Brian Michael Steidl, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1832

Brian Michael Steidl, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed August 11, 2025
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CV-23-1069

Matthew P. Franzese, Wheaton, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Cassandra Buehler, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
A sheriff’s deputy stopped a pickup truck driven by Brian Steidl and suspected that
Steidl—who suffers physical and mental disabilities— was impaired based on his fidgety
behavior, dilated pupils, and poor performance on field sobriety tests. The commissioner
of public safety revoked Steidl’s driver’s license after a blood test indicated positive for
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amphetamines. Steidl unsuccessfully challenged the revocation in the district court,
arguing that the positive test resulted from his having taken drugs as prescribed. We affirm
his revocation because the record supports the district court’s conclusion that the drugs
impaired Steidl.
FACTS
Douglas County Sheriff’s Deputy Corey Sammons was patrolling in Alexandria
when he saw a driver toss a lit cigarette from a pickup’s window. Deputy Sammons
activated his emergency lights to stop the truck, which, rather than stopping, changed lanes
several times while the driver moved around “frantically.” The deputy thrice ordered the
driver to pull the truck over using his squad car’s loudspeaker.
Deputy Sammons approached the stopped pickup and encountered the driver, Brian
Steidl. He noticed that Steidl had dilated pupils, was fidgeting, exhibited facial tremors,
and “blink[ed] with his eyes closed.” This led Deputy Sammons, who has extensive
training and experience in identifying impairment by controlled substances, to suspect that
Steidl was under the influence of a stimulant. Steidl told the deputy that he has ADHD,
depression, and sleep apnea, and he disclosed that he was taking medications but was
unsure of which he was taking.
Deputy Sammons tried to administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus test but could
not because Steidl would not hold his head still. He administered the modified Romberg
test, directing Steidl to tilt his head back, close his eyes, and estimate the passage of 30
seconds. Steidl estimated 30 seconds in just 11 seconds. Steidl failed to follow the
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instructions of the walk-and-turn test in several ways and only three of six times
successfully completed the finger-to-nose test.
Deputy Sammons arrested Steidl and collected a sample of his blood after obtaining
a warrant to do so. The test indicated positive for amphetamines. The commissioner of
public safety revoked Steidl’s driving privileges. Steidl petitioned for judicial review,
raising the prescription-drug affirmative defense. The district court conducted a hearing
where Steidl, Steidl’s father, Steidl’s pharmacist, and Deputy Sammons testified.
The hearing testimony included information about Steidl’s physical and mental
disabilities. Steidl’s father said that he was oxygen deprived at birth, leading to a “very
severe” learning disability, “very poor” motor skills, and balance that is “way off.” Yet
Steidl obtained his license at about age 18 on his first attempt, and his father believes him
to be a safe driver. Steidl is prescribed multiple medications, including Vyvanse and
Provigil, which his pharmacist opined would cause him to test positive for amphetamines.
The pharmacist added that Vyvanse can increase Steidl’s alertness and dilate his pupils.
His father believes that he acts “more normal” when he is on his medications.
The pharmacist acknowledged that Vyvanse taken incorrectly can impair a person.
The court also received into evidence a Vyvanse patient-education sheet that directs users
to avoid driving until the user knows how the medication affects him. Steidl testified that
he takes his medication regularly, carefully timing his doses. He said that a social worker
visits him weekly and helps organize his medications. The pharmacist reported that he saw
nothing in Steidl’s pharmaceutical record that suggested he had filled his prescriptions
irregularly.
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Deputy Sammons testified that he believed Steidl was impaired by s timulants and
was unsafe to drive. He said that Steidl’s appearance and body behavior in court were
“125% different than it was on the night of the traffic stop,” noting Steidl was fidgeting
significantly less and that his head and arm movements were slower. Steidl testified that
he “failed all [the] sobriety tests” but maintained that he would not ordinarily pass them
because of his disability and medications.
The district court upheld the commissioner’s decision to revoke Steidl’s driver’s
license. It considered the prescription-drug defense by determining “whether [Steidl’s]
medications impaired his ability to operate a motor vehicle.” The district court concluded
that, despite Steidl’s physical and mental issues, his performance on the sobriety tests
demonstrated that he was impaired. Steidl appeals.
DECISION
Steidl challenges the district court’s license-revocation decision. We review a
district court’s determination that a driver failed to prove a prescription-drug defense for
an abuse of discretion. See Thordson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 10 N.W.3d 310, 315 (Minn.
App. 2024). A district court abuses its discretion when its findings of fact are unsupported
by the record, it improperly applies the law, or it resolves an issue contrarily to the logic
and the facts on the record. Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). We
consider whether the district court’s decision rejecting Steidl’s affirmative defense reflects
an abuse of its discretion.
The commissioner of public safety must revoke a person’s driver’s license when a
peace officer certifies that an executed search warrant of the person’s blood or urine based
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on probable cause of his driving while impaired has revealed the presence of certain
controlled substances. Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subds. 3(2)(iii), 5(a) (2024). A mphetamine
is a qualifying controlled substance. Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(d)(1) (2024). A driver
may challenge his revocation by asserting the prescription-drug defense:
It is an affirmative defense to the presence of a Schedule
I or II controlled substance that the person used the controlled
substance according to the terms of a prescription . . . unless
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the use
of the controlled substance impaired the person’s ability to
operate a motor vehicle.

Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 12(h) (2024). Steidl contests the district court’s determinations
as to whether he used amphetamines as prescribed and whether his use impaired his ability
to drive. We address both issues.
Use According to Terms of Prescription
Steidl argues that the district court erred by requiring him to produce an expert
witness to establish that the blood-test results show that he was medication compliant. The
argument overstates the district court’s order, which, while unclear, did not impose the
alleged medical-expert requirement:
[T]he issue presented . . . is whether [Steidl’s] medications
impaired his ability to operate a motor vehicle. The
Commissioner argues there is no actual evidence [Steidl] took
his medications according to the prescriptions. The evidence
presented is admittedly circumstantial, but the Court notes it is
virtually impossible for an individual to prove they were
medication compliant absent a forensic review of the blood
sample and testimony from a toxicologist or similar expert.
Regardless of whether an individual is medication compliant
or not, the statute clearly identifies impairment as an objective
basis for evaluation.

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As we observed in Thordson, the prescription-drug defense “does not require [the driver]
to prove that the amount of amphetamine in [his or] her system was within therapeutic
levels.” 10 N.W.3d at 316–17. The district court here “note[d]” the difficulty of
establishing medication compliance without scientific evidence, but it did not require any
party to present that sort of evidence.
Steidl also asserts that the district court erroneously failed to definitively rule on
whether he used the medications according to the terms of his prescription. Assuming that
the statute requires a district court to examine this aspect of the defense, Steidl fails to show
how the alleged failure to do so prejudiced him. We will not reverse for nonprejudicial,
harmless errors. See Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987). The
statute establishes that a driver’s impairment by itself defeats a prescription-drug defense.
See Minn. Stat. § 171.177, subd. 12(h). The district court decided that Steidl’s use of the
medications impaired his ability to drive regardless of whether Steidl was prescription
compliant. The district court’s uncertainty as to whether Steidl had been complying with
his prescription is therefore irrelevant.
Impaired Ability to Operate a Motor Vehicle
Steidl argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that his
medications impaired him. Even if a petitioner proves he was prescription compliant , a
district court may uphold a revocation if it “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the use of the controlled substance impaired the person’ s ability to operate a motor
vehicle.” Id. Steidl’s argument is not compelling.
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Steidl first maintains that the statute requires evidence of actual impaired driving,
not just impairment, to defeat the defense. Steidl did not make this argument in the district
court, and we will not entertain it in this appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988). Steidl’s statutory-interpretation argument is forfeited, and we see no reason
to address the forfeited argument.
Steidl next maintains that the district court erroneously determined that his use of
medication impaired his ability to operate a motor vehicle. We review findings of fact
underlying this determination for clear error by viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the findings, not finding our own facts, not reweighing evidence, and not
reconciling conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221–
22 (Minn. 2021). The district court reasoned that “while some of [Steidl]’s behavior or
responses may be explained due to his physical or mental issues, the field sobriety tests
demonstrated objective indicators of impairment.” It observed that Deputy Sammons
suspected Steidl to be under the influence based on his dilated eyes, eyelid tremors, and
rapid movement of his feet; on the modified Romberg test where Steidl estimated 30
seconds passing in 11 seconds; on Steidl’s failing the walk-and-turn test; and on the fact
that, during the finger- to-nose test, Steidl’s eyes tremored and he missed his nose. The
district court also remarked about other conduct while driving, including Steidl’s failure to
stop promptly, his moving around in the cab, and his changing lanes after Deputy Sammons
activated his emergency lights . It also referenced his inability to follow instructions to
complete the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and his elevated pulse. All these findings are
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supported by testimony in the record, and, cumulatively, they support the district court’s
finding of impairment under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Steidl’s contention that the field sobriety tests
cannot support the impairment finding because his learning disabilities prevented him from
following instructions and his coordination skills prevented him from adequately
performing the walk-and-turn and finger-to-nose tests. Nor are we persuaded by his related
assertion that his non-impairing use of his prescription drugs accounts for his pupil dilation,
eyelid tremors, rapid movement, and elevated pulse. It is true that Deputy Sammons
acknowledged that he did not know whether Steidl could ordinarily perform some of the
coordination tests. And it is likewise true that the pharmacist said that Vyvanse can increase
alertness, dilate pupils, and “do those types of things that amphetamines do.” But we
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, id. at 221, and other
circumstances support the determination that Steidl’s impairment, rather than his condition
or non-impairing medication use, explains his behavior. For example, Deputy Sammons
observed that Steidl used his left hand to attempt the finger-to -nose test rather than his
right, as instructed, and he admonished himself without the deputy’s input, indicating that
he had understood but failed to follow the instruction. And the Romberg test is not based
on coordination. The deputy testified that Steidl’s mannerisms in court were noticeably
reduced from the fidgety behavior he observed the night of the traffic stop. And the district
court was aware of and accounted for Steidl’s disabilities, finding that they may explain
“some of” his behavior or responses. The record supports the district court’s finding that
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Steidl’s conduct during the field sobriety tests resulted from his impairment rather than his
medical issues.
This is no easy case. We are not unsympathetic to Steidl’s circumstances. But we
cannot reweigh the evidence on appeal, and we extend significant discretion to the district
court’s fact findings on circumstances that might reasonably support a different result. See
id. at 221–22.
Public Policy
Steidl argues that the policy behind the prescription-drug defense seeks to protect
people in his situation and, despite its impairment caveat, should result in our reversing the
district court ’s decision. But the judicial role in our separat ed-powers system does not
include legislating from the bench and reading words into or out of a statute. See Martinco
v. Hastings, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn. 1963); Minn. Const. art. III, § 1. The legislature
asks that, for unambiguous statutes, “the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under
the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024); State v. Bradley, 4 N.W.3d
105, 113 (Minn. 2024) . Steidl’s policy argument essentially asks us to apply the spirit of
section 171.177, subdivision 12(h), over its plain language. This we will not do.
Affirmed.