged statements occupying
12 pages of 300-page trial transcript were not prominently presented); State v. Al-Naseer,
8
690 N.W.2d 744, 749-50 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that evidence was prominently
presented because state mentioned it during opening statement, closing argument, and
during direct and cross-examination).
Persuasive Value
Ambuehl argues that the statements were highly persuasive because they included
his own statements referencing his bond money and “other cases.” He cites
State v. Chavarria-Cruz for support. 784 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 2010). In Chavarria-Cruz,
the district court erroneously admitted a defendant’s confession and the supreme court
concluded that, “[g]iven the powerful evidentiary value of [a defendant]’s confession, . . .
the error in admitting the statement was not harmless.” Id. at 365. Chavarria-Cruz does
not apply here, however, because unlike the defendant’s statements in that case, Ambuehl’s
statements do not include a confession to the charged crime.
Use of the Evidence in Closing Argument
This factor weighs against concluding that the errors affected Ambuehl’s substantial
rights because the state did not reference or rely on any of the inadmissible statements in
closing. See Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d at 749-50.
Effectively Countered
Ambuehl argues that he could not effectively counter the prejudice of statements
referencing his “other cases,” his substance addiction, or the likelihood that he would flee
the police, without drawing more attention to them. We agree that this factor weighs in
favor of concluding that several of the errors affected Ambuehl’s substantial rights.

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Strength of the Evidence
Ambuehl argues that, because C.L.’s testimony was “inconsistent” and she admitted
to a “really blurry” recollection of events, the evidence against him was not strong and
therefore did not undermine the prejudicial effect of the erroneously admitted statements.
We disagree. The record shows that, although C.L. had some difficulty recalling
specific days of the week, her testimony regarding the assault was generally consistent, and
was corroborated by her bruising and by her and Ambuehl’s statements in the body-camera
videos. Overall, the strength of the state’s case undermines the persuasive value of any of
the erroneously admitted statements.
In sum, the factors weigh against concluding that any error in admitting the
challenged statements affected Ambuehl’s substantial rights. Ambuehl therefore fails to
establish plain error warranting reversal of his conviction.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Ambuehl argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by (1) “injecting broader
social issues” into the trial, (2) “inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury,” and
(3) misstating the law.
Ambuehl did not object at trial. We review unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct
under a modified plain -error test. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006).
Under the test, if Ambuehl meets his initial burden to establish that the prosecutor’s
conduct was plain error, the burden shifts to the state to establish that the error did not
affect Ambuehl’s substantial rights. Id.

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Injecting Broader Social Issues into the Trial
First, Ambuehl argues that the prosecutor impermissibly invoked public-safety
concerns in his opening statement, and, in closing argument, asked the jury to “send a
message” to perpetrators of domestic violence. He challenges statements from this portion
of the prosecutor’s opening statement:
This case is about safety. In fact, that’s what much of the
criminal law is about. It’s about protecting people’s safety,
protecting society’s safety, protecting a person’s ability to feel
safe in their own home. And the defendant, by his actions,
violated this safety. The defendant, by his actions, didn’t make
[C.L.] feel safe. And as we’ll prove, in fact, he’s the reason
that she wasn’t safe.

He also challenges statements from another portion of the prosecutor’s closing
argument:
Holding an abuser accountable is a daunting task.

[C.L.] told the authorities [about the assault] on the
morning of March 5th. Now four months later she obeyed a
subpoena, she came here in this courtroom, she took an oath,
she testified in front of each of you. Even with that fear of
judgment she testified in front of you and right in front of her
abuser.

Now it’s your turn in this process, ladies and gentlemen.
I ask that you find [Ambuehl] guilty.

We view a prosecutor’s statements “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or
remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence to determine whether
reversible error has occurred.” State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). A prosecutor must not “make statements urging the jury to protect
society or to send a message with its verdict,” State v. Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551, 556
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(Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000), but “a minimal, specific appeal to
the jury to hold the defendant accountable for a crime he is charged with having committed
is not improper,” State. v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 238 (Minn. 2005).
We discern no impropriety in the prosecutor’s statements. While the prosecutor told
the jury that criminal law is about protecting “people’s safety,” he specified that the issue
in this case is “C.L.’s safety.” As to his closing argument, the prosecutor indicated that
C.L. took steps to hold Ambuehl accountable, and told jurors it was their “turn in the
process.” The prosecutor did not directly, or even indirectly, ask jurors to “send a
message,” and we conclude that his argument was a minimal, specific appeal for the jury
to hold Ambuehl accountable for the charged crime.
Second, Ambuehl claims that the prosecutor inflamed the passions of the jury by
referring to him in closing argument as an “abuser.” Prosecutors are afforded
“considerable latitude” during closing arguments and are not required to “make a colorless
argument.” State v. Williams, 586 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1998). A prosecutor “must
refrain from making statements that will inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury,”
Duncan, 608 N.W.2d at 556, but is entitled to use “reasonable and descriptive” language
to convey the state’s version of the facts of a case, State v. Radke, 821 N.W.2d 316, 330
(Minn. 2012). Here, Ambuehl was charged with domestic abuse, and we conclude that it
was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to describe him as an “abuser.”
Misstatement of the Law
Next, Ambuehl argues that the prosecutor made multiple misstatements of law in
the following portion of his closing argument:
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Now as it relates to the second-degree assault second
element, this is a little more nuanced. It’s a little more in the
weeds. Definition of a dangerous weapon it includes any other
device or instrumentality that in the manner it is used or
intended to be used is calculated to produce death or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm. Now I ask you not to get
too focused on this specific case when you analyze this. We’re
not talking about hitting someone in the arm, we’re talking
about the act of taking an aluminum baseball bat and swinging
it at another human being. What could be the result from that?
Brain damage? Vision loss? Permanent fractures? This is the
one unique area of the law where you get to speculate. Usually
speculation is not allowed. When we’re talking about the use
of a dangerous weapon you get to speculate what could have
happened. Thankfully it didn’t happen in this case, I’m sure
that hurt really bad, but fortunately there’s nothing other than
some bruising in this case, but what could have happened when
you swing an aluminum bat at another human being. I submit
to you that element has been proven and satisfied.

First, Ambuehl argues that the prosecutor’s argument conveyed to jurors that they
could rely on “speculation,” rather than the evidence in the record, to determine whether
the state proved the dangerous- weapon element. But we construe the prosecutor’s
argument as an attempt to explain to the jury that, in determining whether the element was
met, the question was whether Ambuehl’s use of the bat was calculated or likely to produce
death or great bodily harm, and not whether C.L. in “this specific case” in fact suffered
death or great bodily harm. Although the argument was not clearly articulated, it is not
clear or obvious to us that it constituted a misstatement of the law.
Second, Ambuehl argues that, by asking jurors to consider if death or great bodily
harm “could” happen when a person is struck with a baseball bat, the prosecutor advanced
a “lower threshold” than whether death or great bodily harm is “likely,” and therefore
“probable or reasonably expected.” See State v. Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d 871, 877 (Minn.
13
2024) (holding that “‘likely’ means ‘probable or reasonably expected’ in the context of the
manner-of-use definition of a dangerous weapon”). Because we agree, and the state
concedes the issue, we must determine whether the state has met its burden to show that
there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misstatement would have had a
significant effect on the verdict of the jury. State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 251 (Minn.
2023).
In making that determination, “we consider the strength of the evidence against the
defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had
an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions. Id.
The state argues that the misstatement did not affect Ambuehl’s substantial rights
because the evidence against him was strong, the misstatement was limited to a few
sentences, and Ambuehl had an opportunity to immediately rebut it.
As discussed above, we agree that the evidence against Ambuehl was strong. We
also agree that the misstatement was brief and therefore not pervasive. Finally, we
conclude that Ambuehl had an opportunity to rebut the misstatement in his closing
argument and made no attempt to do so. The prosecutor’s misstatement did not affect
Ambuehl’s substantial rights.
Cumulative Effect of the Errors
Finally, Ambuehl argues that, even if the judicial and prosecutorial errors were
individually harmless, the cumulative effect of the errors denied him a fair trial.
The cumulative effect of trial errors may warrant a new trial in “‘rare cases’ where
the errors, when taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying [the] appellant a fair trial.”
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State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “When
considering a claim of cumulative error, we look to the egregiousness of the errors and the
strength of the [s] tate’s case.” Id. Generally, “we are more inclined to order a new trial
for cumulative errors in very close factual cases.” Id. at 279.
Here, Ambuehl argues that the errors “worked in concert” to deprive him of a fair
trial because the prosecutorial errors compounded the district court’s evidentiary errors.
We disagree. First, any erroneously admitted evidence portrayed Ambuehl as a pers on
with a criminal history who suffers from substance addiction, but that portrayal is unrelated
to, and therefore not compounded by, the prosecutor’s misstatement concerning the
manner-of-use definition of a dangerous weapon. Second, Ambuehl alleged a number of
egregious errors but failed to establish that they were in fact errors. And, given the strength
of the state’s case, we conclude that the remaining errors are not so egregious that their
cumulative effect denied him a fair trial.
Pro Se Claims
In a pro se supplemental brief, Ambuehl argues that (1) his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective, (2) the prosecutor suborned perjury, and (3) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ambuehl argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel failed to interview alibi witnesses and law enforcement officers, and failed to
obtain court records, phone records, expert witnesses, and social-media posts . A
postconviction proceeding is the proper forum for Ambuehl’s ineffective-assistance claim
15
because the existing record contains no evidence as to why, or even if, defense counsel
failed to investigate an alibi, obtain evidence, or call witnesses. Thus, because the record
is “devoid of the information needed to explain the attorney’s decisions . . . any conclusions
reached by this court would be pure speculation.” State v. Gustafson, 610 N.W.2d 314,
321 (Minn. 2000) (declining to reach appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
but preserving appellant’s right to pursue it in a petition for postconviction relief).
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Ambuehl argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suborning perjury
because, although he was charged with assaulting C.L. on or about March 4, C.L. testified
that she was assaulted on March 3. A person commits perjury when the person, under oath,
“makes a false material statement not believing it to be true.” Minn. Stat. § 609.48, subd.
1(1) (2022).
The record reflects that C.L. testified consistently that she was assaulted the day
prior to her March 5 911 call. The record also shows that, on cross-examination, C.L. was
asked whether she remembered the date of her assault and she replied: “No. The 3rd. I
don’t even know.” Ambuehl provides no evidence that C.L. did not believe her statements
to be true, and, consequently, no evidence that the prosecutor suborned perjury.
Insufficient Evidence
Ambuehl argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because
the state needed to prove that he inflicted “substantial” or “great bodily harm,” and proved
only that “[C.L.] had two bruises.” Ambuehl is incorrect. To prove that Ambuehl assaulted
C.L., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1, the state needed to prove that he
16
“intentional[ly] inflict[ed] . . . or attempt[ed] to inflict bodily harm” upon C.L., while using
a “device or instrumentality” in a manner “calculated or likely to produce death or great
bodily harm.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subds. 10(2) (defining “assault”), 6 (defining
“dangerous weapon”) (2022); Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d at 877 (defining “likely” to mean
“probable or reasonably expected”).
Accordingly, we decline to reach Ambuehl’s ineffective-assistance claim, and his
claims of prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence fail.
Affirmed.