State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1799

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdirizak Bashir Barre,
Appellant.

Filed September 15, 2025
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-18485

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, N. Nate Summers, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rebecca Ireland, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Abdirizak Bashir Barre challenges the district court’s decision to deny
his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his vehicle. Barre
argues that the district court erred when it applied the automobile exception to the warrant
2
requirement because an officer, acting on a tip from a confidential informant, lacked
probable cause to believe that searching the vehicle would result in the discovery of
evidence or contraband. We affirm.
FACTS
In an amended complaint filed on June 13, 2023, respondent State of Minnesota
charged Barre with unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition under Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022) (count I), and first-degree controlled-substance crime under
Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(4) (2022) (count II). The charges relied on evidence
obtained from a warrantless search of Barre’s vehicle conducted after police received a tip
from a confidential informant (CI). Barre moved to compel discovery of the CI’s identity
and suppress the state’s evidence. The district court held a contested omnibus hearing
during which it heard testimony from the officer who received the tip. The following facts
were established at the contested omnibus hearing.
The officer learned about the CI from a detective, with whom the officer had worked
“very many times,” after the CI contacted the detective seeking to share the tip. The officer
had not previously worked with the CI. But the officer believed the CI was reliable for two
reasons. First, the detective “vouched for the [CI].” Specifically, the detective told the
officer “that he had previously worked with this [CI] on several occasions and information
from this [CI] had been corroborated and been reliable in the past.” The detective told the
officer that the CI’s tips had led to other arrests, including in cases related to controlled
substances and firearms. Second, the officer was able to independently corroborate aspects
of the CI’s tip.
3
The officer spoke to the CI in-person at the Hennepin County Jail on September 14,
2022, where the CI was “in custody for some type of violation.” The CI told the officer
“that a Somali male was driving an older silver Mercedes sedan and would regularly park
in . . . the southeast corner of 6th and Cedar, in a parking lot.” The CI also stated that t he
vehicle had out-of-state license plates and always backed into its parking space. The CI
did not know the male by name but indicated that he “was in possession of a firearm” and
sold controlled substances “from the vehicle.” The CI obtained this information “first-
hand,” meaning that “[the CI] saw it in the vehicle.” The officer knew the CI’s identity
and did not pay the CI for the tip.
On the same day that he spoke to the CI, the officer “locate[d] an older model silver
Mercedes with out-of-state plates parked in the exact position in the parking lot, as [the CI]
described.” The vehicle had Nebraska plates, was backed into its parking space, and the
individual—later identified as Barre—matched the physical description given by the CI.
The officer surveilled the area for a short period of time and did not observe any controlled-
substance related activity. The officer then “tried to circle the block to get a better view,”
but the vehicle moved from its spot. The officer then found the vehicle in a different
location and “conducted a suspicious-vehicle stop of the car with several [other] officers.”
Officers searched the vehicle and found a loaded handgun and “a couple thousand fentanyl
pills.”
Following the contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied Barre’s motion
to suppress. The district court determined that the CI’s tip was credible and therefore
“provided officers [with] probable cause to believe that narcotics or illegal firearms may
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be found in the vehicle,” such that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
applied. The district court also denied Barre’s motion to compel discovery of the CI’s
identity.1
The parties agreed that the district court’s ruling on the suppression motion was
dispositive and proceeded under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. 2 Accordingly, Barre
submitted the case for trial on stipulated facts and stipulated evidence in order to preserve
the suppression issue for appeal. In exchange, the state dismissed count I and cap ped its
sentencing request for court II at 65 months in prison. At a hearing, the district court found
Barre guilty on count II and imposed a 60-month prison term with credit for 209 days’ time
served in pretrial confinement.
Barre appeals.
DECISION
Barre contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
Specifically, Barre argues the CI’s tip was not sufficiently reliable to provide officers with
probable cause to search his vehicle without a warrant under the automobile exception.
3
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may
independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court

1 This aspect of the district court’s decision is not contested on appeal.
2 The state described this as a “ Lothenbach proceeding.” “In 2007, Minn. R. Crim.
[P.] 26.01, subd. 4, replaced Lothenbach as the method for preserving a dispositive pretrial
issue for appellate review in a criminal case.” State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn.
2016).
3 The state argues in the alternative that other exceptions to the warrant requirement
applied. Because we conclude the automobile exception applies, we decline to reach the
state’s alternative arguments.
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erred in suppressing— or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90,
98 (Minn. 1999). We review de novo whether a search was justified by probable cause,
and we review findings of fact for clear error. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487
(Minn. 2005).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee individuals the right to be
free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10. “[A]ny evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure must
be suppressed.” State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. App. 2018). “A search
conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless it satisfies one of the well- delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). The state bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search was
constitutionally permissible. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003).
One well-established exception to the warrant requirement, the “automobile
exception,” authorizes officers to “search a car without a warrant, including closed
containers in that car, if there is probable cause to believe the search will result in a
discovery of evidence or contraband.” Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771 (quotation omitted).
“Probable cause is an objective inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances in
each case.” State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted).
“It is a common-sense, nontechnical concept that involves the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal
technicians, act.” Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771 (quotation omitted). And “the totality of the
circumstances includes reasonable inferences that police officers draw from facts, based
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on their training and experience.” Id. The analysis requires “more than mere suspicion but
less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169 (quotation
omitted). Indeed, probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances
shows that there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Probable cause to search an automobile may be established based on an informant’s
tip if the tip has “sufficient indicia of reliability.” State v. Mosley, 994 N.W.2d 883, 890
(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted) . As the supreme court explained in Mosley, we
determine whether a tip has “sufficient indicia of reliability” by evaluating the informant’s
“reliability” and their “basis of knowledge,” but the analysis is “not a rigid two-pronged
test.” Id. (quotation omitted). Instead, the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge
are “relevant considerations” that, along with other indicia of reliability, are part of the
analysis. Id. (quotation omitted). If an informant’s tip to law enforcement is based on the
informant’s personal knowledge, officers need not “corroborate significant details” of the
tip for it to support a probable-cause determination. Id. at 892. Rather, “corroboration of
minor details is enough to lend credence to an informant’s tip based on personal
knowledge.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Barre argues the officer lacked probable cause to search his vehicle, relying heavily
on our decision in State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn.
July 25, 2000). There, we determined that, even though an informant was “undeniably
credible,” their tip did not provide probable cause because it “lacked sufficient detail and
range to establish the [informant’s] basis of knowledge.” Id. at 666-67. The informant’s
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tip included Cook’s name and license- plate number, a description of Cook’s physical
appearance, clothing, vehicle, and a claim that Cook was currently selling crack cocaine at
a particular location while storing the crack cocaine in the waistband of his pants. Id. at
666. However, we determined that the informant’s tip did not establish the basis for the
informant’s knowledge because the informant did not claim to have purchased a controlled
substance from Cook or observed Cook selling a controlled substance. Id. at 668.
Additionally, police corroboration was insufficient to establish the informant’s basis for
knowledge because the tip did “not predict any suspicious behavior on Cook’s part,” and
the corroborated details, such as Cook’s clothing, vehicle, and location, “were entirely
innocuous and lacked any incriminating aspects.” Id.
Barre argues that, like in Cook, the details in the CI’s tip that the officer
corroborated—the make and model of the vehicle, the out- of-state license plates, the
driver’s description, the location, and the position of the vehicle in the parking spot—were
“easily obtained, readily observable facts.” We are not persuaded.
Here, unlike Cook , the officer testified that the CI obtained their information
through first-hand observation. And while some of the details provided by the CI were
“innocuous,” others were very specific. For example, in Cook, we noted that the
informant’s tip predicted Cook’s present appearance and location rather than his future
behavior. Id. at 669. But here the CI was in jail when they reported Barre’s practice of
backing a specific car into a space in a specific parking lot at “the southeast corner of 6th
and Cedar.” And that report predicted Barre’s future behavior when the officer went to
that location and found a vehicle and person matching the information the CI provided.
8
Moreover, this case is very similar to the supreme court’s recent decision in Mosley.
There, an informant contacted an off-duty sergeant to relay that they “personally observed
a male in possession of a firearm inside a vehicle” who “was selling marijuana.” Mosley,
994 N.W.2d at 886. The informant described the male’s appearance, vehicle, license-plate
number, and location. Id. The off-duty sergeant relayed the tip to a second sergeant, who
went to that location, observed a vehicle matching the informant’s description, and verified
its license-plate number. Id. at 887. The second sergeant initiated a traffic stop after the
vehicle left the location. Id. The supreme court determined the informant’s tip was
sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to search the vehicle, reasoning that the
informant had a track record of providing accurate tips. Id. at 890-91. The supreme court
further rejected the argument that the second sergeant did not sufficiently corroborate the
tip to assure that the informant’s basis for knowledge was reliable. Id. at 891-92. In doing
so, the supreme court gave weight to the fact that “the [i]nformant personally observed the
potentially unlawful conduct,” noting that law enforcement need corroborate only minor
details when an informant’s tip is based on personal knowledge. Id. at 892. Accordingly,
because the informant’s tip was based on their personal observations and the second
sergeant corroborated “the vehicle, its location, and its license plate number,” the basis of
the informant’s knowledge was reliable. Id.
Here, like in Mosley, the officer testified that the CI had a track record of providing
reliable tips. Also like in Mosley, the CI’s tip was based on personal observation. And the
officer corroborated the CI’s tip, including the vehicle, its location, and its out-of -state
license plates—the same sort of “minor details” the Mosley court determined were
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sufficient. Id. The officer also corroborated that the vehicle was backed-into a space at
the identified parking lot, and Barre matched the physical description given by the CI.
In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the state established
that there was “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found
in the vehicle at the time it was searched. See Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d at 169 (quotations
omitted). The CI’s past reliability, personal observations, and officer corroboration, when
considered together, convince us that the state established probable cause to search Barre’s
vehicle. See Mosley, 994 N.W.2d at 893. Accordingly, the district court did not err when
it denied Barre’s motion to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search of his
vehicle.
Affirmed.