James Ervin Owen, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1773

James Ervin Owen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 28, 2025
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-19-8297

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order denying his petition for postconviction
relief without an evidentiary hearing, appellant argues that the district court abused its
discretion because he alleged facts sufficient to show that his jury- trial waiver was not
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
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discretion by summarily denying appellant’s postconviction petition because the facts
alleged in appellant’s petition do not affect the validity of his jury-trial waiver under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant James Ervin Owen with
theft of a firearm, unlawful firearm possession, and reckless discharge of a firearm. In
January 2020, the district court found Owen incompetent to proceed under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.01 and suspended the criminal proceedings. In June 2020, Owen was restored to
competency and the proceedings resumed. Owen waived omnibus issues at a hearing in
December 2020.
In August 2021, Owen pleaded guilty to unlawful firearm possession with the
agreement that he could seek a downward dispositional departure at sentencing. At a
hearing in October 2021, the district court informed the parties that it lacked authority to
grant a downward dispositional departure because of Owen’s prior conviction involving a
firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 8(b) (2018) (providing that district courts may not
depart from the mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant has been convicted of
certain offenses involving firearms). The district court granted Owen’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.
On April 26, 2022, Owen appeared for a jury trial and stipulated to his prior
conviction making him ineligible to possess a firearm. Owen indicated that, because he
wanted to personally question witnesses, he might discharge counsel and represent himself.
The district court recessed to give Owen time to talk with his attorney. When the hearing
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resumed, the district court indicated that Owen had decided to proceed with a trial based
on stipulated facts under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(b). The following exchange
occurred:
THE COURT: I understand that, Mr. Owen, you’ve had a
chance to talk with your attorney, and that it’s my
understanding that you are simply wanting to make sure you
preserve any issues that you have for appeal, but aren’t
necessarily contesting the facts at this time. Is that my
understanding?
OWEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I think—I had a chance to discuss
with counsel in chambers how we want to proceed today in
light of the fact that you are interested in waiving your right to
a jury trial and proceeding in that way. . . . I wanted to give
your attorney some time to meet with you and make sure that
everything is done correctly in presenting that to the Court . . . .
[I]s that what you want to do today, sir?
OWEN: It would give me the right in the future to appeal
anything as far as these proceedings at this point—

THE COURT: I have to see what the attorneys put together
for us, and we will address that when we come back this
afternoon, but it’s my understanding that that’s what you want
to work on, correct?
OWEN: That is all I want, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. . . . What I would be most interested in,
I think, when we’re discussing this afternoon is, you know,
under Lothenbach there is that standard that the issue is
contested is dispositive, and I think that it’s something that
we’re going to need to kind of talk about. Go ahead, [defense
counsel].
DEFENSE COUNSEL: We actually would just go under
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. It’s 26—

THE COURT: The subpart A, the stipulated facts trial?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right, subdivision 3.

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THE COURT: 3(a)? That’s how you’re thinking you’d
proceed?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, 3(b). I mean it’s really —
because, like, if you turn to then F, “If the Court finds the
defendant guilty based entirely on the stipulated facts,
stipulated evidence, or both, the defendant may appeal from
the judgment of conviction and raise issues on appeal as from
any trial to the Court.”

THE COURT: Okay. So that’s the rule under which you’re
contemplating we’ll proceed today?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Correct.

The court recessed for nearly three hours to allow Owen to consult with his attorney
and prepare the stipulated facts for trial. When the court reconvened, Owen waived his
right to a jury trial. Owen’s counsel confirmed with Owen that Owen had an opportunity
to review and complete a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. In the written waiver
and on the record, Owen confirmed that he had been advised of his right to trial by jury
and, after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel, was waiving that right. Owen
also confirmed he understood that if the court found him guilty based on stipulated facts,
he could “appeal from the judgment of conviction and raise issues on appeal as from any
trial to the Court.” When the court confirmed with Owen that the checked boxes on the
written waiver reflected his intentions, Owen replied, “As long as I have my right to appeal,
yes.”
The state dismissed the charges of theft of a firearm and reckless discharge and the
district court took the matter under advisement based on the stipulated facts. On April 29,
2022, the district court found Owen guilty of unlawful firearm possession. The court
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sentenced Owen to 60 months in prison. Owen filed a notice of appeal but later voluntarily
dismissed his appeal.
On June 20, 2024, Owen filed a petition for postconviction relief and a supporting
affidavit. In his petition, Owen alleged that his jury -trial waiver was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary because he “did not understand when he waived his right to a
jury trial and stipulated to the state’s facts and evidence that he would not be able to raise
issues on appeal that had not been litigated in the first instance in district court.” Owen
recited the facts of his jury-trial waiver as described above and averred that, when he
completed the waiver, he thought he “could thereafter litigate on appeal any issues related
to the case,” including the admissibility of his statements to law enforcement and “whether
[his] right to due process had been violated by requiring [him] to undergo multiple Rule 20
examinations.” He alleged that, when he filed his direct appeal, he learned that he could
not raise on appeal any of the issues he had intended to appeal when he waived his jury-
trial right “because those issues had not been raised or litigated in the district court.”
The district court denied Owen’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary
hearing. The court determined that Owen’s petition did not allege facts that, if proven,
would entitle him to relief because there was no factual dispute that his waiver complied
with Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a), and it was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
The court reasoned that the misunderstandings Owen alleged in his petition had no effect
on the validity of his jury-trial waiver because he had the same right to appeal issues as he
would have had after a jury trial.
Owen appeals.
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DECISION

We review the summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). “A district court abuses
its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based
its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings .”
Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). We review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. Bonga
v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011).
When a defendant files a petition for postconviction relief, the district court must
hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the
proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.
§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2022). In determining whether to hold a hearing, the district court must
consider “the facts alleged in the petition as true and [construe] them in the light most
favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). A district court “may summarily deny a petition without holding an
evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to
grant the requested relief.” Davis, 15 N.W.3d at 642 (quotation omitted).
Owen argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction
petition because he alleged facts sufficient to establish that his jury-trial waiver was invalid.
When, as here, a case is submitted to a district court on stipulated facts, the defendant must
waive their right to a jury trial. State v. Sandmoen, 390 N.W.2d 419, 423-24 (Minn. App.
1986); Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(b). A defendant’s waiver of their jury-trial right
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must “be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.” State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn.
1991); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The waiver must be
done “personally, in writing or on the record in open court, after being advised by the court
of the right to trial by jury, and after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a).
The “focus” of a court’s colloquy with a defendant advising them of their jury-trial
right “is on whether the defendant understands the basic elements of a jury trial.” Ross,
472 N.W.2d at 654. In general, “[a] waiver made in compliance with Rule 26.01,
subdivision 1(2)(a), meets the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent requirement.” State v.
Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820, 827 (Minn. 2006). But ultimately, “[w]hether a waiver of a
constitutional right was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.” State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 2014).
Owen contends that his waiver was invalid because, when he waived his right to a
jury trial, he thought he would be able to appeal any issue in the case, including issues
surrounding his rule 20 evaluations and the admissibility of his statements to police, even
if those issues had not been raised to the district court. Owen alleged that he first learned
that he would not be able to raise those issues on appeal because he had not presented them
to the district court when he initiated his direct appeal.
For three reasons, we conclude that t he district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Owen’s postconviction petition without a hearing. First, Owen’s jury-trial
waiver complied with rule 26.01, subdivision 1(2)(a). After Owen decided to proceed with
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a stipulated-facts trial, the district court recessed for nearly three hours to allow him time
to consult with his attorney. When the court recalled the case, Owen’s attorney went
through his written jury-trial waiver with him on the record, asking Owen to confirm his
understanding that he has the “right to a 12-person jury trial” at which the jurors “would
hear testimony from the various witnesses that would be called by the State,” that he
“would have the ability to subpoena witnesses” to testify and “would have the ability to
testify” himself, “would have the right to a unanimous verdict,” would have “the right to
have the State prove by proof beyond a reasonable doubt” his prior conviction, and that by
going forward with a stipulated- facts trial, he was waiving all those rights. Owen
confirmed he understood each component of his jury-trial right, that he was waiving that
right, and that he had had time to consult with his attorney in making the decision to do so.
The facts Owen alleged in his petition are not related to his understanding of any of the
“basic elements” of his jury-trial right or to his time to consult with his attorney. Therefore,
Owen’s waiver satisfied rule 26.01, subdivision 1(2)(a).
Second, Owen’s jury-trial waiver was valid under Little. We agree with Owen that
the district court could have more explicitly considered “the facts and circumstances of the
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused” when considering
the validity of Owen’s jury-trial waiver. 851 N.W.2d at 882. But Owen did not allege any
facts in his postconviction petition or accompanying affidavit related to his background or
experience that might render his jury-trial waiver invalid. Instead, Owen argued that his
jury-trial waiver was unintelligent because he was unaware that he could not argue issues
on appeal that had not been raised in the district court.
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Third, the scope of an appeal from the judgment of conviction after a stipulated-
facts trial is the same “as from any trial to the court.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3(f).
Consistent with this provision, Owen expressly confirmed when he waived his jury -trial
rights that he understood, if the court found him guilty based on stipulated facts, that he
could “appeal from the judgment of conviction and raise issues on appeal as from any trial
to the court.”
In this case, Owen waived omnibus issues and he did not move to suppress his
statements to the police or challenge the rule 20 evaluations in district court. Thus, even if
Owen had exercised his right to a jury trial, he generally would not have been able to obtain
appellate review of issues he failed to raise in the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (providing that “[a] reviewing court must generally consider only
those issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in
deciding the matter before it” (quotation omitted)); State v. Roby, 463 N.W.2d 506, 508
(Minn. 1990) (stating that an appellate court does not “decide issues which are not first
addressed by the trial court and are raised for the first time on appeal even if the issues
involve constitutional questions regarding criminal procedure” (quoting State v. Sorenson,
441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1989)). Owen does not direct us to any authority, and we
have found none, establishing that a defendant’s jury -trial waiver is unintelligent if the
defendant is not informed about appellate issue-preservation rules that apply in an appeal
from the judgment of conviction after a stipulated-evidence trial.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that, even if the facts alleged in Owen’s postconviction petition were proved,
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Owen is not entitled to relief because his unawareness of appellate issue-preservation rules
does not render his jury-trial waiver under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, invalid.
Affirmed.