Deanna M. Kortan, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1767

Deanna M. Kortan,
Appellant,

vs.

St. Louis Park Hockey Boosters,
also known as St. Louis Park Hockey Association,
Respondent.

Filed June 30, 2025
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-21-2636

Stephen C. Fiebiger, Stephen C. Fiebiger Law Office, Chartered, Burnsville, Minnesota
(for appellant)

William L. Davidson, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this appeal following remand, appellant Deanna M. Kortan challenges the district
court’s (1) decision to not award damages on her claim under the Minnesota whistleblower
2
act (MWA), Minn. Stat. §§ 181.931-.935 (2024); (2) decision not to award her attorney
fees; and (3) order for prejudgment interest. We affirm.
FACTS
We begin with a brief procedural history. Kortan brought suit against her former
employer, respondent St. Louis Park Hockey Boosters, also known as St. Louis Park
Hockey Association (the association), alleging (1) fraudulent inducement, (2) a violation
of the MWA, and (3) promissory estoppel. After the association failed to comply with
discovery orders, the district court granted Kortan’s motion for a default judgment and set
the matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine damages. Following the hearing, the
district court filed an order awarding damages in the amount of $10,033.44. Kortan
appealed. In an order opinion, we affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the
district court to make findings about whether Kortan sustained damages because of the
MWA violation and to award prejudgment interest. Kortan v. St. Louis Park Hockey
Boosters, No. A23-0603, slip op. at 4, 7 (Minn. App. Jan. 26, 2024), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 16, 2024). On remand, the district court filed its order amending the judgment and
addressing the issues that we remanded. In its order, the district court left the damages
award the same and awarded prejudgment interest. We now address Kortan’s appeal of that
order.
Kortan’s Employment History
The following facts are taken from the district court’s factual findings and the
evidentiary hearing. Kortan was employed by the association from January 2017 through
February 2019 as a pull-tab salesperson at a bar in northeast Minneapolis. Before working
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for the association, Kortan was employed part-time as a bartender at a different bar in
St. Louis Park where the association had a pull-tab operation. According to Kortan, she
was told by the association’s staff that she would have many opportunities to earn money
selling pull tabs. Kortan was also told by the association’s staff that if she took the job
selling pull tabs at the association’s new northeast Minneapolis location, she would be
treated as the most senior staff member at that location and, as a result, would be the first
person offered fill-in or permanent shifts selling pull tabs at the association’s St. Louis Park
location. This was important to Kortan because she knew that she would not make as much
money at the northeast Minneapolis location as she would at the St. Louis Park location,
which was bigger and had “a lot of very wealthy regulars” who tipped well.
Shortly after starting with the association, Kortan noticed that she had not been
asked to fill in at the St. Louis Park location as often as she believed she should have been
based on the association’s promises about filling shifts according to seniority.
In July 2018, about a year and a half after starting with the association, Kortan met
with the gambling manager of the association to discuss her concerns that she was not
receiving the schedule and income that the association had promised her. Kortan provided
the gambling manager with a letter detailing her concerns and referencing certain statutes
that she believed that the association was violating, including Minnesota Statutes
section 181.64 (2024), which prohibits using false statements to induce a person into
entering employment.
Shortly after that meeting, the gambling manager spoke with Kortan while she was
working and “gave [Kortan] the choice to remove the statutory language and send a new
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letter, or he would turn [the letter] over to the attorneys.” When Kortan did not immediately
comply, the gambling manager “threatened to shut the booth down and was intimidating
to her.” After that confrontation, Kortan took the letter back and removed the statutory
language “in order to keep her job and avoid [the gambling manager’s] threats and
intimidation.”
Kortan then continued to work for the association. Her concerns were not addressed,
and no changes occurred until October 2018 when, Kortan asserts, her supervisor “changed
the schedule . . . in an attempt to schedule [Kortan] for shifts that [her supervisor] knew
[Kortan] was unable to work.”
At the end of February 2019, the association discontinued its pull-tab sales at
Kortan’s location in northeast Minneapolis, and another organization took over. Kortan
received a letter from the association, which terminated her employment at the end of
February. According to Kortan, she “was the only [employee] terminated by [the
association]” when the transfer to the new organization occurred. After receiving that
notice, Kortan continued working at the northeast Minneapolis location as a pull-tab
salesperson for the new organization until July 2022.
Legal Proceedings
In September 2020, Kortan commenced her lawsuit against the association. The
district court granted default judgment in her favor in September 2022 based on the
association’s violations of discovery orders. The evidentiary hearing to determine Kortan’s
damages was held in December 2022. Kortan was the only witness called, and she testified
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about her employment history, including her time working for the association, as detailed
above.
In February 2023, the district court filed its order and entered judgment. It
determined that, although Kortan’s claims would have failed on the merits, she was entitled
to recover reasonable damages based on the association’s default. The district court granted
Kortan damages for six months of lost wages based on the difference in income between
Kortan’s job as a bartender and her first six months as a pull-tab salesperson . It stated,
“[G]iving [Kortan] a generous six months to find additional employment, the court
concludes that [the association] is, at most, liable only for six months of [Kortan’s]
decreased income and awards her $10,033.44 in lost wages.” The district court also
awarded $899.50 in costs.
Kortan appealed , challenging the district court’s judgment and arguing that the
district court erred when it (1) awarded only $10,033.44 in damages, (2) considered the
merits of her claims when determining damages despite having granted default judgment,
(3) denied attorney fees under the MWA despite granting default judgment on her claim
under the MWA, and (4) failed to award prejudgment interest.
In an order opinion, we determined that the district court erred by not making any
findings as to damages for the MWA violation and by failing to award prejudgment
interest. Kortan, No. A23-0603, slip op. at 4, 6-7. We reversed in part and remanded the
matter to the district court “for further findings regarding whether Kortan sustained
damages related to the association’s MWA violation” and for “the court administrator [to]
6
compute prejudgment interest authorized pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 549.09,
subdivision 1(c)(1)-(2).” Id. at 4, 7.
On remand, the district court determined that Kortan was not entitled to any
additional damages for her MWA claim and that she was entitled to recover prejudgment
interest on her original award of damages of $10,033.44 at an annual rate of four percent
for the years 2020 and 2021 and at an annual rate of five percent for the years 2022 and
2023.
Kortan appeals.
DECISION
Kortan challenges the district court’s decision to not award damages for the MWA
violation, its decision to not award attorney fees, and its order for prejudgment interest. We
address each issue in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding damages for
Kortan’s MWA claim.
Kortan argues that the district court abused its discretion when it did not award
damages for Kortan’s MWA claim. We are not persuaded.
The MWA provides the district court with discretion to determine damages, stating:
If the district court determines that a violation of section
181.932 occurred, the court may order any appropriate relief,
including but not limited to reinstatement, back pay,
restoration of lost service credit, if appropriate, compensatory
damages, and the expungement of any adverse records of an
employee who was the subject of the alleged acts of
misconduct.

7
Minn. Stat. § 181.935(c) (emphasis added). Even when damages are determined after a
default judgment, the district court generally retains discretion to determine appropriate
damages. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01(b) (“[T]he [district] court shall ascertain, by a
reference or otherwise, the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, and order judgment
therefor.”). Accordingly, we review a district court’s determination of damages under the
MWA for an abuse of discretion.
“A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are
unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against
logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
On remand, the district court found, and Kortan does not dispute, that the report
underlying the MWA violation occurred when Kortan gave her letter—asserting that the
association had violated certain laws—to the gambling manager in July 2018. See Minn.
Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1) (prohibiting retaliation by an employer after an employee makes
a good-faith report of a suspected violation of law). The district court then analyzed
whether Kortan suffered damages as a result of retaliation against her for making that
report.
The district court first addressed lost wages. It determined that, while “[t]he nature
of the retaliation is somewhat unclear,” there was no evidence of lost wages, stating as
follows:
If the retaliation occurred when [Kortan] was
terminated, there is no basis for awarding compensatory
damages for lost earnings because [Kortan] continued to work
8
in essentially the same role and earned essentially the same
total income in 2019 ($20,097.07) as she did in 2018
($21,002.99). If the retaliation occurred in 2018 when [Kortan]
sent the letter, there is no basis for awarding compensatory
damages for lost earnings because, according to [Kortan’s]
own allegations, her schedule and shifts did not change after
the meeting where she gave [the gambling manager] the letter.
(Footnote omitted.)
The district court then addressed Kortan’s claim for emotional-distress damages. It
determined that Kortan’s claim was “based on her testimony that (1) she often cried and
had insomnia because of scheduling uncertainty or unpleasant communications from her
immediate supervisor and (2) the lack of trust resulting from her employment with [the
association] negatively impacted [Kortan’s] relationship with her romantic partner.” The
district court noted that “the emotional distress cited by [Kortan] does not ‘flow naturally’
from any MWA violation because the distress relates to her grievances over scheduling
and antedates the MWA violation.”
The district court concluded its damages analysis by stating:
[O]n the issue of damages for the presumed MWA violation,
the MWA allows the courts to exercise discretion when
determining damages by providing that the court “may” (not
“shall”) award various categories of damages. While the MWA
does not have any public policy requirement, the court is
disinclined to award any damages where (1) the whistleblower
is acting out of self-interest and not to protect any third parties
and (2) liability under the MWA arises from default and not
any determination on the merits. Given the lack of evidence of
any lost wages, the lack of any evidence of emotional distress
“flowing naturally” from the presumed MWA violation, the
lack of any public interest underlying the MWA claim, and
[Kortan’s] recovery of damages for the presumed violation of
Minn. Stat. § 181.64 that was the subject of her whistleblower
9
report, the “appropriate” relief for the presumed MWA
violation is no recovery.
(Footnote omitted.)
Kortan argues that the district court abused its discretion when it (1) determined that
there was a lack of evidence of lost wages, (2) determined that there was a lack of evidence
of emotional distress, (3) considered the lack of public interest in the claim, and
(4) considered the fact that any damages were a result of default judgment and not a
determination on the merits. We address each argument in turn.
A. Lost Wages
Kortan contends that the district court abused its discretion by not awarding Kortan
over $400,000 in lost past and future earnings.
As a preliminary matter, Kortan argues that any calculation of lost wages must be
made in comparison to Kortan’s 2016 income as a bartender for her previous employer,
which was $42,104.72. But Kortan made the report underlying her MWA claim in July
2018, after having worked for the association for a year and a half. Kortan provides no
persuasive argument why the district court should have calculated lost wages for the MWA
violation based on wages she earned from a different employer over a year and a half before
the event underlying the MWA claim. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
calculating whether there were lost wages by comparing Kortan’s income as a pull-tab
salesperson after the report to her income as a pull-tab salesperson for the association
before the report.
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Turning to that comparison, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that there was a lack of evidence that Kortan experienced reduced wages
because of her report. In her complaint, Kortan stated that “nothing had been done or
changed since the meeting” with the gambling manager in July 2018 and that, as of
September 20, 2018, schedules still had not been changed. Kortan claimed that her
schedule was changed in October 2018 “in an attempt to schedule [her] for shifts that
[Kortan’s supervisor] knew [Kortan] was unable to work.” But Kortan only produced
evidence of her annual income and failed to provide any evidence showing that her wages
decreased after the change in October 2018.
Kortan also claimed that she was the only employee terminated in February 2019
and argues that the district court ignored that “[h]er income potential decreased
dramatically after her termination and she no longer had the opportunity to work lucrative
shifts at” the St. Louis Park location. But the record shows that Kortan’s total income was
not significantly affected by her termination. In 2017, which was the first full year that
Kortan worked for the association selling pull-tabs, Kortan made a total of $21,861.78. In
2018, Kortan made $21,002.99. And in 2019, Kortan made a total of $20,097.07. Between
2017 and 2019, Kortan’s total income decreased by $1,764.71.
On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Kortan
did not suffer lost wages as a result of the MWA violation.
1

1 As part of her lost-wages argument, Kortan contends that the district court was improperly
influenced by conflating Kortan’s claim in her letter to the gambling manager, which
asserted a violation under section 181.64, with her MWA claim. But Kortan does not
explain what improper influence this alleged conflation had on the district court’s analysis
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B. Emotional Distress
Kortan argues that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that
the record did not establish emotional-distress damages as a result of the MWA violation.
Kortan notes that she sought $50,000 in past and $50,000 in future emotional-distress
damages.
Kortan argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that there
was a “lack of any evidence of emotional distress ‘flowing naturally’ from the presumed
MWA violation.” The argument is unconvincing. While Kortan testified generally about
crying often and experiencing insomnia due to issues with her supervisor, she mentioned
that these issues had started occurring in 2017. And, immediately after discussing her issues
with management in 2017, Kortan described how she felt that she could not trust her
supervisor or the gambling manager. Kortan claimed that her lack of trust in management
impacted her relationship with her romantic partner, but she did so in general terms without
providing dates when the problem manifested itself. Given Kortan’s testimony, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the alleged emotional distress
predated the events underlying the MWA claim and therefore was not clearly the result of
the MWA violation.
Kortan also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not recognizing
that, after Kortan had given the gambling manager the letter in July 2018, the gambling

or how it resulted in an abuse of discretion, and so, we decline to consider this argument .
See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480
(Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue).
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manager confronted Kortan at work and threatened her job if she did not take out the
references to various laws in her letter. But, while Kortan did testify about this incident and
mentioned that she “was scared that [she] would lose [her] job or lose that shift,” she did
not further describe emotional distress resulting from that incident. And although Kortan
is correct that emotional-distress damages can be awarded based on subjective testimony,
see Kohn v. City of Minneapolis Fire Department, 583 N.W.2d 7, 14-15 (Minn. App. 1998)
(describing basis to award mental- anguish damages under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1998), Kortan failed to provide sufficient subjective
testimony from which the district court could calculate emotional-distress damages
resulting from the MWA violation.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
the record did not present sufficient evidence of emotional-distress damages resulting from
the MWA violation.
C. Third-Party Interest
Kortan argues that the district court abused its discretion because it misapplied the
law when it stated that it was “disinclined to award any damages where . . . the
whistleblower is acting out of self-interest and not to protect any third parties.” Kortan
contends that the district court’s analysis is contrary to Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-
Minnesota Women’s Center, Inc., in which the supreme court stated, “[W]e reject the
importation of a public policy requirement into the whistleblower statute and hold that the
protections of section 181.932, subd. 1(a), are not limited to reports that implicate public
policy.” 637 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Minn. 2002).
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Assuming without deciding that the district court misapplied the law by considering
whether Kortan’s claim would protect any third-party interest, we nevertheless conclude
that any error was harmless. The district court’s decision to deny damages is adequately
supported by its findings that there was a lack of evidence of lost wages and emotional
distress. As a result, its consideration of third-party interests does not require reversal. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 ( requiring courts to disregard errors that do not affect a party’s
substantial rights).
D. Default Judgment
Finally, Kortan argues that the district court abused its discretion because it
misapplied the law when it stated that it was “disinclined to award any damages where . . .
liability under the MWA arises from default and not any determination on the merits.”
Kortan further asserts that, because this was a default judgment, the district court should
have accepted Kortan’s allegation in her complaint that the MWA violation resulted in her
sustaining damages “in excess of $50,000” and that not awarding damages in a default
judgment is contrary to public policy because it incentivizes employers to default to avoid
damages.
Kortan correctly asserts that “the MWA makes no distinction for awarding damages
by virtue of default judgment or on the merits”; there is nothing in the act that makes such
a distinction. See Minn. Stat. §§ 181.931-.935. But Kortan is incorrect in her assertion that,
because this was a default judgment, the district court should have accepted the amount of
damages alleged in Kortan’s complaint. To support her argument, Kortan relies on Parr v.
Gonzalez, which states, “The entry of a default judgment is equivalent to an admission by
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the defaulting party to properly pleaded claims and allegations.” 669 N.W.2d 401, 405
(Minn. App. 2003). But that holding relates to facts underlying the merits of the claim and
does not apply to the district court’s determination of the appropriate amount of damages.
See id. The award of damages in a default judgment is governed by Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 55.01(b), which states that “t he [district] court shall ascertain, by a
reference or otherwise, the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, and order judgment
therefor.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding an evidentiary hearing
and determining damages based on the evidence presented in that hearing.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not awarding attorney fees on
remand.
Kortan argues that our remand for further findings as to damages caused by the
association’s MWA violation also required the district court to consider attorney fees and
that the district court erred by not awarding attorney fees. The association counters that our
remand instruction did not direct the district court to address attorney fees; that, to the
extent Kortan is seeking her attorney fees for her first appeal, that claim is forfeited because
she failed to bring a timely motion under Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure
127 and 139.05; and that an award of attorney fees under the MWA is discretionary and
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it implicitly declined to award any
attorney fees on remand.
A reviewing court “will not reverse the district court’s decision on attorney fees
absent an abuse of discretion.” Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 331
(Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007).
15
Here, assuming the district court could have, consistent with our instruction,
considered attorney fees on remand, the district court implicitly rejected awarding attorney
fees when it stated that the appropriate relief for the MWA violation was “no recovery.”
We discern no abuse of discretion in that decision. The MWA provides that a district court
“may order any appropriate relief” for violations of the act. Minn. Stat. § 181.935(c). The
word “may” is permissive. Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (2024). Thus, the district court
had the discretion to award attorney fees if it determined that an award constituted
appropriate relief for the association’s MWA violation. Considering that the district court
determined that Kortan had failed to present evidence of any damages resulting from the
violation, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it implicitly
declined to award Kortan attorney fees.
III. The district court did not err in its award of prejudgment interest.
Lastly, Kortan asserts that the district court erred in its award of prejudgment
interest. She argues that the district court erred by (1) not calculating the actual dollar
amount of prejudgment interest or instructing the court administrator to do so and (2) not
granting prejudgment interest through the date of the amended judgment in 2024. Both of
Kortan’s arguments involve interpreting or applying the requirements for prejudgment
interest under Minnesota Statutes section 549.09, subdivision 1 (2024), and, therefore, are
questions of law, which we review de novo. See, e.g., In re Minnwest Bank Litig.
Concerning Real Prop., 873 N.W.2d 135, 148 (Minn. App. 2015).
Minnesota Statutes section 549.09, subdivision 1(a), states: “When a judgment or
award is for the recovery of money, . . . interest from the time of the verdict, award, or
16
report until judgment is finally entered shall be computed by the court administrator or
arbitrator . . . and added to the judgment or award.” As we have explained, “[p]rejudgment
interest is intended to compensate a prevailing plaintiff for the loss of the use of a money
judgment, to encourage settlement, and to encourage prompt payment of judgments.”
Miller v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 925 N.W.2d 642, 657 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted).
The original judgment in this matter was entered on February 27, 2023. In the order
amending judgment, the district court ordered “prejudgment interest on the damages award
of $10,033.44 from January 17, 2020, at the annual rate of 4 percent for the years 2020 and
2021 and at the annual rate of 5 percent for the years 2022 and 2023.”
Kortan first argues that the district court erred by failing to calculate the actual dollar
amount of prejudgment interest or to direct the district court administrator to do so. But
Kortan cite s no authority stating that the district court needs to calculate the award or
instruct the court administrator to do so, and such a requirement is unnecessary in light of
the statutory language that any interest on the award “shall be computed by the court
administrator . . . and added to the judgment or award.” Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(a)
(emphasis added). We also note that Kortan filed her appeal to this court without first
requesting that the court administrator calculate the amount of prejudgment interest, so the
court administrator never had the opportunity to comply with such a request. For these
reasons, the district court did not err when it provided the percentages of prejudgment
interest that should apply without an explicit instruction that the court administrator
calculate the amount of interest.
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Second, Kortan argues that the prejudgment interest should have been calculated
through the date of the amended judgment in 2024. In support of her argument, Kortan
cites Minnesota Statutes section 549.09, subdivision 1(c)(1)(i), and Wildlife Research
Center, Inc. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 409 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1138 (D. Minn. 2005). But,
while the statute and Wildlife Research Center provide information on how to calculate
interest under section 549.09, they do not discuss how an amended judgment might affect
the calculation.
The association argues that Kortan is entitled to prejudgment interest only up to the
date of entry of the original judgment at the rates identified by the district court for the
years 2020 through 2023. We agree. B ecause the amended judgment in 2024 did not
change the original monetary judgment, the district court did not err by providing for
prejudgment interest only up to the date of the original judgment. See id. (“When a
judgment or award is for the recovery of money, . . . interest from the time of the verdict,
award, or report until judgment is finally entered shall be computed . . . and added to the
judgment or award.” (emphasis added)). And, as the association acknowledged during oral
argument, Kortan is still entitled to recover interest after the date of the original judgment,
because the association is obligated to pay postjudgment interest from the date of the
original judgment until the date the award of damages is paid, which, for a judgment below
$50,000, is at the same rate as the applicable prejudgment interest rate. See Minn. Stat.
§ 549.09, subd. 2 (2024). As a result, the district court did not err in its award of
prejudgment interest.
Affirmed.