In the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1826

In the Matter of:

Cristina Lillian Mactaggart, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Allen Westad,
Appellant.

Filed July 28, 2025
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-20-1991

Robert Hajek, Hajek Legal Services, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jefferey Allen Westad, Greenwood Village, Colorado (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Wheelock , Judge; and Jesson ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
This case revolves around the custody of the nine-year-old child of appellant-father
Jeffrey Allen Westad and respondent-mother Cristina Lillian Mactaggart. The parties, who

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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were never married, initially reached an agreement on custody and parenting time, which
was contingent on mother’s ability to maintain sobriety and work on her substance abuse
issues—which she has done. But an increasingly acrimonious relationship emerged as
mother sought more parenting time and father sought to move out-of-state with the child.
In November 2024, following motions by both father and mother, the district court
granted mother sole legal custody of the child; ordered that each parent have equal
parenting time and that mother’s home be the child’s primary residence; denied father’s
request to relocate with the child; and directed father to pay $518 per month in basic child
support. Father raises two main issues on appeal. First, that the district court’s order was
contrary to the child’s best interests, a nd second, that the district court erred when
considering previous domestic violence by mother towards father. Because the district
court’s detailed order is supported by the record, and because we discern no error in its
handling of the domestic-violence issue, we affirm.
FACTS
Mother and father are parents of a child born in September 2015. While the couple
never married, they reached a stipulated agreement signed by the court (the agreement) that
they would share joint legal custody of their child, but that father would have sole physical
custody. The agreement identified particular “major decision making” areas requiring
agreement by both parties, which included the child’s education. It is undisputed that
mother struggled with substance abuse issues around this time. Accordingly, the
agreement conditioned mother’s parenting time on her compliance with certain conditions,
which included going to therapy, refraining from using non-prescription mood- altering
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substances, and drug testing every three months for one year. If mother complied with
these conditions, her parenting time would increase. The agreement also provided that the
parenting-time schedule could be reviewed at either party’s request under a best-interests-
of-the-child standard and that any future motion by mother to increase her parenting time
to an equal 50/50 would be reviewed under that same standard.
Sometime in early 2022 father raised the issue of relocating with the child to
Colorado. A court-appointed evaluator, Jeff Postuma, conducted a relocation assessment
based on interviews with the parties and child and his review of several records. Postuma’s
January 2023 report recommended that the child continue to reside in Minnesota.
About two months later, mother petitioned the court for 50/50 parenting time.
Father moved for relocation to Colorado with the child. Mother continued to test negative
for drugs during this time and the litigation between the parties intensified.
Then in October 2023, father unilaterally pulled the child out of her local elementary
school and enrolled her in an online school. Father admitted doing this. The district court
ordered that the child be unenrolled from the online school and reenrolled at her elementary
school and that father not discuss a potential out-of-state move with the child. The district
court stated, “[T]he parties share joint legal custody. The scope [of which is] detailed with
specificity in their stipulation. Father unilaterally changed the child’s school less than a
month after she had started the school year . . . He violated the parties’ agreement, and he
violated a court order.” But father refused to follow the district court’s order and twice
removed the child from her elementary school after the court order. Mother then moved
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for attorney fees and argued that she made a prima facie case for a change of custody based
on endangerment.
In December 2023, the district court issued a temporary order awarding equal
parenting time pending mother’s motion to modify parenting time. The order also required
mother to submit to random substance testing for six months and denied father’s motion to
enroll the child in online school.1
A week later mother moved the court for modification of custody and sought sole
legal custody of the child. She argued that father’s actions endangered the child’s
emotional health and development and requested an evidentiary hearing. Mother also
asked the district court to set child support. Father responded by seeking a new
custody/parenting-time evaluation and an order requiring mother to undergo a new
chemical assessment evaluation and show that she complied with random substance
testing, among other requests. Mother voluntarily underwent another chemical health
assessment and provided negative drug tests results. Father then moved for sole legal
custody and conduct-based attorney fees.
Despite the agreement and this litigation backdrop, father refused to communicate
with mother about travel plans and took the child on vacation out-of-state without notifying
mother. In response, mother moved for a temporary order terminating father’s joint legal
custody and parenting time and awarding mother sole legal custody . The district court
denied mother’s motion and ordered father to return the child after their vacation. Mother

1 In January 2024 the district court awarded mother $11,585 in attorney fees against father.

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and child were eventually reunited in early July, but father continued to interfere with
mother’s parenting time.
The parties appeared before the district court on August 21, 2024, for an evidentiary
hearing on legal custody, parenting time, and relocation to Colorado. Mother testified and
called as witnesses her father, Iain Mactaggart (grandfather), and Jeff Postuma, author of
the 2023 relocation report. Father declined to call any witnesses or cross-examine mother’s
witnesses. He primarily relied on the approximately two dozen exhibits he submitted. His
testimony was limited to answering questions from the district court and cross-examination
by mother. After hearing all the evidence , the district court stated that it would consider
the parties’ motions but orally denied father’s request to relocate to Colorado with the child.
The district court explained that it would provide additional reasoning on its relocation
decision in a written order.
The district court issued that order regarding legal custody, parenting time,
relocation, and child support in November 2024. Noting that mother and her witnesses
presented credible testimony, and that father was “less credible, ” the district court found
that “[f]ather’s actions and decision-making have endangered the [] child and it is in the
child’s best interests that [m]other be awarded sole legal custody.” The district court then
awarded the parties equal parenting time, denied father’s relocation request, made mother’s
address the child’s primary address, and ordered father to pay basic child support of $518
per month.
This appeal follows.

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DECISION
Father’s arguments on appeal generally fall into two categories. First, he contends
that the district court’s best-interests findings from its November 2024 order were clearly
erroneous, and it therefore abused its discretion when it awarded mother sole legal custody,
ordered equal parenting time, and denied his relocation request. Second, father argues that
the district court “erred by failing to properly apply the domestic violence burden-shifting
provision of Minnesota law” regarding relocation.
This court reviews a district court’s findings on the best-interests factors for clear
error. Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Minn. 2019). We review district courts’
custody decisions, including relocation requests, for an abuse of discretion, mindful that
there is little room to question their best-interests analysis. In re Welfare of C.F.N., 923
N.W.2d 325, 334 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019); see
Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. App. 2010). And we defer to district
courts’ credibility determinations. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214,
221-22 (Minn. 2021). But a district court abuses its discretion when it makes findings of
fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplies the law, or issues a decision that is
against the logic and the facts in the record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506
(Minn. 2022).
With these standards of review in mind, we turn to the issues raised by father on
appeal.

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I. The district court properly analyzed the best-interests and relocation factors.

In determining custody-related matters, a district court must make detailed findings
on what is in the child’s best interest. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024); see
Hansen v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). Indeed, here the agreement
between the parties stated that the best-interests standard governed parenting time
decisions. In addressing those interests, the court needed to consider and evaluate all
relevant factors, including the twelve delineated statutory factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17
subd. 1(a).
Those factors follow:
(1) the child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and other needs;

(2) any special medical, mental-health, developmental, or educational needs;

(3) the reasonable preferences of the child provided the district court determines
they are of sufficient age maturity to express an independent, reliable
preference;

(4) whether domestic abuse has occurred in the home;

(5) any physical-, mental-, or chemical-health issues of the parents;

(6) the history of the parents’ participation in caring for the child;

(7) the willingness of the parents to meet the child’s ongoing needs;

(8) the effect a change in home, school, and community would have on the
child’s development and well-being;

(9) the effect the proposed arrangement would have on the child’s relationship
with the other parent, siblings, and other important adults;

(10) the benefit of maximizing the child’s contact with both parents and the
detriment of limiting that contact;

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(11) except in cases where domestic violence has occurred, the willingness of
each parent to encourage a relationship with the other parent; and

(12) the willingness of each parent to cooperate in rearing the children.

Minn. Stat. § 518.17 subd. 1(a)(1)-(12).
Here, the district court addressed each factor after reviewing the record and hearing
testimony from mother and her witnesses, which it deemed credible, and sparse testimony
from father, which it deemed less credible.2 Overall, it determined that relocation was not
in the child’s best interests and awarded the parties equal parenting time and mother sole
legal custody, which were in the child’s best interests.3

2 In addressing father’s lack of credibility, the district court provided an example of father’s
efforts to circumvent court orders. Father had been living in an RV without a separate
room for the child, when father could afford permanent housing. After the district court
ordered father to have permanent housing with a room for the child, “[f]ather simply
disabled the engine of the RV and claimed the RV was now permanent since it could not
be moved,” the court found.
3 While the legal issues set out in father’s brief focus on the district court’s alleged errors
in its best-interests analysis regarding custody and relocation, in his argument he also
asserts that the court’s endangerment finding is clearly erroneous and unsupported by
substantial evidence. We disagree. A district court will only grant an endangerment-based
motion to modify custody if it finds that (1) “a change has occurred in the circumstances
of the child or the parties and [] modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child,” Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d), and (2) “the child’s present environment endangers the
child’s physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the
harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a
change to the child.” Id. at (iv). Here, the court found that father’s actions and decision-
making endangered the child, relying on many facts which led to its best-interests decision.
These facts include father’s extensive steps to remove mother from the child’s life; his
unilateral cancellation of the child’s doctor’s appointments; his move to an RV without a
separate room for the child; and his removal of the child from her local elementary school.
Accordingly, the district court’s endangerment finding is supported by substantial
evidence. It is not clearly erroneous.

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Regarding the first three best-interests factors, among a myriad of findings, the
district court found that father twice removed the child from school after mother dropped
her off and unilaterally enrolled the child in online school; that the parties disagree on the
child’s level of interest in participating in religious activities; and that relocating to
Colorado would benefit father, but not the child. The district court found that father’s
decision to pursue litigation, act contrary to court orders, “and push for his desired outcome
. . . may result in [the child] requiring special mental health services in the future.”
Regarding the child’s preference, the district court found that, because “[f]ather has exerted
such influence on [the child] regarding moving to Colorado[,] [] she likely could not
accurately state or understand a preference” even if she was asked for her input. Based
upon its findings, the district court determined that the first factor weighed in favor of
mother and that the second and third factors were neutral, given that the child had no special
health needs and could not accurately state a preference.
Addressing factors four and five, the district court found that mother was abusive
towards father during the child’s early years when mother was struggling with substance
abuse. Now four years sober, mother acknowledges that her behavior was unacceptable,
and grandfather credibly testified that mother’s recovery was exceptional, “addressing the
core issues that fed her illness,” the court found. But the district court highlighted father’s
“recent behaviors and interactions with the [c]ourt” as a “cause for concern regarding his
mental health and decision-making.” For example, father cut off child’s contact with
mother and communicated with mother in a “condescending and controlling manner,”
while mother “has been successful in remaining sober and providing consistent, safe care
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for [the child].” Accordingly, the district court found that the fourth factor involving
domestic abuse was neutral, while the fifth— any issue of a parent that affects the child’s
safety or developmental needs—favored mother.
On factors six and seven, the district court found that both parents have been very
involved in the child’s life, that her relationship with both of them is important, and that
they both “take an active and loving role.” However, the district court noted how father
has tried to “motivate” the child to “support a move to Colorado”—before knowing
whether it would be permitted—by taking her to visit potential schools and encouraging
her to make friendships there. The district court found that father’s continued comments
to the child about moving to Colorado are detrimental to her well-being. And the court
stated that it had “significant concerns about [f]ather’s recent unilateral decision-making.”4
Based upon this evidence, the district court found that factors six and seven favor an equal
parenting time arrangement and disfavor relocation, while factor seven weighs in favor of
granting sole legal custody to mother.
On factors eight and nine, the district court found that father physically removing
the child twice from her school was disruptive and demonstrated his “lack of respect for
[c]ourt [o]rders or joint legal decision making.” The district court cited findings from

4 Related to this point, father argues that the district court “made erroneous findings
regarding travel notifications” in finding 15, which notes that in June 2024, father left the
state with the child and did not provide mother with notice or travel information, did not
allow the child to contact mother, and failed to return the child following his parenting
time. But m other’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing supports the district court’s
findings.

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Postuma’s report that a move to Colorado would “impact all areas of [child’s] li[f]e” and
specifically noted the child’s relationship with grandfather (with whom child and mother
reside) and mother’s ties to Minnesota. While acknowledging father’s claim that he does
not have family or friends in Minnesota despite living here since 2010, the court found that
father’s proposed move would not allow mother to be a part of child’s daily life. “[I]t is
much more likely that [f]ather could afford to travel to Minnesota” if he moved to Colorado
without the child than mother could afford to visit, the court found. Both of these factors
weigh in favor of mother’s proposal regarding custody and relocation, according to the
court.
Regarding the remaining factors, the district court found that both parents are
important to the child and that an equal parenting time schedule would maximize the time
she can spend with each of them. But father has been an obstacle to mother’s parenting
time and has made parenting decisions that are contrary to the child’s best interests and
court orders.5 Moreover, the district court relied upon mother’s credible testimony about

5 Father argues that when making this finding, the district court failed to consider mother’s
refusal to engage in mediation and settlement discussions. The record does not support
father’s argument. The district court issued its November 2024 order after reviewing “the
court file, arguments, and evidence,” which includes affidavits and motions from father
stating that mother refused to engage in mediation and settlements, and affidavits from
mother denying father’s claims. It appears the district court considered the factual dispute,
and to the extent it addressed the competing affidavits, made a credibility determination
favoring mother.

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father’s controlling behaviors and unilateral decision-making and noted that father’s
decisions have been contrary to the stability or structure that the child needs.6
While the district court addressed many of the underlying issues involved in its
relocation decision while considering the twelve best-interests factors, it also specifically
addressed the additional considerations Minnesota law requires when considering a
parent’s request to move to another state. The district court found that father “has
established a pattern of conduct to thwart the relationship of child and [m]other,” noting
his unilateral decision- making regarding the child’s education, travel plans, and medical
appointments, and his “choice to remove [the child] from the only home she has known to
live in an RV (not for financial reasons but because he intended to leave Minnesota with
her).” The court also found that “[t]he benefits and enhancements to quality of life as a
result of relocation are squarely placed on [f]ather,” that mother “does not benefit at all
from a relocation,” and that “while the child may benefit from relocation . . . as the conflict
between her parents would diminish,[] so too would her time with her [m]other.”
The district court’s detailed best-interests analysis, including its decision regarding
relocation, is fully supported by the record. Here, the court carefully weighed each parent’s
efforts to raise the child, as well as the child’s specific needs. In doing so, it relied on
Postuma’s extensive report and testimony. The report stated: “If [father] were allowed to
continue to involve the [c]ourt (perhaps for years) until he gets what he wants [it] will

6 The court’s analysis did not explicitly state which parent these final factors favored, but
its discussion of the factors demonstrates implicit weighing of these factors in mother’s
favor.
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undoubtedly be detrimental to [the child] and [the child]’s entire family. [Child] will live
in a state of mind not really knowing where to ground herself and perhaps making it
difficult to solidify her friendships and community.”
Mother’s testimony also grounded the district court’s best-interests analysis. The
court found her credible, an assessment we will not second guess. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
at 221-22. Further, the district court relied upon its own experiences with father. It noted,
for example, that father not only showed a lack of respect for joint legal decision -making,
but also for court orders. And father’s limited involvement in the evidentiary proceeding
provided little evidence for the district court to consider. The court found his brief
testimony “less credible.” Given the district court’s detailed, supported analysis, it did not
abuse its discretion by denying father’s relocation request, awarding equal parenting time,
and awarding mother sole legal custody of the child. 7
To persuade us otherwise, father argues that the district court “relied on a flawed
and inadmissible relocation evaluation” because its “outdated” findings from January 2023
“mischaracterize both the scope of the evaluation and the extent of Mr. Postuma’s
involvement with the family.” Father also argues that, because Postuma “is not a licensed
psychologist, therapist, or social worker,” it is questionable whether his opinions constitute

7 Father contends that the district court abused its discretion in making its child support
determination because mother’s financial disclosures were incomplete and inaccurate and
because she acted in bad faith. But father fails to provide any evidence to support this
claim and does not challenge the district court’s determination of his income. We therefore
decline to address his argument. See Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187
N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971) (arguments that are no more than a “mere assertion,” are
unavailing).
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“expert testimony.” Father’s arguments are without support. First, the district court noted
that even though the report dates from January 2023, it is detailed, thorough, and reliable.
Postuma’s report and testimony were based on his personal observations, research, and
conversations and the district court found him credible. Second, the district court never
referred to Postuma as an expert. Nor did father raise the issue of Postuma’s qualifications
below. As a result, we will not address them, for the first time, on appeal. See
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally
address only those questions previously presented to and considered by the district court).
Relevant to father’s relocation request, he argues that the district court failed to
properly consider the quality-of-life benefits of relocation. We disagree. The district court
explicitly found that the “benefits and enhancements to quality of life as a result of
relocation are squarely placed on [f]ather. Moving to Colorado would make [f]ather
happier, reduce the contact [f]ather and [ child] have with [m]other, and allow [f]ather
added contact with his family.” 8 In contrast, t he court determined that mother would not
benefit at all from relocation and her time with the child would “drastically diminish[].”
Because the record supports the district court’s findings of fact on the best-interests
factors and relocation considerations, the court did not abuse its discretion when it

8 A district court’s decision on relocation, which is determined by weighing several
considerations under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 (2024), including the best interests of
the child, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 215.

15
determined that it was in the best interests of the child for mother to have equal parenting
time and sole legal custody of the child and denied father’s relocation request.9
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its application of the domestic-
violence burden-shifting provision.
Father argues that the district court “erred by failing to properly apply the domestic
violence burden-shifting provision” under Minnesota Statute § 518.175, subd. 3(c), as part
of its relocation determination. Section 518.175, subd. 3(b), instructs district courts to
apply a best-interests standard when considering a relocation request. We addressed the
district court’s application of that standard in our analysis above. But in a separate
argument, father argues that the court violated this statute because it placed the burden of
proof regarding relocation on him, rather than mother. The burden should be on mother,
he asserts, because he is a victim of domestic violence.
We begin with the wording of subdivision 3(c):
The burden of proof is upon the parent requesting to move the
residence of the child to another state, except that if the court
finds that the person requesting permission to move has been
a victim of domestic abuse by the other parent, the burden of
proof is upon the parent opposing the move. The court must
consider all of the factors in this subdivision in determining the
best interests of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3(c) (emphasis added).

9 Father also argues that the district court “mischaracterized [his] employment situation”
by “incorrectly stat[ing] that [his] employment is based in Eden Prairie, Minnesota.”
However, his 2023 W-2 identifies his employer’s address as located in Eden Prairie. In an
affidavit, father stated that he is “employed out of Austin, TX,” that his company’s location
“in Minnesota is an unstaffed datacenter,” and that he works remotely. The record supports
the district court’s finding.

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As discussed above, the statutory best-interests factors require the district court to
consider: “[W]hether domestic abuse . . . has occurred in the parents’ or either parent’s
household or relationship; the nature and context of the domestic abuse; and the
implications of the domestic abuse for parenting and for the child’s safety, well-being, and
developmental needs.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4). Which the district court did in
its custody and parenting time determinations. But in addressing the related decision, the
district court did not directly address who bore the burden of proof on relocation: mother
or father.
Given the record and detailed order below, to the extent that the law placed a burden
of proof on mother regarding relocation, mother met this burden. Notably, the district court
relied on Postuma’s 2023 report, which explained how father “previously minimized his
experience of domestic abuse in the relationship and how his statements were void of
intensity and fear for this safety” and that the evidence “does not corroborate [f]ather’s
current stated level of fear.” Not only does this evidence raise questions about the level of
domestic abuse, but much of the testimony supports the district court’s finding that the
benefits from the proposed relocation fall squarely on father. Mother certainly does not
benefit, the court found. And the child benefits only to the extent the conflict between her
parents is removed. But that relocation also, as the district court pointed out, removes her
from her mother.

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In sum, even assuming that mother bears the burden of proof regarding relocation,
the district court’s decision to deny father’s relocation request falls within its wide
discretion.
Affirmed.