Melrose Federation of Teachers, American Federation of Teachers Local 1284, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1813

Melrose Federation of Teachers, American Federation of Teachers Local 1284,
Appellant,

vs.

Melrose Independent School District No. 740,
Respondent.

Filed July 7, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Cochran, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-24-1839

Jonathan Reiner, Education Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Trevor S. Helmers, Dalia N. Istephanous, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Justin D. Cummins, Cummins & Cummins, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amici curiae
Minnesota Association of Professional Employees, SEIU Healthcare Minnesota and Iowa,
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 5, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 638, and Inter Faculty Organization)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
1. When deciding a motion to compel arbitration under Minnesota Statutes
section 572B.07(a) (2024), the district court must decide, as a threshold matter, whether
there is “a grievance arising under a collective bargaining agreement” within the meaning
of Minnesota Statutes section 572B.06(b) (2024), and, if so, order the parties to arbitrate
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“whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or [the] controversy is subject to an agreement to
arbitrate.”
2. A “grievance arising under a collective bargaining agreement,” as that phrase
is used in Minnesota Statutes section 572B.06(b), means an allegation of a violation of a
collective bargaining agreement that a party seeks to resolve by invoking a procedure in
the collective bargaining agreement.
OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
This case concerns a dispute regarding the denial of retiree health-insurance benefits
provided under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and a resulting motion to compel
arbitration. The CBA contains an arbitration agreement. The issue presented on appeal is
whether the district court or the arbitrator should decide whether the parties’ dispute is
subject to arbitration under the arbitration agreement.
We conclude that Minnesota Statutes section s 572B.06(b) and 572B.07(a) require
an arbitrator, not the district court, to determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration
when the dispute involves “a grievance arising under a [CBA],” which means an allegation
of a violation of a CBA that a party seeks to resolve by invoking a procedure in the CBA.
We further conclude that the district court erred when it determined that the parties’ dispute
did not involve “a grievance arising under a [CBA]” within the meaning of
section 572B.06(b) and, on that basis, denied appellant’s motion to compel under
section 572B.07(a). We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to compel
arbitration.
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FACTS
Appellant Melrose Federation of Teachers, American Federation of Teachers Local
1284 (the union) is the exclusive representative of teachers employed by respondent
Melrose Independent School District No. 740 (the school district). The union and the
school district are the parties to a CBA. The CBA governs the compensation and terms of
employment for teachers employed by the school district and represented by the union.
The parties entered into the CBA consistent with the Public Employment Labor Relations
Act (PELRA), Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.01-.60 (2024). The CBA provides that teachers
employed with the school district for at least fifteen years are eligible to receive “health
insurance retirement benefits.” The dispute at issue in this appeal concerns the school
district’s denial of this benefit.
The CBA also contains a grievance procedure pursuant to which “a teacher or group
of teachers” can assert and resolve alleged violations of the CBA. The procedure has five
steps. First, the aggrieved party has an informal discussion with their principal with the
objective of resolving the dispute. Second, if the dispute is not resolved, the aggrieved
party submits a formal written grievance. The aggrieved party and their principal must
meet, after which the principal must render a decision in writing. Third, the aggrieved
party may appeal the principal’s decision to the superintendent. Fourth, the aggrieved party
may, in turn, appeal the superintendent’s decision to the school board. In the event the
aggrieved party and the school board are not able to resolve the dispute, the final step of
the grievance procedure is for the aggrieved party to submit the unresolved dispute to
arbitration.
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Underlying Dispute
In July 2023, P.D., a teacher who had been employed by the school district for
32 years, submitted a letter to the superintendent and others indicating that she had decided
to retire from the school district. The letter also included language from the CBA regarding
health insurance retirement benefits. The school district accepted P.D.’s departure in
August 2023, but in October, the school district denied health insurance retirement benefits
under the CBA to P.D. after determining that she had not “retired.” The school district
made this determination because P.D. was not collecting her pension and because she had
taken another teaching job in a different school district. The union reviewed the school
district’s decision, decided it violated the terms of the CBA, and began the grievance
process.
The union and the school district then went through steps one through four of the
grievance procedure under the CBA. The school district participated in the grievance
procedure but maintained that it was doing so “as a courtesy” and that it had determined
that P.D. had “improperly attempted to grieve an action of the [school] [d]istrict.”
According to the school district, the grievance was improper because P.D. was no longer a
teacher and only teachers, or groups of teachers, could submit a grievance under the CBA.
In December 2023, the school district board heard the grievance and denied relief. The
union then demanded arbitration. The school district, in turn, refused to arbitrate.
Motion to Compel Arbitration
In March 2024, the union filed a motion to compel arbitration in district court. The
union argued that, because this case involves a grievance arising under a CBA, an arbitrator
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must decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the parties’ specific
controversy is within the scope of the agreement, citing the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration
Act (MUAA), Minn. Stat. §§ 572B.01-.31 (2024). Thus, the union asserted that the district
court must grant its motion to compel so the arbitrator may decide arbitrability. The school
district responded that there was no grievance within the scope of the parties’ CBA because
only current teachers could submit a grievance under the CBA and P.D. was a former
teacher when the grievance was submitted. The school district further argued that, under
the MUAA, the district court decides all questions of arbitrability, not an arbitrator.
The district court denied the union’s motion to compel arbitration. In doing so, the
district court agreed in part with the union and in part with the school district. The district
court determined that, under the MUAA, questions of arbitrability are usually determined
by the district court but an exception exists under section 572B.06(b) of the MUAA where
a dispute involves “a grievance arising under a [CBA].”
The district court then went on to consider whether the dispute before it involved “a
grievance under a [CBA],” noting that “whether a controversy constitutes a ‘grievance
[arising] under a [CBA]’ is a threshold question to be determined by the court.” To answer
this question, the district court analyzed the parties’ CBA, including the CBA’s definition
of “grievance,” and decided that the controversy between the parties did not meet the
definition of “grievance” and therefore was not “a grievance arising under a [CBA]”
subject to the exception in the MUAA. Having determined that the exception did not apply,
the district court concluded that the parties’ CBA did not provide for arbitration of the
dispute. Consequently, the district court denied the union’s motion to compel arbitration.
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The union appeals.
ISSUE
Did the district court err in its interpretation of Minnesota Statutes
sections 572B.06(b) and 572B.07(a) when it denied the union’s motion to compel
arbitration?
ANALYSIS
This case involves provisions of the MUAA regarding motions to compel arbitration
and the validity of arbitration agreements. Specifically, we must address an issue of first
impression: how a district court resolves a motion to compel arbitration under section
572B.07(a) when there is a dispute about whether the motion to compel involves “ a
grievance arising under a [CBA],” within the meaning of section 572B.06(b). Section
572B.07(a) requires the district court to “order the parties to arbitrate” “[u]nless the court
finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.” But section 572B.06(b) provides
that “in the case of a grievance arising under a [CBA],” an arbitrator “shall decide whether
an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.”
We must interpret these two related sections of the MUAA to answer the question before
us.
We review de novo “the district court’s decision whether to compel arbitration.”
Rodgers v. Silva, 920 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Minn. App. 2018). We also review de novo issues
of statutory interpretation. Glacier Park Iron Ore Props., LLC v. U.S. Steel Corp. ,
961 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 2021) (Glacier Park I).
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The MUAA
Before analyzing the specific issue before us, we begin with an overview of the
relevant provisions of the MUAA. The legislature enacted the current version of the
MUAA in 2010, adopting in large part the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), a model
uniform act. 2010 Minn. Laws ch. 264, art. 1, §§ 1-33, at 499- 511 (repealing a previous
version of the MUAA and largely adopting the UAA); Unif. Arb. Act §§ 1-33 (Unif. L.
Comm’n 2000). Section 572B.06 of the MUAA addresses the validity of agreement s to
arbitrate, including who decides issues related to arbitrability—a district court or an
arbitrator. Under section 572B.06(a), an agreement to arbitrate “any existing or subsequent
controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of
contract.” And, under section 572B.06(b), the district court decides “whether an agreement
to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate, except in the case
of a grievance arising under a [CBA] when an arbitrator shall decide.” (Emphasis added.)1
Also, under section 572B.06(c), it is the role of the arbitrator to “decide whether a condition
precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.”
Section 572B.07(a) sets forth certain procedures for adjudicating motions to compel
arbitration. “On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another
person’s refusal to arbitrate . . . the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue.”

1 The exception in section 572B.06(b) is not included in the UAA. Compare Minn. Stat.
§ 572B.06(b), with Unif. Arb. Act § 6(b) (Unif. L. Comm’n 2000).
8
Minn. Stat. § 572B.07(a). “ Unless the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement
to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to arbitrate.” Id. If, however, the district court
determines “that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not order the parties to
arbitrate.” Id.
The Specific MUAA Issue
The parties dispute how section 572B.06(b) informs the district court’s decision on
a motion to compel arbitration under section 572B.07(a). Specifically, the parties disagree
as to what issues the district court must resolve, including whether the district court’s
decision to grant the motion to compel under section 572B.07(a) requires the district court
first to determine whether the dispute involves “a grievance arising under a [CBA],” as that
phrase is used in section 572B.06(b).
To resolve the parties’ dispute, we must interpret sections 572B.06(b) and
572B.07(a). The objective of statutory interpretation is to “ ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the legislature.” In re Civ. Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 715
(Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). “The plain language of the statute is our best guide to
the [l]egislature’s intent.” Dakota Drug, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 13 N.W.3d 387, 391
(Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). “[ T]he first step of statutory interpretation is to
determine whether the statute’s language is ambiguous.” Benson, 12 N.W.3d at 715. “A
statute is ambiguous when the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
give effect to the plain meaning of the statutory text.” Id. But, if a statute is ambiguous,
we apply relevant canons of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity. Id. at 716-17.
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Reading sections 572B.06(b) and 572B.07(a) together, we conclude that when
deciding a motion to compel arbitration, the district court must decide the threshold
question of whether the case involves “a grievance arising under a [CBA]” within the
meaning of section 572B.06(b) and, if so, compel arbitration. In this regard, we agree with
the district court’s analysis. We next consider the meaning of the phrase “a grievance
arising under a [ CBA].” There, we part ways with the district court. Consistent with
PELRA and considering dictionary definitions, we conclude that the phrase “a grievance
arising under a [CBA]” refers to an allegation of a violation of a CBA that a party seeks to
resolve by invoking a procedure in the CBA. And finally, applying this interpretation, we
conclude that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel under section
572B.07(a) because the dispute in this case involves “a grievance arising under a [CBA]”
within the meaning of section 572B.06(b). We discuss our reasoning below.
I. To determine whether to grant a motion to compel arbitration , the district
court must first determine whether there is “a grievance arising under a
[CBA].”

We first address how the authority of district courts and arbitrators to decide issues
of arbitrability under section 572B.06(b) relates to a district court’s decision on a motion
to compel arbitration under section 572B.07 (a). The union argues that, under section
572B.06, the arbitrator decides “all arbitrability issues” in cases involving “a grievance
arising under a [CBA].” The union further argues that “[ t]he MUAA does not give
jurisdiction to courts to determine whether a dispute is a grievance arising under a CBA.”
On this basis, the union contends that “the district court erred by holding the question of
whether a controversy constitutes a grievance [arising] under a [CBA] is a threshold
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question to be determined by the [c]ourt.” (Quotations omitted.) The school district
responds that the district court must apply section 572B.07(a) and Amdahl v. Green Giant
Co., 497 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. App. 1993), to resolve issues about the existence and
scope of an arbitration agreement, and it must “determine whether the grievance exception
in [s]ection 572B.06(b) applies as part of that analysis.” We agree with the school district
that the district court, not the arbitrator, determines whether the exception in section
572B.06(b) for “a grievance arising under a [CBA]” applies, but we conclude that the
district court must make that determination first before it resolves issues about the existence
or scope of an arbitration agreement (if it is authorized to do so) or decides the motion to
compel under section 572B.07(a). Doing so allows the district court to know what it is to
resolve when deciding the motion.
Under section 572B.06(a), an agreement to arbitrate is generally “valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable.” While section 572B.06(a) establishes that agreements to arbitrate are
enforceable, section 572B.07(a) provides procedures to compel enforcement. See Rent-A-
Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, and describing 9 U.S.C. § 4, a section analogous to Minn. Stat.
§ 572B.07(a), as part of the “procedures” to implement the FAA’s “substantive rule” in
9 U.S.C. § 2, a section analogous to Minn. Stat. § 572B.06(a)). When a party brings a
motion to compel “showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person’s refusal
to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement,” the district court must grant the motion “[u]nless
the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.” Minn. Stat.
§ 572B.07(a).
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To determine whether a dispute is subject to an agreement to arbitrate, two questions
must first be answered: “(1) whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and (2) whether
the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement.” Amdahl, 497 N.W.2d at
322; see also Provost v. Lundmark, 15 N.W.3d 664, 669 (Minn. App. 2024) . These
questions address substantive arbitrability. See Millwrights Loc. 548 v. Robert J. Pugleasa
Co., 419 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Minn. App. 1988) (“Substantive issues examine whether the
subject matter is arbitrable.”).2 While these two questions must be answered to determine
whether a particular controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate, section 572B.06(b)
unambiguously controls who should answer them. Under section 572B.06(b), “The court
shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an
agreement to arbitrate, except in the case of a grievance arising under a [CBA] when an
arbitrator shall decide .” (Emphasis added.) So, generally a court is required to decide
these questions, but the general requirement gives way “in the case of a grievance arising
under a [CBA] when an arbitrator shall decide.” Minn. Stat. § 572B.06(b) (emphasis
added). In other words, when there is “a grievance arising under a [CBA],” an arbitrator
must decide “whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an

2 Notably, section 6(b) of the UAA—the UAA section corresponding to the first part of
section 572B.06(b) of the MUAA —was drafted with the intent of incorporating state and
federal caselaw generally requiring courts to decide “issues of substantive arbitrability, i.e.,
whether a dispute is encompassed by an agreement to arbitrate.” Unif. Arb. Act § 6 cmt.
2 (Unif. L. Comm’n 2000); see also In re Tr. of Moreland, 993 N.W.2d 80, 88 n.6 (Minn.
2023) (noting comment to uniform act is persuasive authority); Minn. Stat. § 572B.29(a)
(stating that in “applying and construing [the MUAA], consideration must be given to the
need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that
enact it”).
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agreement to arbitrate.” 3 Given the clear statutory directive of section 572B.06(b), we
conclude that when a party moves to compel arbitration, the district court must decide as a
threshold matter whether a particular controversy is “a grievance arising under a [CBA].”
The union argues that the language of section 572B.06(b) authorizes the arbitrator
to make the determination of whether there is “a grievance arising under a [CBA]” in the
first instance. This argument is unpersuasive. Nothing in the plain language of the statute
grants the arbitrator the authority to do so. To the contrary, under the plain language of
section 572B.06(b), the district court has the authority to make substantive arbitrability
decisions “except in the case of a grievance arising under a [CBA].” Consequently, the
district court must first determine whether the exception for “a grievance arising under a
[CBA]” applies in order to know whether the arbitrator or the court is to resolve the
arbitrability issues in section 572B.06(b).
The framework in section 572B.06(b) is similar to other contexts where arbitrability
is at issue. For example, courts make the initial determination as to whether arbitrability
is delegated to an arbitrator based on the language of a contract. See Glacier Park I,
961 N.W.2d at 771 (applying FAA); Glacier Park Iron Ore Props., LLC v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 948 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Minn. App. 2020) (Glacier Park II) (applying MUAA), aff’d,
961 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 2021); Churchill Env’t & Indus. Equity Partners, L.P. v. Ernst &

3 We interpret the exception to apply to both antecedent issues—the existence and scope
of an agreement to arbitrate—as “[a] qualifying phrase separated from antecedents by a
comma is evidence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the antecedents instead of
only to the immediately preceding one.” State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn.
2021) (citing 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 47.33 (7th ed. 2007)).
13
Young, L.L.P., 643 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Minn. App. 2002) (applying FAA). Similarly, courts
determine whether certain claims are statutorily subject to arbitration. See Jansen v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 891 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. App. 2017) (addressing no-fault
arbitration, as required under Minn. Stat. § 65B.525, subd. 1 (2016)) , rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 26, 2017). We see no reason why we would approach the exception in section
572B.06(b) differently.
We are also not persuaded by the school district’s argument that the district court,
not the arbitrator, must also decide issues about the existence and scope of an agreement
to arbitrate pursuant to Amdahl and section 572B.07(a) before compelling arbitration even
in the case of “a grievance arising under a [CBA].” The substantive arbitrability analysis
from Amdahl is now reflected in section 572B.06(b). If there is “a grievance arising under
a [CBA],” that section requires the arbitrator, not the district court, to perform that analysis.
Cases that predate the enactment of section 572B.06(b), such as Amdahl, or do not involve
CBAs, such as Provost, do not convince us otherwise because they do not address the
impact of section 572B.06(b). See, e.g., Provost, 15 N.W.3d at 669 (matter not involving
CBA); Minn. Teamsters Pub. & L. Enf’t Emps. Union, Loc. 320 v. County of St. Louis,
726 N.W.2d 843, 849 (Minn. App. 2007) (matter involving CBA but predating section
572B.06(b)), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2007); Amdahl, 497 N.W.2d at 322 (matter not
involving CBA and predating section 572B.06(b)).4

4 We acknowledge that in such cases we have at times used unqualified language indicating
that the court should decide questions concerning the existence and scope of an agreement
to arbitrate. See, e.g., Provost, 15 N.W.3d at 669 (“It follows that a court presented with a
motion to compel arbitration must determine . . . .”); Amdahl, 497 N.W.2d at 322 (“When
14
Similarly, the language of section 572B.07(a) does not require the court to decide
questions about the existence and scope of an agreement to arbitrate when the exception
for a grievance in section 572B.06(b) applies. Section 572B.0 7(a) requires the district
court to “order the parties to arbitrate,” “[u]nless the court finds that there is no enforceable
agreement to arbitrate.” If issues of substantive arbitrability are statutorily delegated to the
arbitrator under section 572B.06(b), i.e., when there is “a grievance arising under a
[CBA],” the district court cannot find “there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.”
Minn. Stat. § 572B.07(a). Without such a finding, the court must “order the parties to
arbitrate.” Id. Our interpretation is consistent with our precedent recognizing that there
are circumstances where “an arbitrator determines arbitrability in the first instance, instead
of the district court,” Glacier Park II, 948 N.W.2d at 691, in which case the district court
does not decide the issue and instead compels arbitration so that the arbitrator may do so,
Churchill Env’t & Indus. Equity Partners, L.P., 643 N.W.2d at 337.
In sum, under section 572B.06(b), the district court generally resolves issues about
the existence and scope of an agreement to arbitrate when ruling on a motion under section
572B.07(a); but the legislature created an exception when there is “a grievance arising
under a [CBA].” Therefore, we conclude that when the district court decides a motion to
compel arbitration under section 572B.07(a), the district court is required to make the
threshold determination of whether the case involves “a grievance arising under a [CBA]”
under section 572B.06(b). And if there is “a grievance arising under a [CBA],” the district

considering a motion to compel arbitration, the court’s inquiry is limited to . . . .”). But, as
noted, these cases did not address section 572B.06(b).
15
court must compel arbitration under section 572B.07(a) so the arbitrator can resolve
“whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to
arbitrate.” Minn. Stat. § 572B.06(b).
Given that a court must decide whether there is “a grievance arising under a [CBA]”
as a threshold matter, we now turn to what that language means.
II. A “grievance arising under a [CBA]” means an allegation of a violation of a
CBA that a party seeks to resolve by invoking a procedure in the CBA.

The language in section 572B.06(b), “a grievance arising under a [CBA],” has
neither been defined in the MUAA nor interpreted in a precedential opinion. In interpreting
this language, the district court looked to the definition of “grievance” in the parties’ CBA,
and the parties do the same. Based on our de novo review , we disagree that the term
“grievance” as used in the statute is defined, on a case-by -case basis, by looking to the
definition of “grievance” in a particular CBA. Instead, we conclude that the term
“grievance” as used in this phrase is ambiguous and, applying the in pari materia canon of
statutory construction, we interpret the term in a manner consistent with PELRA and in
light of Black’s Law Dictionary. We then consider the meaning of the term “arise,” and
we conclude that the phrase “a grievance arising under a [CBA], ” as used in section
572B.06(b), refers to an allegation of a violation of a CBA that a party seeks to resolve by
invoking a procedure in a CBA.
As discussed above, our touchstone for statutory interpretation is to “ ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Benson, 12 N.W.3d at 715. Our first step in
interpreting a statute is to determine whether it is ambiguous, that is whether it is “subject
16
to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. “If the language of a statute is clear on its
face, then the statute is unambiguous, and we apply its plain meaning.” State v. Plancarte,
20 N.W.3d 30, 37 (Minn. 2025). But if the statutory language is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, we turn to relevant canons of statutory construction to resolve
the ambiguity and determine the legislature’s intent. Id. at 38 (discussing post-ambiguity
canons of construction).
We begin by considering whether the term “grievance” 5 is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, and we conclude it is. The parties and the district court
understood “grievance” to refer to the definition of “grievance” provided in the parties’
CBA. While we agree that this is one reasonable interpretation of the term “grievance” as
used in the phrase “grievance arising under a [CBA]” in section 572B.06(b), our inquiry
does not stop there.
Because there is no statutory definition of “grievance,” “we may consider dictionary
definitions to determine [a term’s] common usage.” Id. at 37 (considering dictionary
definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term and concluding the relevant term
is ambiguous as used in the statute ). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “grievance” as it
relates to labor as “[a] complaint that is filed by an employee or the employee’s union
representative and that usu[ally] concerns working conditions, esp[ecially] an alleged

5 The meaning of the term “collective bargaining agreement” is not in dispute. We note
that Black’s Law Dictionary defines a CBA as a “contract between an employer and a labor
union regulating employment conditions, wages, benefits, and grievances.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 332 (12th ed. 2024).
17
violation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Black’s Law Dictionary 843 (12th ed.
2024) (emphasis added).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also interpreted “grievance,” though in a
somewhat different context. In Ekstedt v. Village of New Hope, the supreme court
addressed whether certain conduct was a “grievance,” such that the conduct could not be
the basis for discharging an employee under a statute. 193 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Minn. 1972).
The supreme court noted that there are “varying interpretations of what actually constitutes
a grievance,” including “collective rather than individual or group complaints,” “major
demands,” or “minor matters or secondary disputes.” Id. (quotation omitted). The supreme
court also emphasized that a “liberal and broad construction of the term ‘grievance’ as used
in collective bargaining agreements should be given in the interest of encouraging”
arbitration. Id. The supreme court then concluded that the statutory reference to
“grievance” “should be defined in its generally accepted sense” and that the term
“grievance” as used in the relevant statute “relates to some complaint related to terms or
conditions of employment.” Id.
Given these varying definitions of “grievance,” the term “grievance” as used in the
phrase “grievance arising under a [CBA]” in section 572B.06(b) could reasonably mean a
complaint concerning “an alleged violation of a [CBA]” (Black’s Law Dictionary); any
“complaint related to terms or conditions of employment” provided it arises under a CBA
(Ekstedt); or a grievance as defined by the parties in a specific CBA. Because there is more
than one reasonable interpretation of “grievance” as used in the phrase “grievance arising
18
under a [ CBA],” we may consider post-ambiguity canons of statutory construction to
resolve the ambiguity and discern the legislature’s intent.
Most relevant to our analysis is in pari materia, or the “related-statutes canon,”
which “allows two statutes with common purposes and subject matter to be construed
together to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutory language.”
State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). This canon
is consistent with our policy of “harmonizing statutes dealing with the same subject
matter.” State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 584, 590
(Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). We are particularly attuned to this canon when the
legislature uses the same terms in related statutes, as we understand the legislature intends
a word to have a consistent meaning. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 438 (stating that “a
legislative body generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning in a given
context” (quotation omitted)); Pecinovsky v. AMCO Ins. Co., 613 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn.
App. 2000) (“Courts presume that the legislature acts with full knowledge of previous
statutes and existing caselaw.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).
PELRA shares a common purpose and subject matter with section 572B.06(b),
namely resolving grievances arising under a CBA. “PELRA regulates labor relations in
the public sector,” Educ. Minn.-Intermediate Dist. No. 917 v. Intermediate Sch. Dist. No.
917 (In re Petition for Clarification of an Appropriate Unit), 660 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn.
App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2003), and it “requires that all collective
bargaining agreements include a grievance procedure,” Minn. Teamsters Pub. & L. Enf’t
Emps. Union, Loc. 320, 726 N.W.2d at 849 (citing Minn. Stat. § 179A.20, subd. 4(a)
19
(2006)). That grievance procedure must provide “for compulsory binding arbitration of
grievances.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.20, subd. 4(a). PELRA also otherwise addresses
grievance arbitration and includes a definition of “grievance.” Minn. Stat. § 179A.21.
Notably, the language from PELRA relevant to our analysis existed in 2010 when section
572B.06(b) was enacted. Minn. Stat. §§ 179A.20-.21 (2010); 2010 Minn. Laws ch. 264,
art. 1, §§ 1-33, at 499-511.
Because PELRA and section 572B.06(b) share a common purpose and subject
matter, we consider PELRA’s definition of “grievance” to help us discern the legislature’s
intended meaning of that same term as used in section 572B.06(b). PEL RA defines
“grievance” for purposes of grievance arbitration under PELR A as “a dispute or
disagreement as to the interpretation or application of any term or terms of any” CBA
required by PELRA. Minn. Stat. § 179A.21, subd. 1. This definition is very similar to the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “grievance” as a complaint concerning “an alleged
violation of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Consistent with the definitions of
“grievance” in Black’s Law Dictionary and PELRA, we conclude that the legislature
intended the term “grievance,” as used in the phrase “grievance arising under a [CBA]” in
section 572B.06(b), to mean an allegation of a violation of a CBA.
Next, we consider the meaning of “arising” as used in that same phrase. Like
“grievance,” the word “arising,” as used in section 572B.06(b), is not defined in the
MUAA. Accordingly, we turn to dictionary definitions to discern the plain and ordinary
meaning of the term. State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. 2018). One
definition of “arise” is “[t]o come into being; originate.” The American Heritage
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Dictionary of the English Language 95 (5th ed. 2018). This definition connotes that “a
grievance arising under a [CBA]” refers to a grievance that “come[s] into being” under a
CBA. We do not discern other reasonable interpretations. Consequently, we give that term
its plain and ordinary meaning of “coming into being.” And, as a practical matter, in the
context of a CBA such as the one at issue here, a grievance comes into being when a party
invokes the procedure in the CBA to resolve the grievance.
Considering the meaning of “grievance” together with the meaning of “arise,” we
conclude that the phrase “grievance arising under a [CBA],” as used in section 572B.06(b),
means an allegation of a violation of a CBA that a party seeks to resolve by invoking a
procedure in the CBA. This interpretation is informed by, and read in harmony with,
PELRA. Our interpretation requires that the CBA have a procedure, consistent with section
179A.20, subdivision 4(a), of PELRA. And this interpretation of the phrase “grievance
arising under a [CBA]” recognizes that a “grievance” is narrower than a “controversy,” as
those terms are used in section 572B.06(b), as it requires a party to be asserting a right to
proceed under the procedure in the CBA. See Schaber v. Ramsey County, No. A21-1453,
2022 WL 1616625, at *4 (Minn. App. May 23, 2022) (concluding there was no “grievance
under the CBA” because the party was not pursuing a grievance under the CBA’s grievance
procedure), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 9, 2022).6
In light of PELRA, we also conclude that the legislature did not intend “grievance”
in section 572B.06 (b) to be “some complaint related to terms or conditions of

6 This case is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite nonprecedential
opinions as persuasive authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
21
employment,” Ekstedt, 193 N.W.2d at 827, or to be based on definitions included in each
individual CBA. The interpretation provided in Ekstedt is too broad when compared to the
more specific and applicable definition of “grievance” in PELRA. And, considering
PELRA’s general definition, we doubt that the legislature would intend the scope of the
exception in section 572B.06(b) to vary in each individual case, and instead understand the
better reading to provide a consistent, broad scope. See Ekstedt, 193 N.W.2d at 827
(indicating that “grievance” should be interpreted in “its generally accepted sense” and
given a “liberal and broad construction”); Provost, 15 N.W.3d at 669 (noting “Minnesota
law favors arbitration”).
Given our interpretation of the phrase “grievance arising under a [CBA],” we must
also conclude that the district court erred by not granting the union’s motion to compel
arbitration. There is no dispute that the union sought to resolve an allegation of a violation
of the CBA by invoking a procedure in the CBA. Therefore, this is a case involving a
“grievance arising under a [CBA]” within the meaning of section 572B.06(b). And because
there is a “grievance arising under a [CBA],” the district court must compel arbitration
under section 572B.07(a).7
DECISION
Minnesota Statutes sections 572B.06(b) and 572B.07(a) require an arbitrator, not
the district court, to determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration when the dispute

7 Whether this particular grievance is arbitrable under the CBA is a question that will be
resolved by the arbitrator, as required by section 572B.06(b). We express no view on the
merits of that question.
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involves “a grievance arising under a [CBA],” meaning an allegation of a violation of a
CBA that a party seeks to resolve by invoking a procedure in the CBA. The district court
erred when it interpreted section 572B.06(b) based on the parties’ definition of “grievance”
included in their particular CBA. We therefore reverse the district court’s order denying
the union’s motion to compel arbitration and remand to the district court with instructions
to compel arbitration.
Reversed and remanded.