State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1812

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Lee Roper, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed September 22, 2025
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CR-24-317

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

John Olson, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from a conviction of first-degree driving while impaired (DWI)
involving a refusal to submit to a blood or urine test, appellant argues that the district court
plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury to decide whether law enforcement had probable
cause to believe that he was driving while impaired. In State v. Torrez, the supreme court
recently held that, when a defendant is charged with refusing a blood or urine test required
by a search warrant in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(2)
(2024), the state is not required to prove at trial that the arresting officer had probable cause
to believe the defendant was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle
while impaired. 21 N.W.3d 467, 473 (Minn. 2025).1 Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from evidence presented at appellant James Lee Roper
Jr.’s jury trial. In March 2024, an officer observed the vehicle that Roper was operating
turn without signaling. After Roper parked his vehicle in the driveway of a cabin, the
officer approached the vehicle, at which point he observed that Roper had “glassy,”
“watery,” and “bloodshot eyes.” After conducting various field sobriety tests, the officer
arrested Roper on suspicion of DWI.

1 The relevant statutory provision has not been amended between the events underlying the
offense and the supreme court’s decision in Torrez. Compare Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd.
2(2) (2022) with Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2024).
3
The officer obtained a search warrant authorizing him to obtain a blood or urine
sample from Roper. 2 The officer showed the warrant to Roper, explained that refusal to
give a sample was a crime, and asked Roper to provide a sample. Roper, having initially
indicated that he was willing to provide a sample, refused to provide a blood or urine
sample.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Roper with felony DWI involving refusal
to submit to a chemical test as required by a search warrant in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2022), and driving after cancellation in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 171.24, subd. 5 (2022).
The state’s proposed jury instruction regarding the elements of the test-refusal count
did not include a requirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that law
enforcement had probable cause to believe that Roper was driving while impaired. The
district court, without objection from Roper’s trial counsel, provided the state’s proposed
instructions to the jury.
3
A jury found Roper guilty of both counts. The district court entered convictions on
both counts and imposed concurrent sentences of 66 months in prison on the DWI count
and 364 days in county jail on the driving-after-cancellation count.
Roper appeals.

2 Roper does not challenge the validity of the search warrant.

3 Roper’s trial counsel acknowledged that this court’s decision in State v. Torrez, which
had been released by the time of trial, held that the state was not required to prove that the
arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while impaired.
8 N.W.3d 674, 678, 680 (Minn. App. 2024), aff’d, 21 N.W.3d 467 (Minn. 2025).
4
DECISION
Roper argues that the district court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury that
the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that law enforcement had
probable cause to believe that he was driving while impaired. Binding precedent compels
our disagreement.
Because Roper did not object to the relevant instruction, we review the instruction
for plain error. State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). Under the plain-error
test, Roper “must show that there was (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) the error must
affect substantial rights.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Minn. 2010). If an
appellate court concludes “that any one of the requirements is not satisfied,” it is
unnecessary to address the other requirements. Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 732
(Minn. 2011). We consider only whether there was an error in failing to give the instruction
to the jury because our resolution of this requirement is dispositive.
The DWI chemical-test-refusal statute provides:
It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a
chemical test:
(1) of the person’s breath under section 169A.51
(chemical tests for intoxication), or 169A.52 (test refusal or
failure; revocation of license); or
(2) of the person’s blood or urine as required by
a search warrant under sections 171.177 and 626.04 to 626.18.

Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2022).

In Torrez, the supreme court considered a defendant’s challenge to the district
court’s failure to instruct the jury on the test-refusal offense under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 2(2) (2024), that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
5
arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant “was driving, operating,
or in physical control of the motor vehicle while impaired.” 21 N.W.3d at 468-70. The
supreme court held that
when a defendant is charged with refusing a blood or urine test
required by a search warrant in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 169A.20, subdivision 2(2), the State is not required to
prove that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe
the defendant was driving, operating, or in physical control of
a motor vehicle while impaired.

Id. at 473. The supreme court thus concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to submit the defendant’s requested instruction to the jury. Id. We
are bound by the supreme court’s precedent. State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn.
2018).
Here, because the state was not required to prove that the arresting officer had
probable cause to believe Roper was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor
vehicle while impaired, the district court did not err by declining to include an instruction
regarding probable cause.
Affirmed.