Daniella Marie Chavez, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1875

Daniella Marie Chavez,
Respondent,

vs.

Fei Zhan,
Appellant.

Filed August 18, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-HA-CV-24-823

Daniella Marie Chavez, Bloomington, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Charles S. Clas Jr., Wilson & Clas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and
Kirk, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Daniella Marie Chavez petitioned the district court for a harassment restraining
order (HRO) against her next-door neighbor, Fei Zhan. After an evidentiary hearing, the
district court found that Zhan engaged in harassment and issued an HRO. We conclude

∗Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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that the evidence supports the district court’s finding of harassment and that the district
court did not err by issuing the HRO. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In August 2024, Chavez and Zhan were next-door neighbors in a condominium
building in the city of Bloomington. Chavez petitioned the district court for an HRO
against Zhan, alleging multiple incidents of harassment at their places of residence. The
district court issued an ex parte temporary HRO the next day. Zhan requested a hearing
on the petition. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing in October 2024.
Chavez and Zhan were the only witnesses. Chavez was self-represented; Zhan was
represented by an attorney.
After the hearing, the district court filed a four-page order. The district court found
that Zhan engaged in harassment in two ways. First, the district court found that Zhan “hit
[Chavez] in the leg with a bag of garbage while [Chavez] was wearing a post-surgery
walking boot.” Second, the district court found that Zhan “continued to run the garbage
disposal for hours after being informed that doing so was causing a backup of sewage into
[Chavez’s] condominium.” (Emphasis in original.) The district court issued an HRO,
which, for a period of one year, generally forbids Zhan from contacting Chavez and
specifically forbids Zhan from “touching any of [Chavez’s] property,” “looking into
[Chavez’s] windows,” or “following and/or recording [Chavez].”
Zhan appeals. Chavez did not file a responsive brief. Regardless, it is this court’s
duty to apply the law to the facts of the case and determine the appeal on the merits. See
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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DECISION
We begin by identifying the applicable law, which provides the framework for
Zhan’s arguments.
A district court may issue an HRO to require a person “ to cease or avoid the
harassment of another person” or “to have no contact with another person” if the court
finds “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in
harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a), (b)(3) (2024). “Harassment,” for purposes
of an HRO, is defined by statute primarily to include
[1] a single incident of physical or sexual assault . . . , [2] a
single incident of nonconsensual dissemination of private
sexual images . . . , or [3] repeated incidents of intrusive or
unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial
adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse
effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless
of the relationship between the actor and the intended target.
Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2024). If a district court finds that a person has engaged in harassment,
the district court “may issue” an HRO. Id., subd. 5(b); see also Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk,
668 N.W.2d 235, 242 n.5 (Minn. App. 2003) (reasoning that “may” is permissive), rev.
denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district court’s findings of
fact concerning a petitioner’s allegations of harassment, Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d
841, 843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004), a de novo standard of
review to a district court’s conclusions of law, Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761
(Minn. App. 2008), and an abuse-of -discretion standard of review to a district court’s
decision to issue an HRO based on a finding that a person has engaged in harassment,
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Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.W.3d 331, 338-39 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17,
2024).
Zhan’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred by finding that
she engaged in harassment. Her argument has three parts. First, Zhan argues that the
evidence of the first incident identified by the district court (the garbage-bag incident) is
insufficient to prove that she engaged in a “physical assault.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.748,
subd. 1(a)(1). Second, Zhan argues that the evidence of the second incident identified by
the district court (the garbage-disposal incident) is insufficient to prove that Zhan’s conduct
had “a substantial adverse effect” on Chavez’s “privacy.” See id. Third, Zhan argues that,
assuming the garbage- bag incident was not a “physical assault,” the garbage -disposal
incident alone is insufficient to support a finding of harassment because it is only a single
incident, not one of multiple “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or
gestures.” See id.
A.
We will first analyze the second part of Zhan’s argument, that the garbage-disposal
incident did not have “a substantial adverse effect” on Chavez’s “privacy.” See id.
The district court acknowledged that “the use of the garbage disposal would not,
under ordinary circumstances, be harassment.” But the district court explained that “the
unique facts of this case show that [Zhan] ran it for hours as a way to annoy [Chavez].”
(Emphasis in original.)
Zhan contends that there is insufficient evidence of “the effect” of her use of her
garbage disposal. She recognizes that her use of her garbage disposal caused “flooding”
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in Chavez’s unit, b ut she asserts that “there was no further description as to how this
affected” Chavez.
Chavez testified that her unit and Zhan’s unit share plumbing. Chavez also testified
that “when [Zhan] clogs her toilet, it doesn’t come out on her end, it comes out on my end.”
Similarly, Chavez testified that “when [Zhan] uses her garbage disposal, it doesn’t come
out on her end, it comes out my sink and . . . out my walls in my kitchen.” Chavez further
testified that she sometimes knocked on Zhan’s door to tell her what was happening in her
unit and to ask Zhan to stop using her garbage disposal but that Zhan responded by calling
the police to complain about Chavez. Chavez testified that, on one such occasion, Zhan
responded by using her garbage disposal “for three hours.” Chavez described the situation
as “a nightmare.”
This evidence indicates that Zhan’s act caused a very unpleasant experience inside
Chavez’s unit. The evidence allows an inference that Zhan’s use of her garbage disposal
interfered with Chavez’s use and enjoyment of her home and, thus, her privacy. See Kush,
683 N.W.2d at 843-46 ( affirming finding of harassment based on respondent’s posting
signs on petitioner’s property and making hostile and threatening oral statements on
petitioner’s property); Cambronne v. Chapp, No. A22-1492, 2023 WL 3445023, at *1-3
(Minn. App. May 15, 2023) (affirming finding of harassment based on respondent’s
posting signs near petitioner’s home encouraging motorists to honk); Anderson v. Weber,
No. A17-0202, 2017 WL 5243537, at *3-4 (Minn. App. Nov. 13, 2017) (affirming finding
of harassment based on, among other things, respondent’s spreading of animal remains on
property line between parties’ properties); Janecek v. Rosenthal, No. A16-1885, 2017 WL
6
2535728, at *3-4 (Minn. App. June 12, 2017) (concluding that petitioner alleged
cognizable claim of harassment based on respondent’s installation of video cameras
pointed toward private areas of petitioner’s home); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c) (providing that nonprecedential opinions are “not binding authority” but “may
be cited as persuasive authority”). Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to prove that
Zhan’s act had a substantial adverse effect on Chavez’s privacy.
B.
We continue by considering the first and third parts of Zhan’s argument, that the
garbage-bag incident was not a “physical assault” and that the garbage-disposal incident,
by itself, is only a single incident of an intrusive or unwanted non-physical act, word, or
gesture. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1).
The district court did not determine whether the garbage-bag incident constituted a
“physical assault.” The district court reasoned as follows: “Whether the Court considers
the garbage-bag incident an act of assault or an unwanted act having a substantial adverse
effect on [Chavez’s] safety, security, or privacy, the result is the same: the Court finds
[Zhan] harassed [Chavez].”
The district court’s reasoning is consistent with the statute, which allows for
alternative means of proving harassment. Under the statutory definition, harassment may
be found if a respondent engaged in either “a single incident of physical . . . assault” or
“repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial
adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security,
or privacy of another.” Id.; see also Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 762-66.
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Given our conclusion that the garbage-disposal incident had a substantial adverse
effect on Chavez’s privacy, see supra part A, it is immaterial whether the evidence is
sufficient to prove that the garbage-bag incident is a “physical assault.” If the garbage-bag
incident is a “physical assault,” it would be an independent basis for a finding of harassment
under the first part of the statutory definition. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1).
And if the garbage-bag incident is not a “physical assault,” it could support a finding of
harassment under the third part of the statutory definition because it would, in combination
with the garbage-disposal incident, be one of two “repeated incidents of intrusive or
unwanted acts, words, or gestures.” See id. Zhan does not dispute that the garbage-bag
incident occurred. And Zhan does not argue that the garbage-bag incident did not have a
substantial adverse effect on Chavez’s safety, security, or privacy. One way or another,
the evidence supports the district court’s finding of harassment.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that Zhan engaged in
harassment. In light of that finding, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting
Chavez’s petition and issuing the HRO.
Before concluding, we note that Zhan also argues that the district court erred by not
providing a translator at the hearing. Zhan admits that she did not ask the district court for
a translator and that the issue is being raised for the first time on appeal. “It is an elementary
principle of appellate procedure that a party may not raise an issue or argument for the first
time on appeal and thereby seek appellate relief on an issue that was not litigated in the
district court.” Doe 175 by Doe 175 v. Columbia Heights Sch. Dist., ISD No. 13, 842
N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
8
1988)). “[I]f an appellant fails to preserve an argument or issue in district court
proceedings, the issue or argument is forfeited and may not be asserted in an appellate
court.” Id. at 43. Forfeiture is especially appropriate in the circumstances of this case
because, as Zhan acknowledges in her brief, the need for a translator is best determined by
a judge in a district court courtroom, who can best perceive a witness’s or a party’s ability
to communicate. Because Zhan did not preserve this issue by raising it in the district court,
we will not address it for the first time on appeal.
Affirmed.