State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1804

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Robert Olson,
Appellant.

Filed December 15, 2025
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CR-23-3100

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from the final judgments of conviction for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, first-degree assault, and violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order
(DANCO), appellant John Robert Olson argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the
2
district court committed reversible error by denying his request for a continuance of the
trial and failing to sequester the lead investigator in the case. Alternatively, Olson
challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
aggregate sentence of 584 months’ imprisonment, because the sentence is disproportionate,
and an 18-month consecutive sentence for the felony DANCO violation that was an
unauthorized upward durational departure. Because we conclude that the district court
acted within its discretion when it denied Olson’s motion for a continuance, denied his
request to sequester the lead investigator, and imposed the aggregate sentence on him, we
affirm as to those issues. But, because the district court applied the wrong severity level
when it sentenced Olson to an 18-month, rather than 12 -month, consecutive sentence for
his felony DANCO violation, we reverse and remand for resentencing as to that issue.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant John Robert Olson with nine
counts, including first- degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree assault, and felony
DANCO violation, based on an incident that occurred in the victim C.Z.’s apartment in
August 2023. Following a court trial, Olson was found guilty of eight counts. The district
court convicted and sentenced Olson on three of the offenses. The underlying facts, which
led to the convictions, are not relevant to the issues on appeal, so we refrain from recounting
them and instead focus on the relevant procedural facts.
Objection to Not Sequestering the State’s Lead Investigator
In June 2024, the district court held a pretrial hearing, at which the state requested
to keep its lead investigator from sequestration so that he could assist the state during trial.
3
Olson objected, reasoning that “his potential testimony may be tainted” if he “hear[d] all
the other witnesses.” He added that if the lead investigator “hears how they’re cross
examined, and he may then amend his testimony to combat that.”
After noting that the lead investigator could not communicate with other witnesses
and that Olson’s counsel could cross-examine the lead investigator on that point, the district
court granted the state’s request not to sequester the lead investigator.
Olson’s Motion for Continuance
In August 2023, Olson applied for a public defender, which the district court
granted. Soon thereafter, Olson fired his public defender. He made a speedy-trial demand
at a contested omnibus hearing. In April 2024, Olson reapplied for a public defender,
which the district court granted. The previously appointed attorney resumed Olson’s
representation approximately six weeks before his scheduled trial date of Monday, June
10.
On Friday, June 7, Olson filed a motion for continuance. In the filing, Olson’s
counsel explained that he first discovered he needed a continuance on May 24, 2024, but
Olson had refused the request. It was not until Thursday, June 6, that Olson agreed to the
continuance request.
The district court held a hearing later that day. Olson’s counsel restated his reason
for the request—that he had a multi-day trial two weeks before Olson’s trial and was
scheduled for another trial the week before that ultimately “resolved at the eleventh hour.”
Olson’s counsel explained to the court that he “didn’t know that [he] would have adequate
time to prepare, which would effectively make [him] ineffective.” Specifically, Olson’s
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counsel referenced some missing discovery1 that he believed would affect “whether or not
[he could] adequately prepare” for trial. The state did not object to the motion but noted
that it was ready to proceed to trial.
The district court denied Olson’s motion for a continuance, supporting its decision
with several factual findings. First, the district court found that Olson’s counsel had
sufficient time to prepare for trial, noting that defense counsel was reappointed to the case
in April 2024, “over a month and a half” before the trial date. Additionally, Olson’s
counsel “had been working the case for almost two months previously” before Olson had
fired him. Second, the district court noted the timing of the request. Olson first requested
a continuance on Friday, June 7, which was the last business day before the trial was
scheduled to begin the following Monday. Finally, the district court expressed concern
about judicial resources, including the inconvenience to various witnesses who were
anticipated to testify for the state.
Trial and Sentencing
On the morning of the trial, Olson’s counsel renewed his objection regarding
sequestration of the state’s lead investigator and his motion for continuance. As to the
sequestration objection, Olson’s counsel stated, “I just wanted to renew that objection,
noting that, uh, as a potential witness, anything that he hears could potentially taint his
future testimony.” As to the request for a continuance, Olson’s counsel noted, “we did
request that continuance and I felt at that time that I was gonna be ineffective. After

1 The state clarified that it had disclosed to Olson the requested discovery that his counsel
referenced to Olson. It appears Olson did not provide that discovery to his attorney.
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spending the balance of the weekend working on this, I don’t know that that’s changed in
any way. Um, there are a few evidentiary items that I would like to explore more but, um,
here we are today.” The district court again denied both motions.
During trial, the state offered evidence to prove Olson committed the charged
offenses. Among the evidence that was ultimately admitted, was (1) a Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension report explaining that DNA obtained from C.Z.’s vagina, rectal, and perineal
area and blood stains in the house “showed the presence of sperm cell fractions with a DNA
profile greater than 100 billion times more likely that the source was [Olson] than an
unknown, unrelated individual”; (2) DNA evidence of blood stains found near C.Z.’s
bedroom doorway and a hand print from a wall that revealed Olson’s DNA was present;
(3) surveillance-camera footage from 6:33 a.m. on August 24, 2023, showing Olson
“shirtless and carrying what appear[ed] to be a white t-shirt” that he placed in a trash can;
(4) testimony from a police officer that he later found a bloody t-shirt in the same trash
can; (5) an August 24, 2023 phone call in which Olson apologized for “hurting [C.Z.] like
that, it’s bad” and made several other admissions; and (6) C.Z.’s testimony that Olson was
the person who raped and assaulted her, which the court found credible.
The district court entered judgment of conviction and imposed sentences on three
counts:
(1) first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd.
1(c)(i) (2022); (2) first-degree assault (great bodily harm) in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.221, subd. 1 (2022); and (3) violation of a DANCO within 10 years of first of two or
more convictions in violation of Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2022). The court
imposed and executed a top-of-the-range guidelines sentence of 360 months for the
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first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, an aggravated double-upward departure
of 206 months for the first-degree assault conviction to be served consecutively, and a
sentence of 18 months for the felony DANCO-violation conviction to be served
consecutively to the previously imposed sentences.2
Olson appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court acted within its discretion when it denied Olson’s request for
a continuance.
“The decision whether to grant a continuance is within the [district] court’s
discretion and will be reversed upon a showing that the [district] court abused its
discretion.” State v. Stroud, 459 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Minn. App. 1990). In determining
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance, we ask
whether the denial of a continuance prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Id. Appellate
courts consider the circumstances that existed at the time the motion for continuance was
made. State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Minn. 1980). The central question,
however, remains whether the defendant was so prejudiced as to materially affect the
outcome of the trial. State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 268 (Minn. 2019).
When determining the extent of any prejudice from the denial of a continuance, we
may consider various factors, including the time in which the party could have addressed
the problem without the continuance, the time between the moving party’s awareness of

2 After trial, the district court issued an aggravated departure order in which it concluded
that the state had proven two aggravating factors—particular cruelty and zone of privacy.
See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b.2, 14 (2022). Olson does not challenge this order.
7
the need for a continuance and the motion for a continuance, the reason for the continuance
and its effect on the merits of the moving party’s case, the time that the case was pending,
the proximity of the request to the start of trial, the number of continuances requested by
the moving party, and the strength of the evidence to support the verdict. See id. at 263,
269 (considering whether defendant’s counsel had “ample time” to acquire and review the
evidence); State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 1987) (affirming the denial of a
continuance because receiving a report 13 days before the start of trial provided sufficient
time to address the asserted problem); State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 247 (Minn. 1984)
(considering the length of time between the indictment and trial and the proximity of the
continuance motion to the start of trial); Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d at 311-12 (concluding no
abuse of discretion occurred in denying a continuance because a “fair reading of the record”
showed the strength of the state’s case and that the witness’s testimony would not have
helped the defendant’s case); State v. Beveridge, 277 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Minn. 1979)
(considering the number of requests for continuances, the proximity of the request to the
start of trial, and the strength of the evidence to support the verdict).
Olson argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request
for a continuance based on his counsel’s explanation that he had inadequate time to prepare
for trial. Specifically, Olson contends that a continuance would have allowed his counsel
to “prove foundation connecting [certain] text messages to the alleged victim” such that
“the text messages could have been utilized to more comprehensively cross-examine her
and impeach her testimony.” He argues that this additional preparation by his counsel
“could have potentially been introduced to buttress Olson’s testimony that he was not
8
present at the residence during the timeframe of the assault.” Olson argues that the remedy
for this abuse of discretion is a new trial.
The state counters that the district court did not abuse its discretion because Olson
has not proven that the district court’s ruling prejudiced him such that it materially affected
the outcome of the trial. The state primarily focuses on the evidence it admitted at trial to
demonstrate that the district court’s ruling did not prejudice Olson. It reasons that the
outcome of the trial would have been the same regardless of whether the district court
granted or denied the motion for continuance.
The record indicates that the circumstances surrounding the requested continuance
were as follows: (1) Olson made a demand for a speedy trial, (2) the district court issued a
scheduling order on April 5, 2024, which set the trial date , (3) Olson’s counsel had
previously served on the case, was fired by Olson, and then reappointed by the court i n
April 2024, ( 4) Olson’s counsel proposed requesting a continuance “a couple of weeks”
before the trial, but Olson “was not . . . supportive of it,” (5) Olson’s counsel had a
multi-day trial two weeks before Olson’s trial and was scheduled for another trial the week
before Olson’s trial but it “resolved at the eleventh hour,” (6) Olson first presented the
motion for continuance on Friday, June 7, and the case was scheduled to begin trial on
Monday, June 10, (7) this was Olson’s first request for a continuance, (8) Olson’s counsel
stated that he felt unprepared for trial, due at least in part, to certain discovery that he had
been missing in the days leading up to trial, and (9) the state did not object to Olson’s
request for a continuance, but noted that it was prepared to proceed with the scheduled trial
date.
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Upon review, we conclude that the factors weigh against a determination that Olson
was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. Only one factor weighs in favor of
granting the continuance—that it was Olson’s first motion for continuance. The factors
that weigh against the continuance are that Olson made the request on the last business day
before trial was scheduled to begin and that he was aware of his counsel’s need for a
continuance “a couple of weeks” before trial. Further, our careful review of the record
indicates that Olson did not elaborate to the district court, as he now does to this court, that
a critical portion of the late discovery relates to text messages to Olson from C.Z. Before
the district court, Olson’s counsel did not specifically identify the discovery items that he
was missing. He simply explained that he “was missing some things, which [he] requested
from the state, which [were] promptly provided to [him.]” In response, the state explained
that it understood Olson’s counsel as identifying discovery that had “previously been
disclosed,” and that Olson’s counsel “just [hadn’t] had an opportunity to review it, or
receive it from his client.” Olson’s counsel did not contest the state’s response or identify
any specific discovery as missing. We note, then, that the district court did not have the
benefit of considering whether Olson’s counsel needed additional time to review the May
28-31, 2024 text messages.
Most importantly, and based on the strength of the state’s case, Olson cannot
establish that the denial so prejudiced him as to affect the outcome of his trial. The state
presented evidence—including DNA evidence, surveillance- camera footage, a recorded
phone call in which Olson apologizes for harming C.Z., and C.Z.’s testimony that Olson
was the person who raped and assaulted her, which the court found credible—that proved
10
Olson’s guilt such that a continuance likely would not have affected the outcome of the
trial. The fact -finder—here the district court—had the ability to review and weigh all of
the evidence admitted during trial, including the text messages that Olson claims were
critical to his defense. After doing so, the district court found Olson guilty.
Although one factor weighed in favor of granting the continuance, several others
weighed against it, and we discern that the district court acted within its discretion when it
denied Olson’s motion for continuance. Olson is not entitled to a new trial on these
grounds.
II. The district court acted within its discretion when it refused to sequester the
lead investigator.
The question of sequestration of witnesses rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Jones, 347 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Minn. 1984). “[W]here there is no showing
that failure to sequester witnesses was prejudicial to the accused, the court’s refusal to
require it does not in itself constitute reversible error.” State v. DeLaCruz, 884 N.W.2d
878, 889-90 (Minn. App. 2016) (quoting State v. Garden, 125 N.W.2d 591, 601 (Minn.
1963)).
Over Olson’s objection, the district court granted the state’s request to exempt the
lead investigator from sequestration so that he could assist the state during trial. The district
court reasoned that, if the lead investigator’s testimony would be tainted by hearing other
witnesses’ testimony, Olson’s opportunity to cross-examine him sufficiently remedied that
concern.
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Olson presents three arguments for why the district court had to sequester the lead
investigator. First, he claims that allowing the lead detective to be present during opening
statements and while other witnesses testified allowed the detective to tailor his testimony
and anticipate Olson’s counsel’s cross-examination. Second, he claims that the lead
investigator’s presence in the courtroom may have affected C.Z.’s testimony. Finally, he
claims that the lead investigator overheard his “confidential and privileged
communications” with his advisory counsel that aided him while he was pro se . Olson
argues that the remedy for this abuse of discretion is a new trial.
As a preliminary matter, we conclude that Olson forfeited his second and third
arguments. It is well settled that claims raised for the first time on appeal are generally
forfeited for the purposes of the appeal. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 883 N.W.2d 282, 285-86
(Minn. 2016) (holding that appellant forfeited an argument by failing to raise it in his
petition for postconviction relief). Olson did not make these arguments before the district
court, which he acknowledges. The district court, therefore, did not have the opportunity
to consider these arguments when ruling on the matter, and, thus, they are forfeited.
Olson’s remaining argument is that sequestration was necessary to avoid tainting
the lead investigator’s testimony. The only case Olson offers to support this argument is
State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1995). Contrary to Olson’s characterization of
this case, sequestration of a witness was not an issue before the court. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d
at 630-31. Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether the district court
committed prejudicial error when it permitted an investigating officer to sit at the counsel
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table with the prosecutor throughout the trial. Id. 3 The court concluded no prejudicial
error occurred because the officer was first to testify, so he did not hear the testimony of
other witnesses before he took the witness stand. Id. at 631. The court also noted that the
officer was not in uniform and there was no indication of inappropriate intimidation. Id.
Given that Koskela addresses a distinct issue that implicates different concerns from the
one presented here, we conclude that Olson has not met his burden of establishing that the
district court abused its discretion when it declined to sequester the lead investigator.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that although the decision to sequester
witnesses is a “matter which is within the trial court’s discretion,” a request to sequester a
witness “should rarely be denied.” Jones, 347 N.W.2d at 802; see also State v. Zornes, 831
N.W.2d 609 , 619 (Minn. 2013) (quoting State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn.
1981)). But as we noted, the district court maintains discretion when a party requests to
have a witness sequestered, and we discern no abuse of discretion to grant the state’s
request that the lead investigator not be sequestered. Olson is not entitled to a new trial on
these grounds.

3 The court’s primary concern in Koskela was “the opportunity for prejudice to the
defendant . . . where the investigating officer sits at prosecuting counsel’s trial table
throughout the trial” because it has “the potential for confusion with the jury in the
perception of a close alignment between the neutral fact-finding function of the police
investigator with the adversary role of the prosecution.” 536 N.W.2d at 631. No such
concern is present here because the judge presided over a court trial.
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III. The district court acted within its discretion in imposing an aggregate sentence,
but the sentence specific to his felony DANCO violation is based upon an
incorrect presumptive sentence.
Appellate courts “review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive
guidelines sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623
(Minn. 2016). “If the reasons given for an upward departure are legally permissible and
factually supported in the record, the departure will be affirmed. But if the district court’s
reasons for departure are improper or inadequate, the departure will be reversed.” State v.
Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The district court convicted and sentenced Olson on three counts. First, the district
court convicted Olson of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342, subd. 1(c)(i), and imposed a 360- month sentence which is at the top of the
presumptive sentencing range. Second, the district court convicted him of first-degree
assault, great bodily harm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1, and imposed a
sentence of 206 months, a double departure from the top-of-the -range presumptive
sentence of 103 months, based on aggravating factors. Finally, the district court convicted
Olson of felony DANCO violation in violation of Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1), and
sentenced him to 18 months. The district court imposed permissive consecutive sentences
such that the three sentences totaled 584 months.
Olson first argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing, in the
aggregate, a disproportionately long sentence. In arguing against the proportionality of his
sentence, Olson does not dispute a particular part of the district court’s sentence but rather
argues that the aggregate 584-month sentence is “unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive,
14
and unjustifiably disparate.” Olson supports his argument by analogizing his case to and
distinguishing it from other cases he deems “comparable analogues.”
We are unpersuaded by Olson’s argument because the caselaw he relies on involves
distinguishable facts or distinguishable law. For example, Olson relies on State v. Bridges,
No. A12-1997, 2013 WL 6839656, at *2 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18,
2014), a nonprecedential case, in which Bridges was convicted of two counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, first-degree burglary, and third-degree assault. The district court
sentenced Bridges to consecutive prison terms of 312 and 48 months. Bridges, 2013 WL
6839656, at *2. Olson identifies Bridges as one of the most analogous cases to his because
“it involved one behavioral incident and one victim.” He argues that the sentence imposed
in Bridges is considerably shorter such that Olson’s sentence must be disproportionate.
Bridges is distinguishable, however, because Bridges was convicted of offenses different
from Olson’s. Although it is true that both Bridges and Olson were convicted of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, their remaining offenses are distinct. Bridges was
also convicted of first- degree burglary and third-degree assault, id., whereas Olson was
also convicted of first- degree assault and a felony DANCO violation. Because Bridges
and Olson were convicted of different offenses, and Olson’s convictions were eligible for
permissive consecutive sentencing, we are not persuaded that Bridges is a helpful analogue
to determine whether Olson’s sentence is disproportionate. For similar reasons, the other
cases Olson relies on are not good analogue s for determining whether the district court
abused its discretion by imposing a disproportionate aggregate sentence.
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When we consider each sentence that the district court imposed on Olson by offense,
it is clear that the district court acted within its discretion with the aggregate duration
imposed.
As to the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct sentence, the court imposed a
presumptive top-of-the-range sentence for this offense based on the facts. As to the
first-degree assault sentence, the district court imposed a sentence that is exactly twice the
presumptive top-of-the -range duration for this offense. 4 “Departures that enhance a
sentence to a term that falls between the presumptive sentence and twice the presumptive
sentence invite the greatest deference.” Dillon v. State, 781 N.W.2d 588, 596 (2010).
“Even a single aggravating factor may justify a departure.” Id. at 599. The court’s reason
for the upward departure was supported by findings of two aggravating factors. Given that
the district court sufficiently justified this upward departure, we conclude that it acted
within its discretion with its sentence for first-degree assault. And because the district court
acted within its discretion for both the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct and first-degree
assault convictions, it also acted within its discretion in terms of the aggregate sentence it
imposed for these offenses.
Olson separately argues that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him to 18 rather than 12 months for the felony DANCO violation because the presumptive

4 The presumptive sentence for a severity-level-nine offense with a criminal-history score
of zero, which is required when imposing a consecutive sentence, ranges from 74 to 103
months without the sentence being considered a departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.F.2.b (2022) (“For each felony offense sentenced consecutively to another felony
offense(s), the court must use a Criminal History Score of 0, or the mandatory minimum
for the offense, whichever is longer, to determine the presumptive duration.”).
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sentence, when imposed consecutively using a zero criminal-history score, is 12 months
rather than the 18 months the district court imposed. The state concedes that the district
court abused its discretion. We agree.
The presumptive sentence for a severity-level-four offense is 12 months. See Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 5.B. (2022) (describing a felony DANCO violation as a
severity-level-four offense); Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.A. (2022) (making the presumptive
sentence for a severity-level-four offense with a zero criminal-history score 12 months). It
appears that the district court inadvertently imposed the presumptive sentence for a
severity-level-five offense, which is 18 months. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the
district court to correct the sentencing error as to this offense only.
5
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

5 Olson also raised several issues in a pro se brief. We understand his arguments to be that
(1) the district court erred when it refused to issue subpoenas on Olson’s behalf, (2) the
district court erred when it failed to address certain motions Olson submitted to the court,
and (3) certain evidence from the crime scene should have been tested. We do not address
these arguments, however, because they are forfeited: “Arguments are forfeited if they are
presented in a summary and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to
analyze the law when claiming that errors of law occurred.” State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d
884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017).