In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Shawn Jamison.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1714

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Shawn Jamison.

Filed March 24, 2025
Affirmed
Florey, Judge*

Commitment Appeal Panel
File No. AP23-9129

Jennifer L. Thon, Jones Law Office, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant Shawn Jamison)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Anthony R. Noss, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Commissioner of Human Services)

Brian Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Aaron D. Duis, Assistant County Attorney, Buffalo,
Minnesota (for respondent Wright County)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Florey, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for transfer from a secure facility to
community preparation services, arguing that the Commitment Appeal Panel clearly erred
in determining that transfer was not appropriate. We affirm.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
Between 2000 and 2002, appellant Shawn Michael Jamison was convicted of fifth-
degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually touching a four-year -old girl and second-
degree criminal sexual conduct for having repeated sexual contact with a ten-year-old girl.
In February 2012, Jamison was indeterminately civilly committed to the Minnesota
Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person. He appealed his
commitment to this court on the grounds that the commitment violated his right to
substantive due process. In re Civ. Commitment of Jamison, No. A12-0692, 2012 WL
4476644, at *1 (Minn. App. Oct. 1, 2012). We affirmed his commitment. Id. at *2-3.
MSOP is a three -phase program. Phase I “focuses primarily on general self-
management, adherence to program rules and treatment-interfering behaviors and beliefs.”
Phase II “focuses on the client’s offending patterns and the identification and resolution of
underlying issues and motivations related to the offending behaviors.” Phase III “is the
transitional phase of treatment and focuses on deinstitutionalization and community
reintegration.” Jamison has been in phase II since December 2021. He resides at MSOP-
Moose Lake.
In June 2022, Jamison petitioned the Special Review Board (SRB) for a reduction
in custody, seeking discharge from civil commitment, provisional discharge, or transfer
from a secure facility to community preparation services (CPS). See Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.27, subd. 2 (2024) (permitting a committed person to petition for a reduction in
3
custody).1 CPS refers to “specialized residential services or programs operated or
administered by [MSOP] outside of a secure treatment facility.” Minn. Stat. § 246B.01,
subd. 2a (2024). The s ervices “are designed to assist civilly committed sex offenders in
developing the appropriate skills and resources necessary for an eventual successful
reintegration into a community.” Id. Respondents Wright County and Commissioner of
Human Services opposed Jamison’s petition.
In August 2023, after a hearing, the SRB made findings and recommended to grant
the petition for transfer and deny the petition for provisional discharge and discharge from
civil commitment. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 3(a) (2024) (providing that the SRB
“shall hold a hearing on each petition before issuing a recommendation and report”).
The commissioner timely petitioned the Commitment Appeal Panel for rehearing
and reconsideration of the SRB’s recommendation to grant transfer. 2 See Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.28 (2024) (authorizing a petition for rehearing and reconsideration before a judicial
appeal panel, which considers the petition de novo). Accordingly, a court examiner was
appointed to do a full evaluation.
The panel held a hearing in August 2024. Jamison testified on his own behalf and
called a DHS risk assessor. The commissioner called the clinical court services director

1 We cite the most recent version of Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 2 because it has not been
amended in relevant part. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617
N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000) (stating that, generally, “appellate courts apply the law as
it exists at the time they rule on a case”). For the same reason, we also cite the current
versions of other statutes cited in this opinion.

2 Jamison also petitioned for rehearing and reconsideration of the SRB’s recommendation
to deny provisional discharge and discharge, but he withdrew his petition.
4
and the examiner the panel appointed. The panel also received exhibits, including expert
reports and treatment notes.
Dr. Matthew Edwards, the DHS risk assessor, described two risk assessment reports
that he prepared : an initial report in 2023, in anticipation of the SRB hearing, and an
updated report in May 2024, in anticipation of the panel hearing. In the initial report, Dr.
Edwards concluded that Jamison did not meet the criteria for transfer. In the updated report,
Dr. Edwards “cautiously opine[d] [that] Mr. Jamison minimally meets criteria for transfer
to CPS.”
Dr. Edwards described Jamison’s treatment trajectory as “solid.” Based on his
review of Jamison’s history, Dr. Edwards explained that Jamison had gradually reengaged
with treatment and that by 2021, Jamison “was pretty much back on board.” Dr. Edwards
observed that, at around the same time, Jamison was having fewer disciplinary issues.
Jamison had shown an “ability to manage increasingly stressful and challenging situations”
without losing progress on his treatment. And, in Dr. Edwards’s view, if Jamison were
transferred to CPS, he could be around “a group of positive peers who are more treatment
minded” to “encourage him in the direction that he needs to go.” Dr. Edwards also testified
that a treatment that Jamison may benefit from—eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing (EMDR)—is unavailable at Moose Lake; it was only available at the St. Peter
facility or through CPS.
At the same time, Dr. Edwards acknowledged that Jamison did not present a
“straightforward clear case . . . for someone who is appropriate for CPS” because he has a
“concerning” identification with a “group of considerably negative minded folks up at
5
Moose Lake” who “[h]e considers his family.” Dr. Edwards described a problematic
attitude that Jamison holds on to:
As I mentioned in my report, he calls his room a cell. He calls
his roommate a cellie. He refers to security counselors as
guards. There’s a lot of old criminal mentality that’s still stuck.
That does not bode well when you think about someone’s
ability to make consistent prosocial choices. And it doesn’t
support the idea that authority is someone that you can trust.
Or the treatment team members are someone that . . . have your
best interests in mind. It undermines the potential for him to
consistently engage in prosocial behaviors. It undermines some
of his potential ability to make progress in his treatment when
he struggles with, can I trust my therapist; I don’t like my
therapist; she doesn’t take the time to meet with me.

Relating that behavior to the appropriateness of transfer, Dr. Edwards testified that “anyone
who’s holding onto the criminal code going into CPS is gonna face challenges.” And his
view was that Jamison has “trauma that he still has to work on” that “has the potential to
dysregulate him emotionally considerably” and potentially “lead to some behavioral
issues.” Dr. Edwards noted that Jamison’s peer group was persistently described by
providers as “anti-treatment,” “all pretty angry,” and “reactive.” According to Dr. Edwards,
while Jamison stated that he considers the group his “family” and reports that they “offer
him a sense of belonging and safety, to describe them as prosocial supports in the truest
sense is an overstatement.”
Christopher Schiffer, the clinical court services director at MSOP, also testified. His
role encompasses making recommendations and reports to the panel. Schiffer testified that
Jamison has made a notable shift to being more active in treatment and pursuing sobriety
but that he still has issues with “antisociality,” externalizing blame and being influenced
6
by his “antisocial companions.” Schiffer clarified that arousal management treatment is
available at MSOP-St. Peter but not MSOP-Moose Lake. He further testified that Jamison’s
needs would be best met at a secured facility, whether at MSOP-Moose Lake or St. Peter.
Moose Lake provides talk therapies that are used to treat trauma.
The final expert the panel heard from was Dr. Amanda Powers, a panel-appointed
examiner. She interviewed Jamison, reviewed records, analyzed his sexual recidivism risk,
and issued a report. Dr. Powers opined that Jamison needs EMDR and arousal management
treatment, which are available at CPS or MSOP-St. Peter (another secure treatment facility)
but not at MSOP-Moose Lake. Yet Dr. Powers concluded that Jamison’s “transfer cannot
be accomplished with a reasonable degree of safety to the public.” Her basis for this
conclusion was that “Jamison’s current treatment progress is indicative of individuals who
have not yet acquired treatment knowledge and implementation that would mitigate risk in
the lower direction.” She noted that Jamison does not pose an elopement risk and would
“not have unsupervised access to potential victims at CPS.” She also identified a number
of unmanaged dynamic risk factors, including Jamison’s sexual deviance and sexual
preoccupation, non-compliance with supervision, emotional identification with children,
and negative social influences. And although Dr. Powers said that MSOP-St. Peter would
meet Jamison’s needs better than MSOP-Moose Lake because it provided EMDR therapy,
she testified that she did not believe that Jamison’s needs could best be met at CPS.
Jamison also testified on his own behalf. He testified that he has been sober from
alcohol since 2018. He testified that he has been engaged with his group treatment but does
not attend the optional Alcoholics Anonymous group because he feels it was not a good
7
fit. Jamison testified that he has not been offered EMDR at MSOP- Moose Lake. He has
not done individual assignments with his therapist on trauma work, but he has started
writing short stories about his traumatic incidents. Jamison disclosed that he regularly
writes to three people who are at CPS, which he finds encouraging. He had a close
relationship with his prior therapist and has adjusted to his new therapist. And Jamison
testified that he ultimately believed that he was prepared to deal with the stress of getting
treatment while under less supervision at CPS and that he had no intention of harming
anyone.
The panel determined that it was not appropriate to transfer Jamison to CPS.
Although the panel recognized that Jamison had made some progress in treatment, it
determined that he needed additional treatment in a secured facility before a transfer to
CPS wo uld be safe and clinically effective. Accordingly, the panel denied Jamison’s
petition for transfer to CPS.
Jamison appeals.
DECISION
This appeal raises a single issue: whether the panel clearly erred by denying
Jamison’s request to be transferred to CPS. We review the panel’s decision for clear error.
In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied
(Minn. June 20, 2017). When reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, do not find their own facts,
do not reweigh the evidence, and do not reconcile conflicting
evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021).
8
Many of the panel’s findings were based on its evaluation of the expert testimony it
received at the hearing. We “generally . . . defer to [the panel’s] evaluation of expert
testimony.” In re Civ. Commitment of Fugelseth, 907 N.W.2d 248, 256 (Minn. App. 2018)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). The panel “is not bound by the
recommendations of the experts, unless the experts’ testimony is so positive as to exclude
all doubt as to the matter on which they are given.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 225 (quotation
omitted). The panel may reach a conclusion contrary to the experts’ unanimous
recommendation if the conclusion is supported by “other evidence in the record as a
whole—such as treatment records, lay or clinical testimony, or parts of an expert’s report
or testimony.” Id.
The panel may grant a request to transfer out of a secure facility, but only if it finds
that transfer is appropriate. Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(a) (2024). The petitioner bears
the burden to demonstrate appropriateness by a preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.28, subd. 2(e) (2024). “In evaluating whether a petitioner has demonstrated the
appropriateness of transfer by a preponderance of the evidence, ‘[t]he panel must address
the statutory factors.’” Foster v. Jesson, 857 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. App. 2014)
(alteration in original) (quoting Piotter v. Steffen, 490 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn. App. 1992),
rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1992). The factors are:
(1) the person’s clinical progress and present treatment needs;
(2) the need for security to accomplish continuing treatment;
(3) the need for continued institutionalization;
(4) which other treatment program can best meet the person’s
needs; and
(5) whether transfer can be accomplished with a reasonable
degree of safety for the public.
9
Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(1)-(5) (2024).
Here, in its memorandum, the panel addressed each of the statutory factors and
determined that transfer would not be appropriate. The panel explained that, although
Jamison is doing well in his treatment at Moose Lake, he did not meet his burden to prove
that transfer was appropriate by a preponderance of the evidence. The panel “found Dr.
Powers most credible and persuasive as to [Jamison’s] clinical progress and present
treatment needs and how [Jamison] requires the security and institutionalization of a secure
treatment setting for continued progress.” The panel noted that Jamison had “work to do
on his antisociality that will make him a better candidate for CPS in the future,” but that
“this work is best done inside a secure perimeter.”
In challenging the panel’s determination that transfer was not appropriate, Jamison’s
arguments fall into two categories: (A) those relating to clinical progress, present need for
treatment, and the treatment program that would best suit Jamison’s needs, see Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(1), (4), and(B) those relating to Jamison’s need for security to
accomplish continuing treatment, need for continued institutionalization, and whether
transfer can be accomplished with a reasonable degree of safety, see Minn. Stat. § 253D.29,
subd. 1(b)(2), (3), (5). We address them in turn.
A. Clinical progress and treatment needs
Jamison posits that he “has clearly demonstrated positive clinical progress in
treatment,” but his treatment needs are not being met at MSOP- Moose Lake because he
needs services that are not offered there. He advances three arguments in support of this
position.
10
First, Jamison argues that the panel clearly erred “when it determined that MSOP-
St. Peter is the best and most appropriate treatment location.” We disagree that the panel
made that determination. Rather, the panel considered Dr. Edwards and Dr. Powers’
opinion that MSOP-St. Peter was the most appropriate location for Jamison, but the panel
did not itself reach that conclusion. More to the point, the panel was not empowered to
transfer Jamison to MSOP-St. Peter because that request was outside the scope of
Jamison’s petition for a reduction in custody. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subd. 1(b) (2024)
(“‘[R]eduction in custody’ means transfer out of a secure treatment facility, a provisional
discharge, or a discharge from commitment.”). The panel found it “very disturbing” that
treatments that could meet Jamison’s needs, such as EMDR and arousal management, were
not offered at MSOP- Moose Lake. But the issue before the panel was not which secure
treatment facility is best for Jamison; the issue was whether transfer to CPS was
appropriate. The panel recognized this limitation on its authority.
Second, Jamison contends that the panel clearly erred because “[i]t is undisputed
that Jamison’s treatment needs can be met at CPS.” But this argument does not establish
clear error. A panel is not required to transfer a client solely because CPS can meet their
needs better than a secure facility. The statute requires the panel to consider other factors.
In determining whether transfer is appropriate, the panel must “consider[] . . . the person’s
clinical progress and present treatment needs” and the treatment program that can best meet
those needs among three other factors. Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b). The panel did so
here.
11
Moreover, the record reasonably supports the panel’s conclusion Jamison’s
treatment needs cannot be most effectively met at CPS at this time. Although the record
established that CPS offers services that are within Jamison’s present treatment needs and
are unavailable at MSOP-Moose Lake, the panel concluded that Jamison’s work of getting
past “his antisociality” and reducing his risk to reoffend “is best done inside a secure
perimeter.” This evaluation of Jamison’s social preparedness is reasonably supported by
the record as a whole. For example, Dr. Edwards testified that Jamison has an “old criminal
mentality” and that “anyone who’s holding onto the criminal code going into CPS is gonna
face challenges.” And in his updated report, Dr. Edwards wrote that Jamison “is not an
ideal candidate for CPS” and that clients who are not ready for CPS “risk jeopardizing their
own progress and that of their peers.” See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 225 (suggesting that
parts of an expert’s report or testimony may be used as evidence to support the panel’s
conclusion, even if that conclusion differs from the expert’s ultimate opinion). Thus, t he
panel did not clearly err in finding that Jamison must continue his treatment in a secured
facility until he is ready for CPS.
Third, Jamison argues that the panel clearly erred in relying on Dr. Powers’ opinion
despite rejecting two components of her testimony: (1) that MSOP offered Jamison a lateral
transfer to MSOP-St. Peter, and (2) that Jamison could destabilize if administered EMDR
and arousal management treatment. We are not persuaded.
As we explained above, the panel may rely on “parts of an expert’s report or
testimony” in making its determination, and it is not error to discount portions of expert
opinions where those opinions conflict with other portions of the record. Kenney, 963
12
N.W.2d at 225 (citing In re Civ. Commitment of Duvall, 916 N.W.2d 887, 894-95 (Minn.
App. 2018)). Rather, the panel’s rejection of only the unsupported portions of Dr. Powers’
testimony—which Jamison himself characterizes as a product of the panel’s “careful []
review” of the record—demonstrates that it thoughtfully weighed the evidence and even
reconciled some conflicting evidence in Jamison’s favor. And Jamison mischaracterizes
the panel’s evaluation of Dr. Powers’ EMDR destabilization prediction. Jamison states that
“the panel did not agree that [destabilization] was highly likely to occur.” But the panel did
not express disagreement—it merely “not[ed] that it did not base its decision [on the fact
that] that there is a ‘high likelihood’ [Jamison] could destabilize” because of EMDR and
certain other treatments. Because the panel appropriately considered Jamison’s clinical
progress and treatment needs in evaluating the appropriateness of transfer to CPS, we
discern no error relating to the panel’s determinations on these factors.
B. Security, need for institutionalization, and public safety
We turn now to Jamison’s arguments relating to security, need for
institutionalization, and public safety. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.29, subds. 1(b)(2), (3), (5).
Jamison argues that the panel clearly erred by applying the incorrect legal standard
in stating, “[I]f his treatment needs were different he could be transferred without risk to
the public safety,” because the statute does not require a risk-free transfer—only that
transfer be “accomplished with a reasonable degree of safety for the public.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(5). The commissioner responds that the panel cited the proper legal
standard in the final paragraph, which makes it “clear that the Panel ’s prior reference to
‘without risk to the public’ is not the legal standard it applied.”
13
We discern no clear error here. By saying that the transfer could be risk-free if
Jamison’s treatment needs were different, the panel did not imply that it misunderstood the
legal standard to require a lack of risk. And the panel’s recitation of the correct standard,
in addition to its appropriate analysis under that standard, assures us that the panel’s finding
on this factor was not clear error. Moreover, the panel’s statement does not seem to suggest
that it concluded that the risk was so great as to preclude transfer; it seemed more focused
on Jamison’s treatment needs. That is consistent with its conclusion that his treatment
would be “best done inside a secure perimeter.”
Finally, Jamison argues that the panel clearly erred in finding that the transfer was
inappropriate because “the record as a whole, and numerous findings made by the [p]anel,
undercut the [panel ’s] ultimate conclusion” on three factors: the need for security to
accomplish continuing treatment; the need for continued institutionalization; and whether
transfer can be accomplished with a reasonable degree of safety to the public. See Minn.
Stat. § 253D.29, subd. 1(b)(2)-(3), (5). Jamison relies on evidence that he would have more
prosocial peers at CPS; that CPS has more services available to address institutionalization;
that Jamison’s compliance with rules has improved, as has his focus on recovery; that he
has maintained his sobriety and developed skills to help him avoid relapse; that the
actuarial assessments suggest that his recidivism risk is not heightened; and that Jamison
is not an elopement risk, nor would he have access to his victim pool at CPS. In response,
the commissioner characterizes Jamison’s argument as a call for this court to improperly
reweigh evidence.
14
Although Jamison is correct that there is evidence supporting the appropriateness of
transfer, the question before us is whether the evidence on the whole reasonably supports
the panel’s decision. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222. We conclude that it does. Two of the
three experts testified that it would be inappropriate for Jamison to be transferred to CPS.
Dr. Powers’ opinion was informed by a risk assessment that accounted for Jamison’s
present actuarial recidivism risk of sexual re-offense of 22.7% in the next five years. And
Dr. Powers testified that persons in Jamison’s risk pool (i.e., children) are present at CPS
and are not always escorted as they are at Moose Lake. These safety concerns reasonably
support the panel’s conclusion that transfer was inappropriate.
In sum, while there is conflicting evidence about the appropriateness of Jamison’s
transfer, the evidence on the whole reasonably supports the panel’s nuanced determination
that the preponderance of the evidence does not support a transfer to CPS “at this time.”
The panel therefore did not clearly err in denying Jamison’s petition for transfer.
Affirmed.