A24-1742 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

In Re the Marriage of:

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed December 15, 2025

The holding in the court’s own words

Because the district court’s factual findings establish that there was no reason to believe child was subject to abuse or neglect , we conclude that the district court was not required to appoint a GAL under Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2. Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 5; Baum, 465 N.W.2d at 600. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its finding that child’s testimony had been coached by mother. We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it assigned less weight to child’s stated preference to live with mother upon making a factual finding that child had been coached by mother.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1742

In Re the Marriage of:

Melissa Ann Kuchera, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Joel Wayne Biebighauser,
Respondent,

County of Dakota,
Intervenor.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19AV-FA-10-4037

Mary B. Rannells Rowan, Groshek Law, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Andrew J. Haugen, Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order granting respondent father’s motion to
modify child custody and parenting time, appellant mother argues that the district court
erred by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL), clearly erred in finding that mother
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coached child’s testimony, and abused its discretion by failing to give greater weight to the
child’s preference in its best-interests determination. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Melissa Ann Kuchera (mother) and respondent Joel Wayne Biebighauser
(father) are the parents of a minor child S.K.B., born in 2010. The following facts are taken
from the district court’s factual findings in its order on the parties’ cross-motions to modify
custody and parenting time after an evidentiary hearing, as well as other portions of the
record relevant to the issues on appeal.
The parties dissolved their marriage in 2011 pursuant to a stipulated judgment and
decree, which awarded joint legal custody to the parties and sole physical custody to
mother. Since then, the parties have engaged in significant litigation concerning custody
and parenting time. Relevant here, in 2021, the district court awarded father joint physical
custody upon determining that mother interfered with father’s rights as a joint legal
custodian and that the resulting imbalance in power left child in a position to develop
serious mental-health issues.
In February 2023, father moved for expedited relief seeking sole legal custody over
medical and mental-health appointments for child and modification of parenting time. As
relevant to this appeal, father averred in a supporting affidavit that (1) mother violated the
required communications protocol by failing to communicate scheduled appointments
within 48 hours after scheduling; (2) mother misrepresented the purpose of one of child’s
appointments, communicating that it was a wellness-checkup when in fact it was an
appointment to address child’s anxiety and depression; (3) as a result of this appointment,
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child had been prescribed medication without father’s consultation or consent; and
(4) mother has resisted addressing child’s mental-health issues through psychiatric care,
opting instead to manage medication and treatment through child’s pediatrician.
The day after father filed his motion, a report was made to Carver County Child
Protective Services (CPS) alleging that father had injured child while child was at father’s
house. A CPS social worker interviewed child and determined that, while there had been
a prior incident involving red marks on child’s hand caused when father grabbed child’s
phone, there had been no recent incidents and there was no safety concern to child in
father’s care. After the CPS report was made, mother involved the police, despite the CPS
social worker’s instructions to mother that it was irregular and inadvisable to do so once
CPS had conducted an interview.
In March 2023, after father filed his expedited motion but before the motion was
heard, mother filed a petition for an order for protection (OFP) against father on behalf of
child. Mother’s OFP request was based on an incident during which father called the police
nonemergency line because child left the house after dark during an argument with father
about cellphone usage. During the argument, father commented that if he had talked to his
parents the way child talked to him, he would have gotten soap in his mouth. According
to the CPS report of the incident, child reported that father had a bottle of soap in his hand
but did not ultimately pour any in child’s mouth. The district court granted a temporary
ex parte OFP , but, after an evidentiary hearing, dismissed the ex parte OFP without
prejudice in order to resolve the matter at the upcoming hearing on father’s expedited
motion.
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On March 15, the district court granted father’s motion for expedited temporary
relief, awarding him sole legal custody regarding child’s medical and mental-health
appointments and decreasing mother’s parenting time.
In July 2023, mother filed a motion for emergency ex parte relief. Mother’s motion
requested immediate temporary sole legal and physical custody of child, suspension of
father’s parenting time pending a hearing, and mandatory appointment of a GAL. In a
supporting affidavit, mother alleged that father was physically abusing child and that child
had engaged in self-harm. In August 2023, the district court denied mother’s motion ,
determining that mother failed to provide sufficient support that child was in imminent
physical or emotional danger warranting emergency ex parte relief.
In November 2023, CPS again became involved with the family because mother
reported to the FBI that father had exposed child to child pornography. After an
investigation, CPS determined that mother’s report lacked credibility. Around this same
time, CPS also investigated a report that father allegedly threw a water bottle in child’s
direction, denting a wall. CPS determined that there were no observable marks on the wall
and that child stated that, while she did not like how father treated her, child was not
concerned about her safety.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the parties’ cross-motions to
modify custody and parenting time over five days in November 2023 and February 2024.
The district court heard testimony from father, mother, child’s paternal grandmother, the
CPS social worker, child’s therapist, two police officers, mother’s pastor, and three of
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mother’s friends. The district court also received child’s in camera testimony and multiple
exhibits.
In a detailed written order, the district court granted father sole legal custody over
child’s medical and mental-health appointments based on endangerment under Minn. Stat.
§ 518.18(d)(iv) (2024). The district court found the testimony of father, the CPS social
worker, and child’s therapist credible and persuasive. The district court found mother’s
testimony inconsistent, evasive and, ultimately, not credible. In particular, the district court
found that mother’s apparent willingness to make serious unsubstantiated accusations that
father possessed child pornography weighed heavily against her credibility. Finally, the
district court stated that it “notes and values” child’s stated preference to live with mother,
but it determined the weight of child’s preference to be “significantly diminished” by its
finding that child “has been unduly influenced and coached by [m]other.”
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Mother advances two arguments on appeal. First, mother argues that the district
court erred by failing to appoint a GAL. Second, mother argues that the district court’s
best-interests determination was an abuse of discretion because it clearly erred when it
found that mother coached child’s testimony and improperly “disregarded” child’s
preference for mother to be the custodial parent. We address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not err in failing to appoint a GAL.

If a district court has “reason to believe” that a child is a “victim of domestic abuse
or neglect . . . the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem.” Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2
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(2024). “The guardian ad litem shall represent the interests of the child and advise the
court with respect to custody and parenting time.” Id. We review the appointment of a
mandatory GAL de novo. See J.A.S. v. R.J.S., 524 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn. App. 1994)
(concluding that district court erred by not appointing mandatory GAL when circumstances
presented “at least a threshold” indication of abuse).1 But “[w]e must defer to the district
court’s assessment of witness credibility.” Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
App. 1993).
Mother argues that the district court erred by failing to appoint a GAL. Mother
contends that appointment of a GAL was mandatory under Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2,
because the district court had reason to believe that child was a victim of domestic abuse.
The GAL statute provides:
In all proceedings for child custody or for marriage dissolution
or legal separation in which custody or parenting time with a
minor child is an issue, if the court has reason to believe that
the minor child is a victim of domestic child abuse or neglect,
as those terms are defined in sections 260C.007 and 626.556,
respectively, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem.

Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2. “Domestic child abuse” includes “any physical injury to a
minor family or household member inflicted by an adult family or household member other
than by accidental means.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 13 (2024).

1 Father asserts that mother failed to preserve this issue for appeal because mother did not
formally move for appointment of a GAL at trial. We disagree. When appointment of a
GAL is mandatory under Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2, the district court’s failure to
appoint a GAL constitutes reversible error, even in the absence of a motion by the parties.
See J.E.P. v. J.C.P., 432 N.W.2d 483, 486-87 (Minn. App. 1988).
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Appointment of a GAL is mandatory under the statute when there is a “threshold
level of circumstantial evidence or ‘reason to believe’” that a child has been subjected to
domestic child abuse. J.A.S., 524 N.W.2d at 27 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2).
Appointment of a GAL is not mandatory, however, when the allegations of abuse are
unsubstantiated. See Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 5 (holding that the district court did not err
in failing to appoint a GAL when respondent presented sufficient evidence to rebut
unsubstantiated allegations of physical abuse); Baum v. Baum, 465 N.W.2d 598, 600
(Minn. App. 1991) (concluding that “[b]ecause appellant presented insufficient evidence
of abuse or neglect, the mandatory appointment provision does not apply”), rev. denied
(Minn. Apr. 18, 1991).
The district court did not expressly address the issue of appointment of a GAL.
However, as part of its consideration of the best interests of the child, the district court
found that “there was no credible testimony or evidence showing that there is or was
physical abuse in [f]ather’s home.” The district court’s finding is supported by the record.
The CPS social worker testified about her involvement with child since the February 2023
CPS report, which, as the district court observed, was made one day after father filed his
motion seeking modification of custody. Child repeatedly told the CPS social worker that
father had not left any bruises on them. The CPS social worker testified that child reported
no credible information about maltreatment in father’s home, that father was cooperative
with her requests for information and meetings, and that she closed the CPS matter upon
determining that there was no concern about child’s safety while in father’s care. Child’s
therapist, a mandated reporter, testified that she had never filed a report alleging abuse by
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child’s father, that father communicates appropriately with her regarding child’s treatment
and is responsive to child’s needs and care, and that child’s condition was improving while
in father’s care. And the sheriff’s deputy who responded to father’s March 2023 call for
assistance testified that she did not think child’s safety was in jeopardy. The district court
found these witnesses credible and found mother’s testimony to the contrary not credible,
determinations to which we defer. Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 4. Accordingly, t he district
court did not clearly err in its factual finding that there are no substantiated allegations of
domestic abuse by father.
As support for her argument that a GAL appointment was mandatory, mother cites
J.E.P. In J.E.P., we concluded that the district court erred in failing to appoint a GAL in a
visitation dispute after a hearing on mother’s petition for an OFP against the father alleging
father’s sexual abuse of their children. 432 N.W.2d at 486. We concluded that the district
court had reason to believe that abuse was occurring because an independent criminal
investigation was underway at the time of the proceedings, mother and the children’s
therapist testified that the children had described the sexual abuse, and the district court
appointed an expert witness to investigate whether sexual abuse had occurred. Id. at 487.
Accordingly, appointment of a GAL was mandatory. Id.
In contrast to J.E.P., in this case the CPS social worker, the child’s therapist, and
the sheriff’s deputy all testified that there was no concern about father physically harming
child. The district court credited this testimony and found there was no credible allegation
of abuse. Because the district court’s factual findings establish that there was no reason to
believe child was subject to abuse or neglect , we conclude that the district court was not
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required to appoint a GAL under Minn. Stat. § 518.165, subd. 2. Anderson, 510 N.W.2d
at 5; Baum, 465 N.W.2d at 600.
II. The district court did not clearly err in its factual findings or abuse its
discretion in its best-interests determination.

“District courts have broad discretion on matters of custody and parenting time.”
Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). We review the district court’s
modification of a custody order for an abuse of discretion. Goldman v. Greenwood, 748
N.W.2d 279
, 281-82 (Minn. 2008). A district court abuses its discretion if it makes
findings of fact that are unsupported by evidence, misapplies the law, or delivers a decision
that is against logic and the facts on the record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506
(Minn. 2022).
A parent seeking custody modification based on endangerment must demonstrate
that “(1) the circumstances of the [child] or custodian have changed; (2) modification
would serve the [child’s] best interests; (3) the [child’s] present environment endangers
their physical health, emotional health, or emotional development; and (4) the benefits of
the change outweigh its detriments with respect to the [child].” Christensen v. Healey, 913
N.W.2d 437
, 440 (Minn. 2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (setting forth
endangerment standard for custody modification).
Appellate courts review the district court’s findings of fact on the best-interests
factors for clear error. Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019). Factual
findings are clearly erroneous “when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the
evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment
10
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). The clear -error
standard does not permit a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence, to engage in fact-
finding anew, or to reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22. Thus, under this standard
an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of
the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the
findings of the [district] court. Rather, because the factfinder
has the primary responsibility of determining the fact issues
and the advantage of observing the witnesses in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the entire proceeding, an appellate
court’s duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all
the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); see also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203,
210 (Minn. 1988) (explaining that the district court’s “findings must be sustained unless
clearly erroneous” and that “[d]eference must be given to the opportunity of the [district]
court to assess the credibility of the witnesses” (quotation omitted)).
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that awarding father sole legal
custody over child’s medical and mental-health appointments is in the best interests of
child, arguing that the district court clearly erred in finding that child’s testimony was
coached by mother. The district court found that the weight of child’s stated preference to
live with mother was diminished because child had been coached by mother. This finding
is supported by the record. The CPS social worker testified that, in her interactions with
child, child displayed an inappropriate level of knowledge regarding the litigation, and it
appeared that mother shared information with child about the litigation and the
interpersonal conflicts between the parents. The CPS social worker also testified that child
reported that child looked through father’s belongings to try to find things that would help
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mother in court. The district court found the CPS social worker’s testimony credible and,
further, that child feels compelled to take mother’s side. We will not second guess these
credibility findings. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22. Accordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not clearly err in its finding that child’s testimony had been coached
by mother.
Mother argues that the district court improperly “disregarded” child’s stated
preference to live with mother. In considering the best interests of the child, one of the
factors the district court must consider is “the reasonable preference of the child, if the
court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an
independent, reliable preference.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(3) (2024). Under Minn.
Stat. § 518.166 (2024), a district court may conduct an in camera interview of a minor child
during a custody-modification proceeding “to ascertain the child’s reasonable preference
as to custodian, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.”
Mother’s argument that the district court disregarded child’s preference is not
supported by the record. The district court received and considered the child’s in camera
testimony. In its order, the district court expressly stated that it “notes and values” the
child’s preference, but found that the weight of child’s testimony is diminished because
mother had unduly influenced and coached child. We have held that, in assigning weight
to a child’s preference, a district court may consider whether the child has been
manipulated or inappropriately influenced by a parent. Roehrdanz v. Roehrdanz, 438
N.W.2d 687
, 691 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 1989). Furthermore, the
district court found that, even with its diminished weight, the “reasonable preference of the
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child” factor weighed slightly in mother’s favor. The district court then weighed the
“reasonable preference” factor alongside the other 11 statutory best-interests factors, none
of which mother challenges on appeal. See Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1)-(12) (2024).
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it assigned less weight
to child’s stated preference to live with mother upon making a factual finding that child
had been coached by mother.
In sum, the record reflects that the district court considered the testimony of the
witnesses and the other evidence it received during the five-day evidentiary hearing. The
district court considered child’s preference and made detailed findings on each of the
relevant best-interests factors, finding that the testimony of father, the CPS social worker,
and child’s therapist was credible, while mother’s testimony was not. Because the record
supports the district court’s factual findings, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined that it is in the best interests of child to grant father’s request for sole
legal custody over child’s medical and mental-health appointments.
Affirmed.