In Re the Custody of: A.L., Ian Larsen, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1789

In Re the Custody of: A.L.,
Ian Larsen, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Sian Minske,
Appellant.

Filed August 18, 2025
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge*

Roseau County District Court
File No. 68-FA-16-982

Jacey Johnston, Johnston Family Law, Grand Forks, North Dakota (for appellant)

Suzanne M. Weber, Grand Forks, North Dakota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this custody-modification appeal, appellant-mother challenges the district court’s
grant of sole physical custody to respondent- father, arguing that the district court abused

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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its discretion by failing to conduct an in -camera interview with the child, relying on a
custody-evaluation report, and not considering the impact of the custody change on the
child. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Sian Minske and respondent-father Ian Larsen are the parents of
the minor child, A.L., born in 2010. The parties were never married. In 2017, the district
court granted the parties joint legal and joint physical custody, with mother’s home being
the child’s primary residence.
In May 2022, father moved to modify custody, and the district court denied his
motion in June 2022. In October 2023, mother filed an ex parte motion, seeking to limit
father’s parenting time. The district court declined to make an ex parte determination and
scheduled the matter for a hearing. Before that hearing, father moved to modify custody
under the “endangerment” standard.
In November 2023, the district court held a hearing on the parties’ motions. The
court granted father an evidentiary hearing on his custody-modification motion and, by
joint stipulation of the parties, appointed a custody evaluator. The evaluator, after
reviewing records and conducting interviews and home visits, filed recommendations with
the district court.
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court received the evaluator’s report into
evidence over mother’s hearsay objection. The court heard testimony from several
individuals, including the parties and the evaluator. The court found the evaluator’s
testimony to be credible and put “great weight on her recommendations.”
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In October 2024, the district court filed an order modifying custody, awarding father
sole physical custody of A.L., and making father’s home the child’s primary residence.
The court found that there had been a change of circumstances since the 2017 custody order
and that custody modification was in the child’s best interests. The court found that mother
had willfully and persistently denied or interfered with father’s parenting time and
endangered A.L.’s emotional well-being.
The court noted the following relevant circumstances. In July 2022, father was
exercising parenting time with A.L. at the county fair, and when it was time to leave, father
found A.L. with mother. A.L. refused to leave. Father agreed to let A.L. stay, but because
of A.L.’s defiance, he removed her “ride pass,” which he had purchased. Mother then
called law enforcement and accused father of abusing A.L. Father’s wife had recorded the
interaction between father and A.L., and after viewing the video and speaking to father,
law enforcement took no further action. For the next 15 months, A.L. refused to engage in
parenting time with father.
The evaluator, after viewing the video of A.L. and father at the fair, did not believe
that father’s actions constituted any type of abuse. The district court likewise found that
there was “no credible evidence that [father] has abused [A.L.].” The evaluator believed
that A.L. avoided parenting time with father “for the sole purpose of being constantly
physically and emotionally available to . . . mother at all costs.” The district court found
that A.L. was “voicing her desire for no parenting time with [father],” but the court found
that “given her age and the inappropriate emotional relationship [with] . . . [mother],”
A.L.’s decision “was not being made freely.” The court noted evidence that mother had
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inappropriately relied on A.L. for emotional support, that A.L. “has been parentified,”1 and
that mother had exposed A.L. to topics that were not age appropriate. The court found that
mother had “been reluctant to involve [father] in the daily parenting decisions . . . and ha[d]
restricted his parenting time.”
Mother appeals. Father did not file a brief in this appeal, and we ordered that the
appeal proceed under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
DECISION
Mother challenges the district court’s custody modification. A parent seeking
custody modification based on endangerment must demonstrate that (1) the circumstances
of the child or custodian have changed; (2) modification would serve the child’ s best
interests; (3) the child’ s present environment endangers their physical health, emotional
health, or emotional development; and (4) the benefits of the change outweigh its
detriments with respect to the child. Christensen v. Healey, 913 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Minn.
2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2024) (setting forth endangerment standard for
custody modification).
We review custody-modification decisions for an abuse of discretion.
Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 2008). “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or improperly applying the law
or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey,
975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

1 Testimony at the hearing conveyed that “parentification” is treating a child like an adult,
and such treatment can harm a child’s mental health.
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Mother raises three arguments: (1) the district court should have conducted an
in-camera interview with A.L. and considered A.L.’s custody preference; (2) the district
court should not have relied on the custody-evaluation report because the evaluator “lacked
the required education and experience” and the report “applied the best interest standard
instead of the endangerment standard”; and ( 3) the district court failed to consider the
impact of the custody change on A.L.. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an in-camera
interview with A.L. and by dissuading mother from calling A.L. as a witness.

Mother argues that the district court erred by failing to conduct an in-camera
interview with A.L. and by disregarding A.L. ’s custody preference. Mother also argues
that the district court discouraged her from calling A.L. as a witness by stating that such
testimony would be “construed” against her.
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(3) (2024), in considering the best interests
of the child, the district court must consider “the reasonable preference of the child, if the
court deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to express an
independent, reliable preference.” Under Minn. Stat. § 518.166 (2024), a district court may
conduct an in-camera interview of a minor child during a custody-modification proceeding
“to ascertain the child’s reasonable preference as to custodian, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference. ” T he decision to interview a child “is a
discretionary choice” for the district court because “[a]n interview is not the only way to
determine a child’s preference.” Madgett v. Madgett, 360 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App.
1985).
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Here, in its best-interest analysis, the district court acknowledged A.L.’s preference
to keep mother’s home as her primary residence. The district court noted its concern over
that stated preference given the child’s desire to make herself emotionally available to
mother. In this way, the district court satisfied the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.17,
subd. 1(a)(3) and implicitly determined that the child could not put forth an independent
and reliable custody preference. As for the district court’s decision to not conduct an in-
camera interview, again, such decisions are discretionary, and we discern no abuse of the
district court’s discretion here.
We now turn to mother’s argument that the district court discouraged her from
calling A.L. as a witness by stating that such testimony would be “construed” against her.
In her brief to this court, mother failed to include a record cite for this alleged exchange
between herself and the district court, and we could not locate any such exchange in the
record. For purposes of our review, we assume, without deciding, that the district court
dissuaded mother from allowing A.L. to testify.2
We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion. Under Minn. R.
Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)(7): “Any motion relating to custody or visitation shall additionally

2 In November 2024, on the same day she filed her notice of appeal, mother moved in
district court to stay the district court’s custody-modification order. She effectively raised
the same argument she raises now, and in an accompanying affidavit, she stated as follows:
“When [A.L.] was at the Courthouse to testify, I understood it would be used against me
to call [A.L. ] as a witness to the stand. At that point, I felt threatened that if I did call
[A.L.], it would be construed against me, so I relented and did not call her.” Again, we
make no determination about any exchange between mother and the district court but
assume that the district court dissuaded mother from allowing mother to call A.L. to testify.
See In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 202, 204 (Minn. 1993) (concluding that this court erred
in considering a letter sent to district court one month after the case was decided).
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state whether either party desires the court to interview minor children. No child under the
age of fourteen years will be allowed to testify without prior written notice to the other
party and court approval.” While mother included A.L. in her second amended witness
list, A.L. was 13 at the time of the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the district court had
discretion to disallow A.L.’s testimony. See Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 303.03(d)(7).
Additionally, the district court expressly acknowledged and considered A.L.’s
preference to keep mother’s home as the primary residence. Mother therefore fails to
establish prejudice stemming from the district court’s decision not to permit A.L. to testify.
The appellant bears the burden of showing that the district court’s error was prejudicial.
Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn.
June 28, 1993); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored on
appeal).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in its custody -modification
determination by failing to conduct an in-camera interview with A.L. and by dissuading
mother from calling A.L. as a witness.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the evaluator’s
report.

Mother argues that the district court erred by relying on the evaluator’s report
because the evaluator “lacked the required education and experience.” Mother points to
the evaluator’s “lack of experience, failure to properly apply Minnesota custody law,
reliance on prejudicial and hearsay evidence, and inconsistent testimony.”
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In contested custody proceedings, a district court may order a professional custody
investigation and report. Kremer v. Kremer, 827 N.W.2d 454, 463 (Minn. App. 2013),
rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2013); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.167, subd. 1 (2024) (“In
contested custody proceedings, . . . the court may order an investigation and report
concerning custodial arrangements for the child.”). The report prepared by the custody
evaluator must:
(1) state the position of each party; (2) consider and evaluate
the [best-interest] factors . . . ; (3) include a detailed analysis of
all information considered for each factor; (4) state the
investigator’s recommendation and the reason for the
recommendation; and (5) reference established means for
dispute resolution between the parties.

Minn. Stat. § 518.167, subd. 2 (2024).
As for the evaluator’s qualifications, the custody evaluator testified that she is
licensed to practice law in North Dakota and Minnesota, she has been practicing law for
over three years, she primarily practices in family law, and she is a certified parenting
investigator. The record supports a determination that the evaluator was qualified, and
mother stipulated to the evaluator’s appointment. Generally, stipulations are treated as
binding contracts. Emerick ex rel. Howley v. Sanchez, 547 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Minn. App.
1996).
Mother argues, without legal citation, that the custody evaluator relied on hearsay.
The Minnesota Rules of Evidence apply to custody-modification proceedings. See Minn.
R. Evid. 1101(a) (explaining that the rules of evidence apply to all state court proceedings
unless otherwise noted). Testimony is hearsay if it is an out-of-court statement offered to
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prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). The rules prohibit admitting
hearsay unless an exception applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802.
Mother’s hearsay argument is unpersuasive because the evaluator was permitted by
statute to rely on out- of-court statements in preparing her report. Under statute, the
evaluator was permitted, in preparing her report, to “consult any person who may have
information about the child and the potential custodial arrangements except for persons
involved in mediation efforts between the parties,” and the evaluator was permitted to
“consult with and obtain information from medical, psychiatric, school personnel, or other
expert persons who have served the child in the past after obtaining the consent of the
parents.” Minn. Stat. § 518.167, subd. 2(a). If mother had an issue with any out- of-court
statements, she had a right to call “any person whom the investigator has consulted for
cross-examination at the hearing.” Id., subd. 3 (2024).
This court recently, in a nonprecedential opinion, concluded that such hearsay
statements were admissible in a n evaluator’s report. See Lesch v. Lesch , No. A24-0515,
2025 WL 1024402, at *2 (Minn. App. Apr. 7, 2025) (concluding that the district court did
not err in admitting, over objection, hearsay in a custody evaluator’s report because the
evidence was admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 703 and Minn. Stat. § 518.167 (2024)).
Mother argues that the evaluator failed to apply the “Christensen” factors, which
apply to a custody-modification proceeding. See Christensen, 913 N.W.2d at 443 (noting
factors a district court may consider when deciding whether a motion to modify parenting
time is a de facto motion to modify physical custody). Mother also argues that the evaluator
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erred by applying the best-interest factors rather than the endangerment standard in section
518.18(d)(iv).
Mother’s argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Minn. Stat. § 518.167,
subd. 2(b)(2), specifically requires the evaluator to “consider and evaluate” the best-interest
factors “in section 518.17, subdivision 1.” Second, the district court applied the correct
endangerment standard, and therefore, even accepting that the evaluator put the incorrect
standard in her report, there was no prejudice to mother. See Bloom, 499 N.W.2d at 845.
Mother argues that the best- interest factors are “only relevant in a custody
modification if there is a written agreement between the parties to apply those standards or
if the child has been integrated into the petitioner’s home with the other parent’s consent.”
Mother is incorrect. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2024) (requiring a finding that
“modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child”); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024) (noting that a best-interest analysis is conducted “for purposes
of determining issues of custody”); Geibe v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. App.
1997) (explaining that the best-interests factors enumerated in statute are the second
required finding when deciding whether to modify custody).
In sum, mother fails to show that the district court abused its discretion in relying
on the evaluator’s report in reaching its custody-modification determination, and we defer
to the district court’s credibility determinations of that report. See Kremer, 827 N.W.2d at
463 (stating that it “was within the district court’s discretion to rely on [a] custody
evaluator’s testimony and report” and deferring to the district court’s credibility
determination regarding that evidence).
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the effect of the
custody change on A.L.

Lastly, mother argues that the district court erred by not considering the effect of
the custody change on A.L., most specifically, the effect that the change would have on
A.L.’s involvement in competitive dance. Father lives in rural Roseau, and mother lives
in Thief River Falls.
The district court conducted a thorough analysis of the best- interest factors and
weighed the harm to A.L. from the change against the benefits of the change. For example,
the district court found: “While [mother] has provided for [A.L.] and [A.L.] is used to this
environment, [father] has a better ability to provide for [A.L.’s] basic needs.” The court
also adopted a portion of the evaluator’s report addressing A.L.’s dance classes:
There was previously an issue between the parties where
[father] was not bringing [A.L.] to all of her summer dance
classes during his parenting time. This resulted in an Order
requiring [that] he bring her to all classes. The issue now is
that [mother] has behaved as if she has sole legal custody and
signs [A.L.] up for classes that interfere with her time with her
father, without any consultation of [father]. Not only does she
not consult him, she tells him last minute. [Mother] has
unilaterally signed [A.L.] up for nine dance classes this
summer and a summer dance camp. These classes will require
[father] or [his wife] to be in Thief River Falls two nights per
week all summer. Additionally, [mother] signed [A.L.] up for
a Po m class this spring unilaterally that required [father’s]
Sundays be cut short every week. [A.L.] is passionate about
dance, but the volume of classes she takes interferes with her
time with her father and her father’s side of the family as well
as her ability to perform well in school. [Mother] is rigid about
parenting time but continues to limit [father’s] time and
minimize his role as a parent by cutting him out of any and all
decisions that relate to [A.L.].

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In sum, the district court considered the effect of the change on A.L. and specifically
considered A.L.’s close connection to dance. Because mother fails to establish that the
district court abused its discretion in modifying custody and granting father sole physical
custody, we do not disturb that decision.
Affirmed.