In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. V. Z., Father.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1680

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. V. Z., Father.

Filed June 30, 2025
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-19-1996

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant father
J.V.Z.)

m boulette, Seungwon R. Chung, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Rebecca A. Randen, Randen Family Law, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent mother A.H.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Lisa Michelle Thompson, Amanda Sackmaster,
Assistant County Attorneys, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Human
Services)

Amanda Weitekamp, St. Paul, Minnesota (for child 4 and child 5)

Marylene Herady, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Larson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order denying appellant father’s motion to
modify parenting time following an order transferring permanent sole legal and sole
2
physical custody of their joint children to respondent mother in a juvenile-protection
proceeding, father argues that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings and
abused its discretion in its best-interests determination. We discern no reversible error in
the district court’s factual findings. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in its best-interests determination. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant J.V.Z. (father) and respondent A.H. (mother) are the parents of eight joint
children (child 1-8), born between 2004 and 2018. The following summarizes the district
court’s factual findings in its order denying modification of parenting time along with other
portions of the record relevant to the issues on appeal.
On September 30, 2019, child 4, who was 12 years old at the time, told mother that
father “had touched her inappropriately.” Child 4 participated in a forensic interview in
which she described multiple instances of sexual abuse. On October 10, 2019, the county
“made a maltreatment determination of sexual abuse of Child 4” by father.
Also in October 2019, the State of Minnesota charged father with second-degree
criminal sexual conduct. The district court filed a domestic-abuse no-contact order
(DANCO) prohibiting father from having contact with child 4. Later, father pleaded guilty
to fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct and was placed on probation. Father admitted to
violating the DANCO by contacting child 4 in a video call and sending a third party to
bring food and a toy to child 4. He was placed on probation for that offense, as well.
On December 20, 2019, respondent Ramsey County Human Services (the county)
petitioned to terminate father’s parental rights. In December 2020, t he parties reached a
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settlement agreement that resolved the petition for termination of father’s parental rights.
The settlement stated that the parties agreed (1) to the “transfer of permanent sole legal and
physical custody of all children to” mother, (2) that father could have contact and
supervised visitation with the children if he enrolled and participated in a sex-offender
treatment program and followed other conditions, and (3) that father “may petition the
court for additional custody and/or parenting time of the children” after completing
treatment. The district court issued a permanency order that incorporated the settlement
agreement, made relevant findings about mother’s ability to parent, and “awarded [mother]
permanent, sole legal and physical custody” of all eight children.
Mother and father divorced in 2021. At some point after the permanency order,
father began parenting time with child 5, child 6, child 7, and child 8 on Wednesday and
Friday evenings and during the day on alternating weekends.
In September 2023, father moved to modify parenting time for the four youngest
children (child 5, child, 6, child 7, and child 8). Child 5 and child 6 are girls and were born,
respectively, in September 2010 and April 2014. Child 7 and child 8 are twin boys who
were born in March 2018.1 In his motion, father asked for overnight parenting time on one
weeknight every week and every other weekend, as well as vacation and holiday parenting
time.

1 Father stated in his affidavit that he did not seek parenting time with child 1 (born July
2004) and child 2 (born October 2005) because child 1 was already emancipated and
child 2 was about to turn 18. He also did not seek parenting time with child 3 (born
February 2009) and child 4 (born April 2007); father stated that child 3 and child 4 did not
want parenting time.
4
In his affidavit attached to the motion, father averred that he “successfully
completed” a sex-offender treatment program and attends weekly therapy. Father also
averred that he is remarried and lives with his spouse in a five-bedroom home in St. Paul,
about 1.5 miles from mother’s home. Father ’s affidavit addressed the 12 best-interests
factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2022), contending that they weighed in
favor of granting him additional parenting time.
Father submitted several supporting documents, including a treatment-progress plan
and report. The report stated that father was “discharge[d] from [a ] previous treatment
program in which he was enrolled,” favorably described father’s conduct during supervised
visits, and noted that “no recommendation has been made restricting [father’s] contact with
minor males” and that “therefore visitation with” child 7 and child 8 “is supported . . . with
no restriction.” Father also submitted a letter from his therapist, who stated that father was
diagnosed with a personality disorder and that he has “implemented several behavioral
changes in order to prevent him from any form of physical touch with his daughters that
could lead to inappropriate thoughts or actions on his part.”
Mother opposed father’s motion. Mother submitted an affidavit in which she
discussed the 12 best-interests factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a),
contending that modification of father’s parenting time was not in the children’s best
interests. Mother attached several documents to her affidavit. First, father’s discharge form
from a treatment program stated that he was involuntarily discharged for a “[m]ajor rule
violation” because he violated a treatment condition restricting contact with child 4 and his
other children. Second, the criminal complaint alleged criminal-sexual-conduct charges
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against father. Third, a letter from father’s niece stated that, in 2013, father “came up to
[her] room once” and “ got onto the mattress” with her; father “got on top of [niece,]
supporting his weight on his arms,” and “began trying to kiss [her] lips.”
The guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children submitted a report discussing father’s
modification motion on April 12, 2024. The report summarized interviews with father and
mother and conversations with and observations of the four youngest children. The GAL
recommended that father “be granted up to four (4) overnights per month[], exclusively
during the weekends,” if he met certain conditions, including completing a new
psychosexual evaluation and providing “Child 5 and C hild 6 with safe and adequate
spaces” in his home.
The GAL provided an updated report on September 10, 2024, in which she stated
that father had completed a new psychosexual evaluation. The GAL recommended that
father be granted overnight parenting time every week, “two non- consecutive weeks of
vacation time each summer,” and holiday parenting time.
On September 17, 2024, the county submitted a letter opposing “any change to
[father’s] contact with Child 5 and Child 6” and stating that the county “would not
recommend changes to his contact with Child 7 and Child 8” because modifying parenting
time would not be in the children’s best interests. The county attached an affidavit by a
social worker, attesting that father’s recent psychosexual evaluation showed that he
exhibited “insight into his past actions.” But the affidavit also stated that father “admitted
to experiencing arousal around an underaged female child, having toxic thoughts that
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included comparing her to his wife, and rationalizing those thoughts.” The psychosexual
assessment was filed in the district court record under a protective order.
The GAL submitted an amended report on September 19, 2024, adding
recommended conditions for father’s overnight parenting time—that another adult must be
present during father’s parenting time with c hild 5 and child 6 and that father “should
refrain from entering Child 5 and Child 6’s bedrooms at all times.”
After a motion hearing that included testimony from the GAL, the district court
denied father’s modification motion in a written order that included 51 factual findings and
a f our-page discussion of the best-interests factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a).
Father appeals.
DECISION
Father argues that the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous and that
its best-interests determination reflects an abuse of discretion. To begin, we address
mother’s argument that “[f]ather failed to preserve many of his challenges against the
district court’s order” by failing to raise them to the district court.
On appeal, father argues that the district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence
and evidence that lacks foundation and that the district court was biased. Mother points out
that father raises these three issues for the first time on appeal. “[T]his court generally
considers only th ose issues argued before and considered by the district court.” In re
Welfare of D.W., 731 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988)). Because father did not object to hearsay or lack of
7
foundation during district court proceedings, we conclude that father forfeited these
evidentiary arguments.
Generally, we also do not consider issues of judicial bias for the first time on appeal.
See Gummow v. Gummow, 375 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Minn. App. 1985) (noting that a claim of
judicial bias should be raised at the district court to be considered on appeal). But it is
unclear when father would have raised a judicial-bias argument during district court
proceedings. Father appears to argue that judicial bias became evident upon receiving the
district court’s order. Even if we assume that father properly challenges judicial bias, we
are not persuaded that the district court’s order shows bias.
A judge must not be biased against a litigant and must also “satisfy the appearance
of justice.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quotation omitted). But “opinions
formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of
the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings” do not show that a judge is biased “unless
they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.” State v. Burrell (In re State), 743 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. 2008) (quoting
Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Father’s bias arguments relate to the
district court’s adverse determinations about his credibility and the weight of the evidence.
These determinations were within the district court’s discretion and do not “display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” Id. (quotation omitted). And appellate courts defer
to a district court’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence. In re Civ.
Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-23 (Minn. 2021). Therefore, father’s
judicial-bias argument lacks merit.
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Next, we consider the remaining issues in father’s appeal: first, whether the district
court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous and, second, whether the district court
abused its discretion by determining that a parenting-time modification was not in the
children’s best interests.
I. We discern no reversible error in the district court’s factual findings.
To resolve father’s motion to modify his parenting time, the district court received
affidavits along with some testimony at a motion hearing. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518.185
(stating that a moving party should provide affidavits “setting forth facts supporting” a
requested modification of a custody order and that the other parties “may file opposing
affidavits”), 260C.521, subd. 2(a) (stating that Minn. Stat. § 518.185 applies in
permanency modification proceedings) (2024). After the record was closed, the dis trict
court made written factual findings.
A district court’s factual findings “will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous or
unsupported by substantial evidence.” In re Welfare of B.A.B., 572 N.W.2d 776, 778
(Minn. App. 1998). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to
the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). “Even if the record might support findings
different from those made by the court, this does not show that the court’s findings are
defective.” In re Welfare of Child of J.L.L., 801 N.W.2d 405, 414 (Minn. App. 2011), rev.
denied (Minn. July 28, 2011). This court has previously concluded that “challenging a
district court’s findings of fact by simply marshalling evidence that could support findings
that differ from those made by the district court is an inadequate way to challenge those
9
findings.” Arise v. Naresh, No. A23-0379, 2024 WL 14994, at *3 (Minn. App. Jan. 2,
2024).2
In other words, appellate courts do not disturb findings of fact based on conflicting
evidence unless the findings are “manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence as a
whole.” In re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 127 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). “[A]n appellate
court need not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the
correctness of the findings of the [district] court.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation
omitted). And, as mentioned above, a ppellate courts defer to a district court’s credibility
determinations. Id. at 221-23.
To warrant reversal, any error during district court proceedings must be prejudicial.
See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.”); Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987) (stating that “we will not
reverse a correct decision simply because it is based on incorrect reasons”); In re Welfare
of Child of A.H., 879 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. App. 2016) (same).
Father challenges 39 of the district court’s 51 written findings of fact. Father argues
that the “majority of the district court’s substantive findings are not supported by facts in
evidence, are clearly erroneous, and led to multiple abuses of discretion.” The county
responds that “the district court’s findings of fact should stand,” emphasizing that “[j]ust

2 We are not bound by nonprecedential opinions but may consider them as persuasive
authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions and
order opinions are not binding authority . . . but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority.”). Arise is persuasive authority on the standard of review.
10
because [father] focuses on different facts than the district court did, does not mean the
district court’s findings are clearly erroneous as they are amply supported by the record.”
Mother argues that the district court’s factual findings are supported by the record. We
organize father’s challenges to the factual findings into four categories for ease of
discussion.
A. Father’s arguments seeking additional or different factual findings are
unavailing.
Father challenges several factual findings, not by arguing that the finding was
unsupported by the record, but by contending that the record supports other findings that
the district court could have made. For example, first, father argues that the district court
erred by referring to the county’s social worker as “the social worker who works with the
family” without stating that “she met with the children only two times in the year she had
been assigned to the matter.” Second, he argues that the district court erred by finding that
the GAL submitted reports that “supported modification of parenting time to allow
overnight visits” without also finding “the weight of the consistency in the GAL’s reports,”
and he argues that the GAL observed some things in one report that are not in other reports.
Third, father argues that the district court erred in its findings about his second marriage,
participation in therapy , and the desire of two children to not see father, claiming solely
that the district court’s order failed to state facts in the record. Father’s arguments are
unavailing because, “[e]ven if the record might support findings different from those made
by the court, this does not show that the court’s findings are defective.” J.L.L., 801 N.W.2d
at 414.
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B. Father’s claims of clear error b ased on how the district court phrased
some factual findings lack merit.
Father argues about the way the district court worded its factual findings. For
example, father argues that the district court erred by finding that mother was “awarded”
custody in the permanency order, reasoning that this language suggests a “contested
dissolution” when custody transferred to mother as the result of a settlement agreement.
Father also urges that the district court erred by finding that his home had bedrooms in the
“basement” when the home has a “lower level.” We reject each of these arguments because
the district court’s word choice and phrasing are not “manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). Father claims that some of
the district court’s phrasing suggests bias. But the record does not show bias, and appellate
courts do not presume error. See Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (stating
that “on appeal error is never presumed”). Therefore, we reject father’s claim that the
district court’s phrasing was due to an improper reason.
C. Father’s challenges to many factual findings fail because the record
supports those findings.
Father claims that many factual findings are clearly erroneous because they lack
support in the record. After a careful review of the record, we disagree and conclude that
the record supports the following factual findings.
Father challenges finding 16, which discusses the GAL’s summary of father’s
“safety practices” during his visits with the children, specifically father’s statements about
“not hugging, not kissing and keeping the children at a safe distance ” and that “it can be
hard to maintain these boundaries.” Father argues that the finding “does not comport with
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[father’s] statements or the report of the GAL.” But the GAL’s report from April 12, 2024,
relays father stating that “he learned to set physical boundaries, such as not hugging, not
kissing, and keeping the children at a safe distance” and “he accepts” these boundaries even
though “it can be hard at times.”
Father challenges finding 21, which states that four of the children “do not wish to
have contact with him” and lists the GAL’s recollection of the current agreed-upon
parenting-time schedule. There is conflicting information in the record about whether
child 1 and child 2 wish to have contact with father. Finding 21, however, is supported by
mother’s affidavit, which states that “[child 5] is the oldest of the children that are okay
with still spending time with [father].” The district court implicitly credited mother’s
affidavit, and appellate courts defer to a district court’s credibility determinations. See
Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23.
And the district court seems to be noting in finding 21 that the GAL mistakenly
described the parenting-time schedule. In finding 11, the district court found that father
“has parenting time every Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m., every Friday from
5:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. and alternatively on Saturday and Sunday from 10:00 a.m. to 8:30
p.m.” Father does not dispute finding 11. But in finding 21, the district court found that,
“[i]ntestestingly, [the GAL] stated that [father’s] parenting time is only two days per
week.” This finding is supported by the GAL’s recommendation that father should
“continue to have parenting time two days per week.” Thus, the record supports the district
court’s finding about the GAL’s description of the parenting-time schedule.
13
Father challenges finding 29, which states that mother believes father is “the fun dad
who spoils” the children and that mother takes on “day-to-day routines, chores, and
discipline.” The district court also found that mother averred father “slapped” one of the
twin boys “on the leg so hard it left a hand print.” Father argues that these findings are
contradictory and illogical. But the district court’s findings about mother’s averments are
accurate and, read together, find that mother avers that father is a “fun” parent but has also
slapped one of the twin boys one time to discipline him.
Father challenges finding 31, which states that mother “is concerned that Child 7
and 8 are too young to understand grooming behaviors by [father].” This finding is
supported by mother’s affidavit, which states that “the boys,” referring to child 7 and
child 8, “are too young to understand what could happen to them or what grooming looks
like.”
Father challenges finding 32, which says that “Child 5 and Child 6 are emotionally
struggling” and that child 6 “struggles with behavioral issues and ADHD” and “receives
therapeutic services.” This is supported by the GAL’s report, which states that mother told
the GAL that “Child 5 and Child 6 are emotionally struggling”; “Child 6 struggles with
behavioral issues and ADHD”; and “both Child 5 and Child 6 receive therapeutic
services.”
Father challenges finding 33, which states that, “[w]hile Child 5 has been
ambivalent about staying with her father overnight, she did state she would not stay there
if Child 6 did not stay there overnight.” This is supported by the GAL’s report, which says
14
that “[mother] reported Child 5 had been more ambivalent about going to their father or
staying overnight, and that Child 5 has stated they would not stay if Child 6 does not stay.”
Father challenges finding 36, which describes father’s psychosexual evaluation.
Father disputes the finding that “the author of the Static and Stable assessments explicitly
states that these assessment instruments tend to underrepresent the risk of actual
offending.” The record supports this finding. The psychosexual evaluation states that one
of its developers “acknowledges that this instrument tends to underrepresent the risk of
actual offending since many offenses are unreported and the conclusions are based on the
likelihood of a conviction for an offense.”
Father challenges finding 38, in which the district court found that mother stated
that “Child 5 felt pressured to have overnights with her father so that she could be present
to protect her younger sister, child 6.” Father contends that other record evidence
contradicts this finding because child 5 and child 6 stated that they felt safe at father’s
home. But finding 38 is supported by the record evidence that child 5 told mother she
“would not stay [at father’s home] if Child 6 does not [also] stay.”
Father argues that finding 47 is clearly erroneous because its footnote stated that the
intake form from father’s sex-offender treatment program did not mention that father was
involuntarily terminated from his previous treatment program. Father points out that a
program report refers to his discharge from a previous program. While the program’s
treatment progress and plan review stated that father was “discharge[d] from the previous
treatment program in which he was enrolled ,” this document did not mention father’s
“involuntary termination.” Thus, the record supports finding 47.
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We also reject father’s arguments asking us to reweigh evidence or reassess
credibility. For example, father argues that the district court clearly erred in (1) finding that
it “cannot fully rely upon the psychosexual evaluation’s conclusions,” (2) failing to find
proper “value” in the importance of “strengthening of [the] bond between parent and
children,” (3) crediting mother’s opinions, and (4) determining that the children wanted to
spend time with father for reasons that father claimed were “superficial.” Appellate courts
do not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility determinations by the district court. Kenney,
963 N.W.2d at 222-23. Therefore, these challenged findings are not clearly erroneous.
D. Father challenges some factual findings that are not supported by the
record, but these errors are harmless.
Father challenges some factual findings that are not supported by the record. Each
challenged finding is addressed in turn, and we conclude that any error is harmless.
Father argues that the district court erred by finding that the settlement agreement
was executed in 2023 rather than 2020; omitting part of a quote from the settlement
agreement; finding that a child told father they were sick, even though mother told father;
and incorrectly calculating the age of child 7 and child 8, who are twins. These errors are
harmless because they did not affect the district court’s best-interests analysis and therefore
did not affect father’s substantial rights. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (stating that courts “must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
of the parties”).
3

3 The only relevance to the age of child 7 and child 8, perhaps, is that the district court
found that child 7 and child 8 were “too young to express a preference.” The district court
also found that child 5, child 6, child 7, and child 8 expressed some interest in spending
16
Father argues that finding 22 was clearly erroneous because the district court found
that father’s niece was a “teenager” at the time of father’s sexually inappropriate behavior.
Father points out that the niece stated that she graduated college in 2011 and alleged that
inappropriate conduct occurred in 2013 and that, therefore, the niece was not a teenager
when the conduct occurred. Father is correct that most of the niece’s allegations were from
2013 and that the niece likely was not a teenager at that time because she had graduated
from college. The niece’s letter, however, described one instance from her “youth” in
which father “held [her] by the waist claiming to be teaching [her] a breathing technique.”
While this is a close call, there is some evidence in the record of alleged inappropriate
conduct by father that occurred when the niece was a “youth.” Even if the district court
clearly erred in finding the niece was a teenager at the time of father’s sexually
inappropriate behavior, this finding was not prejudicial because the district court did not
include father’s behavior with the niece in the best-interests analysis.
Father challenges finding 35, which states that, “[w]hen Child 5 was asked directly
if she felt unsafe with her father, Child 5 agreed by nodding.” Father is correct that the
child nodded when asked “if they meant they don’t feel unsafe with their father.” (Emphasis
added.) Although this finding is clearly erroneous, it is not prejudicial when viewed in the
context of the best-interests analysis, as is discussed below.

more time with father and that child 5 disclosed uneasiness. Still, the district court’s error
of one year in stating the twins’ age did not affect father’s substantial rights because the
district court did not determine that this factor weighed against modification.
17
Father argues that the district court clearly erred in finding 46 when it found that
“[t]he GAL did not review or consider the Discharge Report from” the sex-offender
program that involuntarily discharged father. But the GAL reviewed “[a]ll Court filings in
this matter,” which would include the discharge report because it was attached as an exhibit
with mother’s affidavit. Therefore, the district court clearly erred in finding that the GAL
did not review the discharge report. Although the GAL acknowledges father’s discharge
from the previous program, she does not mention the discharge report in her report or list
it as a consideration in making her recommendations, which supports the district court’s
finding that the GAL did not “consider” the discharge report. Given that the record supports
the gist of the district court’s finding, any error in finding 46 is harmless. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 61.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that modification
of father’s parenting time was not in the children’s best interests.
“The juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings
concerning any child who is alleged to be in need of protection or services . . . .” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.101, subd . 1 (2024). An order for permanent legal and physical custody to
another relative “may be modified using standards under sections 518.18 and 518.185.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.521, subd. 2(a).4 Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d) (2024) states
that a district court “shall not modify a prior custody order or a parenting plan provision

4 Here, father’s motion related to parenting time and not custody; however, under Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(f) (2024), “‘[c]ustody determination’ means a court decision and
court orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including parenting
time.” (Emphasis added.)
18
which specifies the child’s primary residence unless it finds . . . that a change has occurred
in the circumstances of the child or the parties and that the modification is necessary to
serve the best interests of the child.” Here, the district court determined that modification
was not in the children’s best interests and did not determine whether a change in
circumstances had occurred.
The best interests of a child, in the juvenile-protection context, “means all relevant
factors to be considered and evaluated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2024). Here, the
district court applied the 12 best-interests factors from the family-law statutes as stated in
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). Father does not challenge this statutory framework on
appeal, and both father ’s and mother’s arguments exclusively focus on the 12 factors set
out in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). The county argues that, “while the district court
cited Minn. Stat. § 518.17 in the family-law statutes with regard to the best interests of the
child analysis rather than the standard in the juvenile protection realm,” the juvenile
best-interests standard allows “all relevant factors to be considered and evaluated.” The
county adds that the “factors under § 518.17 are certainly relevant,” urging that any error
is harmless.
The factors relevant to a best-interests analysis vary with the question before the
court. See In re Welfare of Child. of M.L.S., 964 N.W.2d 441, 452 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021)
(noting that there is no universally applicable set of best-interests factors). A district court’s
misidentification of the relevant set of best-interests factors, however, is not fatal to that
district court’s best-interests analysis. We addressed a similar issue in In re Welfare of
Children of B.S.F.-J. , in which we determined that the district court erred in citing a
19
family-law statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.175 (2022), when deciding a parenting-time
modification motion following a permanency order. No. A24-0072, 2024 WL 3249287, at
*2-4 (Minn. App. July 1, 2024).5 In B.S.F.-J., we determined that the reference to Minn.
Stat. § 518.175 was harmless error “because the district court’s analysis turned on Minn.
Stat. § 518.18 and tracked the best-interests standard in Minn. Stat. § 260C.511 (2022).”
Id. at *4.
We similarly conclude here that any error in referring to the family-law framework
is harmless. Minnesota Statute s section 260C.511(a) allows consideration of “all relevant
factors” when modifying a permanency order, and the best-interests factors that the district
court considered are relevant. Like the district court in B.S.F.-J., the district court here
considered “all relevant factors” when determining the children’s best interests. Id.
(quotation omitted).
We therefore consider father’s arguments about the 12 best-interests factors set out
in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). This court reviews “a juvenile court’s assessment of
best-interest factors for an abuse of discretion.” A.H., 879 N.W.2d at 7. “A district court
abuses its discretion if it makes findings unsupported by the evidence or when it improperly
applies the law.” In re Welfare of Child. of M.A.H., 839 N.W.2d 730, 740 (Minn. App.
2013) (quotation omitted).

5 See supra note 2 (discussing persuasive authority). B.S.F.-J. is persuasive authority
because it analyzed a similar issue about the best-interests standard for modification of a
permanency order.
20
For example, in A.H., this court concluded that a district court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that the parent seeking modification of parenting time did
not “have the ability to control their behavior or to put the needs of the child first” and was
unwilling to “communicate and cooperate” with the child’s legal guardian, which was
causing stress for the child. 879 N.W.2d at 7. This court also commented that the district
court “conducted a thoughtful analysis of the child’s best interests” and determined that the
district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. Id.
Here, the district court determined that seven out of the 12 best-interests factors in
Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a), support denying modification; specifically, the district
court found that factors 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 weigh against any modification. 6 Father
challenges the district court’s analysis on each of these seven factors. Mother disagrees, as
does the county. We address each of the seven factors that the district court determined
weighed against modification.
Factor 4: Whether domestic abuse has occurred in the household, the nature of such abuse,
and the impact on parenting and the children’s safety, well-being, and developmental
needs
The district court determined that father’s history of abuse and DANCO violation
weighed against modification. The district court noted that father has been criminally

6 The district court analyzed the other five factors as follows: factors 1-3 and factor 5 were
neutral, although the district court included findings weighing against modification;
factor 10— benefit to the children in maximizing parenting time with both parents —
favored modification. To the extent that father challenges aspects of the district court’s
analysis of the other five factors, we discuss those arguments in the first half of this opinion
and need not consider these best-interests factors in detail given our conclusion on the other
seven best-interests factors.
21
convicted of sexually abusing child 4 and violating a DANCO by contacting child 4. The
district court also found that father “physically assaulted” one of the twins when he slapped
him as discipline and that father “lied about always having another adult present when the
children are with him.” The district court concluded that there were “red flags and
questions” about whether father “has internalized the skills he learned in sex offender
treatment and can sustain the behavioral changes that he needed to make.”
Father argues that the district court failed to consider that he completed treatment,
was discharged from probation, and complied with the probation requirements for his
criminal cases. Father also urges that the district court is not qualified to determine whether
he has “internalized” the skills from his treatment. 7 We disagree. The district court
acknowledged that father completed treatment and “was discharged from probation in his
DANCO contempt probation.” The district court also weighed the evidence when it stated
that father has not internalized the skills from his treatment, and we defer to a district
court’s weighing of evidence. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23. Thus, the district court
acted within its discretion in determining that this factor weighed against increasing
father’s parenting time.

7 Father also argues that we should review this factor de novo because it relates to the
application of law to stipulated facts, citing In re Est. of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 63 (Minn.
2008). But the record does not show that the district court considered stipulated facts.
Accordingly, we review the district court’s analysis on this factor for an abuse of discretion.
22
Factor 6: The history and nature of each parent’s participation in providing care for the
children
The district court determined that “[t]his factor weighs against modification”
because father “has not been the primary parent responsible for the children’s needs and
day to day care,” explaining that, during their marriage, mother stayed home with the
children and father was “the breadwinner.”
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by discussing his history of
parenting time because he did not have parenting time after mother was granted sole legal
and physical custody and his current motion did not request joint custody. Father provides
no authority supporting his argument that district courts should not consider this factor
when a parent is not seeking joint custody or has not had parenting time in the past. We
generally decline to consider issues that lack authority. See In re Welfare of Child of J.H.,
968 N.W.2d 593, 602 n.7 (Minn. App. 2021) (“An assignment of error based on mere
assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived
and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere
inspection.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). As even father
acknowledges, he has, at most, spent little time as the primary caregiver for the children .
Thus, the district court appropriately assessed the history of each parent in providing care
to the children. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that this factor weighed against modification.
23
Factor 7: The willingness and ability of each parent to provide care for the children, meet
the children’s developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs, and maintain
consistency
The district court “question[ed] whether [father had] the capacity to meet the
children’s ongoing developmental, emotional, and spiritual needs,” given that when he had
parenting time, “he [was] not always present or fail[ed] to have another supervising adult
present as is required.” The district court determined that this factor weighed against
modification.
Father argues that the district court’s analysis of this factor improperly credited
mother’s averments about events that occurred several years ago . We disagree and
conclude that the district court appropriately considered these past events to assess
credibility and weight of evidence. Again, appellate courts defer to a district court’s
credibility determinations and weighing of evidence. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23. Thus,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by crediting mother’s averments and
considering past events when it determined that this factor weighed against modification.
Factor 8: The effect on the children’ s well-being and development of changes to home,
school, and community
The district court determined that this factor weighed against a modification
allowing overnight visits for several reasons. First, the district court found that the children
would be isolated because other “parent[s] in the community with knowledge” will not
send their children for play dates or sleepovers at father’s home. Second, child 5 indicated
that she felt responsible to “watch over” child 6 when at father’s home, which the district
court found to be “a terrible burden.” And third, child 5 and child 6, who are both girls,
24
would be isolated from the rest of the family because their rooms would be “in the
basement.”
Father makes a series of arguments about this factor but does not claim that the
district court’s findings are not supported by the record. Father’s arguments are therefore
unavailing. For example, father challenges the district court’s comment about the basement
bedrooms. But the district court appropriately expressed its concern that the girls’ basement
bedrooms were separated from other family bedrooms and that this isolation would put
them at risk of sexual abuse by father. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that this factor weighed against modification.
Factor 9: The effect of proposed arrangements on the ongoing relationships between the
children and each parent, siblings, and other significant persons in the children’s lives
The district court acknowledged that “Child 7 and Child 8 do not understand why
their stepbrother and half-sister can sleep at their father’s home while they cannot.” The
district court ultimately determined, however, that his factor weighed against modification
because, although the modification would allow father to spend more time with the
children, it would also give him “more opportunity for having a negative influence on the
children.” Father argues that child 7 and child 8’s understanding is “age-appropriate and
completely irrelevant.” Even if this is true, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s determination that this factor weighed against modification.
25
Factor 11: The disposition of each parent to support the children’s relationship with the
other parent and to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the
children and the other parent
The district court found that mother “has supported the relationship ” between the
children and father while complying with appropriate boundaries given father’s
criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. The district court determined that this factor weighs
against modification because father blames mother “for the lack of overnight visits,” which
“undermines [mother’s] relationship with her children.”
Father argues that the record does not support this determination because it shows
that father supports the children’s relationship with mother. The district court’s finding is
supported by mother’s affidavit, which states that father told the children that she did not
“want [them] to spend time with [father]” and that father portrays himself as a victim. We
defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
this factor weighed against modification.
Factor 12: The willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing of their
children
The district court determined that mother and father do not coparent well, citing
mother’s affidavit and the attached exhibits, and found that father has “shown a tendency
to blame” mother for any disputes . The district court also found that father “has been
constructing two bedrooms in his basement” for child 5 and child 6, “even though this
Court has not approved overnight visits.” The district court reasoned that father “appears
to be manipulating the girls into wanting to stay with him where they will have their own
26
personal spaces, isolated from the rest of the family upstairs.” The district court determined
that this factor weighs against the modification of parenting time to allow overnight visits.
Father argues that the district court should not have relied on mother’s affidavit and
exhibits and argues that the district court incorrectly weighed instances when mother and
father did not get along over instances when they did. The weighing of evidence is within
the discretion of the district court. Id. The district court’s findings on this factor are proper
because, if “the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial
that the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the
contrary.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). Thus, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining this factor weighs against modification.
In sum, the district court considered relevant factors and determined that seven
factors weighed against modification. The district court properly considered the serious
concerns raised by father’s motion for unsupervised overnight parenting time. Father
pleaded guilty to sexually abusing child 4, and the district court found that “Child 6 is
nearing the age” at which father “offended against her sister.” Mother also presented
evidence that father physically disciplined one of the twins, which the district court found
“poses a safety threat.” Even though the GAL recommended granting father more parenting
time, the district court is not bound to adhere to that recommendation. See Sydnes v. Sydnes,
388 N.W.2d 3, 7 (Minn. App. 1986) (“The trial court is not bound to adhere to expert
testimony, especially when it is outweighed by other evidence.”). We conclude that the
district court engaged in a “thoughtful analysis of the [children’s] best interests.” A.H.,
27
879 N.W.2d at 7. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
modification was not in the children’s best interests and denying father’s motion.
Affirmed.