Sunrise Estates, a MN Limited Partnership, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1684

Sunrise Estates, a MN Limited Partnership,
Respondent,

vs.

Reuben Avery,
Appellant.

Filed June 23, 2025
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Jackson County District Court
File No. 32-CV-24-123

Douglass E. Turner, Christopher T. Kalla, Hanbery & Turner , P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Peter J. Hemberger, Sam Pilney, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.,
Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Smith, John
P., Judge.*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant-tenant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
respondent-landlord’s eviction action. We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
Appellant Reuben Avery was a tenant at a property controlled by respondent Sunrise
Estates, a MN Limited Partnership . Because the property is federally subsidized, it is
subject to regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The
written lease agreement between the parties is based on the HUD model lease provided in
HUD Handbook 4350.3 REV -1: Occupancy Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily
Housing Programs, app. 4-A (2013) (HUD handbook).
The lease provides that grounds for termination of the tenancy include “material
noncompliance” with the lease terms. “Material noncompliance” includes “one or more
substantial violations of the lease” and “repeated minor violations of the lease
that . . . adversely affect the health or safety of any person or the right of any tenant to the
quiet enjoyment to the leased premises and related project facilities.” The lease
incorporates a resident handbook with a crime-free provision, which prohibits “acts o f
violence or threats of violence, including but not limited to the unlawful discharge of
firearms, . . . intimidation, or any other breach of the lease or act that otherwise jeopardizes
the health, safety, or welfare of the Owner/Owner’s agents, Management, or other residents
and their guests.” According to the resident handbook, a single violation of the crime-free
provision is a “material violation of the lease and a basis for immediate lease termination
and eviction.” (Emphasis added and omitted.)
On September 10, 2024, Avery went to his apartment building’s management office
to complain that his unit had been vandalized. During Avery’s conversation with a
management agent, he became frustrated and said to “go ahead and call the police” because
3
he “had a 9mm handgun with 17 rounds in [his] unit and anyone that comes to the door
will be popped off.” Other residents and children were in the management office and heard
Avery’s threat.
The next day, a notice of lease termination dated September 11, 2024, was posted
on Avery’s door. The notice stated that Avery’s lease was being terminated as of that day
“for material non -compliance” with the lease and because he violated the crime -free
provision, citing the “threats of violence” Avery made in the management office. The
notice advised that Avery had “ 10 days in which to discuss the termination of [his] lease
with [Sunrise Estates]” (the ten -day discussion period) and that “ [t]he 10-day period will
begin on the earlier of the date this notice is delivered to your unit or the day after the date
the notice is mailed to you. ” The notice provided persons of contact for “ any response
or . . . any grievance” about the notice and noted that management would meet with Avery
if he requested a meeting. According to Avery, he did not request to meet with
management about the termination of his lease.
Also on September 11, 2024, Sunrise Estates commenced an eviction action against
Avery. After that date , Avery was served with the eviction complaint, summons, and
termination notice. Avery filed an answer pro se, and he later obtained counsel. Avery
then moved to dismiss the eviction action asserting, in part, that Sunrise Estates filed its
complaint “prematurely,” meaning “prior to the end of the 10-day period referenced in the
Notice of Lease Termination,” and thus failed to comply with “the lease, federal law, state
law, and HUD regulations.”
On October 14, 2024, the district court held an eviction hearing. On October 17,
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the district court ordered entry of judgement for Sunrise Estates, as well as issuance of a
writ of recovery of premises and order to vacate, which was served on Avery on October
27, 2024. In doing so, the district court concluded that Sunrise Estates properly complied
with notice requirements when terminating Avery’s lease. The district court reasoned, in
part, that “[a]ccording to the lease agreement, the lease could be terminated immediately
upon a material violation of the lease.” The district court further reasoned that neither
HUD regulations nor Minnesota Statutes require a landlord to wait ten days before
initiating an eviction action after providing notice of lease termination. The district court
ruled that because “there was no requirement that [Avery] be given 10 days before [Sunrise
Estates] could file an eviction action and the lease specifically states that the lease is
immediately terminated, Avery’s motion to dismiss for failing to provide him 10 days is
denied.”
Avery appeals.
DECISION
Avery contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the
eviction action. Specifically, he argues that the parties’ lease agreement precluded Sunrise
Estates from initiating an eviction action until expiration of the ten-day discussion period.1
“The application of statutes, administrative regulations, and local ordinances to
undisputed facts is a legal conclusion and is reviewed de novo.” City of Morris v. Sax
Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2008). The same de novo standard of review applies

1 This is the only part of the district court’s ruling that Avery challenges on appeal.
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to the interpretation of federal regulations. In re Ali, 938 N.W.2d 835, 838 (Minn. 2020).
In addition, “a lease is a form of contract” and “[u]nambiguous contract language must be
given its plain and ordinary meaning, and shall be enforced by courts even if the result is
harsh.” Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 591 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 1999) (footnote
omitted).
In arguing that Sunrise Estates had to wait ten days after providing notice of lease
termination before initiating an eviction a ction, Avery primarily relies on the HUD
handbook which contains the model lease. See HUD Handbook 4350.3 REV-1, app. 4-A.
The HUD handbook clarifies that termination of a tenancy is “the first step in the eviction
process,” in which the landlord “gives the tenant notice to vacate the unit because of a lease
violation(s).” HUD Handbook 4350.3 REV-1, § 8-1(B).
The HUD handbook provision at issue here states that when terminating a tenancy,
the landlord must advise the tenant in writing “ that he/she has 10 days within which to
discuss termination of tenancy with the owner” and that the ten-day period “begins on the
day that the notice is deemed effective.” Id., § 8-13(B)(2)(c)(4) (emphasis omitted). Avery
contends that under that provision, a landlord may not initiate an eviction action during the
ten-day discussion period. But the plain language of the provision says nothing about the
timing of an eviction action in relation to the ten -day discussion period. On its face, the
provision simply requires the landlord to provide the tenant with written notice that the
tenant has ten days from the notice’s effective date to discuss the termination with the
landlord. Id. There is no dispute that the written notice of lease termination that was posted
on Avery’s door advised him that his lease was terminated effective September 11, 2024,
6
and that he had ten days from that date to discuss the termination with Sunrise Estates.
That notice complied with the plain language of the relevant HUD handbook provision.
There is also no dispute that Avery did not exercise his right to discuss the termination with
Sunrise Estates during the ten-day discussion period.
Avery cites no precedential authority that prohibits the filing of an eviction action
within the ten-day period, much less prohibits doing so under the circumstances here: when
there is an immediate lease termination based on material noncompliance with a crime-free
provision. This lack of authority stands in contrast to other federal and state laws that
prohibit the immediate initiation of an eviction proceeding following termination based on
non-payment of rent. For example, a HUD regulation expressly prohibits landlords from
initiating eviction actions within 30 days of notice of termination for failure to pay rent.
24 C.F.R. § 884.216(d)-(e) ( 2025) (requiring landlords to “provide the tenant with a
termination notice at least 30 days before a formal judicial eviction is filed ”). Similarly,
Minnesota law provides, “[b]efore bringing an eviction action alleging nonpayment of rent
or other unpaid financial obligation in violation of the lease,” a landlord must provide 14
days’ notice to the residential tenant specifying the basis for future eviction action. Minn.
Stat. § 504B.321, subd. 1a (2024) (referring to this period of prohibited filing as an
“eviction notice period”).
In Manor v. Gales , we noted that a HUD eviction regulation was “detailed and
thorough,” and we “assume[d] that HUD would have further defined [a statutory term] had
it intended to impose ” a more restrictive requirement through the use of that term. 649
N.W.2d 892, 895 -96 (Minn. App. 2002) . Likewise, in this case we assume that HUD
7
would have expressly prohibited immediate initiation of an eviction action if that was
HUD’s intent, just as it did in other contexts . See Lor, 591 N.W.2d at 704 (“In light of
HUD’s careful crafting of the [public housing authority’s] role in eviction decisions, HUD
would likely have spelled out any additional supervisory responsibilities it wished courts
to take.”).
In sum, Avery has not provided authority to support his position that an eviction
action based on a violation other than nonpayment of rent —including a material violation
of a crime-free provision—cannot be initiated immediately after providing notice of lease
termination.
Moreover, Avery does not cite precedential caselaw indicating that an eviction
action cannot be initiated before expiration of the ten -day discussion period mandated by
the HUD handbook. The single binding Minnesota case that Avery cites simply states that
landlords must comply with federal requirements when initiating an eviction. Hoglund-
Hall v. Kleinschmidt , 381 N.W.2d 889, 895 -96 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that federal
regulations governing notice of termination requirements supersede state law and that the
regulations “must be complied with before [a landlord] can terminate a tenancy”). In
Kleinschmidt, the landlord failed to give the tenants any written notice of termination; we
did not address the ten-day discussion period at issue here.2 Id. at 891.

2 Although Avery cites Minnesota district court cases to support his argument that an
eviction action may not be initiated during the ten-day discussion period, rulings of the
district court are not binding on this court. See Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth
Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003) (noting that this court is
bound by decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court).
8
The federal caselaw that Avery cites is not binding on this court. See Citizens for a
Balanced City, 672 N.W.2d at 20. “Although not binding, . . . other federal court opinions
are persuasive” when interpreting federal law “and should be afforded due deference.” Id.
But the cases on which Avery relies are not on point. For example, Staten v. Housing
Authority of the City of Pittsburgh addressed a two -notice system in which the landlord
must first provide notice of a proposed termination of a tenancy before providing a
subsequent notice to vacate premises 14 days later. 469 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (W.D. Pa.
1979). That holding was limited to lease terminations based on nonpayment of rent, and
the holding relied on a federal regulation that explicitly required a 14 -day notice period
“‘in the case of failure to pay rent.’” Id. at 1016 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 866.4(1) (1978)).
Another federal case on which Avery relies, Linares v. Jackson , dealt with an
entirely different issue: whether HUD’s “refusal . . . to provide notice and an opportunity
to be heard before initiating eviction proceedings . . . against tenants in HUD -owned
subsidized housing because HUD has determined that the premises are in need of
substantial rehabilitation violates procedural due process. ” 531 F. Supp. 2d 460 , 461
(E.D.N.Y. 2008). Avery does not claim a due process-violation in this case.
Despite the unambigu ous language of the relevant HUD handbook provision —
which does not restrict when an eviction action may be initiated —and the lack of any
precedential authority supporting his position, Avery argues that we should construe the
HUD handbook provision as prohibiting initiation of an eviction action before expiration
of the ten-day discussion period because doing so would be “in line with Minnesota’s push
to make evictions harder and expungements easier.”
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Avery’s argument sounds in public policy, and we are not a policy -making court.
See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“The function of the court of
appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them. ”); LaChapelle v. Mitten,
607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. App. 2000) (“Because this court is limited in its function to
correcting errors it cannot create public policy. ”), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000) .
Moreover, “the Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected our prior attempt to read equitable
standards into HUD regulations when the regulation is carefully crafted and addresses all
the concerns intended.” Gales, 649 N.W.2d at 895. Whether the initiation of an eviction
action should be delayed after providing notice of lease termination based on conduct that
threatens the safety of others is not a decision for an error -correcting court. In sum, we
cannot rely on a policy basis to construe the relevant HUD h andbook pro vision as
prohibiting initiation of an eviction action before expiration of the ten -day discussion
period.
We conclude that Sunrise Estates was allowed to initiate its eviction action
immediately as provided in the parties’ lease agreement. It was not required to wait until
the expiration of the ten-day discussion period. The district court therefore did not err by
refusing to dismiss the eviction action on that ground.
Affirmed.