State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1782

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Derrick John Thompson,
Respondent.

Filed May 19, 2025
Affirmed; motion granted
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-12910

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Tyler Bliss, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s
order denying its motion to admit other-acts evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). The
state seeks to offer the other-acts evidence during respondent Derrick John Thompson’s
jury trial on five counts of third -degree depraved-mind murder for driving recklessly and
colliding with a car on a Minneapolis street, causing the deaths of five people.
The state contends, first, that the district court’s order critically impacted the
likelihood of a successful prosecution on the third-degree murder charges. Second, the state
argues that the district court abused its discretion because the other-acts evidence is
relevant to prove Thompson’s common scheme or plan, his identity, and his knowledge
and intent. We conclude that the district court’s exclusion of the other-acts evidence
significantly reduced the likelihood of a successful prosecution of Thompson for charges
of third-degree depraved-mind murder. But we also conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the other-acts evidence. Thus, we affirm. We also grant
the state’s motion to supplement the appellate record to include transcripts.
FACTS
On June 22, 2023, the state filed a complaint and charged Thompson with criminal
vehicular homicide for the deaths of five women on June 16, 2023.1 The state amended the

1 The state charged Thompson with five counts of criminal vehicular homicide for
operating a motor vehicle in a grossly negligent manner under Minn. Stat. § 609.2112,

3
complaint on September 16, 2024, adding five counts of third-degree murder under Minn.
Stat. § 609.195(a) (2022), and alleging that Thompson killed the five women by
perpetrating an inherently dangerous act with a depraved mind.
In the probable-cause statement attached to the amended complaint, the state alleged
that, on June 16, 2023, a state trooper in a marked squad car saw a sport utility vehicle
(SUV) driving recklessly and at a “high rate of speed” on Interstate 35W. Before the officer
could “catch up” and initiate a traffic stop, the SUV moved across several lanes of traffic
and exited at Lake Street. After exiting, the SUV ran a red light and collided with a car ,
killing the five occupants. 2 The SUV driver left his vehicle and fled the scene of the
collision. Based on witness reports, Thompson was later found nearby and arrested.
On August 23, 2024, the state gave Thompson notice of its intent to offer other-acts
evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) to prove Thompson’s “[i]ntent (and modus
operandi), knowledge, identity, or common scheme or plan.” The state’s notice described
evidence of an incident in California in which Thompson “quickly exited” a highway to
evade a police officer who was attempting to stop his vehicle, resulting in a car accident in
which a pedestrian was seriously injured (California incident). Thompson pleaded guilty

subd. 1(a)(1) (2022), and five counts of criminal vehicular homicide for causing a collision
and leaving the scene under Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(7) (2022).

2 The state’s brief to this court asserts facts that are not in the appellate record. The record
on appeal includes “[t]he documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript
of the proceedings, if any.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. “The general rule is that this
court will not consider evidence outside the record.” State v. Breaux, 620 N.W.2d 326, 334
(Minn. App. 2001). Thus, we do not consider the extra-record facts alleged in the state’s
brief.
4
to charges of “evading an officer [and] causing injury , leaving the scene of an accident
[that caused] injury/death.” Thompson was released from prison about six months before
the Lake Street incident occurred.
At a pretrial hearing on August 27, 2024, the district court noted that the state’s
motion “can all be addressed in writing” and set a briefing schedule. 3 The state did not
request a hearing on its other-acts motion. The state submitted its memorandum in support
of admitting the other-acts evidence on September 20, and Thompson opposed the motion
by memorandum on September 30.
The district court conducted a pretrial hearing on other issues on November 4, 2024.
The parties did not discuss the state’s motion at that hearing. The same day, the district
court made an entry in the register of actions that stated, “Order Denying Motion Spreigl.”
No written order was issued. The state appeals.
DECISION
“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).

3 No transcripts were initially provided in this appeal. After the parties’ briefs were
submitted and before oral argument, this court asked the parties to submit informal
supplemental memoranda addressing whether the state’s other-acts motion was discussed
during pretrial hearings and whether the record on appeal was sufficient for appellate
review.
The parties responded with memoranda and, on February 19, 2025, one day before
the scheduled oral argument in this appeal, the state moved to supplement the record to
include the transcripts from the August 27, 2024 and November 4, 2024 hearings.
Thompson’s counsel objected to the admission of these transcripts at oral argument ,
arguing that they were not relevant. We grant the state’s motion and consider these
transcripts on appeal because they clarify the handling of the state’s motion and confirm
that there is no on-the-record ruling.
5
Other-acts evidence may be admissible, however, for another purpose, such as proving
“motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.” Id. Other-acts evidence is “often referred to in Minnesota as Spreigl evidence
after [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] decision in State v. Spreigl.” State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.
1965)).
For the state to obtain appellate review of a pretrial order, it must provide notice of
“how the district court’s alleged error, unless reversed, will have a critical impact on the
outcome of the trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 2(2)(b). Accordingly, to obtain
pretrial relief, the state “must show clearly and unequivocally (1) that the ruling was
erroneous and (2) that the order will have a critical impact on its ability to prosecute the
case.” State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotations omitted). The
critical-impact requirement is a “threshold issue.” Id.
In the briefs submitted to this court, the parties treat the entry in the register of
actions as the district court’s ruling denying the state’s motion to admit evidence of the
California incident. We will therefore treat the pretrial ruling as an appealable decision if
the critical-impact test is met. Because the result of our analysis is that we agree with the
state that it established critical impact, we also consider whether the district court abused
its discretion by excluding the California-incident evidence.
6
I. The district court’s ruling denying the admission of evidence about the
California incident critically impacted the state’s case.
To meet the critical-impact requirement, the state must show that “the prosecution’s
likelihood of success is seriously jeopardized” by the pretrial order. State v. Underdahl,
767 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Minn. 2009). When a case involves several charges, critical impact
exists if the order inhibits the state from prosecuting at least one of the charge s. State v.
Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2015). “The S tate can show critical impact when
complying with an order significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.”
Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 683 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts analyzing the critical
impact of a district court’s pretrial ruling will consider “the state’s evidence as a whole” to
understand “the nature of the state’s evidence against the accused” and “the impact that
suppressing these items will have on the state’s case.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624,
630-31 (Minn. 1995).
The state urges that critical impact is established for its amended complaint charging
Thompson with five counts of third-degree murder. The state does not argue that the district
court’s ruling critically impacted its prosecution of the other charges against Thompson.
The third-degree murder charges require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Thompson “cause[d] the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to
others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.195(a). The supreme court has described the depraved- mind element as a mental
state “evincing indifference to human life.” State v. Noor, 964 N.W.2d 424, 433 (Minn.
2021).
7
The state argues that “the exclusion of the [other-acts] evidence . . . will make it
significantly more challenging for the State to prove the depraved-mind element of each of
the five charged counts of third-degree murder.” The state contends that the California
incident is “the best available evidence to prove Thompson knew” that reckless driving
was dangerous enough to cause the loss of life, but he chose to do so anyway. Thompson
responds that “the state has not clearly and unequivocally shown a critical impact” because
the state’s case “is not seriously jeopardized by” excluding the California-incident
evidence. Thompson cites State v. Reckinger, in which this court concluded that the “state
simply failed to show how the absence of” other-acts evidence “significantly reduces the
likelihood of a successful prosecution.” 603 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Minn. App. 1999).
Our analysis in State v. Coleman is helpful. 944 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. App. 2020)
(Coleman I), aff’d, 957 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 2021) (Coleman II). Coleman was convicted of
third-degree depraved-mind murder for killing a child by running over the child with a
snowmobile while intoxicated. Id. at 475-76. The district court admitted other-acts
evidence during Coleman’s jury trial; the state offered evidence that, a few months before
the snowmobile incident, Coleman “was involved in an alcohol-related [auto] crash in
which the driver of the other vehicle involved was injured.” Id.
Coleman appealed his conviction and, among other issues, challenged the district
court’s admission of the other-acts evidence. Id. at 476. This court concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the prior auto incident, reasoning
that “Coleman’s prior alcohol-related hit-and-run was relevant to Coleman’s knowledge of
the dangers of driving while intoxicated” and that, while “there is some common
8
knowledge of the dangers of drinking and driving,” that is different from “firsthand
knowledge of the dangers of drinking and driving that Coleman possessed due to his prior
alcohol-related hit-and -run.” Id. at 481-83 (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed in Coleman II but did not grant review of the other-acts evidence issue or
otherwise address the other-acts evidence. 957 N.W.2d at 72-84.
Similar to the prior -auto-incident evidence admitted in Coleman I, the
California-incident evidence offered by the state is probative of Thompson’s mental state.
The supreme court in Coleman II addressed the legal standard for proving third- degree
depraved-mind murder and held that, when “circumstances show that the defendant
committed an eminently dangerous act with indifference to the loss of life that the
eminently dangerous act could cause, the defendant has the requisite mental state for third-
degree murder.” Id. at 81. The California-incident evidence tends to prove that Thompson
had “firsthand knowledge” of the dangers of reckless driving. Coleman I, 944 N.W.2d at
482. In both the California and Lake Street incidents, Thompson was speeding, kept
speeding to evade law enforcement, drove recklessly, and crashed, causing others to sustain
severe injuries in California and death in Minneapolis.
On the other hand, the state may successfully prosecute Thompson for third-degree
depraved-mind murder without evidence of the California incident. The supreme court
stated in Coleman II that the depraved-mind element for third-degree murder “need not be
proved directly, but might be inferred from the perpetration of . . . an act.” 957 N.W.2d at
79 (emphasis added). Stated slightly differently, the supreme court held that “a person
commits an eminently dangerous act (one that is highly likely to cause death) without
9
regard to human life, when based on the surrounding circumstances one can infer that the
defendant was indifferent to the loss of life that the defendant’s eminently dangerous act
could cause.” Id. at 80 (emphasis added) . In other words, the state may prove the
depraved-mind element indirectly and show Thompson’s disregard for human life based
on “the surrounding circumstances” that support the inference that Thompson “was
indifferent to the loss of life” that his dangerous driving could cause. Id.
While the state may prove the depraved-mind element of third-degree murder
without evidence of the California incident, caselaw discussing the critical-impact test does
not require the state to prove that excluding this evidence precluded its ability to prosecute
the crime. Rather, critical impact requires the state to show only that the district court’s
ruling “significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.” Underdahl ,
767 N.W.2d at 683 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
We therefore conclude that excluding evidence of the California incident
significantly reduced the likelihood of the state proving Thompson’s mental state for
third-degree murder. We also conclude that the district court’s ruling denying the state’s
motion critically impacted the state’s ability to prosecute Thompson for third-degree
depraved-mind murder.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the
California incident.
Appellate courts “review a district court’s decision on whether to admit [other-acts]
evidence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 611 (Minn. 2004).
“An abuse of discretion occurs if a district court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or
10
capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly
erroneous factual findings.” Gilbert v. State, 2 N.W.3d 483, 487 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted). “If the admission of evidence of other crimes or misconduct is a close call, it
should be excluded.” State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006).
The state argues that “the district court abused its discretion in two ways.” The state
contends that the district court erred, first, “by not issuing a ruling, either in writing or on
the record in open court,” and second, by excluding evidence of the California incident.
We address each argument in turn.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not making findings in
support of its ruling.
The state argues that the district court abused its discretion by “fail[ing] to actually
exercise its discretion” because the district court did not make findings, either in writing or
on the record. In its opening brief, the state suggests that the district court’s ruling lacked
sufficient findings to permit appellate review. The state clarifies in its supplemental
memorandum to this court, however, that the record is sufficient for appellate review.
Thompson responds, first, that the state did not ask for findings, even though
Thompson “asked for the [district] court to make written rulings if the state’s motion was
granted.” Second, in his supplemental memorandum to this court, Thompson argues that
the district court addressed the admissibility of the California-incident evidence by written
motions and memoranda to minimize pretrial publicity and avoid tainting the jury pool.
Third, Thompson argues that, if this court determines that the district court failed to make
sufficient findings, we should remand the matter and not reverse the ruling.
11
Caselaw explains that an appellate court may remand for additional findings of fact
if doing so is necessary for appellate review. For example, in State v. Davis, the supreme
court reversed Davis’s conviction and remanded for factual findings on other-acts
evidence, holding that a district court is obligated at an evidentiary hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence “to resolve disputed questions of fact in determining the admissibility
of evidence.” 233 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Minn. 1975). Other caselaw explains, however, that
an appellate court need not remand for findings if the appellant was not prejudiced by the
lack of findings. See State v. Rainey, 226 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1975) (affirming
conviction because the appellant was not prejudiced by the lack of factual findings, even
though “the trial court’s ruling at a [suppression] hearing should be supported by findings
of fact so that it is possible to ascertain from the record the basis for the trial court’s
ruling”).
Here, no evidentiary hearing occurred on the state’s motion, as happened in Davis,
and on appeal, the state does not claim that it was prejudiced by the district court’s failure
to make factual findings. The state cites no authority suggesting that findings, either written
or on the record, are required for a district court to exclude other-acts evidence. 4 And it

4 Although not noted by the parties in their briefs, the applicable rules state that a district
court must rule on omnibus issues on the record, either in writing or orally, and decide
evidentiary issues on the record at the party’s request. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.07 (stating
that a district court “must make findings and determinations on the omnibus issue(s) in
writing or on the record within 30 days of the issue(s) being taken under advisement”);
Minn. R. Evid. 103(b) (“Upon request of any party, the court shall place its [evidentiary]
ruling on the record.”).
Here, the district court denied the state’s motion by an entry in the register of
actions. The state did not take the position during district court proceedings that this ruling

12
does not explain why findings are necessary for our review. In a nonprecedential opinion,
this court determined that no authority states that a “district court is required to make
written findings before it admits [other-acts] evidence.” State v. Nippa, No. A06-317,
2007 WL 446738, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 13, 2007) (emphasis added).5 If written findings
are not required to admit other-acts evidence, it seems unlikely that they are required to
exclude other-acts evidence —especially when no evidentiary hearing occurred. We
conclude that district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to make written findings
in support of its decision to exclude the other-acts evidence.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of
the California incident.
To be admissible, other-acts evidence must meet these requirements:
(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence;
(2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be
offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the
evidence must be relevant and material to the state’s case; and
(5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed
by its potential prejudice to the defendant.
Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686. Thompson does not dispute that the first three requirements of
the other-acts test are met. Accordingly, we address the fourth and fifth requirements.
Because the district court did not expressly state its reasoning on these requirements, we

was not on the record. Nor did the state request that the district court court’s ruling include
findings or be recorded in some other way. Also, as Thompson observes on appeal, the
district court may have prudently decided this motion with a terse ruling to avoid tainting
the jury pool in a case that has drawn media attention.

5 Nippa is a nonprecedential opinion and is cited for its persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c); State v. Jonsgaard, 949 N.W.2d 161, 169 (Minn. App. 2020).
13
consider whether the district court would have been within its discretion to conclude that
the requirement was not met sufficiently to admit the California-incident evidence.
Requirement 4: The other-acts evidence must be relevant and material.
Evidence is relevant when it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 401. “In determining the relevanc[e]
and materiality” of other-acts evidence, courts “consider the issues in the case, the reasons
and need for the evidence, and whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between
the charged offense and the [prior] offense in time, place, or modus operandi.” State v.
Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 83 (Minn. 2005).
The state argues that the California-incident evidence is relevant and material to
show Thompson’s (1) common scheme or plan, (2) identity, and (3) knowledge and intent.
The state also argues that the California incident and the pending charges “are sufficiently
related in time, location, and modus operandi.” We consider the state’s arguments for each
of the proposed other purposes.
Common Scheme or Plan: In Ness, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that, to be
“admissible under the common scheme or plan exception,” the other-acts evidence “must
have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged crime.” 707 N.W.2d at 688.
Other-acts evidence is often admissible to show a common scheme or plan in
criminal-sexual-conduct cases “where the defendant disputes that the sexual conduct
occurred or where the defendant asserts the victim is fabricating the allegations.” State v.
Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551, 557 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000).
14
Here, while the California incident and the pending charges both involve reckless driving
and serious injury to victims, this commonality is too general to be “a marked similarity in
modus operandi.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 688. Thus, based on this caselaw and the record on
appeal, the district court would have been within its discretion to conclude the
California-incident evidence was not relevant to show Thompson’s common scheme or
plan.
Thompson’s Identity: Other-acts evidence may be relevant to prove identity when
there is a “marked similarity” between the previous act and the pending charged conduct.
State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008). F or example, in Bartylla, evidence of
Bartylla’s previous burglary conviction was admissible to prove his identity in a pending
murder case. Id. The supreme court observed many similarities between both incidents:
(1) the perpetrator entered “a woman’s home without consent” while she was alone at
night, (2) the intruder used “a door that had been inadvertently left open,” (3) “neither of
the incidents appear[ed] to have been motivated by theft,” (4) both victims were strangers
to the defendant, and (5) “both victims were severely beaten.” Id. at 21-22.
Here, while the pending charges and California incident are similar, caselaw
instructs a district court to also consider the state’s need for other-acts evidence. Courtney,
696 N.W.2d at 83. T he state’s need for evidence of the California incident to prove
Thompson’s identity is low because the state has ample evidence of the driver’s identity
that is unrelated to the California incident. According to the state’s probable-cause
statement, Thompson was arrested near the collision, the investigation produced
documentary and video evidence that Thompson rented and drove the SUV, a witness
15
identified Thompson in a show-up, and Thompson made statements to hospital staff
admitting that he was the driver. Thus, without using the California-incident evidence, the
state has evidence that the driver was Thompson and not the second person in the SUV.
We therefore conclude that the district court would have been within its discretion to
conclude that evidence of the California incident was relevant but not needed to show
Thompson’s identity.
Thompson’s Knowledge and Intent: The state argues that the California-incident
evidence is “highly probative that [Thompson] acted with a depraved mind” because it
shows that he knew reckless driving could cause grave injuries and loss of life. Thompson
responds that this argument “implicitly suggests that [Thompson] has a proclivity towards”
driving “in reckless disregard of its eminent danger to human life.”
The state is correct that Thompson’s pending charges and the California incident
involve the same type of conduct. In both instances, Thompson critically harmed others by
driving recklessly while evading police. Given the similarity in conduct, purpose, and
resulting harm, the California-incident evidence tends to prove that Thompson knew that
driving recklessly at high speeds and disobeying traffic laws to avoid law enforcement
could cause injury and loss of life. The state may ask the jury to infer that, by doing so
anyway, Thompson acted with indifference to human life. This is similar to the evidence
of the prior auto incident admitted in Coleman I, as we have already discussed. 944 N.W.2d
at 482 (stating that the prior auto incident made “it more probable that Coleman knew that
his actions of driving while intoxicated presented a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
death to another”).
16
But careful review of time, place, and modus operandi shows the relevance of the
California-incident evidence is weaker here than the other-acts evidence in Coleman I. We
have already noted that the modus operandi of the California incident is too general to
support admission as other-acts evidence. The state also acknowledges weaknesses in the
relationship of time and place between the California incident and the pending charges.
The two incidents occurred about five years apart and in different states. Still, the state
points out that Thompson was incarcerated for most of those five years and contends that
“both incidents occurred on similar city streets.” In contrast, the prior auto incident in
Coleman I occurred “approximately three months before the snowmobile accident.”
944 N.W.2d at 482. 6 Thus, the district court would have been within its discretion to
conclude that it is a close call whether time, place, and modus operandi are in “sufficiently
close relationship” between the pending charges and the California incident to support
admission. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d at 83.
Also, as discussed above, caselaw directs that a district court consider the state’s
need for the evidence. Id. The supreme court in Coleman II held that the mental-state
element for third-degree murder can be inferred from the defendant’s acts and surrounding
circumstances. 957 N.W.2d at 79. Given the other evidence of Thompson’s reckless
driving that caused the fatal collision on Lake Street, along with evidence that Thompson

6 This court in Coleman I also reasoned that “the prior offense was sufficiently close to the
charged offense in terms of time, place, and modus operandi” because both offenses
involved Coleman (1) “operating a motor vehicle on public lands in Minnesota” and
(2) “operating a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of more than twice
the legal limit, and ultimately crashing that motor vehicle and causing injuries to another.”
Id.
17
fled the scene after the collision, we conclude that the state’s need for evidence of the
California incident is low. See State v. Mosby, 450 N.W.2d 629, 633 (Minn. App. 1990)
(“Consciousness of guilt is . . . suggested by evidence of flight.”), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 16, 1990).
Thus, while the California-incident evidence is relevant to Thompson’s knowledge
and intent, the state’s need for the evidence is low, and it is a close call whether time, place,
and modus operandi support admission. Thus, the district court would have been within its
discretion to conclude that this requirement is not satisfied.
Requirement 5: The probative value of the other- acts evidence must outweigh the
potential for unfair prejudice.
“[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the probative value of the [other- acts] evidence
outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Coleman I, 944 N.W.2d at 482 (citing
Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 389). Unfair prejudice “does not mean the damage to the
opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it
refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by
illegitimate means.” State v. Welle, 870 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted).
The state argues that the California-incident evidence has high probative value and
that “[a]ny prejudice against Thompson is merely the result of the evidence’s ‘legitimate
probative force’ and not the result of anything unfair or undue.” The state also contends
that any prejudice would be remedied by a cautionary instruction to the jury. Thompson
counters that the California-incident evidence is unfairly prejudicial because it is “likely to
18
confuse the jury and make the case turn on whether [Thompson] was a poor driver
regardless of any limiting instruction and instead focus on his alleged propensity to commit
crimes while driving.” He argues that “[n]o cautionary instruction would obviate this unfair
prejudice.”
In Coleman I, this court acknowledged that admitting Coleman’s previous
intoxicated-driving offense was prejudicial because the evidence “depicts egregious
behavior, making it likely to be damaging evidence.” 944 N.W.2d at 482. But this court
ultimately determined that the other-acts evidence “did not give the state an unfair
advantage,” given that “there was virtually no other evidence that it could have offered to
show that Coleman had a particularized knowledge that his action of drinking and driving
was eminently dangerous” and that the district court provided a cautionary jury instruction.
Id. at 482-83 (quotation omitted). We also described the prior auto incident as “highly
probative” of the depraved-mind element of third-degree murder because it showed
“Coleman’s knowledge of a substantial risk that driving while intoxicated may result in
someone being killed.” Id. at 482.
Like the other-acts evidence in Coleman I, the California-incident evidence has both
probative value and the potential for prejudice because it “depicts egregious behavior.” Id.
This court concluded in Coleman I that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting other-acts evidence to prove Coleman’s mental state for third-degree murder. Id.
at 483. On the other hand, in this appeal, the state must convince us that the district court
abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the California incident. Neither Coleman I
19
nor other authority cited by the parties suggests that a district court abuses its discretion by
excluding other-acts evidence offered to prove a defendant’s mental state.
Under Ness, “[i]f the admission of [other-acts evidence] is a close call, it should be
excluded.” 707 N.W.2d at 685. Here, the district court would have been within its
discretion to conclude that it is a close call whether the probative value of the
California-incident evidence outweighs the potential prejudice to Thompson. Given the
state’s ability to prove Thompson’s mental state by offering other evidence of his acts and
the circumstances leading up to the pending charges, we discern no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s ruling. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny the
state’s motion to admit evidence of the California incident.
Affirmed; motion granted.