In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. L. W. and J. P. N., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1678

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: A. L. W. and J. P. N., Parents.

Filed April 21, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-JV-24-206

Kimberly Stommes, Jeddeloh Snyder Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant
mother A.L.W.)

Brian Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Laura E. Welle, Assistant County Attorney,
Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Morrison County Health and Human Services)

Madeline Nuehring, Little Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to her child,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by determining that (1) the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite mother and the child, (2) clear -and-convincing evidence
supported four statutory grounds for termination, and (3) termination of her parental rights
is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant A.L.W. is the mother of the child who is the subject of this appeal. 1
Respondent Morrison County Health and Human Services (the county) first interacted with
mother when she was pregnant with the child, after receiving a report that mother had used
a controlled substance . The county opened a child-welfare case and offered mother a
chemical-dependency evaluation, which she refused. The case was closed, but the county
opened a new case after receiving a report that, on the day of the child’s birth in July 2023,
mother tested positive for controlled substances and admitted using a controlled substance
one week before the child’s birth. Based on th e evidence of the child’s prenatal exposure
to controlled substances, the child was placed on a peace officer’s hold.
Four days after the child was born, the county filed a child-in -need-of-protection-
or-services (CHIPS) petition. The district court awarded temporary custody of the child to
the county, and the child was placed in foster care. About five months after the child’s
birth, the child was adjudicated CHIPS.
The county created a case plan for mother. The plan identified concerns that mother
needed to address her chemical-dependency and mental-health needs, which the county
determined made mother’s home unsafe for the child and rendered her unable to meet the
child’s needs. The plan provided a list of actions for mother to take to address those needs,
in order to reunite the family. The actions included, among other things, attending
supervised visits with the child; abstaining from non- prescription, mood-altering

1 The parental rights of the child’s father, J.P.N., were also involuntarily terminated in these
proceedings, but he did not appeal.
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substances; submitting to random drug testing; obtaining and maintaining a substance-free
living environment; following probation and other conditions of release in a ny criminal
case; attending the child’s medical and dental appointments; and cooperating with the
county by meeting with a social worker. The district court approved the initial case plan,
as well as two later updated versions. Mother testified at the court trial on the termination
of her parental rights that she was aware that she was required to satisfy the requirements
of her case plan in order to be reunited with the child. She also acknowledged that the
district court had ordered her to comply with her case plan.
Over the course of the child-protection proceedings, mother made efforts with
varying degrees of success to comply with case-plan requirements. The county referred her
to multiple chemical-dependency treatment programs. She enrolled in one such program
within a week of the child’s birth, but she left the program the same day she arrived. The
next month, she completed a comprehensive use assessment with the assistance of a
substance-use-disorder social worker from the county. The social worker provided mother
recommendations from the assessment and referrals to two outpatient programs, but mother
did not enter either of the programs to which she was referred. About one month later,
mother completed another comprehensive use assessment with the social worker and was
referred to two additional programs. She was scheduled to attend one of the programs, but
she missed her first appointment and decided not to attend her second appointment. She
then attended the other program, but she did not complete it because she believed its
residents were using substances. The social worker later referred mother to another
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program that mother felt was not a good fit for her because it was faith-based and did not
align with her beliefs.
In February 2024, the county filed a petition for involuntary termination of mother’s
parental rights. The next month, mother enrolled in a residential treatment program. Three
months later, she graduated from the program and received differing recommendations for
her aftercare. In August 2024, mother’s case plan was modified to specifically recommend
outpatient treatment with a sober-living facility. Mother did not follow this
recommendation and, instead, moved in with a friend she had met through a sobri ety
support group.
The district court held several pretrial hearings, during which it granted additional
time to mother to comply with her case- plan requirements. At a pretrial hearing held two
months after mother’s graduation from the residential chemical-dependency treatment
program, the district court ordered her to complete an intensive outpatient program with
sober housing. Mother then spoke with a county employee who referred her to programs
fitting those criteria.
In September 2024, the district court held a trial on the county’s petition to terminate
mother’s parental rights. At the time of trial, mother had not enrolled in an intensive
outpatient program, and the child had been in out-of-home placement for 423 days.
Six witnesses testified at the trial: an employee of the facility where mother
underwent drug testing, the substance-use-disorder social worker who conducted mother’s
comprehensive use assessments, a case aide who supervised mother’s visits with the child,
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the child-protection case manager assigned to mother’s case, the child’s guardian ad litem,
and mother.
According to the drug-testing-facility employee and facility records, mother missed
more than 30 testing appointments, she was tested at least 17 times between July 2023 and
August 2024, and her tests included positive results for at least three controlled substances
at various points in 2023 and 2024.
The substance-use-disorder social worker who conducted mother’s comprehensive
use assessments stated that he completed mother’s first comprehensive use assessment in
September 2023. After the assessment, he recommended that mother complete an
outpatient treatment program and follow its recommendations. He made referrals to two
programs and discussed the recommendations with her. In October 2023, he conducted
another assessment of mother. He categorized her at the highest risk level for relapse and
continued use of chemical substances because she did not use support groups and did not
appear to have coping skills to achieve sobriety.
The substance-use-disorder social worker also testified that, about a month before
the trial, he completed another assessment of mother. He provided her recommendations
based on the assessment, which included attending an intensive outpatient program, as she
had also been court ordered to do. He provided her referrals to four programs. He testified
that mother had not complied with the recommendations of her most recent assessment.
The child-protection case aide who supervised mother’s visits with the child for
more than a year beginning in August 2023 testified that mother failed to attend some of
her supervised visits with the child and that on some occasions she did not communicate
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that she could not attend those visits. The case aide estimated that mother had missed about
25 visits in 2023 and about 21 visits in 2024. The case aide stated that some of the absences
were explained by periods when mother was in treatment or was sick with COVID.
The case manager testified about the county’s initial contact with mother during her
pregnancy, the report on the day of the child’s birth that led the county to open a new case,
the child’s CHIPS proceedings, and the county’s creation of mother’s case plan. She
described services that the county had provided to mother, including supervised visits,
parenting-skills classes, comprehensive assessments, drug testing, transportation, a cell
phone and minutes for the phone, case management, and mental- health assessments. She
testified that, as of trial, the county’s concerns with the child returning to mother’s home
centered on mother’s chemical-dependency and mental-health needs and her inconsistent
compliance with drug-testing requirements.
The case manager testified that she did not believe that mother had corrected the
conditions that led to the child being placed outside of the home or that mother would
complete the case-plan requirements “in the reasonably foreseeable future” because, over
the course of more than a year, mother had not addressed her chemical-dependency or
mental-health needs and consistently failed to drug test. She testified that she believed
termination of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests because mother had
made little progress on her case plan after more than a year, her chemical-dependency and
mental-health needs remained a concern, and the child deserved permanency and to have
his basic needs met, which the case manager did not believe mother could do “in the
foreseeable future.”
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The guardian ad litem recounted her observations of mother’s supervised visits,
which went well overall and showed mother’s attachment to the child over time. However,
the guardian ad litem expressed concern about mother missing visits. She described
mother’s case-plan progress as “minimal” based on her missing drug-test appointments and
consistently testing positive for substances on the tests she did complete. The guardian ad
litem stated that she believed that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother
and to reunite her with the child and that she did not believe mother should be given more
time to progress in her case plan because she had already received extensions and not made
adequate progress on her chemical-dependency or mental-health issues. The guardian ad
litem testified that she believed termination of mother’s parental rights was in the child’s
best interests because the child “deserves a safe and sober and stable living environment,”
which mother was unable to establish.
Mother testified about her drug testing, stating that she had missed drug-testing
appointments “[m]ore than [she] should have” due to not having transportation or a cell
phone. Mother’s testimony also addressed other case-plan components, including her belief
that the home she was living in at the time of trial was safe for the child, despite ongoing
construction. She testified that the case plan required her to follow probation conditions,
which included abstaining from mood-altering substances, but she acknowledged that she
was arrested in January 2024 for violating probation. Mother also testified that her case
plan required her to attend the child’s medical and dental appointments but acknowledged
that she had missed the last two appointments before trial. Mother also addressed her
supervised visits with the child but acknowledged that those visits were suspended after
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she missed too many appointments. Mother testified that she believed she deserved more
time to comply with the case plan because she could become a better mother after receiving
more help.
In October 2024, the district court terminated mother’s parental rights based on four
statutory grounds. Mother appeals.
DECISION
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). An appellate court can affirm a district
court’s decision to terminate parental rights when at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, termination is in the best
interests of the child, and the county either made reasonable efforts to reunite the family or
those efforts were not required. In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385
(Minn. 2008); see Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2024) (providing the reasonable-efforts
requirement).
Appellate courts review district court findings supporting a termination of parental
rights to determine whether the findings address the statutory grounds, are supported by
substantial evidence, and are not clearly erroneous. Id. A clearly erroneous finding “is
either manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish termination
of parental rights, “subject to the presumption that a natural parent is a fit and suitable
person to be entrusted with the care of a child.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805
9
N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
The evidence must address conditions as they exist at the time of the hearing and show that
the current conditions “will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” Id. at 901-02
(quotation omitted).
Mother challenges the district court’s determinations regarding the county’s
reasonable efforts, the existence of four statutory grounds for termination, and the child’s
best interests. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and the child.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and the child. She asserts that the district
court failed to consider the statutory factors relevant to determining whether the county’s
efforts were reasonable and that the record does not support the district court’s
determination.
When, as here, reasonable efforts were required, “the petitioner must show clear and
convincing evidence that reasonable efforts were made to reunite the parent with the child.”
In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. App. 2018). The district
court must make specific findings that reasonable efforts were made by the county, or other
social-services agency, “to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent
. . . including individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts
. . . to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1)
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(2024). The district court is required to consider whether services provided to the child and
parents were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and,
if appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and
child’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well -being of
the child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the
child and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024). “Reasonable efforts encompass more than just a case
plan.” In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012). A district
court’s determination that reasonable efforts were made is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 322-23 (Minn. App.
2015) (determining that the district court’s “reasonable-efforts finding was not an abuse of
discretion”), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). A district court abuses its discretion if it
makes findings of fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves
discretionary matters in a manner contrary to logic and the facts on record. Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022); see In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11
N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024) (citing Woolsey in a juvenile protection appeal).
Here, the district court determined that the county made reasonable efforts
throughout mother’s case and that it sought to reunite mother and the child through those
efforts. Specifically, the district court found that the county provided mother with
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“supervised visitation, parenting education, drug testing, comprehensive assessments,
residential treatment, outpatient treatment, sober living, mental health services,
transportation assistance, probation, developmental assessment, medical services, and
ongoing case management services.” The district court found that, despite these services,
there was no significant change diminishing the county’s safety concerns about mother’s
ability to parent the child. It determined that mother’s controlled-substance use continued
as evidenced by her repeatedly failing to drug test, frequently testing positive for drugs
when she did test, and struggling to attend treatment programs despite the county referring
her to more than a dozen programs.
Mother argues that the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination was flawed
because the district court misapplied the law by failing to consider every aspect of the
factors required by Minnesota Statutes section 260.012(h)— specifically, whether the
services were selected in collaboration with the child’s family, tailored to the child and
family’s individualized needs, and relevant to the child’s well-being. Appellate courts
review de novo whether the district court correctly applied the law. In re A.R.M. , 611
N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn. App. 2000).
Section 260.012(h) requires district courts to consider a list of factors related to
reasonable efforts. But it does not require a district court to explicitly discuss in its order
every individual factor that it has considered. Here, the district court explicitly addressed
at least six of the eight statutory factors in its reasonable-efforts analysis—the relevance of
services to the child’s safety and protection, the adequacy of services to meet the needs of
the child and mother, whether services were culturally appropriate, the availability and
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accessibility of services, how consistent and timely services were, and whether services
were realistic under the circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). The district court’s
decision to not explicitly address the factors raised by mother does not mean that it failed
to consider these factors. We do not discern an abuse of discretion here.
Mother also argues that the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination is not
supported by the record. The record contains ample evidence of the services that the district
court found that the county had provided to mother, including evidence of supervised visits,
drug-testing services, comprehensive use assessments, free transportation, and the creation
of three case plans.
But mother argues that the reasonable-efforts determination lacks support because
the record shows that the county failed to take certain actions to address its main concerns
for the child’s safety —namely, mother’s mental and chemical health. Specifically, she
asserts that the county failed to inquire into her history of trauma or to refer her to trauma-
specific treatment; that the county’s assistance was inadequate regarding mother’s needs
for a cell phone and transportation to her appointments; and that the county did not
coordinate visit s for the child in mother’s home, increase the duration or frequency of
visits, or permit unsupervised visits. This argument is unconvincing.
With respect to the county’s referrals for treatment, mother never requested
programming that would address her specific trauma history. As to logistical support for
appointments, the record contains evidence that the county provided mother with free
transportation services through a partner organization but that those services were
suspended after mother violated the organization’s policy by not showing up for rides on
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three occasions in a two-month period. After those services were suspended, the county
provided mother gas cards, though it is unclear from the record whether mother owned a
vehicle at the time. The record also reflects that the county provided mother with a cell
phone and minutes for the phone. Finally, while the county did not coordinate home visits
with mother and the child at mother’s home, increase the duration or frequency of visits,
or permit unsupervised visits, it did provide her with supervised visits and parenting-
education services through a partner organization. Those services were suspended at one
point, but, similar to the free transportation services, the suspension was the result of
mother missing appointments.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and the child.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that a statutory
ground for termination of mother’s parental rights exists.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that clear
and convincing evidence supports four statutory grounds for termination.
2 To rule that the
statutory-basis requirement for termination was satisfied, “we need only conclude that one

2 The district court determined that (1) mother refused or neglected to comply with her
parental duties, (2) mother is palpably unfit to parent, (3) reasonable efforts failed to
correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement outside the home, and (4) the child
is neglected and in foster care, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(2), (3), (4), and (7) (2024). We note that, in legislative amendments that
became effective after the filing of the petition in this case but before trial, the relevant
paragraphs establishing these statutory bases were renumbered, see 2024 Minn. Laws ch.
115, art. 18, § 37, at 1742-44, but the district court, in its order, used the paragraph numbers
that were cited in the petition, not the numbering as amended as of August 2024. The error
is insignificant because the order reflects that the district court substantively ruled on the
four statutory bases.
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ground is supported.” In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 602 (Minn. App.
2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). The county bears the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that one or more statutory grounds for termination exists. In re
Welfare of J.S., 470 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. July 24,
1991). Appellate courts apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing whether a
statutory basis to involuntarily terminate parental rights exists. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87.
Because it is dispositive, we begin and end our statutory -basis analysis with the district
court’s determination that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to the
child’s placement outside the home.
Parental rights may be terminated if , “following the child’s placement out of the
home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the
conditions leading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). It is
presumed that reasonable efforts have failed if the following is true: the child is under age
eight when the TPR petition is filed and the child resides outside the home for six months
with the parent failing to maintain regular contact or to comply with an out-of- home
placement plan; an out -of-home-placement plan is filed with and approved by the court;
the conditions that led to the placement are not corrected, which is presumed if the parent
has “not substantially complied with the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan”; and
reasonable efforts are made to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Id. ,
subd. 1(b)(4)(i)-(iv). “A parent’s substantial compliance with a case plan may not be
enough to avoid termination of parental rights when the record contains clear and
convincing evidence supporting termination.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89. “The critical
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issue” is not a parent’s formal compliance with their case plan, but instead “whether the
parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring for the child.” Id.
Mother argues that there is not clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts
have failed to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement. She
focuses on two of the four statutory el ements that support a presumption that reasonable
efforts have failed— namely, noncompliance with the case plan and the county’s provision
of reasonable efforts. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4)(iii)-(iv). Mother also argues
that the district court failed to address the conditions existing at the time of the trial and
that the evidence does not support a finding that that the conditions would continue for a
prolonged, indeterminate period of time. See J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 901-02. We address
each of mother’s three challenges.
First, as to the reasonableness of the county’s efforts, as we concluded above, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunite mother and the child. The district court made detailed findings regarding
the county’s efforts, including the provision of services targeted at mother’s chemical
dependency and mental health, and those findings were supported by the record.
Second, as to mother’s compliance with her case plan, the district court found that
mother had demonstrated “little compliance.” The district court made detailed findings on
this issue, including about mother’s attendance of supervised visits, continued use of
controlled substances, noncompliance with drug-testing requests, completion of
comprehensive use assessments, struggles to follow the recommendations of those
assessments, failure to maintain a drug-free living environment, probation violation,
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inconsistent attendance of the child’s medical appointments, and cooperation with the
county by meeting with social workers.
The district court’s findings regarding case-plan compliance are supported by the
testimony and other evidence in the record. Specifically, the district court found that mother
attended supervised visits with the child, as her case plan required, but that these services
were suspended after mother missed three appointments. After services were suspended,
mother met with a county social worker to discuss the issues preventing her from attending
supervised visits. The social worker identified that mother had transportation issues, and
so the county arranged for volunteer driver services for her and purchased her a cell phone
with minutes. Despite those efforts, mother again failed to attend an appointment when her
supervised visits resumed, resulting in her termination from the program.
The district court also made findings about the case-plan requirement that mother
abstain from using controlled substances and comply with county requests for random drug
testing. It noted that, per the case plan, any missed test was presumptively considered a
positive drug-test result. The district court found, based on the testimony of the employee
of the drug-testing facility that mother used, that mother was placed on a random drug-
testing schedule at the facility. In total, mother was asked to test 49 times while on the
random-testing schedule. The district court found that despite having “49 opportunities to
show abstinence from chemical use,” mother tested just 17 times, and she tested negative
on only two of the tests, which were taken on the same day. In its findings, the district court
noted that mother testified that her transportation and cell-phone issues contributed to her
missing test appointments. The district court also noted that mother testified that she had
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used a controlled substance in the week preceding the trial and that she acknowledged that
she was not sober because of that use.
The district court also found that in January 2024, mother was arrested for a
probation violation. Mother testified that, because she had used controlled substances, she
had violated her probation—which was another instance of noncompliance with her case
plan.
On this record, the district court’s determination that mother did not substantially
comply with her case plan is supported by the evidence.
Third, as to current and future conditions, the district court found that the conditions
that led to the child’s out-of-home place existed at the time of trial and that there was “[n]o
substantial likelihood” that mother would be able to provide for the child’s “ongoing
physical, mental, emotional, or safety needs in the reasonably foreseeable future.” The
finding is supported by the record. In addition to testimony regarding mother’s lack of
progress in treatment, at trial mother acknowledged that she had used a controlled
substance a week prior to trial, that she uses the substance to self-medicate, and that she is
therefore not sober.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the record
contains clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts failed to correct the
conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement under Minnesota Statutes section
260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(4). Because only one statutory basis need exist in order to
affirm, we do not address the remaining statutory bases found by the district court. See
J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 602.
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
of mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the child. She asserts that the
district court failed to analyze the relevant best-interests factors and that the record does
not support the district court’s determination.
If a statutory basis to terminate parental rights is present, the best interests of the
child are “the paramount consideration” in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024); see J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902. The district court must
“make a specific finding that termination is in the best interests of the child.” Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). In making its best-interests finding, the district court must analyze
three factors: (1) “the child’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship;” (2) “the
parent’s interests in preserving the parent-child relationship;” and (3) “any competing
interests of the child.” Id. “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment,
health considerations and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of Child. of K.S.F., 823
N.W.2d 656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “apply an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s conclusion that termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interests.” A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 657.
The district court specifically found that termination is in the best interests of the
child and made findings in support of that determination. The district court did not,
however, explicitly address each of the three factors in its order. But while the district court
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did not categorically address each of the factors, they are nonetheless implicitly analyzed
in the district court’s findings.
For example, the district court implicitly addressed both mother’s and the child’s
interests in preserving the parent-child relationship in describing mother and the child’s
emotional connection in the findings, as demonstrated by descriptions of their supervised
visits during which mother was attentive to the child, verbally encouraged the child, and
showed affection through hugs and words. And the findings also address mother’s
inconsistency in attending schedu led supervised visits with the child and her struggles to
maintain sobriety, which implicate the competing interest of the child’s need for a stable
and safe environment. See id.
Finally, the record contains extensive evidence supporting the district court’s best-
interests determination, including the testimony of the child’s guardian ad litem and the
case manager who was involved in the creation of mother’s case plan. Their testimon ies
address the struggles mother has had to maintain sobriety and to consistently attend
supervised visits with the child and the concerns those issues raised that led both the
guardian ad litem and case manager to recommend that termination of mother’s parental
rights is in the best interests of the child.
Because the record supports the district court’s determination that termination of
mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the district court did not abuse
its discretion.
Affirmed.