State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1676

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jamaal Terrance Tanna,
Appellant.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-24-350

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Ryan Hansch, McLeod County Attorney, Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Patrick Monnens, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Appellant Jamaal Terrance Tanna appeals from a conviction for controlled-
substance crime in the first degree—possession, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
152.021, subdivision 2(a)(1) ( Supp. 2023). He argues that (1) his conviction must be
2
reversed because the state did not offer sufficient evidence to prove the weight element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) he is entitled to a new trial because the district
court erroneously instructed the jury, and (3) he is entitled to a new trial because the district
court abused its discretion in admitting a search warrant into evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from the evidence received at a jury trial.
After midnight one evening, Deputy K.1 was on duty in Glencoe when he noticed a
car very slowly approach a nearby intersection, stop before making a left-hand turn despite
no oncoming traffic, and then nearly drive off the road. Based on the driving behavior and
the time of night, the deputy believed the driver might be impaired and initiated a traffic
stop. When the deputy approached the car, the driver identified himself as Tanna but did
not produce a license. He stated that his driver’s license was revoked. The deputy observed
that Tanna’s eyes were “extremely dilated,” bloodshot, and had no “noticeable reaction to
light”—all of which he believed indicated impairment. Around this time, Deputy M.
arrived to assist.
Deputy K. asked Tanna to step out of the car for field sobriety testing. While
Deputy K. accompanied Tanna to the back of the car, he “noticed several items sticking
out of [Tanna’s] pocket, including a clear plastic bag.” When the deputy asked about the
plastic bag, Tanna indicated it was marijuana but kept his hands in his pockets, even after

1 We refer to the officers as Deputy K. and Deputy M. instead of their full names in
accordance with our rules of public access. See Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud.
Branch 8, subd. 2(b) (recommending that appellate opinions limit disclosure of witness
identities “to what is necessary and relevant”).
3
being instructed to remove them. Tanna then attempted to run around the passenger side of
the car and away from Deputy K.
Deputy M. stepped in and grabbed Tanna, who “tense[d] up” and “attempted to
bring his . . . right hand up.” As Deputy M. and Tanna continued to struggle, Deputy K.
saw Tanna put a small plastic bag in his mouth and noticed that the bag “was fully into his
mouth and there was chewing going on and that white substance or crystal substance was
falling from his mouth.” Both deputies attempted to pull the item from Tanna’s mouth
while he was pressed against the car. Deputy M. also saw Tanna “chewing” with “stuff
falling out that was white” that the deputy believed was methamphetamine. Tanna was
taken to the ground but continued resisting and “start[ed] spitting.” At some point during
the struggle, the small plastic bag came out of Tanna’s mouth. Eventually, the officers were
able to handcuff Tanna after one officer threatened to use a taser.
After Tanna was sitting up, Deputy K. “was able to see the chewed plastic bag on
the ground with a large amount of . . . crystalline substance.” Describing the scene, he
testified, “There [were] crystals scattered throughout the grass where we were, some still
in the bag and some back by the car” and “[t]here was also blood mixed in, saliva mixed
in, with the crystals and the [chewed] bag.” When he searched Tanna, Deputy K. found a
second “small clear [plastic bag] with a white crystal powder substance inside [of it]”
(evidence bag 1). Deputy M. took pictures of the suspected meth amphetamine on the
ground and on Tanna’s car and then, with the assistance of other officers who had arrived,
he “collect[ed] larger chunks and other pieces off the ground.” Some of the substance blew
away in the wind. Deputy M. testified that the officers collected as much as they could but
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were “unable to collect all of it” and “stomped” on what remained, “trying to get it into the
ground as much as [they] could.”
Tanna was transported by ambulance to the hospital and consented to a blood draw
pursuant to a warrant. He underwent medical evaluation and treatment before being
released and transported to jail. Separately, officers conducted an initial search of Tanna’s
car during which they found a glass pipe containing some remnants of a white substance.
While searching a backpack found in the backseat, Deputy M. collected a “large bag” of
“suspected methamphetamine” (evidence bag 2), a tube with a glass end on it that officers
identified “as a sort of a crude pipe used to . . . smoke an illegal substance,” and a butane
torch. The car was impounded, and a more thorough search was done at a later date
pursuant to a search warrant.
Before sending evidence of the suspected methamphetamine to the Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension (BCA) for testing, the substance collected from the ground was
combined in an evidence bag (evidence bag 3) and Deputy M. “attempted to pull out as
much of the grass and gravel [as he] could” from it.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Tanna with nine counts, including the first-
degree controlled-substance-possession charge that is the subject of this appeal.
2 Tanna

2 Tanna was also charged with obstructing legal process, a gross misdemeanor offense ,
Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2023); driving while impaired, Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (Supp. 2023); fleeing a peace officer by means other than a motor
vehicle, Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2022); driving after revocation, Minn. Stat.
§ 171.24, subd. 2 (2022); controlled-substance crime in the second degree, 25 grams or
more of methamphetamine, a lesser-included offense, Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1)
(Supp. 2023); obstructing legal process, interfere with a peace officer, a lesser-included
offense, Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2); fourth degree driving while intoxicated, Minn.
5
pleaded not guilty to all charges and proceeded to a jury trial. The state called ten witnesses:
eight officers involved in the arrest or vehicle searches and the two BCA forensic scientists
who tested the blood sample and the suspected methamphetamine. The state offered over
80 exhibits including body-worn and squad camera footage, photos of the scene, the three
evidence bags with suspected methamphetamine, the pipe and chewed bag with some
remaining white substance in it, the search warrants issued for Tanna’s car and blood
sample, and the BCA reports. Tanna objected to admission of the search warrant for
Tanna’s car.
Both BCA forensic scientists testified consistent with their reports. The BCA
forensic scientist who tested the blood sample testified that it was positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine. The forensic scientist responsible for testing the
collected substances testified about the process for weighing and testing the bags he
received. He explained that it is BCA policy to test only to the highest achievable statutory
threshold, which was determined here to be 50 grams. He testified that he first weighed
and tested the substance in the bag found in the backpack, evidence bag 2, and it was
positive for methamphetamine and weighed 35.687 grams. He then tested the bag of
substance collected from the ground, evidence bag 3, which was also positive for
methamphetamine and weighed 15.381 grams. Because those two bags totaled 51.068
grams, the BCA analyst had reached the 50-gram threshold and did not weigh or test the

Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (Supp. 2023 ); and controlled-substance crime in the third
degree, 10 grams or more of methamphetamine, a lesser-included offense, Minn. Stat.
§ 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (Supp. 2023).
6
bag found on Tanna after his arrest, evidence bag 1. The forensic scientist’s report and
testimony identified the uncertainty of measurement as plus-or-minus 0.004 with a
standard confidence interval of 95%.
The forensic scientist acknowledged that evidence bag 3 contained debris that could
not entirely be separated from the substance. When asked how much that the debris may
have impacted the weight, he replied, “I can’t give an exact number, . . . but I didn’t feel it
had—A few blades of grass don’t weigh very much.” He then further reiterated that “[t]here
was nothing” in the sample “that [he] thought would significantly alter the weight” and that
he believed it was “an accurate weight” of methamphetamine. On cross-examination, h e
acknowledged that the presence of blood or saliva could affect the weight, but he denied
seeing either of those fluids in the bag.
The jury found Tanna guilty of all nine counts. The judge sentenced Tanna to
102 months’ imprisonment for the count of first-degree controlled-substance possession.3
Tanna appeals.
DECISION
Tanna argues for reversal of his conviction for first-degree controlled-substance
possession because the state presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he possessed 50 grams or greater of methamphetamine. In the alternative, Tanna
argues for a new trial on that count on two grounds. First, Tanna contends that the district

3 The district court also imposed concurrent sentences of 364 days’ imprisonment for
obstructing legal process, 90 days’ imprisonment for driving while impaired, 90 days ’
imprisonment for fleeing a police officer, and 90 days’ imprisonment for driving after
revocation. The remaining convictions were unadjudicated as lesser-included offenses.
7
court’s jury instructions for constructive possession amounted to an abuse of discretion.
Second, he maintains that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to admit into
evidence the warrant for the search of his car. We address each argument in turn.
I
Due process requires the state to prove every element of a charged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d
361, 366 (Minn. 1988); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Tanna was
convicted under Minnesota Statutes section 152.021, subdivision 2(a)(1), which provides
that a person is guilty if they “unlawfully possess[] one or more mixtures of a total weight
of 50 grams or more containing . . . methamphetamine.” Tanna challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence on the weight element, arguing that the bits of debris in evidence bag 3
allow for a reasonable conclusion that the methamphetamine itself weighed less than
50 grams.
When analyzing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, the “relevant standard of
review depends on whether the factfinder . . . reached its conclusion of law based on direct
or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). Direct
evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true,
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599
(Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the
factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id . (quotation
omitted).
8
In “reviewing the sufficiency of direct evidence, we painstakingly review the record
to determine whether that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was
sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d
142, 155 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). But “[w]hen the direct evidence of guilt on a
particular element is not alone sufficient to sustain the verdict, . . . we apply a heightened
two-step standard . . . called the circumstantial-evidence standard of review.” Loving v.
State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). This “two-step process” requires us to first
identify the circumstances proved. State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d 266, 275 (Minn. 2023).
At this step, we “winnow down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts that is
consistent with the jury’s verdict and disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s
verdict.” Id. (quotations omitted). Put another way, we “construe conflicting evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the State’s
witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858
(Minn. 2008). Second, we analyze “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other
than guilt.” Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d at 275 (quotations omitted). We will reverse if there is
a reasonable inference other than guilt. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.
Here, we need not decide whether the evidence provided by the state was direct or
circumstantial because the parties briefed it as a circumstantial-evidence issue, and the
evidence is sufficient under even the heightened two-step standard.
The circumstances proved with respect to the weight element are as follows.
Officers saw Tanna put a small plastic bag containing a white substance into his mouth and
9
chew. That white substance fell out of his mouth and onto the ground and his car. Officers
picked up as much of the spilled substance as possible, but they could not pick up all of it.
Some had to be “stomped” into the ground, and some blew away in the wind. Before
sending the substance collected from the ground, evidence bag 3, to the BCA, Deputy M.
tried to remove as much debris as possible. The BCA forensic scientist saw a few blades
of grass in evidence bag 3 and otherwise denied seeing any blood or saliva. The substance
in evidence bag 3 tested positive for methamphetamine and weighed 15.381 grams, plus-
or-minus 0.004. The BCA forensic scientist reported a 95% confidence interval. He did not
believe any remaining debris would significantly alter the weight and believed that the
weight he calculated was an accurate weight of the methamphetamine. Officers found
evidence bag 2 in Tanna’s car. T he substance in evidence bag 2 tested positive for
methamphetamine and weighed 35.687 grams, plus-or-minus 0.004, with the same 95%
confidence interval. Deputy K. found an additional bag on Tanna, evidence bag 1, with a
white substance inside it that was consistent with the substances in bags 2 and 3 that tested
positive for methamphetamine. Evidence bag 1 was not tested or weighed. Officers also
found a pipe with some white residue on it in the car. The chewed bag was collected with
some white substance remaining inside it.
Tanna does not dispute that the circumstances proved are consistent with a
reasonable inference that he possessed 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. He argues
instead that the circumstances proved are also consistent with a rational hypothesis other
than guilt—that debris impacted the weight of the substance in evidence bag 3, such that
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Tanna possessed a total of less than 50 grams. We disagree that Tanna’s alternative
hypothesis is reasonable.
Even if the jury had concluded that debris impacted the weight of the substance in
evidence bag 3, the circumstances proved, considered in their entirety, assure us that Tanna
was in possession of more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. First, the forensic scientist
testified that he did not think that the blades of grass in evidence bag 3 were significant
enough to affect the weight and that he did not see blood or saliva in the sample. Assuming
the jury believed that testimony, as we must, the weight of any visible debris was minimal.
Second, the circumstances proved include that Tanna initially possessed more of the same
white crystalline substance than what was collected and placed in evidence bag 3, but that
it (1) spilled into and out of Tanna’s mouth while he chewed the bag during the struggle,
(2) blew away in the wind as officers tried to collect it, and (3) was stomped into the ground
after the officers were not able to collect it all. Third, Tanna was in possession of evidence
bag 1, which contained a similar white substance, but that bag was not tested because the
BCA reached what had been determined as the highest achievable statutory threshold for a
possession charge—50 grams—without evidence bag 1. And fourth, the collected pipe and
chewed bag both contained a small amount of white substance or residue that was not
tested. The only reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is that Tanna was in
possession of additional methamphetamine that was not tested but that weighed as much
as, if not more than, any debris in evidence bag 3.
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We conclude that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the district
court’s conclusion that Tanna committed the offense of first-degree controlled-substance
crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1).
II
We next consider Tanna’s argument with respect to the constructive-possession jury
instruction. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the state may meet its burden
on any of the controlled-substance-possession charges by proving either actual or
constructive possession. The jury instruction on constructive possession stated:
A person is in constructive possession of an item if the
item was in a place under the person’s exclusive control to
which other people did not normally have access, or if found
in a place to which others have access, the person knowingly
exercised dominion and control over the item.

In order to prove constructive possession of a controlled
substance, the State has to prove that police found the
substance in a place under Defendant’ s exclusive control to
which other people did not normally have access, or that if
police found it in a place to which others had access, there was
a strong probability that Defendant was, at that time,
consciously exercising dominion and control over it. You may
find that the element of possession, as that term is used in these
instructions, is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had actual or constructive possession.

(Emphasis added.)
Tanna argues that this instruction materially misstated the law by reducing the
state’s burden of proof because the instruction allows the state the option of proving
constructive possession by showing “there was a strong probability that Defendant was, at
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that time, consciously exercising dominion and control over [the controlled substance],” if
it was found “in a place to which others had access.”
The district court is allowed considerable latitude in its selection of language for
jury instructions. Alholm v. Wilt, 394 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. 1986). The law requires that
“the charge as a whole convey to the jury a clear and correct understanding of the law of
the case.” Barnes v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 47 N.W.2d 180, 187 (Minn. 1951). We review jury
instructions in their entirety to determine whether they fairly and accurately reflect the law
of the case. State v. Peou, 579 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn. 1998); State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d
150, 155 (Minn. 1988).
Tanna did not object at trial to the district court’s jury instruction. An unobjected-
to jury instruction is subject to a plain-error analysis on appeal. See State v. Baird, 654
N.W.2d 105, 113 (Minn. 2002). Under plain-error review, an appellant must establish
(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583
N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67
(1997)). If the first three prongs of the plain-error standard are met, a reviewing court then
assesses whether reversal is required to ensure “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” State v. Scruggs, 822 N.W.2d 631, 642 (Minn. 2012) (quotation
omitted).
The district court modeled its jury instruction on the standard articulated in State v.
Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1975). In Florine, the supreme court determined that,
considering the purpose of the constructive-possession doctrine, the state should have to
show that a substance was discovered “in a place under defendant’s exclusive control” or
13
otherwise that “there is a strong probability (inferable from other evidence) that defendant
was at the time consciously exercising dominion and control over it.” Id. at 611. We have
referenced the Florine standard in addressing a challenge to a constructive-possession jury
instruction on other grounds. See State v. Porter, 674 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. App. 2004)
(stating that if an item is found “in a place to which others had access” the state must prove
“that there is a strong probability, inferable from the evidence, that the defendant was, at
the time, consciously exercising dominion and control over it”) . Tanna argues that use of
the Florine standard for a jury instruction is misplaced because the Florine standard is for
appellate courts reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.
We need not decide whether the district court’s decision to instruct the jury with the
language in Florine was error because, even if it was, we are not persuaded that any such
error was plain. An error is plain when it was “clearly contrary to the law at the time of
appeal.” State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 513 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S.
at 468). An error is clearly contrary to law if “it is clear or obvious, which is typically
established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v.
Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted).
To show that the instruction here was not clearly contrary to law, the state points us
to State v. Peterson, a nonprecedential opinion of this court addressing the same issue.
No. A07-1433, 2008 WL 4628398 (Minn. App. Oct. 21, 2008). In Peterson, we held that
a jury instruction for constructive possession that used the language from Florine did not
“dilute[] the state’s burden of proof” and was not erroneous. Id. at *2. Although we are not
bound by Peterson, see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), we agree it is instructive
14
within the framework of the plain-error analysis. Even assuming without deciding that it
was error for the district court to use the Florine standard as the jury instruction, Peterson
makes clear that any such error would not be plain because the instruction did not
“contravene[] case law.” Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 787. To the contrary, Peterson offered
persuasive support for the instruction the district court used. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c) (providing that nonprecedential cases may be considered for their
persuasive value). There is also no caselaw instructing that the standard in Florine may not
be used in a jury instruction or that it is relevant only to appellate review of the sufficiency
of the evidence.
Because we conclude that any error was not plain, we need not consider the other
factors in the plain-error analysis. State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Minn. 2021). We
decline to reverse Tanna’s conviction and order a new trial on this basis.
III
Tanna’s final argument is that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
the warrant for a search of his car into evidence because it had little probative value and
any value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See Minn. R. Evid. 403. The
state sought to admit the warrant during Deputy K.’s testimony about the collecting and
processing of evidence on the night of the arrest and the officer’s inability to conduct a
thorough search of the car that night. Tanna’s counsel objected to admission of the warrant
on rule 403 grounds. After a bench conference was held off the record between the court
and the parties, the court overruled the objection.
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Tanna argues that the warrant was inherently prejudicial, primarily because it
“informed the jury that a judge believed a crime was committed . . . and that the collected
items from the vehicle tend to show that Tanna did commit a crime.” He maintains that the
findings relating to the district court’s probable-cause determination supplanted the jury’s
role. He adds that the warrant’s reference to other possible offenses for which he was not
charged is “tantamount to introducing evidence of other crimes” under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(b).
Tanna objected to the admission of the search warrant at trial, so we review the
district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235,
249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an
erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Guzman,
892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). To reverse, “we must find actual prejudice to the
defendant’s case.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. 2005).
To begin, we assess the search warrant’s probative value. We agree with Tanna that
the search warrant had little probative value. To the extent the warrant was relevant at all,
it appears to have been cumulative to the testimony of the officers who conducted the
search and to the photos from the search that were admitted into evidence. That said, there
is no reason to believe, on this record, that the probable-cause finding or the warrant’s
reference to possible uncharged offenses was unfairly prejudicial. “Unfair prejudice under
rule 403 is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair
prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair
advantage.” Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 478. It is not apparent that such an unfair advantage
16
resulted here. The warrant states that it involves a finding of probable cause and did not
purport to establish Tanna’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And the jury was instructed
on only the nine counts with which Tanna was formally charged and was instructed that it
must determine whether Tanna was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume that
juries follow a district court’s instructions. See Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 167. Moreover, the
warrant was one exhibit among 80 that were admitted at trial, the pro bable-cause finding
was not discussed by any witness, and the warrant was not referenced by the prosecution
at closing argument.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the warrant.
Affirmed.