In Re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1718

In Re the Marriage of:

Erica Leigh Riehm, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Harold Andrew Riehm,
Appellant.

Filed January 26, 2026
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge*

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-23-301

Mark Z. Hanno, Oakdale, Minnesota (for respondent)

Harold Andrew Riehm, West Saint Paul, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Wheelock , Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
On appeal from the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage, a ppellant-father
Harold Andrew Riehm challenges many of the district court’s procedural and evidentiary

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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rulings, findings of fact, and discretionary decisions. He also asserts the district court was
biased against him and deprived him of a fair trial and due process of law. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent-mother Erica Leigh Riehm’s petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage
sought sole physical custody of the parties’ two children. Father’s answer and
counterpetition sought joint physical custody and equal parenting time. When trial
commenced, both parties sought an award of joint legal custody and joint physical custody
of their children.
The district court’s December 2023 order for temporary relief allocated parenting
time, divided assets, and set father’s monthly “temporary family support” obligation at
$1,500. Later, mother moved to hold father in contempt for not paying temporary family
support. In May 2024, father filed five motions (the May motions). They included a 100-
page combined motion (the combined motion) asking the district court to make admissions,
establish facts, exclude evidence, and grant sanctions and attorney fees. Before trial, the
district court ruled on neither mother’s contempt motion nor father’s May motions.
Also in May 2024, the parties hired James Street as a neutral evaluator to interview
their 12-year-old son regarding his custodial preferences. The evaluator filed a report
documenting his interview and resulting findings.
At trial, mother argued that the district court should not consider father’s May
motions because they were procedurally defective. Because there were several motions
pending, including father’s combined motion, the district court clarified: “So the record is
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clear, anything that runs afoul of the General Rule [303.03(a) 1] with regard to timing of
motions, the Court is declining to hear those motions.” Regarding father’s evidentiary
requests or the part of the combined motion regarding “motions in limine,” the district court
declined to grant any request. But it encouraged the parties to make objections during trial
so that the record would be “fully robust.”
At the end of the trial, the district court heard mother’s contempt motion and found
father in contempt of court for not paying temporary family support. It directed father to
purge the contempt within 30 days. At a later review hearing, the district court found father
had not purged the contempt. The parties, however, agreed that if father had not paid within
one additional day, father could be confined for contempt.
Shortly afterward, the district court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage. The
judgment ruled, among other things, that the parties would share joint physical custody and
joint legal custody of the children and have equal parenting time. Father appeals the
judgment after making neither a motion for a new trial nor a motion for amended findings
of fact.
DECISION
I. Preliminary matters
A. Record on appeal: The litigation of this case in district court continued after
father took this appeal. The materials the Central Appeals Unit (CAU) provided us for this
appeal include material associated with some of that post-judgment litigation. But the

1 The district court referred to “General Rule 303.035(a).” The Minnesota Rules of General
Practice lack a rule “303.035(a).” It appears the district court meant rule 303.03(a).
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record for an appeal is limited to the documents and exhibits that were before the district
court when it made the ruling(s) at issue on appeal and any transcript of proceedings.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01; see In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn. 1993) (ruling
we should not have considered a letter sent to district court after that court made the ruling
at issue on appeal). We do not base our decisions on matters outside the record on appeal
and do “not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988); see also In re Block, 727 N.W.2d
166, 177 (Minn. App. 2007) (granting a motion to strike documents not considered by
decision-maker who made the decision being reviewed). To the extent the CAU provided
us with material beyond the record for this appeal, we do not consider that extraneous
material.
B. Scope of review: Generally, “matters such as trial procedure, evidentiary rulings
and jury instructions are subject to appellate review only if there has been a motion for a
new trial in which such matters have been assigned as error.” Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389
N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1986). Here, father did not move the district court for a new trial
or amended findings of fact. Thus, our scope of review is limited to the substantive legal
issues properly raised to and considered by the district court, whether the evidence supports
the findings of fact, and whether those findings support the conclusions of law and the
judgment. See Alpha Real Est. Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 664 N.W.2d
303, 309-10 (Minn. 2003) (stating that new trial motion is not prerequisite to appellate
review of substantive legal issues properly raised and considered in district court);
Gruenhagen v. Larson, 246 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn. 1976) (stating that absent motion for
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new trial, appellate courts may review whether evidence supports findings of fact and
whether findings support conclusions of law and judgment). Accordingly, the district
court’s rulings regarding trial procedure, as well as its evidentiary rulings, are not properly
before us, and we need not review them.
Relatedly, appellate courts address only those questions previously presented to and
considered by the district court. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582. Thus, to the extent father
raises questions on appeal that were not previously presented to or considered by the
district court (e.g., assertions of defamation and perjury), those questions are not properly
before us, and we need not address them. We note that if father believed the district court
failed to adequately address a question otherwise properly before it, he could have filed a
posttrial motion asking the district court to address the question(s). He did not do so.
C. Father’s arguments: In district court, father sought joint physical custody with
“approximately 50/50” parenting time. The district court granted the parties joint physical
custody with equal parenting time. Thus, why father make s certain arguments related to
custody and parenting time is unclear.
Generally, to obtain relief on appeal, an appellant must (a) identify a particular
ruling of the district court appellant believes is incorrect; (b) explain why —given the
relevant standard of review—that ruling is incorrect; (c) identify prejudice to the appellant
arising from that allegedly incorrect ruling; and (d) show that the prejudice that arises from
the ruling is substantial. See, e.g., Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949) (stating
appellate courts do not assume district court error); Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283
(Minn. App. 1999) (applying Loth); Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be
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ignored); Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that appellate
courts ignore prejudicial error when prejudice is de minimis). An appellant’s failure to do
one or more of these things can render the appellant’s briefing of the question inadequate.
And appellate courts need not address inadequately briefed questions.
See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480
(Minn. 1997) (declining to review question that was not adequately briefed);
Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-
law appeal). As set out below, father failed to adequately brief certain questions.
D. Findings of fact: Father challenges certain of the district court’s findings of
fact. The crux of those challenges seems to be that the record could be read to allow the
district court to make findings other than the findings the district court actually made or
that the district court made erroneous credibility determinations or both. Neither argument
is an effective way to challenge a district court’s findings of fact.
A district court’s findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
When addressing whether a district court’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous, appellate courts (1) view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the findings, (2) do not find their own
facts, (3) do not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not reconcile
conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963
N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021). Thus,

an appellate court need not go into an extended
discussion of the evidence to prove or
demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the
court. Rather, because the factfinder has the
primary responsibility of determining the fact
issues and the advantage of observing the
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witnesses in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly
considered all the evidence and has determined
that the evidence reasonably supports the
decision.

Id. (quotations and citation omitted)[.] In other words, when an
appellate court reviews findings of fact, the review is not to
determine whether the record could support findings other than
those made by the district court—it almost always can.
Instead, our task is to review the record “to confirm that
evidence exists to support the decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
at 222. As such, an appellant who simply marshals record
evidence pointing to alternative findings has not demonstrated
clear error. The appellant must show that the record lacks the
evidence necessary to support the findings the district court
actually made.

In re Welfare of Child(ren) of L.A.B., ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 3510842, at *3-4
(Minn. App. Dec. 8, 2025) (emphasis added) (other citations omitted).
We have reviewed the record. Father has not shown that it lacks the evidence
needed to support the findings that he challenges. Therefore, we need not further address
the district court’s findings of fact. See Cook v. Arimitsu, 907 N.W.2d 233, 240 n.3 (Minn.
App. 2018) (summarily affirming findings of fact in a family appeal), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 17, 2018); Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357-58 (Minn. App. 2004) (same);
see also Engquist v. Wirtjes, 68 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Minn. 1955) (stating that “[t]he function
of an appellate court is that of review. It does not exist for the purpose of demonstrating
to the litigants through a detailed statement of the evidence that its decision is right. If the
length of judicial opinions is to be kept within reasonable bounds, appellate courts must
more closely adhere to the purpose for which they exist”); Wilson v. Moline, 47 N.W.2d
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865, 870 (Minn. 1951) (stating that the function of an appellate court “does not require [it]
to discuss and review in detail the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that it supports
the trial court’s findings,” and that an appellate court’s “duty is performed when [it]
consider[s] all the evidence, as we have done here, and determine[s] that it reasonably
supports the findings”).
E. Discretionary decisions: Father challenges various decisions committed to the
district court’s discretion. The crux of his challenges often seem s to be that the record or
the findings, or both, would allow the district court to resolve the discretionary question in
a manner other than the way the district court resolved that question. Neither argument is
an effective way to challenge a decision committed to the district court’s discretion. “A
district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the
evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
That a certain set of facts found by a district court can generate more than one
affirmable result is inherent in the combination of (a) the nature of district court’s
discretionary decisions and (b) appellate deference to a district court’s exercise of its
discretion. Alternatively stated: The nature of appellate review of a district court’s
discretionary decisions allows an appellate court to affirm different decisions based on the
same or similar facts. Thus, unless an appellant shows a district court’s discretionary
decision is based on findings that are not supported by the record or a misapplication of the
law, to obtain relief, the appellant must show the district court’s discretionary decision is
contrary to logic and the facts found by the district court (not that another result could be
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reached, and not that the result reached by the district court in the case on appeal is
dissimilar that reached in an allegedly similar case). See id. Here, as noted above, the
record supports the findings made by the district court.
II. Discovery, motions in limine, and evidentiary matters
Focusing on the impact that they allegedly had on his ability to assert his parental
fitness, f ather challenges the district court’s discovery-related rulings. He asserts that
mother refused to provide discovery in bad faith and that the district court should have
deemed mother to have admitted that father is a fit parent. Father makes related arguments
regarding both the district court’s denial of what he asserts were his motions in limine and
its exclusion of evidence he wanted to present at trial.
Even if these questions are properly before us, despite father’s failure to bring a
posttrial motion, the district court awarded the parties joint physical custody and equal
parenting time. As a result, exactly what custody- or parenting-time-related prejudice
father suffered is unclear. 2 To the extent that father asserts that mother’s conduct
unnecessarily contributed to the length or expense of the case, that assertion goes to the
district court’s decision regarding attorney fees, rather than its discovery and evidentiary
decisions. See Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subds. 1, 1a (2024) (addressing fee awards). 3

2 Because father failed to show substantial prejudice from these rulings, we need not
address his related argument that the district court erred by ruling that his motions were not
actually motions in limine. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61; Hesse, 778 N.W.2d at 105.
3 In 2024, the Minnesota Legislature amended this section. 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 101,
art. 1, § 5, at 862-63. The amendments are not material to this case . Thus, we cite the
current version of the statute. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs ,
617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000).
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III. Custody & support
Father asserts: “The court erred, as a matter of law, in failing to consider whether
[son] had the ability to express his reasonable preference and failing to make findings as to
[that child’s] preference.” We disagree. Referring to the Street report, the judgment notes
son “indicated that he would like more time with his father.” Thus, the district court
considered son’s preferences.
Noting that he alleged abuse by mother, father asserts the district court clearly erred
in finding that there was no domestic abuse alleged in the case. Despite what father asserts
he submitted before trial, there was no testimony of abuse at trial. Further, the parties’
treatment of each other and the children is a focus of the ongoing post-judgment litigation.
The district court knows the parties, the children, and the current state of these matters
better than we do. For these reasons, we will not grant relief on this point.4
Nor, given the clear-error standard of review discussed above, will we grant relief
regarding father’s challenge to the district court’s findings that address the impact of the
proposed custodial arrangement on the children’s relationships. A similar analysis
addresses father’s challenge to the district court’s ruling that father was not credible when
he asserted that he c ould not work. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988) (noting that appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations).

4 We express no opinion on how the district court should resolve any matter before it.
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IV. Attorney fees
1. Rule 37: A court “shall” award attorney fees in certain discovery disputes.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.03(b); 37.04. Each rule also lists circumstances which, if found to
exist by the district court, excuse it from awarding fees. Father notes that the district court
did not specifically find the relevant circumstances excusing a fee award and argues that
the district court should have granted his motions for fees under these rules. We assume—
without deciding—both that fees might have been available here under rules 37.03 and
37.04 and that the district court did not specifically find the relevant circumstances. But
we decline to grant relief.
The list of circumstances that excuse a district court from awarding fees under rule
37.03(b) includes a catchall provision that “there was other good reason for the failure to
[make the requested admission]. ” Similarly, the list in rule 37.04 includes the catchall
provision that “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”
The judgment states: “The Court finds that [father’s] late and voluminous filings
resulted in unnecessary attorney costs of $1,000.00[,]” and awarded mother $1,000 in
conduct-based attorney fees. Under these circumstances, and having reviewed this record,
we conclude that remanding for the district court to specifically address whether the
circumstances listed in rules 37.03(b) or rule 37.04 exist will not change its denial of
father’s motion for discovery-related attorney fees. See Grein v. Grein, 364 N.W.2d 383,
387 (Minn. 1985) (affirming district court when, from the files, record, and the findings
the district court did make, the appellate court discerned that the district court, on remand,
“would undoubtedly” reach the same result).
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2. Conduct-based fees: Father argues the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion for $109,400 in conduct-based attorney fees when he provided
evidence that allegedly supported his motion. Under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1a, a court
“may” award conduct-based fees against someone who unreasonably increases the length
or expense of the proceeding. “May” is permissive. Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2024).
Thus, improper conduct by a party allows, but does not require, the court to award fees
against that party. Here, the district court awarded conduct-based fees against father based
on his conduct. This record supports the district court’s disapproval of father’s conduct.
We decline to remand for further findings on father’s motion.
Father also challenges the district court’s award to mother of $1,000 in conduct-
based attorney fees. He argues that mother failed to adequately document her request, and
that the district court failed to make required findings of fact. For three reasons, we decline
relief here. First, a motion and associated documentation are required for fee awards of
$1,000 or more. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 119.01; see Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 119.02. The district
court’s fee award exceeds the $999 limit on award for which documentation is not required
by only a de minimis amount. See Hesse, 778 N.W.2d at 105. Second, as noted, the district
court found father’s filings were “voluminous,” which we understand to mean unnecessary
in length and frequency. The record supports these determinations. Third, while a district
court should support its fee-related decisions with the relevant findings of fact, a lack of
findings is not necessarily fatal to the award if, as here, the district court is familiar with
the relevant circumstances. See Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 826 (Minn. 1999)
(affirming an award of need-based attorney fees despite a lack of findings when the record
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showed the judge “was familiar with the history of this case and that, in [awarding the]
fees, the judge had access to the [relevant information]”).
V. Bias
Father argues that the district court was biased against him. See Minn. Code Jud.
Conduct Rule 2.3 (bias, prejudice, and harassment); 2.4 (external influences). Appellate
courts presume a district court discharges its duties “properly,” Hannon v. State, 752
N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 2008), and we do not infer bias from adverse rulings,
Olson v. Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986). Instead, we review the record
for indicia of favoritism or antagonism . Hannon, 752 N.W.2d at 522. “E ven if a court’s
comments are not always appropriate, appellate courts will not intervene unless the
comments were prejudicial, biased or deprived plaintiffs of their right to a fair trial.”
In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (quotation omitted).
Here, for two reasons, we deny relief.
First, the indicia of bias alleged by father include the district court’s evidentiary
rulings and credibility determinations and its statements cautioning father to abide by court
rules. The former are rulings by the district court. By themselves, they do not show bias.
Olson, 392 N.W.2d at 341. And how directing a party to comply with the rules shows bias
is neither clear nor explained. To the extent that father also asserts that the district court
articulated an opinion on how his counsel could have better spent her time and showed
confusion about the role of father’s attorney-girlfriend in representing him, father did not
show how these statements deprived him of a fair trial. D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d at 176. While
father generically alleged certain actions of the district court showed bias, he did not
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specifically state why those actions showed bias, nor did he cite authority for the idea those
actions were inherently biased. Absent more, father’s argument on the issue of bias is
inadequate. See Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d at 480; Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d at
479; see also Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135
(Minn. 1971) (stating that inadequately briefed issues are forfeited and “will not be
considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection”).
Second, and more importantly, a careful review of this record shows that there was,
in fact, no bias. When addressing alleged bias, appellate courts consider whether the
district court considered arguments and motions from each side, ruled in favor of a
complaining party on any issue, and took actions to minimize prejudice to the complaining
party. Hannon, 752 N.W.2d at 522. Here, the district court overruled and sustain ed
objections from both parties. While the district court ruled that one of father’s assertions
was not credible, it did so based on a finding that the assertion contradicted the record and
father’s own testimony. The district court also expressed concern about the impact o f
father’s romantic relationship with one of his attorneys, encouraged father’s counsel to
move on from irrelevant issues to save time, and patiently corrected father’s courtroom
conduct despite father’s repeated interruptions and improper attempts to speak directly to
the judge. When the district court later cautioned father to abide by the parenting schedule,
the district court explained that a violation could lead to limits on his parenting that it
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“would hate to [impose.]” This was an explanation of the legal consequences of father’s
potential actions, not bias.5
In general, the district court was patient and respectful with both parties throughout
the proceedings. Because the record does not suggest bias, partiality, or favoritism by the
district court, we deny father’s judicial-bias claim.6
Affirmed.

5 Father asserts that a reference by the judge to his girlfriend-attorney as his lead attorney’s
“junior associate or friend” shows bias. Father does not, however, explain —nor is it
otherwise clear—how this prejudiced him. If this reference was inappropriate, it was an
inappropriate comment about someone who, by that point, had withdrawn from the case.
The comment does not merit relief from the judgment.
6 Father’s assertions that he was deprived of due process of law and of a fair trial are
derivative of his bias claims. Thus, we do not separately address those assertions. But we
note that our review of the record supports neither argument.