State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1805

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jenna Marie Bourgeois,
Appellant.

Filed November 24, 2025
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-22-617

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Aaron Welch, Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BOND, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for animal mistreatment,
appellant argues that (1) federal organic farming regulations preempt state law and
preclude his prosecution; (2) the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knowingly
deprived his animals of necessary food, water, or shelter; and (3) the animal mistreatment
2
statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Appellant raises additional issues in
a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 31, 2022, a caller reported to police that multiple goats and chickens were
surrounded by water on a property owned by appellant Jenna Marie Bourgeois in rural
St. Louis County. An investigator with the St. Louis County Sheriff’s Office went to the
property, which was on the edge of the Sax- Zim Bog, a wetland and bird watching area.
The investigator, who was trained on animal-welfare matters, observed mesh fencing
creating a “makeshift yard in [a] ditch.” Chickens, both alive and dead, were “tangled”
“everywhere in the fencing.” A “chicken tractor,” which is a mobile chicken enclosure
with no flooring so that chickens have access to the ground, was “full of water” and
contained a number of dead chickens and others that were missing feathers. The
investigator also observed a metal stock tank containing many decomposing birds and a
dead bird that was “pushed into the ground” and rotted beyond identification. The
investigator estimated that the birds had been dead for “more than a couple of days.”
In another enclosure, three goats were standing on a piece of thin plywood
surrounded by standing water. The goats did not have any clean water to drink. The goats
were coughing and the investigator determined they were ill.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Bourgeois with six counts of depriving
animals under his charge or control of necessary food, water, or shelter in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2 (2020) (animal mistreatment statute). Bourgeois moved to
dismiss the charges on the ground s that the animal mistreatment statute was
3
unconstitutionally vague and was preempted by federal organic farming regulations. The
district court denied Bourgeois’s motion to dismiss and a single count proceeded to a jury
trial. At trial, the investigator testified consistently with the above facts and the jury saw
photos of Bourgeois’s property taken by the investigator on May 31.
Bourgeois testified on his own behalf and explained that he purchased the property
in October 2021 and began farming it in March 2022. Because the property is surrounded
by elevated roads with no drainage ditches, the farm sits in a man-made bowl that collects
water during every rainfall. Bourgeois testified that he began to construct a driveway and
drainage ditch but, in May 2022, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
issued a cease-and-desist order because Bourgeois was excavating wetlands in violation of
state wetland conservation laws. Bourgeois kept chickens in partially covered stock tanks
and a mobile enclosure that was exposed to the ground, while the goats were provided a
lean-to that was not intended to protect them from the elements. Bourgeois did not always
fully cover the animals’ enclosures when it rained. Bourgeois testified that he provided
food, water, and shelter to the animals in accordance with federal organic farming
standards. As to the events giving rise to the charge, Bourgeois testified that he fed and
provided fresh water to the animals on a daily basis. Bourgeois maintained that the area
received nearly five inches of rain on May 30. He acknowledged that, on May 31, a
“significant” number of chickens had died, and he speculated that the chickens’ deaths
were caused by pecking, genetic disease, or avian flu. Bourgeois denied that any birds had
been dead on May 30, asserted that the investigator “blatantly lied” during her testimony,
and maintained that heavy rain interrupted ongoing improvements to the farm.
4
The jury found Bourgeois guilty. The district court denied Bourgeois’s motion for
judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to 90 days in jail, execution stayed for one year.
Bourgeois appeals.
DECISION
I. Federal law does not preempt state law and preclude prosecution of Bourgeois
for animal mistreatment under Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2.

Bourgeois first argues that federal law preempts the state’s animal mistreatment
statute, precluding his prosecution. Whether federal law preempts state law is a legal
question we review de novo. State v. Sherbrooke, 633 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. App.
2001).
The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, which provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal regulations, as well as federal statutes,
may give rise to preemption. Hillsborough County Fl orida v. Automated Medical Lab.,
471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). “Congressional purpose is the ultimate touchstone of the
preemption inquiry.” Gretsch v. Vantium Cap., Inc., 846 N.W.2d 424, 432 -33 (Minn.
2014). We presume that Congress “did not intend to displace state law,” and the defendant
bears the burden of overcoming this presumption and demonstrating preemption. Brandt
v. Marshall Animal Clinic, 540 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 9, 1996).
Federal preemption can occur in three different ways: (1) field preemption,
(2) express preemption, and (3) conflict preemption. Gretsch, 846 N.W.2d at 433.
5
Bourgeois’s argument rests on conflict preemption. 1 That a state law “touches” on some
aspect of a federally regulated industry “does not necessarily mean that it is preempted by
federal law.” Sherbrooke, 633 N.W.2d at 862. Instead, under conflict preemption, federal
law preempts state law when it is “impossible” for a person to comply with both the state
and federal requirements or when the state law “stands as an obstacle” to the objective of
Congress. Gretsch, 846 N.W.2d at 433.
Bourgeois argues that the animal mistreatment statute is in direct conflict with the
federal organic farming standards. Organic farming in the United States is regulated under
the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6524 (2018) (OFPA). The
purpose of the OFPA is to “establish national standards governing the marketing” of
organically produced agricultural products and to “assure consumers that organically
produced products meet a consistent standard.” 7 U.S.C. § 6501. Pursuant to the OFPA,
the United States Department of Agriculture promulgated regulations, known as the
National Organic Program (NOP), 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2024) . Bourgeois contends that it is
impossible to comply with both the animal mistreatment statute and 7 C.F.R.
§ 205.239(a)(1), which requires producers of organic livestock operations to “establish and
maintain year-round livestock living conditions” that “accommodate the wellbeing and
natural behavior of animals.” In particular, Bourgeois argues that the animal mistreatment
statute is preempted by federal regulation because he was complying with the requirement

1 While his brief alludes to field-preemption argument, Bourgeois clarified at oral argument
that he is only arguing conflict preemption.
6
that animals must have “[y]ear-round access” to “the outdoors, shade, shelter, exercise
areas, fresh air, clean water for drinking, and direct sunlight.” 7 C.F.R. § 205.239(a)(1).
We discern no reason why it is “impossible” to comply with Minnesota’s animal
mistreatment statute and the provision of the federal organic farming standards Bourgeois
identifies. Gretsch, 846 N.W.2d at 433. Under Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2, “[n]o person
shall deprive any animal over which the person has charge or control of necessary food,
water, or shelter.” Under the federal organic farming standard Bourgeois relies on, animals
must have access to “the outdoors, shade, shelter, exercise areas, fresh air, clean water for
drinking, and direct sunlight.” 7 C.F.R. § 205.239(a)(1). The same subsection within the
NOP provides that “[t]he producer of an organic livestock operation may provide
temporary confinement or shelter for an animal because of . . . [i]nclement weather.”
7 C.F.R. § 205.239(b)(1). It also requires that livestock have “[a]ppropriate clean, dry
bedding.” 7 C.F. R. § 205.239(a)(3). Thus, a person can both provide an animal with
necessary food, water, and shelter as required by Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2, and ensure
the animal has access to “the outdoors, shade, shelter, exercise areas, fresh air, clean water
for drinking, and direct sunlight” as required by 7 C.F.R. § 205.239(a)(1).
Because it is not impossible to comply with both state law and federal organic
farming regulations, Bourgeois has not met his burden of demonstrating that federal law
preempts state law and precludes his prosecution under the animal mistreatment statute.
Gretsch, 846 N.W.2d at 433.

7
II. The state provided sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Bourgeois knowingly deprived his animals of necessary food, water, or shelter.

Bourgeois argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he knowingly
deprived his animals of necessary food, water, or shelter. Due process requires the state to
prove every element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship , 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn. 1988); see U.S. Const.
amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. To convict Bourgeois of animal mistreatment, the
state was required to prove that he knowingly deprived an animal over which he had charge
or control of necessary food, water, or shelter. Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2. To “[k]now
requires only that the actor believes that the specified fact exists.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 9(2) (2020).
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we
“carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v.
Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact-finder believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence. Id.
Generally, a criminal defendant’s state of mind is inferred through circumstantial
evidence. State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn. 2013). Under the circumstantial-
evidence standard of review, we first identify the circumstances proved, “defer[ring] to the
[fact-finder’s] acceptance of the proof of [the] circumstances and rejection of evidence in
the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” State v. Silvernail,
8
831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). This means that “we consider
only those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.” Id. at 599.
Next, we determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, giving “no deference to the
jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601
(Minn. 2017). When evaluating the inferences that may be drawn from the circumstances
proved, “[w]e review the circumstantial evidence not as isolated facts, but as a whole.”
State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 175 (Minn. 2013). “The circumstantial evidence
standard does not allow us to ‘analyze and parse each fact’ in a ‘piecemeal’ fashion to
conclude that a hypothesis is reasonable.” State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn.
2023) (quoting State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 415 (Minn. 2016)). “Circumstantial
evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so
directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any
reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted). A reviewing court will not overturn a conviction on the basis
of conjecture or speculation. Id. at 480.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances
proved are that, on May 31, multiple dead chickens were “tangled” in the fencing of an
animal enclosure on Bourgeois’s property. Dead chickens were also in the “chicken
tractor” enclosure, which was full of water. A metal stock tank contained decomposing
birds and there was a dead bird “pushed into the ground” that was rotted beyond
identification. The birds had been dead for “more than a couple of days.” Coughing and
9
ill goats without access to clean drinking water were standing on a piece of thin plywood
surrounded by standing water in another enclosure.
The property was next to a bog that was almost always wet , and Bourgeois knew
the property did not drain well after rainfall . Bourgeois kept his chickens in partially
covered stock tanks and a mobile enclosure that was exposed to the ground, while the goats
were provided a lean-to that was not intended to protect them from the elements. Bourgeois
did not always fully cover the enclosures when it rained. Bourgeois testified that he
followed federal organic regulations as he understood them.
2
We next examine whether the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. We conclude that the circumstances proved as to the nature
of the animals’ structures, the dead and decomposing animals, and Bourgeois’s knowledge
about the rainy conditions and the farm’s drainage issues support a reasonable inference
that Bourgeois knowingly deprived the animals of food, water, or shelter.

2 At trial, Bourgeois broadly testified that he was following federal organic farming
regulations set out in 7 C.F.R. § 205. The state did not rebut this testimony at trial and, on
appeal, agrees that it is a circumstance proved that Bourgeois was complying with federal
organic farming standards. On this record, it is difficult to determine the extent to which
the jury credited Bourgeois’s testimony that his farm complied with federal organic
farming regulations. See State v. Gilleylen , 993 N.W.2d 266, 275 (Minn. 2023) (stating
that the jury is “free to accept part and reject part” of a witness’s testimony). We therefore
consider Bourgeois’s testimony regarding his organic farming practices a circumstance
proved only to the extent that it does not conflict with the jury’s verdict that Bourgeois
deprived his animals of food, water, or shelter. See State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 670-
71 (Minn. 2011) (rejecting the part of a defendant’s testimony that conflicted with the
state’s evidence supporting the verdict); see also Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 150 (holding
that we must disregard those circumstances that are inconsistent with the jury’s verdict).
10
We further conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis of innocence. Bourgeois argues that, because no animals were dead on May
30, there is a reasonable inference that “the poor conditions on his farm on May 31, 2022,
were caused by a severe weather event (a.k.a. “act of God”) on May 30, 2022.” 3 But
Bourgeois’s testimony that there were no dead birds on May 30 conflicts with the
investigator’s testimony that some of the birds had been dead for at least a couple of days.
Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (explaining that, “[i]n identifying the circumstances proved,
we ‘defer . . . to the jury’s . . . rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State” (quotation omitted)). Because “we are bound to
disregard evidence that is inconsistent with the jury’s verdict when identifying the
circumstances proved,” it is not a circumstance proved that no birds were dead before the
rainfall on May 30. State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d 178, 187 (Minn. 2021).
Moreover, in determining the reasonableness of inferences, we must consider the
circumstances proved, not in isolation, but as a whole. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 150;
Sterling, 834 N.W.2d at 175. While it is a circumstance proved that it rained on May 30,
other circumstances proved establish that multiple dead animals were tangled in fencing
and stacked on top of one another in animal enclosures that did not provide shelter from

3 In a footnote, Bourgeois asserts that the district court erred by denying his request to
instruct the jury on the definition of “an act of God” and to admit the National Weather
Service forecast report. These arguments are forfeited because, while he asserts that these
errors impacted the verdict, Bourgeois does not provide any argument or authority
explaining why the district court’s rulings were error. See State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d
884, 889 (Minn. App. 2017) (“Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary
and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when
claiming that errors of law occurred.”).
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rising rainwater. Some animals had been dead for more than a couple of days and were
badly decomposed. Viewed as a whole , the circumstances proved are inconsistent with
any rational inference other than that Bourgeois knowingly deprived his animals of
necessary food, water, or shelter.
Because the circumstances proved are consistent with a finding of guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis of innocence, we conclude that sufficient
evidence supports the jury’s determination that Bourgeois violated the animal-
mistreatment statute by knowingly depriving his animals of the necessary food, water, or
shelter.
III. The animal mistreatment statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
Bourgeois.

Bourgeois argues that his conviction must be reversed because Minn. Stat. § 343.21,
subd. 2, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Appellate courts review the
constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 2007).
“Minnesota statutes are presumed to be constitutional and [a court’ s] power to declare a
statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely
necessary.” Id. (quotation omitted). The party challenging a statute’s constitutionality
must establish “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute violates a provision of the
constitution.” State v. Grossman, 636 N.W.2d 545, 548 (Minn. 2001).
Due process requires that criminal statutes be written “with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 357 (1983). Thus, a statute may be void for vagueness “if the description of the
12
forbidden conduct is vague” or “if its wording leaves doubt as to which persons fall within
the scope of the law.” State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990). In other words,
the statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Bourgeois argues that Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2, is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to him because he was complying with federal organic farming requirements.
Bourgeois asserts that, “[w]hile the district court correctly determined that a person of
ordinary intelligence would understand that leaving animals in elements that do not allow
them to retreat from weather conditions or have dry shelter would violate the statute,” a
person of ordinary intelligence would also believe that they would have time to repair the
shelter and food and water containers damaged by a severe weather event before running
afoul of the statute.
We reject Bourgeois’s void-for-vagueness argument. When, as here, no
fundamental rights are implicated, the alleged vagueness of the criminal statute “must be
judged in light of the conduct that is charged to be violative of the statute.” City of Mankato
v. Fetchenhier, 363 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. App. 1985) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 369
(White, J., dissenting)). Bourgeois must show that the statute “lacks specificity as to his
own behavior and not as to some hypothetical situation.” City of Edina v. Dreher, 454
N.W.2d 621, 622 (Minn. App. 1990) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. June 15,
1990). As we have explained, the charged conduct involved maintaining conditions on the
farm that led to multiple dead chickens being “tangled” in the fencing of an animal
enclosure, a dead bird “pushed into the ground” and rotted beyond identification,
13
decomposing birds in a metal stock tank, birds that had been dead for more than a couple
of days, and coughing, ill goats standing on thin plywood surrounded by water. A person
of ordinary intelligence would understand that these conditions are prohibited by Minn.
Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2 , because they deprived the animals of necessary food, water, or
shelter. While Bourgeois maintains that “with the exception of the extreme weather event
on the night of May 30, 2022, [he] did provide the necessary food, water, and shelter to his
animals,” the state alleged—and, considering the verdict, the jury clearly found— that the
birds had been dead for more than a couple of days.
We conclude that Bourgeois has failed to meet his heavy burden of demonstrating
that Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subd. 2, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
IV. Bourgeois is not entitled to relief on the arguments raised in his pro se brief.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Bourgeois argues that the investigator’s testimony
was incomplete and misleading and the photographic evidence was false. To the extent
that these arguments challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s guilty
verdict, we are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, assume
that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence, defer to the
jury’s credibility determinations, and not reweigh the evidence. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
600-01; State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 72- 73 (Minn. 2009). For the reasons we have
discussed, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and requisite burden of proof, to reasonably conclude that
Bourgeois was guilty of animal mistreatment.
14
Bourgeois next contends that (1) law enforcement failed to follow avian flu
protocol, (2) the state withheld evidence, (3) the district court erroneously stated that the
road was a public right-of-way, (4) the prosecutor hypnotized and tampered with the jury,
and (5) the county engaged in a pattern of deception regarding the farm. Bourgeois
additionally makes several assertions about the agriculture exemptions, wetland
designations, the county’s flood-control measures, and the farm’s location.
While “some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has
repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001). “Claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are unsupported by
either arguments or citation to legal authority are forfeited.” State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d
643, 650 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). “Such arguments will not [be] considered
unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Id. at 650-51. We have reviewed
Bourgeois’s remaining claims of error and conclude that they are forfeited because they
are unsupported by either legal arguments or citation to legal authority and because
prejudicial error is not obvious on mere inspection. See id.4 We therefore do not address
them.
Affirmed.

4 Additionally, many of Bourgeois’s arguments refer to facts that are outside of the record
on appeal. The record on appeal consists of “[t]he documents filed in the [district] court,
the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.
Appellate courts do not consider any factual assertions that are beyond the record. See
Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co., 261 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1977) (stating that “[i]t
is well settled that an appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record
on appeal”).